- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

RE: Edupage 1/3/95
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some selected articles from Educom that may interest you... *************************************************************************** Edupage, a summary of news items on information technology, is provided three times each week as a service by Educom -- a Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities seeking to transform education through the use of information technology. *************************************************************************** CYBERPHOBICS GALORE A recent Gallup poll conducted for MCI shows almost half of the 600 white collar respondents admitting they are cyberphobic or resistant to new technology. More than a third do not use a computer at all, either at home or at work, and nearly 60% don't use voice mail. Two thirds do not use e-mail at work, and about the same number don't carry a pager. The most common reason cited for anti-technology attitudes was a fear of loss of privacy. Close runners up were worries over information overload and a fear of losing face-to-face contact with associates. (Miami Herald 1/2/95 p.22) MORE INTERNET FACTS Traffic on the NSFnet grew a whopping 110% in 1994, and the number of countries online increased from approximately 137 in 1993 to approximately 159 this past year. There were 1,964 phone calls to InterNIC Registration Services during November '94. For more facts, check out http://www.openmarket.com/info/internet-index/current-sources.html. (The Internet Index, Number 5) "GIVE US YOUR MONEY, BUT KEEP YOUR OPINIONS TO YOURSELF!" A survey of small business executives conducted for IBM by Roper Starch Worldwide shows 65% of the respondents saying that building the information highway is a good use of government funds, but only 3% think the government should have "a lot" of influence on how the highway operates. Forty-four percent felt the government should have no influence, and 49% said they thought it should have "some" say in how things were run. (Inc. Technology Premiere Issue p.19) THE WIRED REVOLUTION While saluting Wired magazine's worthy premise as a publication that addresses the social and cultural effects of digital technologies, the director of the 21st Century Project at the University of Texas blasts Wired for its "fevered, adolescent consumerism, its proud display of empty thoughts from a parade of smoke-shoveling celebrity pundits, its smug disengagement from the thorny problems facing postindustrial societies, and most annoyingly, its over-the-top narcissism. If this is the revolution, do we really want to be part of it?" (New Republic 1/9-16/95 p.19) ************************************************************************ EDUPAGE is what you've just finished reading. To subscribe to Edupage: send a message to: listproc(a)educom.edu and in the BODY of the message type: subscribe edupage Sidney Carlton (assuming that your name is Sidney Carlton; if it isn't, substitute your own name) ... To cancel subscription to Edupage: send a message to: listproc(a)educom.edu and in the BODY of the message type: unsubscribe edupage. ************************************************************************ Educom -- Transforming Education Through Information Technology ************************************************************************ Written by John Gehl & Suzanne Douglas. V: 404-371-1853. F: 404-371-8057 == Johnathan Corgan "Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent." jcorgan(a)scruznet.com -Isaac Asimov

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Where to Get PGP FAQ
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ===============================BEGIN SIGNED TEXT============================= WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 30 December 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Platform(s) | Latest Version | Distribution File Names | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | Viacrypt PGP 2.7 | disk sets | | Mac, Windows, | | | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | DOS, Unix, | MIT PGP 2.6.2 | pgp262.zip (DOS + docs) | | others | | pgp262s.zip (source) | | | | pg262s.zip source on CompuServe | | | | pgp262.tar.gz (source) | | | | pgp262.gz (same as above on DOS)| | | | pgp262.tar.Z (source) | | | | pgp262dc.zip (documentation) | | | | pg262d.zip (docs on CompuServe) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Macintosh | MIT PGP 2.6 | MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx (binary+docs) | | | | macpgp26.hqx (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx (source) | | | | macpgp26.src (same as above) | | | | MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx (binary)| | | | mcpgp268.hqx (same as above) | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Mac Applescript | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | MacPGP-2.6ui-v1.2.sit.hqx | | | + some beta versions| MacPGP2.6ui_V1.2_sources.cpt.hqx| | | based on MIT PGP | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2en.cpt.hqx | | | 2.6.2 | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2src.cpt.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6uiV1.2.68000.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6.2.beta.sea.hqx | | | | MacPGP2.6.2.beta.src.sea.hqx | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Amiga | PGP 2.6.2 Amiga 1.4 | pgp262-a14-000.