- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

CRYPTO ANARCHY/SOCIAL BODY
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Doug Cutrell offered some well thought out speculations on the social consequences of "crypto anarchy" in an essay he just posted to the list. I would like to respond to a few of his comments. Doug wrote: ... it is imperative that cypherpunks,... consider carefully what social impact these changes may have.... cypherpunks should examine ways to influence the deployment and patterns of use of strong crypto tools in society, and not merely consider the construction of the tools alone.... With all due respect, I think this has already been done by most Cypherpunks. We have looked at societal trends, seen problems, posited strong crypto as the solution to some of those problems and examined the consequences of strong crypto solutions. No one is writing code just to write code. The Cypherpunks list has always been ideologically driven. Though Cypherpunks cover the political spectrum, they have put aside sectarian differences to work towards the narrow ideology of personal privacy. At the same time, we have always thought about crypto "side effects." ... man is a social animal. We are evolved to survive through cooperative interactions with each other.... There are universal properties of interaction which create the social body in these species, and in all human societies throughout history. These properties depend fundamentally on the publicly visible nature of most social interactions.... Well, here I must disagree. While there is no disputing that man is a social animal, I find the last claim untenable. There are numerous historical forms of cooperative interaction that do not depend--"fundamentally" or otherwise--on a "publicly visible" interaction (e.g., postal mediated relationships, private clubs and other private relationships and most aspects of the market). Individual social animals exist in a relationship to the social body deriving from the visibility of their actions to others. This *defines* individuality.... While this is an interesting concept of individuality, it doesn't jive with any definition I've ever heard. If you were the only person on the planet, you would be just as much an "individual" (perhaps MORE so) than you are with 5.5 billion other folks blocking your view of the parade. ... Strong crypto -- the tools of crypto anarchy -- represents a break in these primal functions upon which the social body is based.... it is not only a first for human societies, but a first for all of biological evolution.... nodes -- "individuals" -- may appear and disappear over extremely short time periods, as anonymous identities come and go. All nodes may have any number of unknowable links, or links which are unknowable by arbitrarily large sections of the net. Links may have new properties, such as asymmetry of identity. Individual nodes may "unknowably" represent (equate with) entire collections of other nodes. The point is that the social structure is altered along dimensions that have been constant since the dawn of the evolution of social animals. Here is the crux of the matter. Doug obviously believes that crypto anarchy represents a paradigm shift or quantum leap in human interaction. I don't think so. every one of the "unique" properties Doug claimed existed for crypto anarchy already exists in the non-crypto society. I won't (unless asked) enumerate such analogs, but I will give two "clues" as an exercise for the student: John Paul Jones and Delaware corporations. [1] This picture implies the development of something radically different than what we now think of as a social body. [2] It is far more complex, with new types of basic components and operations. [3] There is no reason to expect it to resemble any society in the history of man, or to bear any resemblance to any social body which has evolved to date... [1] Only if the picture is correct, which has not been shown. [2] Granted, it is more complex, but really "new components" has yet to be demonstrated. [3] I most heartily disagree. Humans are conservative; when they make progress, it usually looks like an extension of what went before. (Ever notice how the first autos looked like buggies? Why do computer graphic interfaces use "desk" and "folder" metaphors?) There is *every* reason to expect crypto anarchy will resemble historical social models. ... For my purposes, desirable changes would include an increased standard of living for all humans, increased communications ... undesirable changes would include ... Crypto anarchy is coming whether we like it or not. With it, your hopes and fears are much more in your hands then they have ever been before. I hope we all use our super powers for good rather than evil. In any event, the cat is out of the bag. ... it seems that a reasonable approach would be to conduct computer simulations of the spontaneous forms of self organization that occur in populations participating under various game-theoretic and economic models, when these populations have access to strong crypto.... In my opinion (offered without a shred of proof), (1) it ain't gonna happen, (2) wouldn't work even if it did happen. In closing, I want to thank Doug for refocusing discussion of social implications in such organized and thoughtful way. I want to reiterate, this is not something that Cypherpunks have not thought about and discussed before. Nevertheless, it is always good to go over old ground if it can be done in a reasoned and comprehensive manner. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Thanks to Chris Hibbert for the clarification of his (her?) police stop scenario. The first impression would have constituted very bad advice for dealing with your friend, the policeman. In his second message, Chris wrote: ... you do have to give a name (and probably an address) when the police ask. Of course, it might be added that you have to give a *correct* name, address and whatever. In common law countries, such as the US and UK, this requirement might not be as unequivocal as one might think. What name would "John Wayne" (or "Bill Clinton" for that matter) have to give? Neither was born with those names. What if Paul Stubens(?) hadn't volunteered that he was "Pee Wee Herman" when he got busted for lewd conduct? Maybe he'd still be on TV in his Playhouse. ... When they do have probable cause, they can insist that you cooperate or allow a search. And if you don't cooperate, they can arrest you. "Probably cause" is not required for a police officers to make what is called a "field stop." The criterion for a field stop is "reasonable suspicion." During a field stop, an officer can hold on to you only as long as it takes to determine if there is probable cause to believe you have committed a crime (this could include checking to see if you have any wants or warrants). Incidental to the field stop, the officer is allowed to do a gross pat-down search of you and anything you are wearing or carrying. The purpose of this pat-down is solely to determine if you have weapons that would endanger the officer. They can't, for example, look inside an envelope (which might contain drugs), because it could not reasonably be expected to conceal a weapon such as a knife or gun. ... If you assume they always have the right to insist, you will spend more time talking to cops than you have to, and will let them dig deeper than they have a right to. The longer they poke around the better the chances they'll find something you thought of as innocent that they think is suspicious.... Amen, to that. When a cop asks if he can look in the trunk of your car, or take a look around your apartment, you can say "I'd rather not," and ask if you're free to go. **Remember that they have a gun** and the right to use it in some situations. Be polite. They'll let you know if they're insisting on your cooperation. Physical resistance is a very bad idea. But there's no need to let them look if they don't insist, and they are prohibiting from insisting if they don't have a legally justifiable reason. Dittos. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

