July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [IP] is restricted cell net access acceptable?
by bts＠evenmere.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> Isn't [Web app] access public enough for a mobile terminal where > operators interests do matter, although perhaps not as much as > operators constrain it to today? It restricts one critical component: the iPhone cannot keep a secret. I don't mean that your data isn't safe---I'm sure Apple's put significant effort into keeping secrets in their native apps, and that the SSL/TLS code is well done. I mean that the web apps I can write for an iPhone cannot behave as principals in cryptographic protocols. I can't write an SSH client, for example, or a protocol for any instant messaging system whatsoever. The only way to do such is to run the interesting protocol client remotely, and provide a web interface to access from the iPhone. That unnecessarily involves a third party. As you say, the iPhone is a mobile network terminal---but its capabilities as a peer on that network have been crippled. I also cannot write an editor or viewer for locally stored data---that's a problem related to secret keeping and to the origin-only restrictions on JavaScript. -Brian -- Brian Sniffen bts(a)alum.mit.edu GPG Key fingerprint DED2 61C9 3CBA E7A2 D20D F933 D379 A524 79E0 25F1 Want to verify that I sent this message? Use http://www.gnupg.org/ and http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ with Thunderbird ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Important new protection for anonymous speech in Texas
by Paul Levy 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The Texas Court of Appeals for the Sixth Appellate District at Texarkana took an important step today toward protecting the rights of Internet bloggers in Texas to write anonymously. In an opinion issued by Justice Jack Carter in Essent v. Doe, the court of appeals joins a broad consensus of state and federal courts in insisting that plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to show they could win at trial before gaining access to information identifying anonymous speakers whom they wish to sue for wrongdoing. The case arose from a blog about the Paris Regional Medical Center in Paris, Texas, which included analysis of problems at the hospital (http://the-paris-site.blogspot.com ). Claiming a concern for patient privacy, Essent, the operator of the Medical Center, sued for defamation, and immediately sought discovery to identify the employees who, Essent claimed, were revealing confidential patient information in the course of criticizing abuses at the hospital. The Doe, represented by James Rodgers of the Moore Law Firm in Paris, sought to block discovery but District Judge Scott McDowell upheld the request. However, the Court of Appeals has now reversed and remanded the case to give the hospital a chance to submit evidence for consideration under the proper legal standard. In ruling, the court recognized that although Internet anonymity can be abused, the right to speak anonymously online is protected by the First Amendment. That right cannot be denied absent real evidence supporting the plaintiffbs claims of wrongdoing. Otherwise, the very threat of litigation will have a serious chilling effect on anonymous speech. The court also agreed with rulings in other states that declare an anonymous blogger has b standingb to oppose discovery even though the discovery demand is directed to a third-party Internet hosting service, and that a blogger has the right to appeal if their request for anonymity is denied. The decision is not a perfect one. Unlike last monthbs decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Mobilisa v. Doe, and the 2001 ruling of the New Jersey Appellate Division in Dendrite v. Doe, the Texas Court of Appeals did not add an explicit balancing step, under which, for example, the danger of retaliation against an employee whistleblower can be considered in deciding whether the plaintiff has put in enough evidence of wrongdoing. This case may well present a realistic possibility of such retaliation. So far as I have been able to determine, the balancing step was not proposed to the Texas court. Still, the requirement of presenting evidence provides an important measure of protection for employee whistleblowers and other anonymous critics of powerful corporations, political figures, and others. The opinion can be found on the web site of the Texas Court of Appeals at http://www.6thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/HTMLOpinion.asp?OpinionID=9055 (We have not been involved in the Essent case, having learned about the appeal too late to submit our views as friend of the court) Paul Alan Levy Public Citizen Litigation Group 1600 - 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 588-1000 http://www.citizen.org/litigation ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Important new protection for anonymous speech in Texas
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Wikileaks moved to cave bunker in Iran, Mr. Assange reportedly offered asylum by North Korea...
