- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: NYT on IBM GAK
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:26 AM 10/2/96 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: > > >On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, John Young wrote: > >> The New York Times, October 2, 1996, pp. D1, D8. >> Executives of the International Business Machines >> Corporation said late yesterday that they were still lining >> up the final list of companies in the alliance. Those >> involved will include Digital Equipment and smaller >> data-security companies including RSA Data Security, Cylink >> and Trusted Information Systems. > >We are in deep trouble. >--Lucky Wouldn't a letter-writing campaign be in order here? How often do these companies get protest letters? Generally, my experience has been that people actually listen to such objections, if for no other reason than they are usually so rare. The moment I first heard of "Clipper," I looked up the manufacturer of the "Clipper" microprocessor (assuming that there was a connection) and called that company, fully prepared to "ream them a new one!" It turned out that they had nothing to do with the chip, etc, appreciated my call, and were entirely sympathetic. While that was an uninvolved company, I think it's likely that some corporate decisions are based on the assumption that the public won't notice. Give them enough feedback and they'll react. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Utah as a Religious Police State
by Deana Holmes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 2 Oct 96 at 8:47, John C. Randolph wrote: > > Moroni says: > > >I never cease to be surprised by the interest that gentiles show > >in working mormon communities while totally neglecting their own > >failing areas. > > I don't do a lot of nit-picking on this mailing list, but: > > I am a Jew. *You* are a gentile. So are all the rest of the mormons. > Get this point straight. Uh, in Utah, Jews are Gentiles. No lie. Deana Deana M. Holmes April 1996 poster child for clueless $cientology litigiousness alt.religion.scientology archivist since 2/95 mirele(a)xmission.com

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[But how does one undo the dangerous criminals without violating the privacy rights of everyone else? --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 10:30:43 -0700 (PDT) From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late If you become a dangerous criminal, Declan, I think law enforcement does have the right to use key escrow to undo you. That has nothing to do with spying. You need to be a little more selective about your language, and to make distinctions a little more rationally than you do. Best, Joe Shea Editor-in-Chief The American Reporter joeshea(a)netcom.com http://www.newshare.com:9999 On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > BTW, Joe, I'm still waiting for your response to my comments on why > your endorsement of key escrow (GAK) is braindead. Or do you still > think that the Feds should have the right to spy on my conversations, > just like you thought that "porn isn't speech?" > > -Declan > > > On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Joe Shea wrote: > > > Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 09:47:59 -0700 (PDT) > > From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> > > To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > > > Declan, how does your list work? Do you only publish comments > > that agree with you? I didn't see my first two, and this one only came > > with your response. Is this your version of freedom of the press, or what? > > > > Joe Shea > > Editor-in-Chief > > The American Reporter > > joeshea(a)netcom.com > > http://www.newshare.com:9999 > > > > > > On Wed, 2 Oct 1996, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > > Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 20:19:16 -0700 (PDT) > > > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > > To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu > > > Cc: joeshea(a)netcom.com > > > Subject: Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > [Joe, this may be yet another area where we disagree. It represents a > > > power grab by law enforcement; the infrastructure is prone to failure > > > and can be compromised; it's more government meddling and coercion and > > > more restrictions on free speech; the Fed bureaucrats controlling this > > > are vulnerable to special-interest lobbying; the Constitution gives > > > the Federal government no right to impose such restrictions; the FBI > > > has demonstrated that we can't trust the Feds with our most personal > > > information; it violates an absolute right to privacy; and it's > > > technically impractical for a good number of applications. --Declan] > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > > Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 15:57:51 -0700 (PDT) > > > From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> > > > To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > > Cc: fight-censorship > > > Subject: Re: FC: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late > > > > > > > > > Declan's most recent piece makes much more sense than the earlier > > > one. He is quite correct in emphasizing the future vulnerability of the > > > encryption logarithms rather than centering on whether or not terrorists > > > might use them. By making them impossible to crack without the key, and > > > permitting the key to be available to appropriate law enforcement > > > authorities when absolutely necessary, everyone's real needs are > > > satisfied, I think. I enjoyed this report a lot. > > > > > > Best, > > > > > > Joe Shea > > > Editor-in-Chief > > > The American Reporter > > > joeshea(a)netcom.com > > > http://www.newshare.com:9999 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