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-020.lha | | | | pgp262-a14-src.lha | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Atari | Atari PGP 2.6ui | pgp26uib.lzh (binary, docs) | | | | pgp26uis.lzh | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Archimedes | Archimedes 2.3a | ArcPGP23a | |-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------------| | Non-USA version | PGP 2.6.i from | pgp26i.zip | | to avoid RSAREF | Stale Schumacher | pgp26is.zip | | license. | | pgp26is.tar.gz | |_________________|_____________________|_________________________________| WHERE CAN I LEARN ABOUT PGP? First, get a copy and read the instructions that come with it. There are also at least two books on PGP. I've read the following and think it is pretty good: Protect Your Privacy: A Guide for PGP Users William Stallings Prentice-Hall, ISBN 0-13-185596-4, $19.95, 300 pages is available at most technical bookstores and many general bookstores such as Barnes and Noble. If you order it from National Computer Security Association (74774.1326(a)compuserve.com) they will donate $1 of the price to Phil Zimmermann's legal defense fund. WHERE CAN I GET THE PGP VERSION DIRECTLY FROM PHILIP ZIMMERMANN? This is the MIT version. For several good reasons, Phil is releasing the main line freeware PGP through MIT, at net-dist.mit.edu. See a list of sites that also carry this version, below, or use this WWW URL: http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html WHAT IS PGP 2.6.i? Stale Schumacher <staalesc(a)ifi.uio.no> released an international version of PGP built the "right way." By "right way," I mean that it uses the latest MIT code, but uses a different rsaglue.c to use the mpilib instead of RSAREF for RSA calculations, thus including all the latest bug fixes and features in the main freeware PGP code line, but frees non-USA persons from the limitations of the RSAREF license. This release has been as strongly endorsed by Philip Zimmermann as he can do without incriminating himself. Naturally, by not using the RSAREF code for RSA calculations, this version is not legal for use in the USA (other than limited research, etc.), but is fine anywhere else (like Canada) were RSA patents don't hold. Note that the latest version of Stale Schumacher's PGP is 2.6.i, 2.6i (without the second .) was a beta test version that has been superceded. WHAT IS PGP 2.6ui? The "unofficial international" versions are really just PGP 2.3a, modified just enough to make it compatible with MIT PGP 2.6, but do not include all of the fixes in MIT PGP 2.6 and MIT PGP 2.6.1. They have a "ui" somewhere in their file names. I recommend the use of the "ui" versions only if you are using a platform for which there is no Viacrypt or MIT PGP that works properly. For a version that doesn't use RSAREF, PGP 2.6.i from Stale Schumacher is a better choice, because it is more up-to-date. WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial and government environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for Viacrypt PGP is 2.7. Here is a brief summary of Viacrypt's currently-available products: 1. ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS. Prices start at $99.98 2. ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX. Includes executables for the following platforms: SunOS 4.1.x (SPARC) IBM RS/6000 AIX HP 9000 Series 700/800 UX SCO 386/486 UNIX SGI IRIX AViiON DG-UX(88/OPEN) Prices start at $149.98 Executables for the following additional platforms are available upon request for an additional $30.00 charge. BSD 386 Ultrix MIPS DECstation 4.x 3. ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav. A special package for users of CompuServe. Prices start at $119.98 Please contact ViaCrypt for quantity discount pricing. Orders may be placed by calling 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 9033 N. 24th Avenue Suite 7 Phoenix AZ 85021-2847 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET THE FREEWARE PGP? These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Because this list changes frequently, I have not attempted to keep it complete, but there should be enough pointers to let you easily find PGP. There are several ways to get the freeware PGP: ftp, WWW, BBS, CompuServe, email ftp server, and sneakernet (ask a friend for a copy). Just don't ask Philip Zimmermann directly for a copy. FTP SITES IN NORTH AMERICA There are some wierd hoops to jump through, thanks to the U. S. Department of State, at many of these sites. This is apparently because the U. S. Department of State wants to make it easier for people outside of North America to develop, distribute, use, or sell strong cryptographic software than people inside of the USA and Canada -- at least that is the effect of their rules. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (see the above chart for names). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. You can also get PGP from: ftp.csn.net/mpj See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README.MPJ ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ ftp.csua.berkeley.edu (for U. S. or Canadian users) /pub/cypherpunks/pgp/ ftp.gibbon.com /pub/pgp/README ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/README WORLD WIDE WEB ACCESS http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp-form.