Re: PRIVACY REGULATIONS
by No Taxes through No Government 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, physical resistance to authority is, more often than not, a bad idea, and hopefully most of us know why (even if you're right and even if you're being attacked, they're not above planting a gun/drugs/other thing on you to justify beating/killing you). But the Supreme Court has said, most emphatically, that there is no "requirement to identify oneself", regardless of whether an officer has probable cause to stop and question the individual. Brown v. Texas, 443 US 47 (1979). I'd repost the relevant excerpts from this great case again if I hadn't already posted it so many times to so many different fora. Suffice it to say, regardless of whatever else may be at issue, the "ruling establishment" (i.e., the highest legal authority in the country) has stated that there is no requirement to identify oneself. Just had to get that off my chest. We now return you to our regularly scheduled stuff.

1 0

"Packet Sniffers"
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is probably the wrong forum, but I also know that the quality of hte people here is ample to get my question answered. I am an undergraduate student at a state university in Minnesota. This summer as part of a long-term independent study I set up a Linux machine on the campus ethernet, get it assigned an IP, and then proceeded to do a practicum on system administration and information management. (This is also the same machine that briefly rand the digested version of the Cypherpunks mailing list). Following some departmental conflicts and (IMHO) illegal sanctions, the machine was shut down for some unspecified "security concerns". Essentially, it turns out, the computer science department didn't was this kind of independent project around. So I trundled across campus to another college, got the proper faculty behind me and submitted for the continuance of the project. After three weeks of jumping through the correct hoops and over the correct hurdles, there appears to be only one "concern" remaining. Some junior computer administrator has raised the concept of "packet sniffers" as being a suitable bar for my project (the machine is a 486/66 Linux machine). Unfortunately, I haven't a clue what exactly a "packet sniffer" is and am really not in a position to answer the arguments in even a semi-informed manner. Thus, I am posting here in the hope that one or more of you can take a moment to give me the lowdown on what these things are. Common sense seems to indicate that it is a piece of software or firmware that will display the contents of any packets that pass through the machine on its way to the correct destination. The specific setup would have the machine on a thinnet link in a lab with about 20 other PCs which are used primarily as word processors and terminals to the campus VAX or UNIX machines. The specific upstream setup is unknown, but I assume there is some kind of a line to a router upstream, eventually winding its way into the real world. It seems to me that a packet sniffer on the lowest link of the network wouldn't be able to look at those packets passing upstream because the router would never pass them down, but I could be just plain wrong and thats why I'm asking for some clarification. Thanks for your help. Sorry if this seems confusing. ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> I do not necessarily speak for the \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> City of Mankato or anyone else -=-=-=-=-=-=-=- (GEEK CODE 2.1) GJ/CM d- H-- s-:++>s-:+ g+ p? au+ a- w++ v* C++(++++) UL++++$ P+>++ L++$ 3- E---- N+++ K+++ W M+ V-- -po+(---)>$ Y++ t+ 5+++ j R+++$ G- tv+ b+ D+ B--- e+>++(*) u** h* f r-->+++ !n y++**