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Re: ITAR satellite provision
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:40 AM 10/2/96 -0700, I wrote: >I think you're talking about the definition of "export", located at 22 CFR >120.10: ^^^^^^ but upon closer inspection it looks like the House of Representatives' WWW-accessible version that I looked it up in is out of date. (geez.) The more current version is located at 22 CFR 120.17; there are some wording changes in the definition of export but the exemption for launch vehicles and payloads is unchanged. ("(6) A launch vehicle or payload shall not, by reason of the launching of such vehicle, be considered an export for purposes of this subchapter.") -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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INFO: White House Clipper 3.1.1 plan unveiled; continues to ignore privacy concerns
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| WHITE HOUSE RELEASES CLIPPER 3.1.1 PLAN; SAME OLD STORY EXCLUDES CONGRESS; PROPOSAL DRIVEN BY LAW ENFORCEMENT NO CONCERNS FOR PRIVACY OF INTERNET USERS http://www.crypto.com/ Date: October 2, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents Introduction White House announces new encryption proposal Text of White House announcement Response from Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) Response from Senator Conrad Burns (R-MT) How to receive crypto-news Press contacts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Interested in spreading the word in Congress about privacy rights and encryption? Want to help Congress fight the White House's poorly crafted, dictatorial, encryption policies? WWW.Crypto.Com has opened up a new service, "Adopt Your Legislator", which allows you to add your name to a targeted list for contacting your legislators. Whenever your legislator is teetering on an issue related to privacy or encryption, we'll notify you directly for a focused call-in/write-in campaign. It's fast, it's easy, it's like having your own personal activist. Sign up at http://www.crypto.com/ or through one of the many fine organizations below that have links to the adoption pages: Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org/) Center for Democracy and Technology (http://www.cdt.org/) Voters Telecommunications Watch (http://www.vtw.org/) Look for the "My Lock, My Key" icon and follow it to help fight the new Clipper 3.1.1 proposal and fight for your privacy! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCES NEW ENCRYPTION PROPOSAL The White House announced their new encryption proposal yesterday. There are several main points that have come out now, or will appear soon: -jurisdictional move from State to Commerce for export applications with a Department of Justice role -temporary increase of key lengths to 56 bits, provided future key escrow functionality is promised, -joint effort with companies such as IBM to produce key escrow products, -increased purchasing of key recovery products by Federal agencies to stimulate the creation of a key escrow industry, and -legislation to legitimize the key escrow recovery market. There are absolutely no plans to permanently increase the key length of unescrowed encryption products. Companies who do not have an escrow plan in place by the end of the two year temporary increase will lose their export status. This proposal has a number of significant problems, including: DOMINATED AND DRIVEN BY LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERESTS This Clipper proposal, like the three previous ones, has been driven entirely by the concerns of law enforcement. This should come as no surprise to even the most optimistic industry or public interest advocates. As Senator Leahy (D-VT) says in his statement below: Internet users themselves -- not the FBI, not the NSA, not any government regulator -- should decide what encryption method best serves their needs. JUSTICE ROLE IN EXPORT APPLICATIONS A BLATANT ATTEMPT AT DOMESTIC CONTROL OF CRYPTOGRAPHY By allowing Justice a seat at the table in approving export applications, the Clinton Administration has clearly demonstrated that they wish to control the domestic cryptography market. Justice will certainly veto the export applications of any products which they are not able to break either by brute force or without key escrow. This will probably end up being an even worse route for companies wishing to export products. TEMPORARY INCREASE IN KEY LENGTH IS NOT SUFFICIENT The original Clipper proposal would have allowed encryption with 80 bits keys. Clipper II bandied about the number 64 as the acceptable level of encryption. With Clipper 3.1.1, that amount has been reduced to 56 bits for the next two years. This is clearly too little too late. CONGRESS WAS NOT CONSULTED Congress has clearly stated their intentions with regards to the White House policy, and this year will certainly not be the end of their involvement in the issue. Senator Burns (R-MT) summarizes it well: This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination. The administration has prevented Congress from weighing in on this issue just as support was building for a legislative solution. I intend to move forward with pro-encryption legislation in the next Congress. You can continue to follow this issue at http://www.crypto.com/ ! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Vice President FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: 456-7035 TUESDAY, October 1, 1996 STATEMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT President Clinton and I are committed to promoting the growth of electronic commerce and robust, secure communications worldwide while protecting the public safety and national security. To that end, this Administration is consulting with Congress, the information technology industry, state and local law enforcement officials, and foreign governments on a major initiative to liberalize export controls for commercial encryption products. The Administration's initiative will make it easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products -- whether at home or abroad -- to protect their privacy, intellectual property and other valuable information. It will support the growth of electronic commerce, increase the security of the global information, and sustain the economic competitiveness of U.S. encryption product manufacturers during the transition to a key management infrastructure. Under this initiative, the export of 56-bit key length encryption products will be permitted under a general license after one-time review, and contingent upon industry commitments to build and market future products that support key recovery. This policy will apply to hardware and software products. The relaxation of controls will last up to two years. The Administration's initiative recognizes that an industry-led technology strategy will expedite market acceptance of key recovery, and that the ultimate solution must be market-driven. Exporters of 56-bit DES or equivalent encryption products would make commitments to develop and sell products that support the key recovery system that I announced in July. That vision presumes that a trusted party (in some cases internal to the user's organization) would recover the user's confidentiality key for the user or for law enforcement officials acting under proper authority. Access to keys would be provided in accordance with destination country policies and bilateral understandings. No key length limits or algorithm restrictions will apply to exported key recovery products. Domestic use of key recovery will be voluntary, and any American will remain free to use any encryption system domestically. The temporary relaxation of controls is one part of a broader encryption policy initiative designed to promote electronic information security and public safety. For export control purposes, commercial encryption products will no longer be treated as munitions. After consultation with Congress, jurisdiction for commercial encryption controls will be transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department. The Administration also will seek legislation to facilitate commercial key recovery, including providing penalties for improper release of keys, and protecting key recovery agents against liability when they properly release a key. As I announced in July, the Administration will continue to expand the purchase of key recovery products for U.S. government use, promote key recovery arrangements in bilateral and multilateral discussions, develop federal cryptographic and key recovery standards, and stimulate the development of innovative key recovery products and services. Under the relaxation, six-month general export licenses will be issued after one-time review, contingent on commitments from exporters to explicit benchmarks and milestones for developing and incorporating key recovery features into their products and services, and for building the supporting infrastructure internationally. Initial approval will be contingent on firms providing a plan for implementing key recovery. The plan will explain in detail the steps the applicant will take to develop, produce, distribute, and/or market encryption products with key recovery features. The specific commitments will depend on the applicant's line of business. The government will renew the licenses for additional six-month periods if milestones are met. Two years from now, the export of 56-bit products that do not support key recovery will no longer be permitted. Currently exportable 40-bit mass market software products will continue to be exportable. We will continue to support financial institutions in their efforts to assure the recovery of encrypted financial information. Longer key lengths will continue to be approved for products dedicated to the support of financial applications. The Administration will use a formal mechanism to provide industry, users, state and local law enforcement, and other private sector representatives with the opportunity to advise on the future of key recovery. Topics will include: . evaluating the developing global key recovery architecture . assessing lessons-learned from key recovery implementation . advising on technical confidence issues vis-a-vis access to and release of keys . addressing interoperability and standards issues . identifying other technical, policy, and program issues for governmental action. The Administration's initiative is broadly consistent with the recent recommendations of the National Research Council. It also addresses many of the objectives of pending Congressional legislation. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESPONSE FROM SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (D-VT) STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEAHY ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW ENCRYPTION INITIATIVE October 1, 1996 The timing of the Administration's announcement on encryption, within hours of the Congress' likely adjournment, is unfortunate. The Administration needs to work with Congress to develop a consensus on a national encryption policy that takes account of the privacy, law enforcement and competitiveness concerns of our Nation's citizens and businesses. Taking unilateral steps will not resolve this issue, but instead could delay building the consensus we so urgently need. This issue simply cannot by resolved by Executive fiat. While technology should not dictate policy, particularly when our public safety and national security interests are at issue, any policy we adopt must protect our privacy. As the Administration and industry rush to find an alternative to unbreakable encryption, they should take heed that any solution which fails to protect the Fourth Amendment and privacy rights of our citizens will be unacceptable. That is why, with bipartisan support, Senator Burns and I introduced legislation in March that set out privacy safeguards to protect the decoding keys to encrypted communications and stringent legal procedures for law enforcement agencies to get access to those keys. In this plan, the Administration is directing the resources of our high-tech industry to develop breakable, rather than unbreakable, encryption. But no one is yet clear about who will be legally allowed to break into encrypted messages, and under what circumstances. These are questions that have to be answered not only with our own government but also with foreign governments. The weakest link in a key recovery system may be the country with the weakest privacy protections. Internet users, who can send messages around the globe seamlessly, do not want the privacy of their encrypted communications to be at the mercy of a country that ignores the Fourth Amendment principles we enjoy here. These are significant privacy and security concerns not answered by the Administration's plan. Even without reading the fine print, the general outline of the Administration's plan smacks of the government trying to control the marketplace for high-tech products. Only those companies that agree to turn over their business plans to the government and show that they are developing key recovery systems, will be rewarded with permission to sell abroad products with DES encryption, which is the global encryption standard. Conditioning foreign sales of products with DES on development of key recovery systems puts enormous pressure on our computer industry to move forward with key recovery, whether their customers want it or not. Internet users themselves -- not the FBI, not the NSA, not any government regulator -- should decide what encryption method best serves their needs. Then the marketplace will be able to respond. The Administration is putting the proverbial cart before the horse, by putting law enforcement interests ahead of every one elses. But that is not the only catch in the Administration's plan. Permission to export DES will end in two years. Allowing American companies to sell DES overseas is a step long overdue. Given the fact that a Japanese company is already selling "triple DES", one might say this step is too little, too late. Threatening to pull the plug on DES in two years, when this genie is already out of the bottle, does not promote our high-tech industries overseas. Does this mean that U.S. companies selling sophisticated computer systems with DES encryption overseas must warn their customers that the supply may end in two years? Customers both here and abroad want stable suppliers, not those jerked around by their government. The most effective way to protect the privacy and security of our on-line communications is to use encryption technology. Every American should be concerned about our country's policy on encryption since the resolution of this debate will affect privacy, jobs and the competitiveness of our high-tech industries. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESPONSE FROM SENATOR CONRAD BURNS (R-MT) For immediate release: Contact: Matt Raymond Tuesday, October 1, 1996 (202) 224-8150 Randall Popelka (202) 224-6137 Burns Cautious on Encryption Plan Oversight Vowed for Plan That "Raises More Questions Than It Answers" WASHINGTON, D.C. _ Montana Senator Conrad Burns today reacted cautiously to plans by the Clinton administration to loosen restrictions on exports of stronger encryption for computer software and hardware. He also criticized the White House for its failure to negotiate on the cornerstone of its proposals: that companies must agree to "escrow" their decryption keys. "I have no doubt that it was the pressure of Congress, high-tech companies and privacy advocates that dragged the White House kicking and screaming into agreeing that export restrictions should be eased," said Burns, chief sponsor of the Pro-CODE bill, which would loosen restrictions on encryption exports and prohibit government-mandated key escrow. "However, I can't say I'm pleased with a process that has all but excluded Congress and the public from the discussion. "The administration's insistence on key escrow as a condition of lifting these restrictions has never been negotiable. Meanwhile, what choice do these companies have but to yield as their global competitiveness withers on the vine? "This plan raises even more questions than it answers, such as, what about the widespread availability of much stronger encryption than that which is allowed by the White House? How do we deal with rapid changes in technology that will inevitably render the 56-bit limit obsolete? The devil is definitely in the details. "This debate is not over by any stretch of the imagination. The administration has prevented Congress from weighing in on this issue just as support was building for a legislative solution. I intend to move forward with pro-encryption legislation in the next Congress. "I will also push for vigorous oversight of the administration's plan in the Commerce Committee." The Senate Commerce Committee, of which Burns is a member, has jurisdiction over the Commerce Department. The administration has stated its intent to transfer export licensing authority over encryption from the State Department to the Commerce Department. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: How might new GAK be enforced?