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGPVersions.html http://www.mantis.co.uk/pgp/pgp.html http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/crypt.html http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ http://community.net/community/all/home/solano/sbaldwin http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~rknop/amiga_pgp26.html COMPUSERVE GO NCSAFORUM. Follow the instructions there to gain access to Library 12: Export Controlled. PGP may be other places, too. Compuserve file names are even more limited than DOS (6.3 instead of the already lame 8.3), so the file names to look for are PGP262.ZIP, PG262S.ZIP (source code), PGP262.GZ (Unix source code) and PG262D.ZIP (documentation only). BULLETIN BOARD SYSTEMS Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including ATBASH, DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, QUICRYPT, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, or if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. The Freedom Files BBS, DeLand Florida, USA 904-738-2691 Exec-Net, New York, NY, USA (Host BBS for the ILink net) 914-667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> CVRC BBS 317-791-9617 CyberGold BBS 601-582-5748 Self-Governor Information Resource, 915-587-7888, El Paso, Texas, USA In the UK, try 01273-688888 Other BBS -- check your local BBS. Chances are good that it has any release that is at least a month old if it has much of a file area at all. OTHER FTP SITES ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp This site has most, if not all, of the current PGP files. ftp.ox.ac.uk (163.1.2.4) /pub/crypto/pgp This is a well organized site with most of the current PGP files as well as shells and mailer scripts. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dc/dcosenza -- Some crypto stuff, sometimes includes PGP. ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) (Atari ST/E,TT,Falcon) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26uib.lzh (2.6ui ttp, 2.3a docs) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26uis.lzh (2.6ui sources) /pub/atari/misc/pgp/pgp26ui.diffs (Atari diffs for 2.6 sources) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) /pub/aminet/util/crypt qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) ftp.csua.berkeley.edu kauri.vuw.ac.nz nctuccca.edu.tw /PC/wuarchive/pgp/ ftp.fu-berlin.de:/mac/sys/init/MacPGP2.6uiV1.2en.cpt.hqx.gz Also, try an archie search for PGP. FTPMAIL For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. It works with messages something like this: > To: ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com > Subject: Ftpmail request > Connect ftp.csua.berkeley.edu > chdir pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp262 > uuencode > get pgp262.zip > quit Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send mail to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi with the word HELP. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. To get pgp 2.6.i by email: Send a message to hypnotech-request(a)ifi.uio.no with your request in the Subject: field. Subject What you will get GET pgp26i.zip MS-DOS executable (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.zip MS-DOS source code (uuencoded) GET pgp26is.tar.gz UNIX source code (uuencoded) For FAQ information, send e-mail to mail-server(a)rtfm.mit.edu with send usenet/news.answers/ftp-list/faq in the body of the message. MACPGP OPTIONS There are multiple parallel efforts to write an up-to-date MacPGP. See the following for the latest MacPGP beta stuff. Zbigniew Fiedorowicz <fiedorow(a)math.ohio-state.edu> has updated his MacPGP to support Apple events, and his distribution comes with complete source code. Grady's netcom directory contains a different version, about which he says "This latest bug release beta 1.23 fixes several relatively minor bugs. Source to this version is NOT available, so its use should be restricted to experimentation only." ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ ftp://ataxia.res.wpi.edu/pub/mac-pgp/README ftp://highway.alinc.com/pub/jordyn/mac-pgp/README ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/gr/grady/PGP/MacPGP262b1.23.seq.hqx.asc PGP FOR WINDOWS, WINDOWS NT, AND WINDOWS 95 There isn't one, yet, that I know of (at least not a true native Windows application). There are several good shells that call the DOS PGP for the actual work, though. I use Viacrypt's, but there are others available as shareware or freeware at most of the sites listed above for PGP itself. IS MY COPY OF PGP GOOD? If you find a version of the PGP package that does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. PGP should be signed by one of the developers (Philip Zimmermann, Jeff Schiller, Viacrypt, Stale Schumacher, etc.). If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. To be really sure, you should get PGP directly from MIT or check the signatures with a version of PGP that you trust. The copies of PGP on ftp.csn.net/mpj, ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj, and the Colorado Catacombs BBS are direct copies of the ones on MIT, except that the ones on the BBS include a BBS advertisement (automatically added by the system when it virus scans new files) in the outer .zip files. OTHER PGP DOCUMENTATION For more information on the "time bomb" in PGP, see ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/pgpbomb.asc More PGP details are at http://www.pegasus.esprit.ec.org/people/arne/pgp.html Windows shells documentation http://www.LCS.com/winpgp.html LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/language/pgp23_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/language/pgp23_japanese.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/language/pgp23_lithuanian.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/language/pgp26_russian.zip * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp/language/pgp23_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt MAILINGLISTE FUER PGP UND VERWANDTES (PGP MAILING LIST IN GERMAN) Die Listenadresse: pgp-friends(a)fiction.pb.owl.de Die *Request*adresse (fuer subscribe/unsubscribe und andere Administra- tiva): pgp-friends-request(a)fiction.pb.owl.de WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? For a detailed rant, get ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/cryptusa.zip The practical meaning, until the law is corrected to make sense, is that you are requested to get PGP from sites outside of the USA and Canada if you are outside of the USA and Canada. If you are in France, I understand that you aren't even supposed import it. Other countries may be worse. Make sure you follow the laws of your own country. If you want to officially export PGP, you may be able to get permission in limited cases and for a fee. Contact the U. S. Department of State for information. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN THE USA? MIT PGP is only for personal, noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of both the RSA algorithm (attached to RSAREF) and the IDEA algorithm. PKP/RSADSI insist that we use RSAREF instead of the mpi library for reasons that make sense to them. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use both the RSA and IDEA algorithms in commercial and corporate environments (as well as personal use, of course). Another restriction is due to an exclusive marketing agreement between Philip Zimmermann and Viacrypt that applies to the USA and Canada only. Viacrypt has exclusive rights to market PGP commercialy in this area of the world. This means that if you want to market PGP commercially in competition with Viacrypt in the USA or Canada, you would have to create a new implementation of the functions of PGP containing none of Philip Zimmermann's copyrighted code. You are free to modify existing PGP code for your own use, as long as you don't sell it. Phil would also appreciate your checking with him before you distribute any modified versions of PGP as freeware. "PGP", "Pretty Good Privacy" and "Phil's Pretty Good Software" are trademarks owned by Philip Zimmermann. This means that if you modify an older version of PGP that was issued under the copyleft license and distribute it without Phil's permission, you have to call it something else. This avoids confusing all of us and protects Phil's good name. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST IN CANADA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial use because of restrictions on the licensing of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented in Canada, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license associated with the RSAREF copyright, which is valid in Canada. For commercial use, use Viacrypt PGP, which is fully licensed to use the IDEA algorithm in commercial and corporate environments. The exclusive marketing agreement with Viacrypt also applies in Canada. See the section on USA intellectual property restrictions for more details. WHAT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESTRICTIONS EXIST OUTSIDE NORTH AMERICA? MIT PGP is only for noncommercial in areas where there is a patent on software implementations of the IDEA algorithm. Because the RSA algorithm isn't patented outside of the USA, you are free to use the mpi library instead of RSAREF, if you want to, thus freeing yourself of the RSAREF license restrictions. The RSAREF copyright holds outside of the USA, even though the RSA patent does not. The IDEA conventional block cipher is covered by US Patent 5,214,703 and European patent EP 0 482 154 B1. IDEA is a trademark of Ascom-Tech AG. Commercial users of IDEA (including commercial use of PGP) may obtain licensing details from Ph. Baumann, Ascom Tech Ltd., IDEA Lizenz, Postfach 151, CH-4502 Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel ++41 65 242828, Fax ++41 65 242847. WHAT IS COMMERCIAL USE? Use some common sense. If you are running a business and using PGP to protect credit card numbers sent to you electronically, then you are using PGP commercially. Your customers, however, need not buy the commercial version of PGP just to buy something from you, if that is the only commercial use they make of PGP (since they are spending, not making, money with PGP). If you are just encrypting love letters or other personal mail (for which you don't get paid) on your own personal computer, that is not commercial. If you are encrypting official business mail on your for-profit corporation's computer with PGP, that is commercial use. Note that there are some gray areas not covered above, and the patent owners of RSA and IDEA may differ from my interpretation in the areas not covered above, so if you are in doubt, you should consider the licensing of Viacrypt PGP (or outside of North America, direct licensing of IDEA) to be cheap legal insurance. Indeed, the license fee is probably a lot cheaper than a legal opinion from a lawyer qualified to make such a judgement. Note that I am not a lawyer and the above is not legal advise. Use it at your own risk. WHAT IS THE "TIME BOMB" IN MIT PGP 2.6? There was a version byte change in MIT PGP 2.6 as of 1 September 1994. See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/pgpbomb.asc for details. ARE MY KEYS COMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHER PGP VERSIONS? If your RSA key modulus length is less than or equal to 1024 bits (I don't recommend less, unless you have a really slow computer and little patience), and if your key was generated in the PKCS format, then it will work with any of the current PGP versions (MIT PGP 2.6, PGP 2.6ui, or Viacrypt PGP 2.7). If this is not the case, you really should generate a new key that qualifies. MIT PGP 2.6.2 should be able to use 2048 bit keys. Generation of 2048 bit keys is supposed to automatically be enabled in PGP 2.6.2 in December, 1994. By then, hopefully, most people will have had a chance to upgrade to a version of PGP that can use them, so longer keys won't be a big problem. On the other hand, 1024 bit keys are probably beyond the reach of most criminals and spies to break, anyway. MORE WORLD WIDE WEB URLs