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Returned mail: unknown mailer error 126
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The original message was received at Tue, 22 Aug 1995 12:45:26 -0400 from localhost [127.0.0.1] ----- The following addresses had delivery problems ----- "|/home/gheap/\+\ \+\ \# -vo /home/gheap/.elm/gheapfilter.log" (unrecoverable error) (expanded from: gheap) ----- Transcript of session follows ----- sh: /home/gheap/+: No such file or directory 554 "|/home/gheap/\+\ \+\ \# -vo /home/gheap/.elm/gheapfilter.log"... unknown mailer error 126 ----- Original message follows ----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue, 22 Aug 1995 12:45:26 -0400 blah

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Re: Third World Man
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:41 PM 8/21/95, Adam Shostack wrote: > Strong cryptography is needed for a secure information >infrastructure. If American companies aren't allowed to build secure >infrastrucure, then parts of the infrastrucure will move overseas, as >insurance, liability, and deployment costs rise for a badly secured >network. > > This issue will not cause the USA to become a third world >nation, but it will contribute to large institutions moving their data >processing out. Tim, you've talked a lot about how companies will >move data centers out of the US to avoid 'expensive' laws; do you see >the ITARs as being in a different catagory, than say, the laws on >reporting a bankruptcy? Sure, they will move some parts of their operations to other jurisdictions. They already are, for various reasons. Most large U.S. companies are of course "multinationals." I didn't cite examples, and won't now. (But you can imagine a few of the many successful U.S. companies: Sun, Intel, Microsoft, SGI, Qualcomm, Altera, Merck, and on and on.) I am not saying that things are as they should be. And I am not a U.S. chauvinist. I really don't care which countries do well, so long as my investments continue to do well. My point was that hyperbole about the U.S. being on the verge of becoming a Third World nation is wrong. As Sternlight might put it, "arrant nonsense." --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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No Subject
by Bryce Wilcox 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here is an article that I just posted to alt.security.pgp and sci.crypt. Having had a couple of hours to calm down, it seems a little frenetic, but there is enough truth in it that I will now repost it to cypherpunks. Context: Someone was asking how he could go about verifying the identity of an anonymous interlocutor, so that he could sign his public key. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Look, I don't have a lot of time here, but I need to say that this whole "certifying anonymous keys" idea is misled. The fact is, *I* *don't* *care* what your True Name is. I can only think of two reasons why you would need a person's True Name, and I doubt that anybody here can apply either of these reasons to anyone else here. Reason Number Uno, why you might want a person's True Name: Because you want to physically hurt them, or effectively threaten to hurt them. (Or send someone else to do it, like a hit man, policeman, etc.) Reason Number Dos, why you might want a person's True Name: Because you want to have sex with them. (Or as above, if you prefer to do it through proxies...) Okay now does anyone want to do any of the above two things to me? If not then *don't* *worry* about whether my public key is signed by anyone or not. It makes zero difference to you until such a time as one of the above motivations acquires. Zimmermann et al. were/are naive to emphasize the Web of Trust as a means of introducing strangers. With very few exceptions, strangers don't *need* to verify each other's physical identities! This fact is central to some of the more interesting social evolutions that information technology promises to cause. In retrospect, the emphasis in "pgpdoc1.txt" on verifying True Names via mutually trusted introducers will seem quaint. Bryce Announcement: I have had technical difficulties. If you sent me e-mail between Aug 5 and Aug 20 and didn't receive a response, please re-send. signatures follow: + public key on keyservers /. island Life in a chaos sea or via finger 0x617c6db9 / bryce.wilcox(a)colorado.edu ---* - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta iQCVAwUBMDkLf/WZSllhfG25AQFhxwP6AzS0nus2QK8UEF5rvyqhFrwpzeAEE/Vr BwRXJtstk5ln2f3SRh7BSYfda/TQDJe2VRt0qMF1xNCt1VLP+QCyr06LqZ0i/qv0 /CpC85/QRAgpQtrgyFKR6v3Ryi3MbeiUQuEOSgU+OelvZ5XcoRP3o5WDp18N4+Pv 5ddGzIVXQEk= =5rxb - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta iQCVAwUBMDk3AfWZSllhfG25AQGQCgQAld0FFtRVZgDKZ1ofok4pK9zAAqlJHCiO A+eLsSolfIvvfpTiE0viJUOuXIywnWzBT50js4LodwsQI4cKSVfnHdYNI4aoyQJf G2P7dy7BaryOj8C74U2gYYq8Lys6Mh/i640KEa77EV4ZEDpLhSi25R+LB58qjvwJ l705Z8I/Bhs= =+xrs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Third World Man