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Tim May asks: > >: Any other ideas on how the government plans to enforce GAK, to make GAK the >: overwhelmingly-preferred solution? > >The problem seems somewhat analogous to the software copy protection >problem and maybe the enfocement will be similar: make "examples" of a >few high profile offenders who are exchanging blatantly un-GAKed >traffic with foreigners. This assumes they fine tune the law to make >such behavior illegal without having to prove you yourself exported >the stuff to them. Wonder what the Supremes will say to that. Another possible monkey wrench is to send non-GAK messages containg random data. Since the entropy of encrypted and RNG data should be identical you can always maintain the messages contain nothing at all and cannot produce a decrypt key since none exists. > >But that's not the end of the story. If there is lots of GAK encrypted >traffic flowing about, then encrypted traffic in general is no longer >noteworthy. So as long as your traffic looks like GAK, you won't be >hassled until they try to read your traffic. See above comment. > >So it's possible that products will appear that use pseudo-GAK >protocols -- they look just like their GAKed cousins but the GAK >fields contain plausiable garbage instead of keys. It could even >turn out to be a vendor "quality control" thing -- oops, the GAK >was supposed to work but... > >You couldn't do that with Clipper (except via Matt Blaze's brute >forcing of the LEAF checksum) because the crypto wouldn't decrypt a >packet with an invalid LEAF checksum. Since it was a sealed hardware >module, implementers had no choice but to play by those rules. There's >no such enforcable limitation on commercial software implementations. Another casuality could be anonymity. Once GAK is in place, look for a requirement for Clipper cards in order to access ISPs. -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Voice: 1-702-655-2877 Sacred Cow Meat Co. | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 7075 W. Gowan Road, #2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Ve know you have relatives in Germany
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recollect all those World War II propoganda movies where the evil Nazi would sneer: "Ve know you have relatives in ze Fatherland" According Scientific American (page 40, october 1996, an early version of a proposed German web control law would require operators of "media services" to provide German authorities with the name of a german resident who would be "subject to unlimited criminal liabilities". The Scientific American commentator predicted a low rate of compliance. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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INTERNET SERVICE Without a computer
by jdewayne＠yahoo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Power Outage in San Fransisco/bay area
by Max Inux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, we are going on hour 4 now, most of the power is back. One group of 2-4 employees caused it they say. This was admitted 3 hours later, and then they knew 15 minutes after it happens.. typical. They expect to be back on by this afternoon On the Shell Building at 8:30AM "Building closed, no power. Power will not be restored for 6-8 hours." I wonder how they knew. The estimate is probably about right too, wierd. The mission village sub-station has been re-oppened, and most peoples power is now being revived. Funny how 2-4 people not following procedure were able to shut down 4 substations. Looks like PG&E have lots of work ahead to find out the cause/effect of this type action. Max -- Max Inux <maxinux(a)openpgp.net> New DH and RSA keys Generated. Kinky Sex makes the world go round If crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto

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EPIC Alert 3.17
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================= @@@@ @@@@ @@@ @@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@@@ @@@@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @@@@ @@@ @ @ @@@@@ @ @@@ @@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @@@@ @ @@@ @@@@ @ @ @@@@ @@@@ @ @ @ ============================================================== Volume 3.17 October 2, 1996 -------------------------------------------------------------- Published by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) Washington, D.C. http://www.epic.org/ ======================================================================= Table of Contents ======================================================================= [1] White House Releases New Clipper Proposal [2] International Crypto Symposium Held in Paris for OECD [3] OECD Crypto Experts Meet in Paris [4] Human Rights Groups Release Crypto Resolution [5] E-FOIA Bill Approved by House and Senate [6] P-TRAK SSN System Criticism Continues [7] Avrahami Files Appeal to State Supreme Court [8] Upcoming Conferences and Events ======================================================================= [1] White House Releases New Clipper Proposal ======================================================================= The White House has released the latest version of the key escrow/recovery plan intended to promote government access to encoded communications. The new proposal follows similar proposals in which the Administration offers to relax export regulations in exchange for an industry commitment to establish key escrow encryption. Under the plan announced by the Office of the Vice President on October 1, 1996, companies would be allowed to export 56-bit encryption systems for the next two years if they setup a formal