http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/pgp/pgp-mac-faq-hinely.html http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/pgp/pgp.html http://draco.centerline.com:8080/~franl/crypto/cryptography.html http://www.pegasus.esprit.ec.org/people/arne/pgp.html http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/crypt.html http://ibd.ar.com/PublicKeys.html http://www.ifi.uio.no/~staalesc/PGPversions.html WINDOWS SHELLS Several shells for running PGP with Microsoft Windows are available at the same places PGP can be found. MACPGP KIT The MacPGP kit is a user interface for the Mac version of PGP. See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qw/qwerty ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGP_icons.sit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkit.hqx ftp://duke.bwh.harvard.edu:/pub/adam/mcip/MacPGPkitSources.sit.hqx BUGS See the documentation that comes with PGP in the latest versions for bugs in the older versions. The latest versions of PGP may not fully wipe all traces of plain text from a file when given the -w option. For more information, see http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/warlord/pgp-faq.html BETSI - BELLCORE'S TRUSTED SOFTWARE INTEGRITY SYSTEM For information on this service, send mail to certify(a)bellcore.com with the subject help, or check http://info.bellcore.com/BETSI/betsi.html INTEGRATING PGP AND PINE Send blank e-mail to slutsky(a)lipschitz.sfasu.edu with Subject: mkpgp to get a c-shell script to interface PGP and Pine. Send a second message with Subject: addtomkpgplist if you want updates sent you automatically. HOW DO I PUBLISH MY PGP PUBLIC KEY? There are lots of ways. One way is to use a key server. Send mail to one of these addresses with the single word "help" in the subject line to find out how to use a key server. pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.mit.edu pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu public-key-server(a)pgp.ai.mit.edu pgp-public-keys(a)cs.tamu.edu pgp-public-keys(a)chao.sw.oz.au pgp-public-keys(a)jpunix.com pgp-public-keys(a)dsi.unimi.it pgp-public-keys(a)kiae.su pgp-public-keys(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de There is also an experimental public key server at http://ibd.ar.com/PublicKeys.html There is a commercial key certification and publication service, too. Send mail to info(a)Four11.com for information. You can also mail your key to pgp-public-keys(a)c2.org, and it will be posted to the subscribers of that mailing list, sent to the keyservers, and posted to alt.security.keydist. To subscribe to the mailing list, send a message to majordomo(a)c2.org with "subscribe pgp-public-keys" in the body of the message. Another way is to upload it to the PGP public keys area of the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-772-1062). Another way is to just send it to your correspondents. You could add it to your .plan file so that finger returns your key. You could add it to some of your postings. No matter which way you do it, you should have your key signed by someone who verifies that your key belongs to you, so that you don't have someone else generating a key that has your name on it, but that isn't yours. Here is my public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCNAi4PT2QAAAEEAPPCZnrshEJ9PSnV+mXEwjM4kzJF0kyg2MnLMzo83vWI40ei jogncqdkXT0c2TQWg+Bsu9ckFoXdId0utumYv0aqd8yI/oU/DwJ1zJrqRL2PFbxe ZLofHoKFjvq1TiNiJq9ps3jW6iYS4IU1SzyKhjmyE+K0+WyrPPX0zg8FAL9FAAUR tCdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajiJAJUCBRAu G3chZXmEuMepZt0BAZtAA/0Rw5mintlUDgHycNbeoyIiMHoLu8jWaCSaiGSt+dDU 1A/bUCo+gorv5TYxOClRf3XHjD6zSooWyUz3ehotrzPYLunhVOE2YBxPU+OvKFOc 37mcZrnXGBlF5NblnSYxp0186tGaTm7WMWx7NDlHT4GvhzHJQSOoo48ykDkKm/mk LIkAlQIFEC4PWbs/ZwY8hTPrxQEBKyMD/A7kv91C1ZZIRtkbC9k9lsWOgOnO8wG8 bGMajaco465Z5llWD+Y8QCMdSWcowtOBGfW0Wv1bZ1uebeCpg1L66pJ7C+BOExrk gPqRVCstLLiVerKGeSOZo3yXtxYKYX7mHQPrHp98ef7fUG4IiKS+S+znmGxpJwrV sHZRlhJ3hXUsiQCVAgUQLg9ZefX0zg8FAL9FAQFBTAQAh4u4Vun7WhPuL6fsXiXm paaGfeLtd3biRj/aOMAG1eHuhVdWejx71ormyKTdNB2YV56bpsE3JQ/KhBuYDo0N SkRnqeM2S+Ef7aZEg6Q44uXG52pqCZUldtCeYfOs3aLCR9SMlc6Y3zmpSwB1wKP0 5+tN9zruNYVKKBLWEIFAY7W0K01pY2hhZWwgUGF1bCBKb2huc29uIDxtLnAuam9o bnNvbkBpZWVlLm9yZz60IE1pY2hhZWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+ tChNaWtlIEpvaG5zb24gPDcxMzMxLjIzMzJAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+tCtNaWNo YWVsIFAuIEpvaG5zb24gPG1wam9obnNvQG55eC5jcy5kdS5lZHU+tC1EbyBub3Qg dXNlIGZvciBlbmNyeXB0aW9uIGFmdGVyIDI3IEp1bmUgMTk5Ni4= =rR4q - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Permission is granted to distribute unmodified copies of this FAQ. To get the latest version of this FAQ, get ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/getpgp.asc or send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com with the line SEND mp/mpj/getpgp.asc in the body of the message, or send blank mail to mpjohnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu. There are many other frequently asked questions. Most of them are covered in the documentation that comes with PGP or in one of the books about PGP. Send corrections to mpj(a)netcom.com. I regret that I lost some of the corrections people sent me on the last round of this FAQ, so if I missed yours, please send it again. Thanks. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mp/mpj/README -. --- ----- .... | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLwRpyvX0zg8FAL9FAQF57gQAoUHu3+YN+K4KsaJU3bOUgLAPhCzTAQId PRyhY96OjzTRVPmR0bLeZjBCnj4Z2VPirsURA2dIKiQwvCSO9/ODD/HBwty683AD sGWNPhPJ5i7Ik51EGC9xRn2aCbom9KhwXHQNpsB85hI+JRKaorNHlDO7H52FBGA+ Cvb1tro1Zpg= =aM1F -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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another factoring thing. . . .
