- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek reorder"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org --*+* *+* .- 3:47:29 99.20% robo robo(a)c2.org #** *##+ ## 1:57 99.04% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *** ***+* ** 9:23 98.98% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ++* ** +* ** 19:50 98.83% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ++* ***+* * 12:53 98.69% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++ ++ ++ 36:16 98.69% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ##+ ## :51 98.68% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----+-+ + - 1:13:12 98.54% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net *** * +* * 17:08 98.26% replay remailer(a)replay.com ++* ** 7:26 98.05% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com * +* ## 3:56 97.99% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net **+** + * 16:08 97.79% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #** *#-+* # 3:17 97.03% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ------- - - 6:03:13 95.95% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi -----..- - 11:16:54 95.74% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+* + ++ # 5:01 95.02% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de _ _-.-+ +++ 17:34:27 92.75% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -..-- ----- 5:46:08 92.40% c2 remail(a)c2.org +++ + + + 53:15 91.60% rahul homer(a)rahul.net -**+*#++* * 8:22 97.99% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org +- ++ 5:13:50 28.61% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: WRITTEN CODE
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 18 Nov 1995 s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > Curious, where is uncg.edu? Your French name doesn't make me think you're > in the States (as an .edu address might suggest, but then not necessarily > either). (univ of Calgary?) I think the University of Calgary is actually in the .ca domain. It's a Canadian address. Its just like your very own domain. Your machine tesla is on uottawa.ca. Your University of Ottawa address is not in .edu, but is in .ca. It's interesting though, that you brought up Calgary. Calgary, as I assume our Ottawa poster knows, was very busy over the last week. Grand Central station. All of the politico's seemed to transit the city. Reform Party Leader, Preston Manning, and Conservative Party Leader, Jean Charest, held duelling fund-raising dinners this last Wednesday in Calgary. And Canada's ambassador to the United States, the Prime Minister's nephew -- Raymond Chretien -- left Washington and spoke to the Calgary Chamber of Commerce about NAFTA on Friday. Chretien was particularly troubled by remarks from Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, about wanting to re-open Chapter 19 in the NAFTA. Following his Chamber of Commerce address, Chretien was quoted as saying, "For us, Chapter 19 is the heart of NAFTA. And this dispute mechanism has been put in there to take into account the fact that we are a much smaller economy, a much smaller country. We have to rely on those tri-national panels to defend our interests." Chretien for now is chalking up the threatening comments to political posturing in the run-up to the presidential election next year, otherwise he said, "we will have a serious problem." Chretien also played down security concerns after a knife-wielding intruder broke into his uncle's (the Prime Minister's) home at 24 Sussex. Despite living in Washington, D.C., Chretien said he doesn't fear for his public safety. When he was asked about the lack of visible protection during his visit to Calgary, he said: "I'm just a humble public servant." Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: "Junk Email"
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

See http://www.valleynet.net/hypermail/html/ Hurry, they might turn it off. ROTFL -rich