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:46 AM 8/22/95, Jon Lasser wrote: >On Mon, 21 Aug 1995, Peter Trei wrote: > >> > The US is slipping into the second world as we >> > speak, with no signs of a turnaround ahead. Only the sheer size of >> > the economy keeps people from believing it. >> >> Just a nomenclature peeve - I'm not sure of the precise time and >> place the (first|second|third) world meme originated, but it seems to >> predate 1970, and until very recently it's meaning was clear: >> >> First world: Western (and Westernized) nations - mainly the US, Canada, >>Western Europe, >> Japan, Australia, & New Zealand >> >> Second world: Communist bloc (I can still remember the Cultural >> Revolution. Prior to that, the Communists seemed a monolithic force, >> marching in lockstep.) >> >> Third world: The rest, mostly poor nations. > >Erm, nope. The "First World" (or old world) was Europe and Asia; the "New >World" (not frequently referrred to as the second world, but hey...) The >third world was the developing nations. THAT (as far as I was taught in >history class, so it MIGHT be a lie...) was how the terms originated... Then you should sue your history teacher for giving you a defective education :-}. Perhaps she or he was of my generation and was at Woodstock when she should've been doing her homework. By convention, the First World is the set of "Western" nations, the democratic, capitalist nations. The Second World, though not often used as a term, is the set of Communist bloc nations. The Third World, by far the most commonly used term here, is the set of nations not formally affiliated with either the First or Second Worlds. These nations are often poor, though not necessarily poor, and so the "Third World" is often (incorrectly) associated with poverty. And, to confuse things further, the "lesser-developed countries," or LDCs, are often equated to the Third World. When a certain character in a television show referred to "Third World mutants," he was also referring to "your basic brown types." (His words, not mine. Ten credits to anyone who can identify the t.v. show and the character.) The term "Fourth World" has in the last 20 years come to refer to the countries which are so impoverished as to be almost hopeless. Bangla Desh is the canonical Fourth World nation. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: DES & RC4-48 Challenges
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:29 AM 8/22/95, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >I think we can probably do DES within two years. > > Phill I strongly doubt it, and may be willing to bet money against it happening. (If "we" means someone or some group on this mailing list. If "we" means the Net, I still doubt it will happen.) If the "idea futures" and betting markets we've talked about here (which exist) ever take off, this may be a way to make some money for someone. For example, if someone was laying 10:1 odds that SSL would not be cracked in 1995.... And for the "do DES" bet, you need to differentiate (no pun intended) between a chosen plaintext attack and a more general attack. The differential cryptanalysis ("DC" gets another overload) method needs chose plaintext to cut the search space down to 2^47 keys. Wiener's hypothesized "million dollar DES cracker" may do the general attack, but I doubt anyone on our mailing list will do it. That is, the number of workstations and even supercomputers which would have to be lashed-together would be, ballpark, about 2^16 times greater than what was lashed-together for the SSL challenge. Maybe a factor of ten could be cut out with increased cleverness. Maybe. Call it a factor of "only" 6000 times harder than the SSL challenge. Hard to imagine this happening in the next two years. Maybe if much of the Net community was energized to run DES crackers instead of Flying Toasters, but a hard effort to organize...for fleeting reward. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: DES & RC4-48 Challenges
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:52 PM 8/21/95, Timothy C. May wrote: >Call it a factor of "only" 6000 times harder than the SSL challenge. Hard >to imagine this happening in the next two years. > >Maybe if much of the Net community was energized to run DES crackers >instead of Flying Toasters, but a hard effort to organize...for fleeting >reward. Given the rate at which news of the prior cracks seems to have spread among people quite new to these questions, I think you'd be surprised: I've heard mention of it from no less than ten people who, to my knowledge, had never before taken any interest whatsoever in crypto questions. Granted, ten people a-laboring away on Pentiums and PPCs ain't much--but, who knows?, my experience might just scale quite well. Yes, I know: Life is short and art is long. Still, I think it's worth a try: failure seems likely and success remote, but how much sweeter victory if the project were to succeed. The key, I think, would lie in making participation in the project extremely accessible: developing simple platform-specific apps that'd make sweeping space nearly idiot-proof. If joe.anne.net could DL an app appropriate to hir platform then fill out field in a web page that would delegate keyspace according to the question "I can let my [platform] run for [n] hours," and easily report back the results, the response might be quite strong. How long it would take to succeed, _if_ it did, is anyone's guess: it could be a day or a decade. Obviously, the preparation would be a labor-intensive; the trade-off, a good one imho, is that this labor having been performed, the reservoir of potential contributors would expand manifold. If we could increase the reservoir by a factor of 1000, which isn't at all unlikely, that advance would be nothing to sneeze at. Cracking something that for now seems beyond reach would up the ante in a pretty big way, and would put that much more pressure on policymakers to jack that bit-limit up. And that's exactly what we want. Ted

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True Names and Webs of Trust