by camp＠industrial.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey did anyone see the artical, some time ago in Science News (May 14, 1994) their was this artical on using a 'quantum computer'. Through the marvels of quantum mechanics it is theroretically possible to build a computer that would be really good at factoring large numbers such as the ones used in RSA. This combined with team sieving could possibly be used to signifigantly reduce the time required to factor a key. Any thougts, did anyone else see the artical, has there already been a really stimulating discusion that I missed? Well let me know. gemnis

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NYT on MEMS
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Malcolm Browne has longish article today on MEMS and current mathematical and engineering research on their use to control turbulence -- in planes, ships, submarines, blood, water, flatulence. For email copy send blank message with subject: MEM_tug

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bill alert...
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do you think this will force folks into using encryption? If I was a sysop, I sure would have all my users using encryption... :) -lile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lile Elam | "a brush in hand, a wisp of wind, she sighs lile(a)art.net | knowing that this will be the great one..." http://www.art.net | -lile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -> EMA ALERT <- News For and About the Members of the ELECTRONIC MESSAGING ASSOCIATION ============================================================ February 3, 1995 -- Number 18 <----------------------------------------------------------> ***** SPECIAL ALERT ***** - Congress to consider making all system operators liable for messaging content. Bill would force employers to monitor message content. ACTION NEEDED NOW! <----------------------------------------------------------> UNREASONABLE NETWORK POLICING PROPOSED Yesterday, Senator Jim Exon (D-NE) introduced S.314, the Communications Decency Act of 1995, in the United States Senate. In an effort to stamp out digital pornography, it makes all telecommunications providers doing business in the United States (from the telephone companies all the way down to offices that use LANs) liable for the content of anything sent over their networks. To avoid the possibility of tens of thousands of dollars in fines and up to two years in jail, business owners would be forced to police their networks and monitor in advance all messages sent over them. WITHOUT ACTION - COULD BE LAW IN MONTHS This bill is substantially the same as the one he put forward last year. He will offer it as an amendment to the pending telecommunications deregulation legislation in the U.S. Senate, which is expected to be enacted by July. Last year, his amendment was adopted even though many thought it hastily drafted and poorly thought out. Fortunately, the telecommunications deregulation legislation died. This year, a more conservative U.S. Congress may be even more reluctant to challenge a "morality" amendment; and its legislative vehicle, the telecommunications deregulation legislation, stands a much better chance of passage this year. ACTION NEEDED NOW Action by the business community is needed now. Please notify your corporate government affairs office and/or your legal counsel. This measure could be adopted as an amendment to the telecommunications bill IN A MATTER OF WEEKS (or potentially added to any legislation pending on the U.S. Senate floor), if business does not mobilize against it. S.314 will not stop digital pornography, but it could devastate the messaging business. If you are interested in further information or are able to participate in lobbying efforts over the next few weeks, contact Sarah Reardon at EMA (see below). ------------------------------------------------------------ EMA ALERT is published and copyrighted (1995) by the Electronic Messaging Association. Permission to reproduce and/or redistribute with attribution is hereby given to all EMA members. For more information about anything in EMA ALERT, contact EMA via e-mail - use either X.400 (S=info; O=ema; A=mci; C=us) or Internet (info(a)ema.org) address, facsimile (1-703-524-5558), or telephone (1-703-524-5550). Any EMA staff member can be addressed directly via e-mail by using, for X.400, G=<firstname>; S=<lastname>; O=ema; A=mci; C=us, and, for Internet, <firstinitial><lastname>@ema.org. EMA's postal address is 1655 N. Fort Myer Dr. #850, Arlington, VA 22209 USA. ------ End of Forwarded Message

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The NSA (Was Re: Factoring - State of the Art and Predictions )