process to fully develop a key escrow system. After two years, non-escrow systems would be prohibited. Jurisdiction for the control of exports would also be transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department. The Justice Department would be given veto power over export applications. The White House plans to introduce legislation for key escrow centers. According to the statement released by the Vice President, the Administration will continue to promote key escrow encryption through the purchase of key recovery products, bilateral and multilateral discussions, federal cryptographic and key recovery standards, and federal funding. The statement also said that "the Administration's initiative is broadly consistent with the recent recommendations of the National Research Council." However, the NRC report recommended against government promotion of key escrow encryption, noting that "the risks of key escrow encryption are considerable," Earlier this year, the Internet Society also endorsed a recommendation of the Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group which said that "such policies are against the interests of consumers and the business community, and are largely irrelevant to issues of military security." IBM announced that it would establish an industry consortium to support the plan, and several US hardware companies signed on. However, Netscape head Jim Barkesdale described the proposal as "extortion". Bipartisan criticism was also heard from Congress. Both Senator Leahy and Senator Burns quickly issued releases criticizing the proposal. The software industry expressed opposition to the White House plan. The Software Publishers Association, the Business Software Alliance, and the International Technology Association of America criticized the proposal. More information on Clipper 4.0 is available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/key_escrow/ ======================================================================= [2] International Crypto Symposium Held in Paris for OECD ======================================================================= On September 25, 1996 cryptographers, human rights advocates, legal scholars, and delegates to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development met in Paris to explore issues concerning cryptography policy. The symposium was scheduled to coincide with an OECD meeting to consider new guidelines on international cryptography policy. The conference on the "Public Voice in the Development of International Encryption Policy" was sponsored by EPIC and Planete Internet and held in the Centre de Conferences des Internationales. Justice Michael Kirby, a member of the High Court of Australia and former chair of the OECD expert panels on security and privacy, opened the conference with remarks that placed the current effort to develop cryptography guidelines in the larger context of the OECD's work on privacy and information security and the ongoing need to recognize human rights concerns. Justice Kirby, drawing on his international human rights work in the area of HIV/AIDS, urged participants to keep in mind ten principles for the development of sound policies. Justice Kirby concluded his remarks with an appeal that "the claims of national security and law enforcement agencies be attained within a context of constitutionalism, the rule of law and respect for, and effective protection of human rights." Kirby reminded those present that "respect of human rights, and especially individual privacy" is "the ultimate common denominator of the OECD." Welcoming remarks were provided Mr. Norman Reaburn the Chair of the OECD Expert Panel on Cryptography Policy, Mr. John Dryden the head of the OECD Secretariat, and Mr. Marc Rotenberg the director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Washington, DC. The panels were moderated by OECD delegates from Australia, Canada, Germany, and Japan. The first panel "Cryptography Policy: The View of Cryptographers" featured Dr. Ross Anderson of the University of Cambridge, Dr. Matt Blaze of AT&T Laboratories, Dr. Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Mr. Yves Le Roux of Digital Research, and Dr. Herb Lin of the National Research Council. The second panel "Human Rights Issues in the Development of Cryptography Policy" featured Mr. Dave Banisar of EPIC, Mme. Louise Cadoux of the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes, Mr. Simon Davies of Privacy International, Mr. Barry Steinhardt with the American Civil Liberties Union, and Mr. Alain Weber of the French Human Rights League The third panel "User Needs for Strong Cryptography" featured Dr. Brian Carpenter of the Internet Architecture Board, Dr. Stephane Bortzmeyer of the Association des Utilisateurs d'Internet, and Mr. Phil Zimmerman of the Pretty Good Privacy Inc. The final panel "Legal Dimensions and Cryptography Policy" featured Mr. Victor Mayer-Schoenberger of the Austrian Institute for Law and Policy, Mr. Kevin O'Connor the Australian Privacy Commissioner, and Prof. Joel Reidenberg of the Fordham Law School and the Sorbonne. The complete program for the EPIC/Planete Internet conference, the speech of Justice Kirby, remarks of speakers, and other resources are available at: http://www.epic.org/events/crypto_paris/ ======================================================================= [3] OECD Crypto Panels Meets in Paris ======================================================================= Following the EPIC/Planete Internet conference, the OECD Member countries met in Paris for two days to discuss Cryptography Policy Guidelines that could provide internationally comparable criteria for encryption of computerised