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a comment on this business of whether we need certification of the True Names of people we deal with: I've dealt with "in person" maybe 60 to 100 of the people on this list (at one time or another). In no cases--not a single one--have I made elaborate checks to confirm that people are who they claim to be. A few driver's licenses have been flashed at meetings, but I didn't look closely. Maybe a passport was even displayed, but, again, I didn't look. And documents are readily forged. This has relevance to the thread Michael Froomkin raised, as well. To wit, none of the people I've met has been "certified." And yet it doesn't bother me. As Bill Stewart correctly claimed is my view, the "key is the identity." Or, more accurately, a _persistent personna_ is what matters. Thus, I don't need to "verify" that "Eric Hughes" is "really" Eric Hughes, and is not actually Fritz Doppelganger, assigned to Berkeley by the BND. I really don't care about the so-called "reality." (Sorry for all of the "quotes," but all of these terms are heavily laden with connotations which bear deconstructing.) My experiences are the norm, I think. Identity credentials are rarely checked, and most people don't care too much. (An important point is that in a cash economy, identity is almost irrelevant. It's only in non-cash, or "account-based," economy that True Names are demanded. Lots of interesting issues to discuss here, which I won't now.) The "web of trust" model is really the normal way people go about their business. I knew someone once introduced to me as "Hugh Daniel," and he eventually introduced me to someone calling himself "Eric Hughes," and so on. Introducers, webs of trust, etc. What their "real names" are makes little difference. (Besides, their Real Names were written on flat stones on the 3rd day after their births and placed in a safe place known only to the Great Bird.) I never use the web of trust model in PGP. I get so few PGP messages that it's enough that people I know give me their keys. So I concede that the web of trust model in the PGP world may or may not scale well. (In the sense of tens of thousands of folks establishing a "web of trust.") But the _basic_ idea of self-arranged transfers of keys and local networks of friends is right on. This is why I don't worry too much about the need for government-authenticated keys and True Names. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Article in Time Magazine
by Kari Laine 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> How many exported software products might have backdoors, > vulnerabilities, and hidden procedures which are harmfull if ever > activated? I am not saying it is so I am just speculating Windows ? Microcode of big host systems like the one from IBM? Each mainframe comes with a line attached. Customer typically don't have the faintest idea what is going on that line. I know one customer who stuck a printer there and though - now we will see ... well he ended up with printouts he did not have the faintest idea of their context. Now does anyone has real evidence of possible backdoors? Best Regards Kari Kari Laine buster(a)klaine.pp.fi LAN Vision Oy Tel. +358-0-502 1947 Sinikalliontie 14 Fax +358-0-524 149 02630 ESPOO BBS +358-0-502 1576/1456 FINLAND

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e$: The Book-Entry/Certificate Distinction
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:30 AM 8/22/95, Timothy C. May wrote: > (An important point is that >in a cash economy, identity is almost irrelevant. It's only in non-cash, or >"account-based," economy that True Names are demanded. Lots of interesting >issues to discuss here, which I won't now.) I'd like to vamp on this for a while. I think Tim's talking about what I call the book-entry/certificate distinction. It goes right to the heart of finance, and it's why I think that the strong crypto/Moore's law combination is going to do more to free people than any political system ever could. (How's that for a wind-up to a rant?) Accounting, well, double-entry bookeeping anyway, was invented in the late middle ages so people could measure their financial progress, but most importantly, so that people could trust other people doing the measurement for them: their bookeepers. This allowed the Renaissance entrepreneur (or more orignally an Italian nobleman, who was more of a gangster than anything else) to delegate financial measurement and consequently build a much larger enterprise than he could have otherwise. Before double-entry bookeeping, the first book-entry system, everything was done on a cash, or certificate, basis, and, like the apocryphal Silicon Valley entrepreneur's bedroom shoebox, you knew you were making money when there was more in the till today than there was yesterday. The first certificates were actually the first form of writing: the original Cuneiform(sp?) of the Babylonians actually evolved from little pieces of clay formed into interesting three-dimensional polygons with a signature seal stamped on them, certificates, or abstractions of value, like "3 cows, so says I, J. Nebbuchenezzar", these were, in turn, used like money. Book-entry allowed the creation of larger and larger enterprises, and it's no surprise that a hundred years or so after the invention of double entry bookeeping, joint stock companies, and eventually limited liability, came into being. The paradox here was that this was an enherently certificate-based system. People met in front of a buttonwood tree on Wall Street, and traded ornately engraved certificates representing some fractional amount of a company's shares or debt outstanding. To trade your shares, you had to physically send them to Wall