- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Nuclear Physics Study Group
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to>: > On a completely unrelated note, is there some interest in starting up a > "Cypherpunks Nuclear Physics Study Group"? I recently finished reading > "The Curve of Binding Energy". Fascinating book. Is this really unrelated or does it represent growing ambition by the cypherpunks shooting club ? Will you be asking for anonymous donations of SNM ? I could be interested, but not in the manner of the above 2 sentences. A Nym To Be Generated Later

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Big Brother Is Watching ATMs
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I just heard that a bank card company has just released a program for using photos of the iris in people's eyes as a biometric ID to replace people's PIN codes for ATM / credit cards. What I found really interesting is how they plan to implement it. As people use the ATM, they are photographed. (Every ATM has a security camera.) Over time, as people use the ATM, the security camera images are composited to produce a high-quality image of their irises, which is coded and placed in their account information. Once this is accomplished, when a card is inserted into the ATM and the security camera gets an iris image that matches the account sufficiently closely, the user can conduct transactions without entering the PIN code. People affected by this will merely receive a letter that under certain circumstances, entering the PIN is no longer necessary, but this is not a security problem. This scenario may not be a security problem, but it certainly poses a privacy problem. Given the frequency that the average Joe Sixpack uses the ATM, it is only a matter of time before the government mandates a nationwide eyeprint ID database to catch ATM and credit card theives, money launderers, tax cheats, and other undesirables. Perhaps the eyeprint could even replace or supplement the SSN as the unique taxpayer ID key for tax and other purposes. Of course, given the fact that ATMs have had cameras from the start, this theoretical eyeprint database could already be under construction. How's that for paranoia? >:-( Of course, there are a few ways to beat this, such as mirror sunglasses, (which would only be useful while alternative credentials to eyeprint ID are still available) and contact lenses, (which would have to be carefully oriented so that the same side of the lens was always up, or the fact that you are wearing contacts and are therefore a Suspicious Person would become obvious to the system) and of course intraocular implants of various types. Of course if the implant's power-on LED gives your eyes a constant Satanic red glow, you may be flagged as a Suspicious Person anyway. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNIJMc8JF0kXqpw3MEQJEiACdH+0zupstOe2EK3nO+xkF6nY4SOsAnAuO d/cf2DBRj3tiSUHgBaQHOgq9 =LxX3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jonathan Wienke PGP Key Fingerprints: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams "Stupidity is the one arena of of human achievement where most people fulfill their potential." -- Jonathan Wienke Never sign a contract that contains the phrase "first-born child." RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: PGP / Outlook Express Plugin Problem
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rip van Seaberg writes: > Anyone care to speculate irresponsibly about what PGP is up to, what > with dropping the 2.6 command line in favor of a handful of plugins? > Did they get paid to integrate PGP support in Eudora and Communicator > and make integration unavailable to competing tools? Are they hoping to > sell piles of US$12k+ SDKs? Is there any other plausible reason they > would want to break every tool and script that shells to PGP? Since the introduction of PGP in 1991 there have been changes in the way people use computers. Instead of typing clumsy command lines like "pgp -s -a -e -t -f" to perform operations, computer users today use a "mouse", a small device about the size of a pack of cards which is connected to the computer by a long "tail" (hence the name). By moving the mouse they are able to move an indicator on the screen called a "cursor". They point the cursor at "icons", small pictures which represent the operations they want to perform. Clicking buttons on the mouse allows them to manipulate data in a much more intuitive way. Old command line programs were accessible only to a small fraction of potential computer users. The new mouse based graphical computers open the world of computing to a much wider base of users. PGP plugins allows mail to be encrypted or decrypted with a single click of a mouse button. This is a far cry from the clumsy command lines of the past. Tune in next week to find out how your trusty floppy disks may soon be replaced by Compact Disk Read Only Memory devices.

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If it saves the life of one non-Iraqian child...