3 2

Re: RC4
by HALVORK＠sofus.hiof.no 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It occurs to me that if the code has not been posted to sci.crypt, then >some cypherpunks reader outside the US/Canada should do so. > >Bruce Ops... I never saw this original posting. Could somebody please re-post it? Please include RC4 in the Subject. - Halvor Kise jr. (from Norway (

2 1

RE: CONTROL FREAKS
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From 1) Samuel Kaplin & 2) Sandy Sandfort: The senario that I see, is [1] the borders being closed.... [2] All of the firearms and weapons being removed from private hands.... [3] The U.S. economy being isolated from the rest of the world.... [1] If they stopped foreign businesspeople and tourists, the economy suffers. Without Mexican "guest workers" the price of agricultural products go through the ceiling. The US can[not] afford to close its borders. [2] . . . Gun ownership is *growing* not declining. These folks are *serious* about keeping their weapons. . . . . [3] The US economy is broad, but not that broad. Without world trade (especially for petroleum) we would grind to a halt. . . . ...................................................................... ........... Although I can't see the US arriving at Samuel's scenario completely, neither can I prevent from seeing the threat which does rear its ugly head; the trend is towards the proposal & acceptance of more controls. It may not succeed 100%, but still there is an intervening time to consider during which the "legislators" attempt to accomplish just these things. 1) The suffering of the economy has not stopped the big G in the past from preventing "guest workers" or others from crossing the borders, or at least giving them & their US employers a hard time in the process. 2) Gun ownership may be increasing (among the "inner city youth" mostly, it appears sometimes), but nevertheless there are many other groups building up their campaigns against the possession of certain weapons and against "violence" per se. 3) There are always groups in govmt & private industry who wish for protection against the vicissitudes of world trade problems; if it were not for the efforts of those who constantly oppose them it is conceivable that the US could be closed to most areas of trade (even if only temporarily, until the pain becomes too great). It isn't conceivable that the US would ever become 100% isolated and totalitarian, but it is true that there are many people who would support such measures as would arrive at that stage eventually, if they could have their way. Sandy & others (including myself) may be able to reason that it wouldn't work to do such-and-such, because of the adverse consequences and because it wouldn't make economic sense, but it doesn't follow logically that the members of Congress & their supporters will also reason along the same lines. Unfortunately I am constantly reading in the news that just such restrictive, constraining ideas and interests are being proposed in Congress and applauded by private groups. I think that there may be a big tug-of-war between the growing contrasts in the political/philosophical inclinations of the citizenry of the US. The lines between them are becoming more clearly demarcated (to myself, anyway). (Oh - and of course, there will be a role in there, in between, for crypto, what with all the secret messages they will all want to send to each other.) Blanc

1 0

Re: Running PGP on Netcom
by SAMUEL.KAPLIN＠warehouse.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Running PGP on Netcom (an >> But keeping it on your home machine, the bad guys could break into your >> house, set up a keyboard monitoring program, and get it that way. Or if >> they wanted to, grab you and force you to reveal your key. It's highly doubtful that they could physically get to my computer without my knowledge. I service alarms for a living. I work for the company who monitors my alarm. I am the only person who knows the specs on my alarm. It would be pretty tough to conceal a court order to suspend the monitoring from me. Someone would tip me off. Plus the system will communicate with me via 2 other methods that no one knows about. Pretty doubtful. >> It's not black and white. There are degrees of security. I keep my >> encrypted secret key on dunx1, a UNIX box used by many other people. >> Anyone who has the ability to can either watch my keystrokes, probe throug >> memory to retrieve my key or message, or probably a few other things I >> haven't thought of. The benefit, though, of being able to decode messages >> as soon as I receive them, and being able to send encrypted messages when >> I'm not at home is major. For me at least, it's a fair trade-of I guess it depends on your level of paranoia or guilt. :) If I was just putzing around with the software, then I wouldn't be too concerned. If I was actually doing something illegal or confidential with the software then I would be greatly concerned. But under no circumstances would I consider that arrangement secure. If the cops nail this guy, he has no one to blame but himself. He hanged his own ass. >> There isn't anything I send right now that I would find particularly >> embarassing should it become public knowledge. If I did get into that >> situation, I'd probably create a second key pair for use only at home, and >> keep both in use. Then you have the possibility of people sending you secure messages on a compromised key. (The one on the Unix Box) In most cases, its not the technology that nails you, it's human error. Take for example the recent Tiffany's robbery. The police hadn't a clue who pulled it off. I heard statements of grudging praise from many members of the NYPD police department. It was very close to the perfect robbery. They received a tip from a citizen that someone was selling rings matching the description of the stolen merchandise on the street. They busted this individual and he sang. If they would have left the goods sit for a couple of years, they would have gotten away with it. Human stupidity compromised the whole operation. >> The bad guys will almost always be able to get your key. Even if they hav >> to get you to get it. The goal is to raise the difficulty such that they >> aren't willing to do it. This is probably true, but in most cases they won't have to take it from you. Somehow someone will screw up and hand it to them on a silver platter. Instead of John the Baptist's head, its yours! ;{ --BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthg== =M8Dh --END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== Processed by WILDUUCP! v1.00 for WILDCAT! ===========================================================================