Street to have them traded for you. Eventually book-entry systems got into the trading of securities when stock exchanges were founded. Specialists or market-makers would take your order, and cross them on their books with their own inventory or with people on the other side of the trade, or, in the commodities markets where the trade volume is much higher, people stand around a pit, execute the trade with a contra party, and sign each other's orders. This was compounded enormously by the advent of faster communications, particularly telecommunications. People could trade their stock from anywhere by wire, or by physically talking to a branch office of a securities firm who was itself linked by wire to an exchange through its main office. In the early days of book-entry trading, delivery of physical certificates was done at various traders' operations departments, called "cages" for obvious reasons, to settle a trade. After a while clearing houses were instituted to do book-entry settlement of exchange-traded securities. In fact, when someone says "book-entry" these days, they usually mean book-entry securities settlement. A clearing house has all the physical certificates in a vault, and keeps books as pointers to all that paper to show who owns what. Those books match the books of the various traders, and through the miracle of double-entry bookeeping, everything balances so everyone agrees with each other. In fact, the need for all those certificates sort of goes away in this system, and when I first got on this list a year or so ago, Perry and I talked about the existence, at the Depository Trust Company -- the New York Stock Exchange's clearinghouse -- of a single certificate representing a company's entire common stock. Okay, so what does this have to do with strong crypto? A lot. Every once in a while I've compared strong crypto and privacy to flight. Flying is an inherent good for lots of people, but what makes it really economically useful is how fast you go when you fly. People buy airline tickets because they can get anywhere much quicker if they fly than if they do anything else. The same with strong cryptography. Privacy, and the strong cryptography which makes it possible, is an enherent good for most of us, especially here on *this* list. But cryptographically strong protocols become economically useful when used for the creation of certificates which abstract value: digital bearer certificates like digital cash, and eventually digital certificates representing stocks, bonds, and various derivative securities. To understand why, we need to make one further digression. Remember all those telecommunications lines going into the exchanges? The inherent geometry of a system where lines are cheaper than nodes is a hierarchy: you pick up a phone to call someone, and your central office routes you up to its central office, and further on up the hierarchy until the call can be switched back down somewhere to complete the call. The interesting correlation between this "switching" and most of our current social structure can be left for another list, but the reason for this methodology is all bound up in the economics of wires and switches: at first, wires were cheaper than switches, who, in the beginning, were people. We all know the story from there, people were first replaced with electomechanical switches, then with solid-state switches, then with microprocessing switches. When we got microprocessors, the economics of the nodes/lines problem got turned on its head. We run into Moore's Law. Moore's Law, for Moore of Intel, is an observation that the price of a given semiconductor falls by half every 12 months, though it was 18 months when Moore figured this out. From a cryptological prospective, we understand what this means to the future cost of breaking a keyspace of a certain size. Moore's Law also means just as much to the structure of the network: in collapsing the cost of a network's nodes, it converts it from a hierarchy to a geodesic. Like Bucky Fuller's geodesic domes, a geodesic network consists of nodes connected to an arbitrary number of lines, with no real directionality to the motion of traffic: there is no up or down like in a hierarchy. A message could originate at the node, or could be just passing through in any direction to any other line the node is connected to. A good example of this is a company's PBX, which allowed intra-company switching of phone calls for large organizations over long distances directly, without going up and down the telephonic heirarchy. The abolition of monopoly in the telephone system was primarily caused by the advent of the geodesic network, and the phrase "Geodesic Network" was the title of Peter Huber's analysis of the phone system for Judge Green, the judge who broke up the Bell System in the early 80's. Huber's reccommendation to Green in 1986 as was to allow competition in the Regional Bell Operating Companies' core markets: the local loop. They're just getting around to doing it almost 10 years later. Another consequence of hierarchy, right? Once again, the social consequences of geodesic information networks are interesting; ubiquitious computing, telecommuting, flattening organization structures, and lots of other phenomena can be attributed here, and even Mr. Archer's transaction-based tax proposal can. However, let's look at what it does to book-entry, particularly in the presence of strongly cryptographic certificate systems. First, like Tim says, a book-entry system is bad for privacy. The IRS knows how much money you make, the bank knows how much you spend on your credit card, another