by Joe Greco 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> On Thu, Dec 2, 2010 at 10:05 PM, Ken Chase <ken(a)sizone.org> wrote: > > All our topics of discussion are merging... (soon: "does > > Wikileaks run on 208V?" :) > > If they keep going that way, soon they will be running on nuclear > power from the hidden centrifuges in some cave. And just announced via Twitter ... no, just kidding. However, the events here are troublesome. On one hand, it's kind of predictable. You have some things in the real world, like the arrest alert and being placed on Interpol's "most wanted" for what appears to be not even a case of rape [*1], getting booted from EC2 for "intellectual property" reasons (when the materials in question are not and cannot be copyrighted), having their DNS service disrupted, etc. Assange has irritated a large beast: the US Government. On the other hand, this is the same government that has repeatedly fought to reduce and minimize privacy laws, seen recently in cases such as the GPS tracking fun out in the western states [*2]. None of that might seem relevant to netops, of course, but at some point, we're going to see, and maybe already are seeing, deliberate interference with the network in an effort to make the Internet work the way that the US Government would prefer. We've already seen some examples of this in seizures of domain names [*3], an activity that would doubtlessly explode under COICA, etc., which at the moment is probably the most vulnerable aspect of the Internet, but will this move on to more insidious things, such as redirection of or null routing of Wikileaks IP space "in response to a congressman's request", while simultaneously waving a patriotic flag? And at what point does that stop? Just for "big bad" things like Wikileaks? We seem to be sailing into an interesting new set of challenges. I'm not sure that it'll be healthy for the net for the government to be providing lists of IP addresses that have to be blocked; our routing tables are already quite challenged. [*1] http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/sex-by-surprise-at-heart-of-julian-ass… [*2] http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/ [*3] http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/11/us-government-seizes-82-websites-draco… ... JG -- Joe Greco - sol.net Network Services - Milwaukee, WI - http://www.sol.net "We call it the 'one bite at the apple' rule. Give me one chance [and] then I won't contact you again." - Direct Marketing Ass'n position on e-mail spam(CNN) With 24 million small businesses in the US alone, that's way too many apples. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Wikileaks moved to cave bunker in Iran, Mr. Assange reportedly offered asylum by North Korea...
by Joe Greco 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> On Thu, Dec 2, 2010 at 10:05 PM, Ken Chase <ken(a)sizone.org> wrote: > > All our topics of discussion are merging... (soon: "does > > Wikileaks run on 208V?" :) > > If they keep going that way, soon they will be running on nuclear > power from the hidden centrifuges in some cave. And just announced via Twitter ... no, just kidding. However, the events here are troublesome. On one hand, it's kind of predictable. You have some things in the real world, like the arrest alert and being placed on Interpol's "most wanted" for what appears to be not even a case of rape [*1], getting booted from EC2 for "intellectual property" reasons (when the materials in question are not and cannot be copyrighted), having their DNS service disrupted, etc. Assange has irritated a large beast: the US Government. On the other hand, this is the same government that has repeatedly fought to reduce and minimize privacy laws, seen recently in cases such as the GPS tracking fun out in the western states [*2]. None of that might seem relevant to netops, of course, but at some point, we're going to see, and maybe already are seeing, deliberate interference with the network in an effort to make the Internet work the way that the US Government would prefer. We've already seen some examples of this in seizures of domain names [*3], an activity that would doubtlessly explode under COICA, etc., which at the moment is probably the most vulnerable aspect of the Internet, but will this move on to more insidious things, such as redirection of or null routing of Wikileaks IP space "in response to a congressman's request", while simultaneously waving a patriotic flag? And at what point does that stop? Just for "big bad" things like Wikileaks? We seem to be sailing into an interesting new set of challenges. I'm not sure that it'll be healthy for the net for the government to be providing lists of IP addresses that have to be blocked; our routing tables are already quite challenged. [*1] http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/sex-by-surprise-at-heart-of-julian-ass… [*2] http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/ [*3] http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/11/us-government-seizes-82-websites-draco… ... JG -- Joe Greco - sol.net Network Services - Milwaukee, WI - http://www.sol.net "We call it the 'one bite at the apple' rule. Give me one chance [and] then I won't contact you again." - Direct Marketing Ass'n position on e-mail spam(CNN) With 24 million small businesses in the US alone, that's way too many apples. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Wired: NSAbs Warrantless Wiretapping and Data Mining