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> writes: > On the other hand, the people in the black community have > the advantage that they can read anything that the open > community produces but not vice versa, and they have at > least a 15 year edge in knowledge about the design of > conventional systems, and who knows (we certainly have no > idea) how much of an edge in the modern cryptographic arena. Such a situation does not apply solely to the NSA. There are, for instance, secret lodges of French mystics who devote themselves to higher mathematics, absorb everything the open community produces, and rarely publish anything or draw attention to themselves. They solve problems, write secret manuscripts, put them on shelves, and have been doing this for centuries. Perhaps the ultimate factoring algorithm already exists within their walls. We would never know if it did, unless they chose to tell us. The NSA is very good at solving problems that require "acres of Crays". They are crack numerical analysts and algorithm designers. They also make nice block ciphers. I do not think, however, that they have deeply profound insights into the complexity of computation that exceed those of the University community, and certainly not by 15 years. > We don't know for sure if the NSA knew about Public Key > before the open community did. Certainly they knew of > differential cryptanalysis and similar techniques, and they > must know quite a lot that we don't. Rumour has it that the NSA nearly had a collective epileptic fit when they realized the implications of Public Key Cryptography. Yes, they did invent differential cryptanalysis and some other techniques before outsiders thought of them, but I'm unsure this implies some great cabal of hidden knowlege on their part. It is more likely a case of throwing research dollars at a problem which had not yet captured the interest of researchers outside the intelligence community. > Overall, I'd say that in the long run the open community is > going to catch up regardless of what the NSA likes. That > does not mean, however, that this is going to happen > particularly soon, or that they don't still know decades > more than we do. I think the NSA has lost its edge completely in the last decade, as cryptographic research in the open community has taken off. It is much the same sort of situation experienced by IBM, when they were slow to catch on to the paradigm shift created by distributed computing and workstations, and companies like Sun rose from nowhere to become major players. If the NSA were a corporation, they would be apologizing to their shareholders, restructuring, and trying to identify a market niche they could continue to be a player in. Since they are funded by government, we don't see them doing this, but it is absurd to suggest that they are still decades ahead of the rest of the world in basic research and technology. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: Our Ignorance....
by M00012＠kanga.stcloud.msus.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "L. McCarthy" <lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu> > ... > BTW, with an eye to avoiding rehashes of old flamewars, this does *not* > constitute an invitation to scour the subscriber list for *.gov and *.mil and > announce the results. Consult the archives if in doubt on this point. > > -L. Futplex McCarthy Even so, my guess is that 1/4 to 1/3 of the subscribers to this list are interested government employees--though the most interested are not using addresses with .gov or .mil. Mike o

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Re: The NSA (Was Re: Factoring - State of the Art and Predictions )
by aegis＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I think the NSA has lost its edge completely in the last decade, >as cryptographic research in the open community has taken off. It >is much the same sort of situation experienced by IBM, when they >were slow to catch on to the paradigm shift created by >distributed computing and workstations, and companies like Sun >rose from nowhere to become major players. > >If the NSA were a corporation, they would be apologizing to their >shareholders, restructuring, and trying to identify a market >niche they could continue to be a player in. Since they are >funded by government, we don't see them doing this, but it is >absurd to suggest that they are still decades ahead of the rest >of the world in basic research and technology. As a former civilian TS Clearance holder working for the government, I can tell you I was amazed at what a small percentage of classified material really deserves to be classified. 90% of what I saw could be categorized as 1)trival, 2)in the public domain already, or 3)politically embarrassing. For example, look at the long classified human radiation experiments just coming to light. The government certainly wasn't hidding that info from the Russians, they were hiding it from the voters. I remember once fighting for months to get access to some classified papers on the fracture characteristics of ceramics only to find them to contain nothing that hadn't been available in the public domain for 20 years. This of course has a lot to do with the strange sociology of government bureacracies where the combination of classified information with need-to-know restrictions create powerful petty-fiefdoms that lead to increased perks and prestige. The other thing to realize is that inside the bureacracies there's little in the way of the vigorous competion of ideas (primarily because of the manipulation of need-to-know restrictions) that characterizes academia. Bureaucracies tend to foster myopia and tunnel vision rather than risk taking and originality. My guess (and it's only that) is that if all of NSA's secrets were laid bare, maybe 10% of what they have would be truely unique and the other 90% would be surprisingly pedestrian. Dale H. ------------------------------------------------------------ Dale W. Harrison, president | TEL: (713) 682-0501 AEGIS Software Development, Inc. | FAX: (713) 623-0030 12 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1100 | aegis(a)netcom.com Houston, Texas 77046 | daleh(a)ix.netcom.com ------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: standards...