book-entry system, even your grocery store knows what kind of food your cat likes. In a certificate system, like digital cash, no one knows anything, and it's cheaper that way anyway. Who did what to whom and for how much has no economic value whatever. No one can track the origin of all the bits of cash going through the till, much less audit it's ownership trail, and cryptographic protocols allow the secure handling of the money anyway, so the existence of the money speaks for itself, without needing to know who gave it to you. Book-entry stays where it belongs, on the store's accounting system, and there's reason to believe that as processors get cheaper and cheaper, there might be a micro economy (ecology?) in the making in an enterprise's various economic units, as a result of ubiquitous computing. Transfer payments have always been a vexing problem in large businesses, because there's no way to arrive at a fair price for intra-company trades of goods and services without looking to some outside market price. In fact, it's safe to say that the current paradigm for financial analysis, the efficient market hypothesis and it's offspring, CAPM, Black-Scholes, etc., is a solution to the transfer pricing problem which evolved into something infinitely more useful. But let's take this idea of strong cryptography in a geodesic network to another financial abstraction, the securities markets. What you get then is a reversion to certificate based trading. You've gone back to the Buttonwood tree, only you're now trading digital certificates on the net. People announce their intention to trade, what they're willing to pay or accept, and, when the trade is made, people trade certificates under a strong cryptographic protocol, announce the price to the market, and walk away. People can "make markets" in securities by holding inventories and simply posting their prices bid or asked, to buy or sell their inventory of securities. Notice I said people here. What we're talking about is behavior which was originally done by *people* with *certificates*, and then by ever-larger *institutions* with *book-entry*. That is, until the advent of computers, when the pendelum swung back toward smaller entities. After all, in 1972, anyone with the money could get a Quotron or a NASDAQ Level 3 machine, and soon, at least the sell side of the market was competitive again. The stodgy old firms like Morgan Stanley and Salomon had to turn into very efficient carnivores to survive. Paradoxically, the buy side of the market, composed of banks, pensions, and mutual funds, had its development arrested by regulation and is just approaching the centralizing phase. However, we now know that the operation of both the buy and sell sides of the capital markets are going to get very interesting very soon, right? With a geodesic, certificate-based financial system, the economies of scale caused by hierarchical communications systems go out the window. There is no need to concentrating processing power to be used to used on the market's information, because the information is everywhere without having to concentrate it. What's more, the specialization of processing enabled by Moore's Law creates such a flood of information that no centralized entity can process it all, and so it collapses under its own weight. Everyone trusts their transactions because of the difficulty of forging certificates. That means that once again, a certificate has it's own inherent worth. It speaks for itself, and when it changes hands, the trade is, as Eric Hughes says, "immediately and finally" cleared and settled. The overhead of keeping books is gone, at least for the trading parties, and especially for the clearing houses, who, like exchanges, just kind of disappear, along with any way to regulate them. Somewhere, Joe Kennedy, the first Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Comission, is probably either crying his eyes out or laughing his head off, depending on your interpretation of his role in regulatory history. This brings us to the reason securities exist, anyway. A stock certificate is really a legal document, right? How can you enforce laws in a geodesic environment protected by strong cryptography. Well, in a geodesic market, cryptographic protocols, instead of laws, enforce agreements. If the cryptographic protocol isn't satisfied, the software won't work. It's easy to see how a combination of certification technology and cryptographically anonymous voting protocols allow the direct election of a company's board members without proxies -- another hierarchical device -- for instance. It's easy to see how the presentation of digital interest coupons to a company's bond trustee could result in a payment in digital cash. This seems to work for just about any kind of financial instrument you could imagine. The presence of the digital certificate is prima facie claim upon the abstracted item, votes, interest/dividends, hog bellies, you name it, and the protocol could be put into software everyone could check themselves. Obviously, we aren't talking about the end of bookeeping as we know it (BAWKI? ;-), but it does mean that days of book-entry as a means of social control are numbered. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Any code for getting noise from PC & Mac sound card?
by baldwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for an example of software that extracts unpredictable bits from the sound cards of PCs and MACs. Has anyone written software like this? Can someone send me a URL to it? Thanks, --Bob Baldwin

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