by Moritz Bartl 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/new-yorker-on-thomas-drake/ New Yorker Sheds New Light on NSAbs Warrantless Wiretapping and Data Mining By Kim Zetter May 16, 2011 | 5:37 pm | Categories: Crime, NSA, Surveillance New details about the NSAbs postbSept. 11 domestic surveillance programs have emerged in a stunning New Yorker article about NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake, who faces trial next month for allegedly leaking information about waste and mismanagement at the agency. The article provides new insight into the warrantless surveillance program exposed by The New York Times in December 2005, including how top officials at the intelligence agency viewed the program. Former NSA Director Michael Hayden, in 2002, reportedly urged a congressional staffer who was concerned about the legality of the program to keep quiet about it, telling her that she could b yell and screamb about the program once the inevitable leaks about it occurred. Asked why the NSA didnbt employ privacy protections in its program, Hayden reportedly told the staffer, b We didnbt need them. We had the power,b and admitted the government was not getting warrants for the domestic surveillance. The New Yorker also spoke with a former head of the agencybs Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center, or SARC, who invented software codenamed ThinThread that is believed to have been adapted by the NSA for the warrantless surveillance. The program had privacy protections built into it, but the official says he believes the NSA rejiggered the program to remove those protections, so that it could collect data on everyone, including people in the United States. Thomas Drake, the focus of the article, is facing trial next month on charges that he violated the Espionage Act by retaining classified information. Ironically, hebs not being charged for leaking classified information about the warrantless wiretapping program itself. Instead, the charges are based on five documents government investigators found in Drakebs basement and e-mail archive that prosecutors say contain classified information. The documents discuss another data-mining program dubbed Trailblazer that was deemed a failure and canceled before it was implemented. Drake allegedly provided information about waste and mismanagement of the Trailblazer program to a reporter at the Baltimore Sun in 2006 and 2007, but he maintains that he gave the reporter no classified information and disputes that the documents found in his possession contain classified material. Drake, who left the NSA in 2008 and now works at an Apple Store outside Washington, D.C., is facing a possible sentence of 35 years if convicted. The governmentbs decision to prosecute him is now resulting in further information about the NSAbs illegal surveillance being exposed, as the New Yorker article shows. Drake was a linguist and military crypto expert who had been an NSA contractor when he began a new staff job with the agency on the fateful morning of September 11, 2001, in the agencybs Signals Intelligence Directorate. As a contractor, Drake had become familiar with a data-mining program codenamed ThinThread, that had been tested within the NSA and could be deployed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions where terrorism was prevalent. After 9/11, the program seemed ideal to address the suddenly urgent need to track down terrorist targets. The program was created in the late b90s by Bill Binney, a mathematician and head of the NSAbs SARC unit. It was designed to trap, map and mine vast amounts of data in real time to pick out relevant and suspicions communications, rather than requiring the data to be stored and sifted later. The New Yorker details it: As Binney imagined it, ThinThread would correlate data from financial transactions, travel records, Web searches,GPS equipment, and any other b attributesb that an analyst might find useful in pinpointing b the bad guys.b By 2000, Binney, using fibre optics, had set up a computer network that could chart relationships among people in real time. It also turned the N.S.A.bs data-collection paradigm upside down. Instead of vacuuming up information around the world and then sending it all back to headquarters for analysis, ThinThread processed information as it was collectedbdiscarding useless information on the spot and avoiding the overload problem that plagued centralized systems. Binney says, b The beauty of it is that it was open-ended, so it could keep expanding.b The program was b nearly perfectb except for one thing. It swooped up the data of Americans as well as foreigners and continued to intercept foreign communications as they traversed U.S.-based switches and networks. This violated U.S. law, which forbids the collection of domestic communication without a probable-cause warrant. To solve this problem, Binney added privacy controls and an b anonymizing featureb to encrypt all American communications that ThinThread processed. The system would flag patterns that looked suspicious, which authorities could then use to obtain a warrant and decrypt the information. ThinThread was ready to deploy in early 2001, but the NSAbs lawyers determined it violated Americansb privacy, and NSA director Michael Hayden scrapped it. In its place, Hayden focused funding on a different program, codenamed Trailblazer, which the NSA contracted with outside defense companies, like SAIC, to produce. That system ran into numerous problems and cost overruns, yet continued with Haydenbs support. Haydenbs deputy director and his chief of signals-intelligence programs worked at various times for SAIC, which received several Trailblazer contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2006, after eating up some $1.2 billion, Trailblazer was finally deemed a flop and killed. But in the meantime, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, rumors began circulating within the NSA that the agency, with the approval of the White House, was violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by conducting domestic surveillance. On Oct. 