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Pi Stuff
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Various amazed people on the Pi thread wrote: > But BTW, isn't it interesting, that news item from a few > weeks ago, on an algorithm for determining individual bits > in Pi, regardless of whether you've calculated all the > previous ones. Only problem is, it only works in > hexadecimal (and, obviously, binary, etc, not decimal. > I didn't see this result you mention, but it surprises me. > Yeah, well, I understand your frustration, but to me the > really amazing part is that the elephant flies at all, and > not how well he flies (<G>) (In other words, the amazing > thing is that there is a predictable relationship in ANY > base system) Chances are the thing WON'T work in base > 3,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, and any other non 2**n base. > Or, at least, it will take a DIFFERENT equation to work in > those other bases, if they work at all. A few quick comments. The notion that one might be able to compute digits of Pi efficiently at any starting point in the number is not late-breaking news. The Chudnovsky brothers developed a formula which permitted them to do this a number of years ago, and used it to compute Pi to several billion digits. Prior to that time, the Borweins' quartic interation based on Ramanujan's modular identities and AGM techniques was the existing state of the art. Given a base, d, and an finite ordinal, i, the function which computes the ith digit of the Pi in the base d is certainly a computable one. If we can find an algorithm for computing this function whose time as a function of "i" does not include the time required to compute all previous digits, then we are to a certain extent evaluating individual digits of Pi without calculating the previous ones. One should keep in mind, however, that the degree to which such things are true for algorithms lies on a continuum, with a near-constant number of arithmetic operations at one end, and a geometric progression at the other. So it is not the classic either/or situation. Good algorithms whose times are tractable functions of "i" are certainly desirable, and have been discovered. Someone suggested that radix conversion was a time-consuming operation. Modern FFT-based algorithms can do multiplication, division, Nth root, reciprocal, and base conversion in near-linear time. Doubtless good algorithms to compute the Nth digit of Pi in any base do exist, but their form may not be as obvious as those for trivial bases, such as powers of two. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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[NON-LIST] Re: reputations: discussions and meta-discussions
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(This really should be in private mail; keyid D072FC19 (still unnamed) can reach me using anon.penet.fi or alpha.c2.org or a reply-block remailer to get replies.... Or if you prefer, send me one-way remail and I'll post replies in alt.anonymous.messages.) At 02:17 AM 11/19/95 -0800, - keyid D072FC19 (still unnamed) wrote: >On Sat, 18 Nov 1995, Bill Stewart wrote: >> Here's the new entity's key, signed :-) I haven't added it to the >> PGP key servers; I'll leave that up to you... > >As we know, a public key certificate is a binding between the key and >some attribute, as asserted by the signer. In this case you have asserted >a binding between my key and the string "a new entity, as yet unnamed". >I don't understand why you did this. Would you please explain? >The only reason I can think of is that you wanted to provide evidence >for the key's creation date by timestamping it. If that was the case, >I thank you. But in the future, to avoid confusion, perhaps you can >create a new ID "timestamp" for the key and sign that instead. Are you asking why I used the string "a new entity, as yet unnamed", or why I certified it? If the former, it's because when I loaded the PGP key block into my public key file, that's who it said it was, and it matched the name in your cypherpunks posting. If you're asking why I certified a key used by a nym, I started doing that a couple months ago, as an experiment about what it means to certify keys and how to provide better continuity for keys used by nyms, and signing yours seemed like an appropriate thing to do (since you chose to name your key as belonging to the same string you signed your message with.) I have the policy of only signing one key for a given namestring with the key I use for signing nyms, so it gives a certain evidence of uniqueness as well as the timestamping effect. Since you also commented on cluttering up namespace, I didn't send the key to the keyserver myself; that's up to you. Has it been a wildly successful experiment? Well, no :-) But I've at least had to think about some of the issues more, and a couple of people have gotten their nym keys signed. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP can be vulnerable to virus attacks. (Similar attacks can be made on other cipher systems.) These virus attacks can either be "Get the Key", or "Subvert the System" attacks. Schneier's "Rubber Hose" attack and a class of attack which I will call "Black Bag" attacks are get the key attacks. With a black bag attack, victims do not know their keys have been stolen, and so continue to use them. (According to "The Puzzle Palace", NSA got the FBI to perform black bag attacks on embassies in Washington DC.) I don't think subvert the system attacks have any parallel in classical cryptography. Get the Key Attacks PGP has three keys: the secret key ring pass phrase, the secret RSA key, and the IDEA key. Getting any of them would constitute a successful attack. A virus that collects secret key rings and sends their contents somewhere, either via UDP like messages or by dialing the modem late at night doesn't seem to much harder to build than one that erases your hard disk. If it runs only once per machine, its chances of getting caught are fairly low. The standard IP error handling of "throw away the packet" means that it probably won't be caught by firewalls. It seems more likely that someone will catch their computer making an unauthorized 800 number call. This attack would allow an opponent to use a brute force attack on the pass phrase. Getting the pass phrase or the IDEA key requires that the virus infect something in the PGP environment. The infection could be to PGP itself, or to the operating system in which it runs. (N.B. Since Mac and PC systems have only one protection domain, all programs running in them are part of the operating system for the sake of this analysis.) Assuming PGP is infected, although similar arguments apply to the operating system, the possible mechanisms of infection are many: A infected PGP binary is installed A virus modifies disk copies of PGP The OS's loader is infected to modify PGP as it is loaded The compiler or linker is infected to modify PGP. Any of these forms of infection could send pass phrases, secret keys, or IDEA keys out via IP or modem. Subvert the System Attacks The mechanisms of infection are similar to those of the get the key attacks, but these attacks do not require that the virus send data outside the machine. Instead, these attacks act by reducing the size of one of the three key spaces, making it vulnerable to brute force attacks. For example, if the OS provides a "random number" service, then limiting the randomness of the numbers constitutes an attack. Making RSA key generation loosely connected to the date and time constitutes an attack. Defenses One standard defense in classical cryptography is to frequently change the cipher keys. The PGP web-of-trust makes changing keys difficult, and is perhaps the weakest part of the overall protocol. Standard defenses against viruses can help, but if the attacker is determined and competent, then the virus will not be detected by virus detection programs, and will not have bugs which cause noticeable ill effects on infected machines. Custom changes to things like random number utilities and the PGP code itself may increase resistance by preventing some of these attacks from identifying the modified code as its intended target. Auditing code, preferably object code, can detect infection. Having ALL the source code available is almost a requirement here. Maintaining a file of cryptographic hashs of the IDEA keys used and checking for duplicates can detect subvert the system attacks on IDEA key generation at the risk that the cryptographic hash is in fact invertible and can be used to reveal the IDEA key. Using operating systems which run in many small protection domains can limit the opportunity for infection. One such system I have been involved with for over 20 years is described at the following WEB sites: http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~KeyKOS/ http://www.webcom.com/agorics/allkey.html Bill ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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(cpx) Re: "Junk E-Mail"
by Dave Dittrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 06:47 PM 11/19/95 -0500, you wrote: > > > > Is anyone else getting lots of junk e-mail lately? I'm getting all > >kinds of direct marketing crap to both of my main accounts and I haven't > >posted to usenet in months. > > On a related note, Compuserve had a note on their system last week from > the sysop. Their customers are receiving unwanted e-mail advertisements > from the Internet. Compuserve sysops are attempting to block the spaming > but are finding it difficult because the advertiser is coming in via > different routes. They are also attempting to stop them using the court > system. > > The advertiser, according to the Compuserve sysop, threatened a > mail-bombing if Compuserve tried to block them!!! This would be a just > cause to call in the CSOF (Cypherpunk Soldier of Fortune) for a "measured > response". Yes, I've noticed these as well. One troubling thing I noted with one such spam-handed "attack" was the use of a group of internal email addresses (in the sense that we don't advertise these addresses) as addressees for a message that had an analog sent to www-buyinfo and some other web related addresses. This seems to indicate a way of organizing lists into sets based on location/topic, but doesn't include all other potential addressees in the same domain or organization. I guess it was only a matter of time before someone wrote sophisticated spamming servers that somehow capture/analyze log files, or is this just some idiot front end that lets ad-happy fools spam with a smaller apparent footprint? By the way... One reply I got from an ISP re: one of these drive by spammings indicated that they were charging the idiot for disobeying policy. I've started suggesting to ISPs that they dis-user and charge the offender (in case they haven't thought of this yet). If non-spam policies were more widely used, and these idiots loose their email/access and a few hundred dollars in charges for wasting ISP admin time, perhaps this trend won't continue. -- Dave Dittrich Client Services, Computing & Communications dittrich(a)cac.washington.edu University of Washington <a href="http://www.washington.edu/People/dad/"> Dave Dittrich / dittrich(a)cac.washington.edu</a>