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ya gotta love that Saddam, eh? Allowing the press to do a photoshoot of all those children who don't seem to be the child everyone is desparately trying to save by taking away our basic human rights and freedoms... I loved watching the western newswoman on TV yesterday, trying to explain to the local citizens how the US embargo that was resulting in the deaths of their children was all Saddam's fault. (Although I must have missed the part where she explained Saddam's authority to set US foreign policy.) I think we should immediately drop-ship a few thousand baby T-shirts to Iraq that have "I am not _the_ child!" stenciled on them, so that Americans watching at home don't mistake the starving Iraqian children for the one that we are saving by allowing our government to monitor and oppress us. Next time you pay your taxes, try to remember that you are just following orders...Saddam is evil...those are not _the_ child...you are only doing what is required by law...Saddam is responsible...you are just obeying the law...you are just following orders...you don't put them in the ovens, you just pay for the ovens...you don't turn on the gas, you just pay for the gas...you are just following orders... TruthMonger

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Kashpureff stuff online
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CBC has put together a short (7 mins or so) news piece on the Kashpureff/Alternic situation - it's available via RealVideo (which seems to run reasonably over my 28.8 modem at home) at <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/undercurrents/tv/week09/fugitive.ram>. They've also made an image of his US arrest warrant and the criminal complaint filed in the US district court (ED NY, 97-1343M) available at <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/undercurrents/stories/internic/warrant.html>. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Subject: Re: Pasting in From: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sender: Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> Robert Costner says: > It seems to me that the purpose of a remailer is to strip the headers, > including the FROM header, not to put in fake headers. Until someone can > explain it to me, I'd consider the idea of adding a FROM header to > anonymous mail to be asinine. The purpose of a remailer is to allow the sender to be anonymous, so it strips real headers to prevent accidents (eg. subject fields organization etc). Then it has to allow you to put headers back in otherwise you can't interoperate with software. Eg pasting in References:, Subject: (I would like to see Cc: and Bcc: being allowed to be pasted in also). I would also like to see From: pasted in. In fact I can see no purpose to restrict what can be pasted in, other than to reduce complaints to the remailer operator possibly. > Best I can tell, the only reasonable good purpose for this is to create a > persistent nym identity without a reply to capability. Well, remailer > software cannot support everything I suppose. (Even if Cracker may > apparently support this) It's easy enough to allow From:. I do it myself sometimes, and notice Nerthus does also, pasting in From fields works at least with Replay as the exit node, but that results in two From fields. My software shows be all headers. I am not sure what other software would do, probably, only display the first From field (the remailers). I would have thought remailers are not actually trying to advertise their From fields. Perhaps allowing bogus From fields, or even putting in remailer(a)dev.null if there is not a From field would greatly reduce complaints from clueless users. If you want to you can always put in Sender: remailer(a)anon.efga.org. > I would think the best way to put in a persistent nym capability would be > to database the PGP key id's along with the persistent identity. Then the > remailer could produce lines like > > From: "Monty Cantsin" <anon(a)anon.efga.org> That'd do. However you'll notice that my address is: Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> which means that I would like it to be pasted in as it is replyable (for encrypted mail) even though not being a nymserver account. > Persistent identities would be created by sending a signed PGP message that > includes both the PGP public key and the persistent identity. Since the > identity server would not database email addresses, only PGP key id's, and > only work for signed messages, there should be no problem with people > worrying about the remailer being compromised. This also keeps someone > from stealing another's reputation capital. Not sure that the assurance is this strong. However the feature would be useful. Amad3us -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 6.6.6 iQCVAwUBNIKq4PKMuKFNFivhAQGvpwP9HnkWew9lSzQ5cj70UehLkopbLJr7YFSq S5ZJzPp2KuYqVpjs7Lyagg0WtFyX9UUFFCXuWemhjJNLAmqQP7fkAnxs1Epq4LTj cd+qn3Y58EQlyQAlFwF/l7bUedWVwcxIkVmR5PxkwG3LTMzYHGLSIuhF6gqanSv0 EyjvkXIw/as= =fbA1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Conservative groups call for new Net "code of conduct"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sitting in the National Press Club, in front of a dozen television cameras, where a conservative press conference on Kids and the Net is starting. Groups like the Family Research Council and the Christian Coalition are complaining that the Internet industry isn't doing enough to