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the policy, which was operational by Oct. 6. Drake said strange things began happening inside the NSA, with equipment suddenly being moved, and people who worked on FISA warrants being re-assigned. Drake saw this as a tipoff that the conventional legal surveillance process was being circumvented. Binney, who wasnbt involved directly in the post-9/11 surveillance program, was certain that the rumored surveillance must be using components of the ThinThread program he helped design, but with the privacy protections now stripped out of it. b It was my brainchild,b he told The New Yorker. b But they removed the protections, the anonymization process. When you remove that, you can target anyone.b NSA people who were apprised of the program told him, b Can you believe theybre doing this? Theybre getting billing records on U.S. citizens! Theybre putting pen registers on everyone in the country!b Drake heard from colleagues that the surveillance involved special b arrangementsb that were being made with telecom and credit card companies to collect data on customers. Drake says he tried to raise concerns about the legality of the program with the NSAbs general counsel but was told not to worry about it, that it was legal and none of his business. b The mantra was bGet the data!bb he told The New Yorker. He discussed the issue with Maureen Baginski, his superior at the NSA and the third-highest-ranking official in the agency. She reportedly told him presciently that she feared the NSA would be b hauntedb by the surveillance program. She left the agency in 2003 in part because she was uncomfortable with the program, The New Yorker reports. Drake also confided in Diane Roark, a staff member on the House Intelligence Committee. She wrote a series of memos in February 2002 warning of the potential legal violations and gave them to Intelligence Committee staffers who worked for committee chairman Porter Goss and Democratic minority Whip Nancy Pelosi. But nothing happened. Instead, Roark drew the wrath of Hayden who pleaded with her to stop agitating against the program and seemed to suggest to Roark he had assurances that the Supreme Court would back the program. The New Yorker: He conceded that the policy would leak at some point, and told her that when it did she could b yell and screamb as much as she wished. Meanwhile, he wanted to give the program more time. She asked Hayden why the N.S.A. had chosen not to include privacy protections for Americans. She says that he b kept not answering. Finally, he mumbled, and looked down, and said, bWe didnbt need them. We had the power.b He didnbt even look me in the eye. I was flabbergasted.b She asked him directly if the government was getting warrants for domestic surveillance, and he admitted that it was not. Roark tried to contact Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist but got no response. When she contacted a judge on the FISA court to express concern that the NSA and government were doing an end-run around the court, she was referred to the Justice Department, which had approved the surveillance program in the first place. b This was such a Catch-22,b Roark told The New Yorker. b There was no one to go to.b _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [ZS] BitCoin FBI report
by R|diger Koch 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

2012/5/8 Bryce Lynch <virtualadept(a)gmail.com> > > Botnets are already being used to mine bitcoins. Or so they say. With mining moving from GPUs to FPGA, and ASIC mining on the horizon, what can even a billion CPUs do? > Blackhats are already using Bitcoins to pay for services, including > periods of DDoS attack against arbitrary targets and selling > weaponized exploits. Judging from the reputation tracking on the Silk > Road for such services, somebody's got to be getting their money's > worth... > > We had best tread carefully. I can't disagree any stronger. The cashless society is coming up. Listen what RMS has to say: http://bitcoinmedia.com/stallman-likes-bitcoin/ But even he doesn't completely grasp the full issue. It's not only the payment provider who has to nod to each and every one of your transactions. You also need at least your government to agree. And that of the counter party. In a cashless society your government has a level of power over you that even the Kims of North Korea can only dream of having over their subjects. If the government simply does not help you in your purchases, you cannot buy a thing. The cashless society as dreamed up by certain companies and governments will turn out a totalitarian nightmare that will not end. Unless we do something. This is a number of years off. Bitcoin is our best hope that we will never have to physically fight for our rights. So the least what we can do at the moment is to use Bitcoin for every (legitimate) purchase that can be done with Bitcoin. Or start working on developing an > disseminating a memetic counterattack. > Yeah. -R|diger -- Zero State mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] Wired: NSAbs Warrantless Wiretapping and Data Mining