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Remailer list or FAQ?
by Thomas E Zerucha 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a FAQ or other list of anonymous remailers? Or how to use the one at portal.com (I had this info somewhere, but it takes forever to do a zgrep `find...). zerucha(a)shell.portal.com -or- 2015509 on MCI Mail finger zerucha(a)jobe.portal.com for PGP key

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Pix Lox
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Gates in "The Road Ahead": A complete failure of the information highway is worth worrying about. Because the system will be thoroughly decentralized, any single outage is unlikely to have a widespread effect. If an individual server fails, it will be replaced and restored. But the system could be susceptible to assault. As the system becomes more important, we will have to design in more redundancy. One area of vulnerability is the system's reliance on cryptography -- the mathematical locks that keep information safe. Excerpted in Newsweek, November 27, pp. 67-68. Rubberneck the roadwreck with Steven Levy in "Bill's New Vision."

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Re: toolkits?
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alice here ... On Wed, 8 Nov 1995, Daniel R. Oelke, <droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com> wrote: > > Now were getting specific. These are things that us ordinary folk can do > > which show the 'leaders' how to follow. What software, hardware, > > applications, support and sysadmin experience is required and where is it > > available on what terms. What are the cash flow opportunities to support > > such services? By "cash flow-opportunities", is this the "opportunity-cost" of providing services?? The foregone profits of today. Or is this the future cash flow opportunities which could arise from this type of activity. The future assets of tomorrow? Essentially, doesn't all of this reduce to "valuing" in present dollar terms (i.e. attaching a discounted present value through some appropriate hurdle rate) to some level of future benefit. The real issue as I see it, is finding some way to actually "fund" that hazy discounted present value. > A good service would be to provide and support distribution of > of privacy enhancing tools to universities and companies that > want them. i.e. have people who will help set up firewalls, > PGP, encrypted telnet (pick your flavor), etc. As long as it of course *obviously* excludes product like Netscape Navigator -- the black-box code with significant security holes and flaws -- I'd have to agree that this is in fact a very good idea. But it requires forward-thinking. It's no different actually than paying someone for what they know, rather than paying them for what they do. > Yes - I know that most of this stuff is out there already, > but having people *willing* to integrate it for you without > charging an arm and a leg would go a long way towards convincing the > suits that this is a *good* thing. It sounds good on the surface. In fact the liason officer / integrator might even establish some valuable "working relationships". I think that this form of thinking is what will define who will be long term players in this industry -- and who won't. Those who are able to build "goodwill" will survive and flourish, while the others will flounder. If I may paraphrase, I believe that Dan is speaking possibly of loss-leader services. Services which do not in actuality show presently as "high value-added" under our antiquated systems of accounting and measurement. Services which might in fact reduce short-term "profits" because they are "current-expensed" rather than being recognized as the deferred assets, they in fact truly are. (Essentially, the same problem we've visited with R&D expenses. The problem where the "solution" is defined as cutting R&D expense, so that there is increased "profit", although long-term health and corporate competitiveness is actually weakened. A true management accounting paradox.) There should be a re-focus onto a horizon that is somewhat longer than the current quarter. Or the current day, for that matter, or the current moment. Unfortunately, these types of "forward-thinking" plans and projects all require current funds. Money. And lots of it, before they start showing and generating "measurable" returns. It really is the laying and strengthening of foundations. And who has the authority to spend any money on "wasteful" foundations?? If no one funds these types of projects, either jointly or individually, then these projects and bright ideas invariably go absolutely nowhere. > Dan > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems > droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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