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Such programs should make use of encryption modules or >libraries, and should be able to easily adapt to new >modules as they become available. Hmmm. Did you come in late, or have you seen my posts about the crypto library I'm working on ("Hastur Crypto Toolkit," nee "GUCAPI")? > I. Public key encryption. > C. Not limited to one public encryption scheme. AFAIK, RSA is the only feasible PK scheme available. There's eliptic curves, of course, but that's patented. > II. Block Ciphers Needn't be block. Stream cipher works perfectly well for the "fast crypto" symetric cipher part. > A. Each block cipher has a committee assigned > identification number. Why a number? When you can choose between a number and a human-readable string (and space is not a big issue), choose human-readable. > B. Uses of random session key for encrypton for > non-public key encryption. > 1.) Random session key is encrypted with > hash of user supplied password. > 2.) Encrypted session key is appended to > ciphertext. Hmmm. If the session key is a hash of a password, then why on Earth would you include it? > C. Functrion/format standards for easier chaining > of multiple block ciphers in user interfaces > that implement these functions. > 1.) Minimize/mitigate/eliminate use of layer > headers that would serve as known plaintext. We shouldn't be using ciphers that are vulnerable to "known plaintext" attacks. RSA is known to be vulnerable to "chosen plaintext" attacks (see Schneier), but is useful enough that we work around this shortcoming by RSA encrypting only hashes and session keys. >III. Compression > A. Perhaps implemented in the same or similar format > used for block ciphers. Naturally. In fact, encoding, encryption, and compression are the same thing: mapping one set of numbers into another. >Of course, this requires _STANDARDS_. The cypherpunks are >the ideal people to define these standards (and start writing >such modules). If others are working on this, I'd like to get >a copy of the standards so that I can contribute some code, >otherwise I am willing to help draft the standards--although >the significance of my contributions might amount to an >occasional unoriginal idea. As far I know, there are two standards: the PKCS #11 document from RSADSI, which I do not care to follow if I can avoid it. The other is the IETF GSSAPI, which should be accomodated. In general, I very much agree with the thrust of what you're saying. Which is why I'm folding the crypto work I already have to do for my company into the larger "general solution" approach. If you haven't read my postings on GUCAPI/Hastur, please go back and take a look (send me mail if you'd like a copy). It very much sounds to me like you're addressing the same problem that I've been hacking full-time for the last month or so. If you're interested in helping, the best things that could possibly be provided is code released to the public domain that implements: - Good random number generators for Macs and PCs, or - Implementations of the non-RSAREF symetric ciphers and hashes, incl. IDEA, RC4, RC5, BLOWFISH, MD4, MD5, SAPPHIRE, GOST, SHA, LUC, and LOKI91. Or any others that seem like a good idea. I'll mention some miscellaneous features that will be in the library that I haven't brought up yet: - It will be trivial to make the UNIX-style filter programs that Perry and Matt desire. - Specification of a format for outgoing and incoming messages will be trivial. All known old formats (PGP 2.*, RIPEM, etc) will be supported by including format specs. Key _management_ will *not* be supported, though public keys _will_ be imported from PGP and PEM key rings as well as X.509 certificates with no judgement as to trust (see message from Eric Hughes from the middle of last week). Some key translation (x.509 --> PGP) services might be provided. - - -- Todd Masco | "If we don't make utter fools of ourselves from time to time, cactus(a)hks.net | we grow smug - that is, we do not grow at all." - T. Peters Cactus' Homepage - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLz7c3hNhgovrPB7dAQHGdQP+Idvw/FxnPgR49z70DCMqgHV6w3UEds3f vdm0E5P7+3evSB++iTuP/NzOP92CCnen9VTlFX+gAab61g8T9mfT5mYMu3B9iCvi PWo3/+3XFinypShYJaYyZHWaHkYJtse7A7rFgLhoqQXNPFYdPeSh5XSJqugtfHIm wK37TDUptS4= =3wi6 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLz8VwyoZzwIn1bdtAQHQDgGAgURmCoUB4Hop6nPRayXkK//DJ6muBORK H8Vs6rEiDuYEezGPOT0oIxM4J1aJMuwa =t78D -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The NSA (Was Re: Factoring - State of the Art and Predictions )
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:09 AM 2/13/95, Black Unicorn wrote: >There is a internet lore that says the more valuable and insightful a >given article is, the less response it gets. > >I hope this is right, as most of mine tend to be ignored. On the other hand, they also get forwarded to people not on the list who may be interested, which helps. Bruce's went to 3 or 4 mathematically aware people I know. The work of Mssrs 'corn, Froomkin, Hughes, Finney, May, et.al. get re-zinged all over the place by yours truly. Some of us don't have the chops to comment on the <mostly> excellent content of this list. We still appreciate the work. Thanks to all of you. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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