label, filter, and rate the Net and is instead looking to "make a few quick bucks." What prompted this event is a two-day summit about to start here in Washington, DC, where high tech firms are joining senior administration officials. The industry's goal: to head off the sequel to the Communications Decency Act. Sen. Dan Coats (R-Indiana), the bill's chief sponsor, is here today. "It has only been the threat of government involvment that has prompted this industry to take any steps at all," he's saying. "There is a dark side to the Internet. That dark side brings unrestrained, unrestricted pornographic material into every home, every library, every school." Now Karen Jo Gounaud is blasting the American Library Association for the unlikely offense of condoning bestiality. "Parents cannot being to handle these problems alone. It's a village problem and it demands a village solution," she says. The solution, these groups say, is to pressure Internet providers to adopt their "Code of Ethical Conduct." It says: "Will adopt terms-of-service policies stating that it reserves the right to take action in good faith to restrict availability of material that it considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected." Among other things, the code calls for Usenet filtering and "parental controls as the default settings" for minors. In a few hours (in the same room, in fact), civil liberties and journalism groups are going to be arguing against "mandatory voluntary" rating systems and pointing out their flaws. This leaves the White House precisely where it wants to be: squarely in the middle. More on this later. -Declan

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Re: FC: Revolution and the limits of free speech online
by Mike Godwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The proper test is not the Yates test, but the test of Brandenburg v. U.S. (1969, I believe), which distinguishes between mere advocacy of violence and "incitement to imminent lawless action" that is "likely to result in such action." Brandenburg is the leading case. Under Brandenburg, Tim May or anyone else could call for violent revolution (or for the commission of other violent acts) and the speech is understood to be protected. Only an incitement to *imminent* (that is, immediate) violent action, where such incitement is likely to cause an unreflective response, is punishable. The facts of Brandenburg concern a speech given at a KKK rally in which the speaker called for a race war and "revengeance" against non-whites. The speech was deemed to be protected by the First Amendment. The decision was authored by Justice Hugo Black. Mike >---- > >Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 00:45:48 -0500 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >Subject: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? > >So I've been reading "Freedom and the Court" by Henry Abraham, and a >passage in it made me think of Tim May and the cypherpunks list: > > "//Actual, overt// incitement of the overthrow of the government > of the United States by force and violence, accompanied by the > language of direct and imminent incitement, is not freedom of > expression but a violation of Court-upheld legislative > proscriptions; yet the //theoretical// advocacy of such > overthrow, on the other hand, has been a judicially recognized > protected freedom since 1957." [See Yates v. United States, 354 > U.S. 298 (1957), particularly Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for > the 6:1 court.] (Emphasis in the original. --DM) > >Some civil liberties lawyers, incidentally, have told me that Internet >messages almost by definition are probably not "direct and imminent >incitement." > >Some excerpts from Yates v. United States: > >http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=US&vol=354&p… >2 >9 > The essential distinction [354 U.S. 298, 325] is that those to whom > the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or > in the future, rather than merely to believe in something. [...] > > Instances of speech that could be considered to amount to "advocacy > of action" are so few and far between as to be almost completely > overshadowed by the hundreds of instances in the record in which > overthrow, if mentioned at all, occurs in the course of doctrinal > disputation so remote from action as to be almost wholly lacking > in probative value. Vague references to "revolutionary" or > "militant" action of an unspecified character, which are found > in the evidence, might in addition be given too great weight by > the jury in the absence of more precise instructions. > Particularly in light of this record, we must regard the trial > court's charge in this respect as furnishing wholly inadequate > guidance to the jury on this central point in the case. We cannot > allow a conviction to stand on such "an equivocal direction to > the jury on a basic issue." > >-Declan > > >Date: Fri, 28 Nov 1997 07:25:01 -0500 >To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> >Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? > >At 12:45 AM 11/28/97 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >>So I've been reading "Freedom and the Court" by Henry Abraham, and a >>passage in it made me think of Tim May and the cypherpunks list: > >There is no crime called "advocating revolution" or even >"revolution." The crime that is being discussed in such cases is >"sedition." > >Any US Attorney will tell you that sedition convictions