by Moritz Bartl 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/new-yorker-on-thomas-drake/ New Yorker Sheds New Light on NSAbs Warrantless Wiretapping and Data Mining By Kim Zetter May 16, 2011 | 5:37 pm | Categories: Crime, NSA, Surveillance New details about the NSAbs postbSept. 11 domestic surveillance programs have emerged in a stunning New Yorker article about NSA whistleblower Thomas Drake, who faces trial next month for allegedly leaking information about waste and mismanagement at the agency. The article provides new insight into the warrantless surveillance program exposed by The New York Times in December 2005, including how top officials at the intelligence agency viewed the program. Former NSA Director Michael Hayden, in 2002, reportedly urged a congressional staffer who was concerned about the legality of the program to keep quiet about it, telling her that she could b yell and screamb about the program once the inevitable leaks about it occurred. Asked why the NSA didnbt employ privacy protections in its program, Hayden reportedly told the staffer, b We didnbt need them. We had the power,b and admitted the government was not getting warrants for the domestic surveillance. The New Yorker also spoke with a former head of the agencybs Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center, or SARC, who invented software codenamed ThinThread that is believed to have been adapted by the NSA for the warrantless surveillance. The program had privacy protections built into it, but the official says he believes the NSA rejiggered the program to remove those protections, so that it could collect data on everyone, including people in the United States. Thomas Drake, the focus of the article, is facing trial next month on charges that he violated the Espionage Act by retaining classified information. Ironically, hebs not being charged for leaking classified information about the warrantless wiretapping program itself. Instead, the charges are based on five documents government investigators found in Drakebs basement and e-mail archive that prosecutors say contain classified information. The documents discuss another data-mining program dubbed Trailblazer that was deemed a failure and canceled before it was implemented. Drake allegedly provided information about waste and mismanagement of the Trailblazer program to a reporter at the Baltimore Sun in 2006 and 2007, but he maintains that he gave the reporter no classified information and disputes that the documents found in his possession contain classified material. Drake, who left the NSA in 2008 and now works at an Apple Store outside Washington, D.C., is facing a possible sentence of 35 years if convicted. The governmentbs decision to prosecute him is now resulting in further information about the NSAbs illegal surveillance being exposed, as the New Yorker article shows. Drake was a linguist and military crypto expert who had been an NSA contractor when he began a new staff job with the agency on the fateful morning of September 11, 2001, in the agencybs Signals Intelligence Directorate. As a contractor, Drake had become familiar with a data-mining program codenamed ThinThread, that had been tested within the NSA and could be deployed in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regions where terrorism was prevalent. After 9/11, the program seemed ideal to address the suddenly urgent need to track down terrorist targets. The program was created in the late b90s by Bill Binney, a mathematician and head of the NSAbs SARC unit. It was designed to trap, map and mine vast amounts of data in real time to pick out relevant and suspicions communications, rather than requiring the data to be stored and sifted later. The New Yorker details it: As Binney imagined it, ThinThread would correlate data from financial transactions, travel records, Web searches,GPS equipment, and any other b attributesb that an analyst might find useful in pinpointing b the bad guys.b By 2000, Binney, using fibre optics, had set up a computer network that could chart relationships among people in real time. It also turned the N.S.A.bs data-collection paradigm upside down. Instead of vacuuming up information around the world and then sending it all back to headquarters for analysis, ThinThread processed information as it was collectedbdiscarding useless information on the spot and avoiding the overload problem that plagued centralized systems. Binney says, b The beauty of it is that it was open-ended, so it could keep expanding.b The program was b nearly perfectb except for one thing. It swooped up the data of Americans as well as foreigners and continued to intercept foreign communications as they traversed U.S.-based switches and networks. This violated U.S. law, which forbids the collection of domestic communication without a probable-cause warrant. To solve this problem, Binney added privacy controls and an b anonymizing featureb to encrypt all American communications that ThinThread processed. The system would flag patterns that looked suspicious, which authorities could then use to obtain a warrant and decrypt the information. ThinThread was ready to deploy in early 2001, but the NSAbs lawyers determined it violated Americansb privacy, and NSA director Michael Hayden scrapped it. In its place, Hayden focused funding on a different program, codenamed Trailblazer, which the NSA contracted with outside defense companies, like SAIC, to produce. That system ran into numerous problems and cost overruns, yet continued with Haydenbs support. Haydenbs deputy director and his chief of signals-intelligence programs worked at various times for SAIC, which received several Trailblazer contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2006, after eating up some $1.2 billion, Trailblazer was finally deemed a flop and killed. But in the meantime, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, rumors began circulating within the NSA that the agency, with the approval of the White House, was violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by conducting domestic surveillance. On Oct. 