1 0

Re: E.C.T.
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, I like the idea of running important social engineering experiments, like ECT, in cyber-simulations. It gives pretty realistic feedback. But Second, I worry about discovering clever ways to "charge" the play money for general internet services. This will condition people to accept paying in all kinds of novel ways for services that were once freely available. After that, the folks who are trying to figure out how to charge for internet use the way phone companies charge will find little resistance from the net users. Ken

1 0

Boulder, Colorado RMIUG Crypto-Fest 9/13 6:30pm
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What: Rocky Mountain Internet User's Group (RMIUG) Crypto-Fest When: Tuesday 13 September 1994 7:00pm-9:00pm, cookies at 6:30pm Where: NCAR (West end of Table Mesa Drive), Boulder, COLORADO Who: Philip Dubois (Philip Zimmermann's lawyer and a very nice guy) and Mike Johnson (alledged crypto expert, designer of the Diamond Encryption Algorithm, PGP beta tester, and PGP user). Sorry, Philip Zimmermann had a change of plans and will be at a conference in Atlanta. The show must go on! RMIUG "Crypto-Fest" A users approach to encryption with PGP (Pretty Good Privacy): I. A Very Short History of Cryptography A. Single Key Systems B. Two Key Systems (Public Key Cryptography) C. Hash Functions (MD4, MD4, SHA) D. What can be done with encryption? II. Current crypto applications III. PGP Building Blocks A. Public Key Algorithm (RSA) B. Hash function (MD5) C. Symmetric Key Algorithm (IDEA) D. Compression engine (Info-ZIP) E. ASCII armor engine F. Key database G. File formats IV. What can PGP do? What are its advantages? A. Privacy B. Authentication with nonrepudiation C. Compression (ZIP) D. ASCII armor C. Distributed Key Management (the Web of Trust) D. Inter-platform compatibility E. Wide availability F. Source code available (except for Viacrypt Digi-Sig) G. Ease of use (best around, but could be better) V. Who uses PGP? What do they use it for? VI. How do you use PGP? Read the fine manual. 2 books coming. A. Getting PGP B. Installing PGP C. Generate your key D. Distribute your public key E. Add keys from your correspondents E. Signing messages F. Encrypting messages (public key method) G. Conventional encryption pgp -c VII. History/development of PGP & Legal Issues A. Why did Philip Zimmermann write pgp? B. Legal Issues C. Version History VIII. What's happening now? A. Legal Actions & Status B. Political Action C. Future Development Plans There will be opportunities to ask questions of the two panelists during and after the presentation. ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLnUoSPX0zg8FAL9FAQE6nAQAmWpomcfCcWslktsuRYPNotY8kJFOwiuL BUrh5L/UbCnM8L9Gh36CF2PGjrwuxDLhlySc70yhAGpBuMijWryTk0mPcJVKDoDm 6Z9v+L0Xs4Ql2kTshYpiJg5DlUd7CKsuREN0r07xJUMybudUXM8NLUG9YGvDz4CX tIGH4nlDAS4= =Qedh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: "Packet Sniffers"
by Oluf Bagger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You should tell the staff at your campuss that a Linux box is no greater threat than any of those PC's used for word processing. A packet sniffer can hide itself as a resident program on a doze box and collect data into a data file. Such a program can be installed by any user on the doze box or even spread as a virus. On a Linux box only root programs have access to the ethernet driver. Any packet sniffer programs can therefore only be installed by root. On a Linux box you only allow access to known users and you have log files stating when users have logged in and out. If the machine have been abused in some way you can trace the problem using the log files. Best Regards, Oluf -------------------------------------------------------------------- Oluf Bagger, Eurochip DTU. tlf: +45 4593 3332 lok. 5722 fax: +45 4593 0216

1 0