are hard to >win because of the difficulty proving that the defendant actually >tried to do so in a realistic way. Tough. > >The trial of a group of isolationists during WWII and some white >supremacists a few years ago resulted in acquittals. > >DCF > > > >Date: Sat, 29 Nov 1997 22:33:10 -0800 >To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> >Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? > >At 12:45 AM 11/28/1997 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: >> "//Actual, overt// incitement of the overthrow of the government >> of the United States by force and violence, accompanied by the >> language of direct and imminent incitement, is not freedom of >> expression but a violation of Court-upheld legislative >> proscriptions; yet the //theoretical// advocacy of such >> overthrow, on the other hand, has been a judicially recognized >> protected freedom since 1957." [See Yates v. United States, 354 >> U.S. 298 (1957), particularly Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for >> the 6:1 court.] (Emphasis in the original. --DM) >> >>http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=US&vol=354&p… >>=2 >Actually, the linewrap munged the "page=298" at the end, leaving a >reference is Reid vs. Covert, another fascinating case, >dealing with the limits on US jurisdiction on citizens outside the 48 states, >in particarticular military jurisdiction and territorial jurisdictions >(including pointers to the cases about confiscation of Mormon Church property >during the Defense Of Marriage\\\\\\\\\\\anti-polygamy legislation.) > >Yates, a case about the legalization of Communism, is at >http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=US&vol=354&p… >2 >98 . >While the primary opinion of the court was as above, the court >unfortunately stopped short of the blazingly absolutist defense of free speech >by Justice Hugo Black (joined by Douglas), in an opinion that partially >concurs and partially dissents, and is therefore only dicta. > "I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish people > for talking about public affairs, whether or not such discussion > incites to action, legal or illegal." ...... > >It was either this case or cases like it that spurred the >John Birch Society to their calls for impeaching Earl Warren, >even before that pinko compounded his anti-Americanism by >insisting that cops read people their rights and get search warrants. > >As for the case of May vs. Reno, 99 US 666 (1999) (:-), I've never >heard Tim call for the violent overthrow of the US government. >He's called for a far more dangerous method of getting rid of it >(rendering it obsolete and letting the public catch on at their own speed), >and he's also expressed the position that if a bunch of >black-hooded thugs invade his house some night he'll defend himself >first and not worry about checking their bodies for stinkin' badges >or designer logos on their backs until the bullets stop flying. > >Not guilty. > > > Thanks! > Bill > > > >Date: Sat, 29 Nov 1997 23:04:58 -0700 >To: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com>, Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com>, > cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> >Subject: Re: Is Tim May guilty of illegally advocating revolution? > >At 11:33 PM -0700 11/29/97, Bill Stewart wrote: > >>As for the case of May vs. Reno, 99 US 666 (1999) (:-), I've never >>heard Tim call for the violent overthrow of the US government. >>He's called for a far more dangerous method of getting rid of it >>(rendering it obsolete and letting the public catch on at their own speed), >>and he's also expressed the position that if a bunch of >>black-hooded thugs invade his house some night he'll defend himself >>first and not worry about checking their bodies for stinkin' badges >>or designer logos on their backs until the bullets stop flying. >> >>Not guilty. > >An almost complete summary of my stance. > >But Bill left out the third leg of my tripod, that I expect to wake up some >morning and learn that some major city, perhaps Washington, D.C. has been >nuked or bugged. > >And, as I am fond of saying, I doubt I'll shed any tears. > >(Which got first twisted into "Tim wants to see D.C. nuked) (possibly >true), and then further mutated into "Tim is involved in a conspiracy to >help terrorists destroy major cities" (possibly true)). > >Fortunately for me, none of these legs of the tripod are (yet) illegal, >though I gather from what I saw of several of Hettinga's recent foamings >that he thinks they should be. > >--Tim May > > >The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments. >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >This list is public. To join fight-censorship-announce, send >"subscribe fight-censorship-announce" to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu. >More information is at http://www.eff.org/~declan/fc/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- We shot a law in _Reno_, just to watch it die. Mike Godwin, EFF Staff Counsel, is currently on leave from EFF, participating as a Research Fellow at the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center in New York City. He can be contacted at 212-317-6552. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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None
by Off-Topic.Header.Remailer＠sasknet.sk.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anon-To:

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