information. According to the OECD, the Guidelines identify the issues which countries should take into consideration in formulating cryptography policies at the national and international level. An OECD press statement said that, "Discussions have focused on the rights of users to choose cryptographic methods, the freedom of the market to develop them, interoperability, consequences for the protection of personal data and privacy, lawful access to encrypted data, and reducing the barriers to international trade." The OECD Guidelines will be non-binding recommendations to Member governments, meaning that they will not be part of international law, nor will they endorse any specific cryptography system. The Group of Experts on Cryptography Policy will continue discussions the week of December 16, with a view to completion this year of a draft of the Guidelines which would be forwarded for approval by the Council of the OECD early in 1997. The complete text of the OECD press statement is available in english at: http://www.epic.org/events/crypto_paris/releaseE_OECD.html The complete text of the OECD press statement is available in french at: http://www.epic.org/events/crypto_paris/releaseF_OECD.html ======================================================================= [4] Human Rights Groups Release Privacy Resolution ======================================================================= More than a dozen international human rights and cyber rights organizations recently endorsed a resolution in Support of the Freedom to Use Encryption. The resolution was released in Paris on September 25, just prior to the meeting of the OECD. Noting that "national governments have already taken steps to detain and to harass users and developers of cryptography technology" and that "cryptography is already in use by human rights advocates who face persecution by their national governments," the organizations urged the OECD to "base its cryptography policies on the fundamental right of citizens to engage in private communication." The organizations further urged the OECD to "resist policies that would encourage the development of communication networks designed for surveillance." The organizations that endorsed the resolution included ALCEI (Electronic Frontiers Italy), the American Civil Liberties Union, Association des Utilisateurs d'Internet, CITADEL-EF France, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, cyberPOLIS, Digital Citizens Foundation in the Netherlands, EFF-Austin, Electronic Frontier Australia, Electronic Frontier Canada, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Human Rights Watch, NetAction, and Privacy International The campaign was organized by the Global Internet Liberty Coalition, a new coalition of national and international human rights and cyber rights organizations. The complete text of the crypto resolution is available at: http://www.gilc.org/gilc/resolution.html ======================================================================= [5] E-FOIA Bill Approved by House and Senate ======================================================================= Congress has passed and sent to the President the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996. The "E-FOIA" legislation requires federal agencies to make information available to requesters in electronic form "if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format." It also requires agencies to maintain indices of previously released documents that are "likely to become the subject of subsequent requests," and to make such indices available "by computer telecommunications" no later than December 31, 1999. The legislation also attempts to tackle the perennial problem of agency delays in responding to FOIA requests. These provisions include the establishment of "multitrack processing of requests ... based on the amount of work or time (or both) involved," and the expedited processing of requests upon a showing of "compelling need." It is likely that these new provisions, like earlier FOIA amendments designed to improve public access, will be applied narrowly by federal agencies and become the subject of litigation. The text of the E-FOIA legislation is available at: http://www.epic.org/open_gov/foia/efoia.html ======================================================================= [6] P-TRAK SSN System Criticism Continues ======================================================================= Opposition to the proliferation of commercial databases exploded into public view recently when the Lexis-Nexis P-TRAK "personal locator" system prompted a flood of angry e-mail and telephone calls to the information service company. The P-TRAK database originally allowed Lexis-Nexis subscribers to search under an individual's name and access telephone numbers, addresses, previous addresses, maiden names and Social Security numbers (SSNs). After an initial flurry of complaints in June, the company claimed that it had eliminated SSNs from its database. After the recent flare-up, the firm provided a clarification: SSNs are no longer searchable using an individual's name, but a subscriber can start with an SSN (or any nine-digit number, for that matter), and obtain all of the personally-identifying information that goes along with that number. Also, contrary to claims of the Lexis/Nexis company, the personal data was not publicly available, nor is it similar to "white pages" information. In fact, Lexis/Nexis obtained the P-TRAK personal locator information from TransUnion, a credit reporting agency. The two companies exploited a loophole in the Fair Credit Reporting Act which leaves credit "header" information unprotected even though the associated credit