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the policy, which was operational by Oct. 6. Drake said strange things began happening inside the NSA, with equipment suddenly being moved, and people who worked on FISA warrants being re-assigned. Drake saw this as a tipoff that the conventional legal surveillance process was being circumvented. Binney, who wasnbt involved directly in the post-9/11 surveillance program, was certain that the rumored surveillance must be using components of the ThinThread program he helped design, but with the privacy protections now stripped out of it. b It was my brainchild,b he told The New Yorker. b But they removed the protections, the anonymization process. When you remove that, you can target anyone.b NSA people who were apprised of the program told him, b Can you believe theybre doing this? Theybre getting billing records on U.S. citizens! Theybre putting pen registers on everyone in the country!b Drake heard from colleagues that the surveillance involved special b arrangementsb that were being made with telecom and credit card companies to collect data on customers. Drake says he tried to raise concerns about the legality of the program with the NSAbs general counsel but was told not to worry about it, that it was legal and none of his business. b The mantra was bGet the data!bb he told The New Yorker. He discussed the issue with Maureen Baginski, his superior at the NSA and the third-highest-ranking official in the agency. She reportedly told him presciently that she feared the NSA would be b hauntedb by the surveillance program. She left the agency in 2003 in part because she was uncomfortable with the program, The New Yorker reports. Drake also confided in Diane Roark, a staff member on the House Intelligence Committee. She wrote a series of memos in February 2002 warning of the potential legal violations and gave them to Intelligence Committee staffers who worked for committee chairman Porter Goss and Democratic minority Whip Nancy Pelosi. But nothing happened. Instead, Roark drew the wrath of Hayden who pleaded with her to stop agitating against the program and seemed to suggest to Roark he had assurances that the Supreme Court would back the program. The New Yorker: He conceded that the policy would leak at some point, and told her that when it did she could b yell and screamb as much as she wished. Meanwhile, he wanted to give the program more time. She asked Hayden why the N.S.A. had chosen not to include privacy protections for Americans. She says that he b kept not answering. Finally, he mumbled, and looked down, and said, bWe didnbt need them. We had the power.b He didnbt even look me in the eye. I was flabbergasted.b She asked him directly if the government was getting warrants for domestic surveillance, and he admitted that it was not. Roark tried to contact Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist but got no response. When she contacted a judge on the FISA court to express concern that the NSA and government were doing an end-run around the court, she was referred to the Justice Department, which had approved the surveillance program in the first place. b This was such a Catch-22,b Roark told The New Yorker. b There was no one to go to.b _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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wow - palladiated! (Re: Palladium: technical limits and implications)
by Adam Back 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Aug 07, 2002 at 03:08:08PM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > At 6:54 PM +0100 on 8/7/02, Adam Back wrote: > > Palladiumized > > Palladiated? > > ;-). that's pretty funny, rhymes with irradiated -- nice connotations of radioactive material with radioactive half-lives spewing life-hazardous neutron radiation ;-) Helps that palladium is in fact a heavy metal. Man, perhaps Pd even _has_ a half-life on the decay path from plutonium down to lead or something. That would be very funny. Adam --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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MS recruits for Palladium microkernel and/or DRM platform
by R. A. Hettinga 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/26651.html MS recruits for Palladium microkernel and/or DRM platform By John Lettice Posted: 13/08/2002 at 10:23 GMT Microsoft's efforts to disassociate Palladium from DRM seem to have hit their first speed bump. Some voices within the company (and we currently believe these voices to be right and sensible) hold the view that Palladium has to be about users' security if it's to stand any chance of winning hearts and minds, and that associating it with protecting the music business' IP will be the kiss of death. So they'll probably not be best pleased by the Microsoft job ad that seeks a group program manager "interested in being part of Microsoft's effort to build the Digital Rights Management (DRM) and trusted platforms of the future (Palladium)." [...] ---------- --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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