report could not be disclosed. In the wake of the P-TRAK episode, the Federal Trade Commission recommended that Congress take steps to provide greater protection for sensitive information. The FTC says that it has received "numerous complaints "... concerning recently-introduced, widely-available commercial services that provide, for a fee, identifying information on individuals." Congress adjourned before it could act, but is likely to take up the issue next year. Additional information on the misuse of Social Security numbers is available at: http://www.epic.org/privacy/ssn/ ======================================================================= [7] Avrahami Files Appeal to State Supreme Court ======================================================================= Ram Avrahami, the Virginia resident who brought suit last year against U.S. News and World Report for selling his name without his consent, has appealed the decision of a lower court to the Virginia State Supreme Court. Mr. Avrahami argues that the lower court wrongly dismissed his claim. He argues that under Virginia law "the unauthorized sale, exchange, or rental of a person's name as part of a mailing list violates the Privacy Act's prohibition on using a person's name for the purposes of trade." He also contends, among other points, that "the Mail Preference Service established by the Direct Marketing Association is no substitute for the 'written consent' required by the Privacy Act." U.S. News & World Report will reply to Mr. Avrahami's motion and then the Virginia Supreme Court must decide whether to review the decision of the lower court. More information on Avrahami v. US News & World Report is available at: http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk_mail/ ======================================================================= [8] Upcoming Conferences and Events ======================================================================= "Managing Privacy in Cyberspace and Across National Borders." October 8-10, 1996. Washington, DC. Sponsored by Privacy and American Business. Contact: Lorrie Sherwood, (201) 996-1154. "The Information Society: New Risks & Opportunities in Privacy," October 17-18, 1996. Bruxelles, Belgium. Sponsored by the European Parliament. Contact: http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/privacy96.html "Communications Unleashed - What's at Stake? Who Benefits? How to Get Involved!" October 19-20, 1996. Washington DC. Sponsored by CPSR and Georgetown University. Contact: phyland(a)aol.com. "19th National Information Systems Security Conference." October 22-25, 1996. Baltimore, MD. Sponsored by NSA & NIST. Contact: Tammy Grice (301) 948-2067. National Consumer Rights Litigation Conference: Defending Consumer Access to Justice. October 26-28. Washington, DC. Sponsored by the National Consumer Law Center. Contact: NCSL: (617) 523-7398 (fax). ETHICOMP96: The Third International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, November 6-8, 1996. Madrid, Spain. Contact: pbarroso(a)capilla.cph.es. "CFP97: Commerce & Community." March 11-14, 1997. Burlingame, California. Sponsored by the Association for Computing Machinery. Contact: Cfp97(a)cfp.org or http://www.cfp.org. "Eurosec'97, the Seventh Annual Forum on Information Systems Quality and Security." March 17-19. 1997. Paris, France. Sponsored by XP Conseil. Contact: http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/eurosec/ "INET 97 -- The Internet: The Global Frontiers." June 24-27, 1997. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Sponsored by the Internet Society. Contact: inet97(a)isoc.org or http://www.isoc.org/inet97. (Send calendar submissions to alert(a)epic.org) ======================================================================= The EPIC Alert is a free biweekly publication of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. To subscribe, send email to epic-news(a)epic.org with the subject: "subscribe" (no quotes). Back issues are available via http://www.epic.org/alert/ ======================================================================= The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center in Washington, DC. It was established in 1994 to focus public attention on emerging privacy issues such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital Telephony proposal, national id cards, medical record privacy, and the collection and sale of personal information. EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government, a non-profit organization established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional rights. EPIC publishes the EPIC Alert, pursues Freedom of Information Act litigation, and conducts policy research. For more information, email info(a)epic.org, HTTP://www.epic.org or write EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1 202 544 9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax). If you'd like to support the work of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, contributions are welcome and fully tax-deductible. Checks should be made out to "The Fund for Constitutional Government" and sent to EPIC, 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301, Washington DC 20003. Individuals with First Virtual accounts can donate at http://www.epic.org/epic/support.html Your contributions will help support Freedom of Information Act and First Amendment litigation, strong and effective advocacy for the right of privacy and efforts to oppose government regulation of encryption and funding of the National Wiretap Plan. Thank you for your support. ---------------------- END EPIC Alert 3.17 -----------------------

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