July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Tor 0.0.9 is imminent
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi folks, If you've been stunned by the frequency of new release candidates and you've been waiting for The Actual Release Candidate, 0.0.9rc7 is it. If you have a free moment this weekend, please pull it down and try to break it. If no major problems come up, we'll be releasing 0.0.9 in a few days. Thanks! --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: PeerPoint Discussion - please don't use for other topics
by Miles Fidelman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Poor Richard wrote: > I'm disappointed but not surprised that the PeerPoint project is viewed > with scorn by old-guard digital libertarians and anarchists. Please don't count me as either of those, as I am neither. > > I am accused of being naive--they've seen everything and done > everything and they have a superior, smug outlook. They argue that what > works is more of what they are accustomed to. Personally, my criticisms are based precisely on lessons learned the hard way about what NOT to do, because it hasn't worked. > > But it is exactly that approach that resulted in the present state of > affairs in which the internet is colonized and dominated by large > corporate actors. > > Anarchists and libertarians are the unwitting pawns of the powerful > actors they mean to resist. I'll certainly agree with you there. Part of the mess we're in with the Internet comes precisely from folks who refused to play in the political or business arenas - leaving the Internet ripe for colonization by both corporate types and by old style regulators. Unfortunately, nobody wanted to get involved early to help craft a regulatory environment that would protect the net. > > I've been around IT since long before the internet, since it was called > data processing. Since before email and electronic bulletin boards and > USENET. And I've been involved in every aspect of it since we operated > mainframes with teletype terminals and punched tape right through until > today. I was old guard once, very old guard. > And it shows. PeerPoint strikes me as a classic case of analyze, analyze, analyze, then design the one true solution, by committee. To a degree that was necessary in the days of expensive mainframes - but it's also what led to the "PC wars" where corporate IT tried to hold the reigns of control, while departments bought microcomputers and PCs, and suddenly everyone was a spreadsheet jockey. Made life a lot easier for folks who wanted to get their jobs done, not so good for data sharing and long term preservation. It's not clear that the best balance has been found after 30 years or so. (I lived on both sides of those wars, not fun. And I, too, punched cards and toggled boot loaders into front panel switches before that.) One of the clear lessons of the past decade or so, is that developing software in today's world is a lot more like gardening, or maybe farming, than design and manufacturing. Define simple interfaces, create a climate, fertilize, cut weeds, do some selective seeding, trim stuff, and otherwise stand back. The clearest example is SOA vs. REST. Huge amounts of time and money have gone into defining SOA architectures, but noboday actually uses them. On the other hand, we have lots of mashups. There are lessons to be learned about developing software ecosystems. My sense is that PeerPoint is based on a set of premises and approaches that simply don't work anymore. -- In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is. .... Yogi Berra ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: The dh small subgroup confinement attack and Tor
by Curious Kid 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Maybe not a good week. Browser flaws expose users to man-in-the-middle attacks http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3950 Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsersb HTTPS Deployments http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/79323/pbp-final-with-update.pdf ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[EPIC_IDOF] I Have An Essay on Salon
by Bruce Schneier 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/ Uncle Sam is listening Bush may have bypassed federal wiretap law to deploy more high-tech methods of surveillance. By Bruce Schneier Dec. 20, 2005 | When President Bush directed the National Security Agency to secretly eavesdrop on American citizens, he transferred an authority previously under the purview of the Justice Department to the Defense Department and bypassed the very laws put in place to protect Americans against widespread government eavesdropping. The reason may have been to tap the NSA's capability for data-mining and widespread surveillance. Illegal wiretapping of Americans is nothing new. In the 1950s and '60s, the NSA intercepted every single telegram coming in or going out of the United States. It conducted eavesdropping without a warrant on behalf of the CIA and other agencies. Much of this became public during the 1975 Church Committee hearings and resulted in the now famous Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The purpose of this law was to protect the American people by regulating government eavesdropping. Like many laws limiting the power of government, it relies on checks and balances: one branch of the government watching the other. The law established a secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and empowered it to approve national-security-related eavesdropping warrants. The Justice Department can request FISA warrants to monitor foreign communications as well as communications by American citizens, provided that they meet certain minimal criteria. The FISC issued about 500 FISA warrants per year from 1979 through 1995, and has slowly increased subsequently -- 1,758 were issued in 2004. The process is designed for speed and even has provisions where the Justice Department can wiretap first and ask for permission later. In all that time, only four warrant requests were ever rejected: all in 2003. (We don't know any details, of course, as the court proceedings are secret.) FISA warrants are carried out by the FBI, but in the days immediately after the terrorist attacks, there was a widespread perception in Washington that the FBI wasn't up to dealing with these new threats -- they couldn't uncover plots in a timely manner. So instead the Bush administration turned to the NSA. They had the tools, the expertise, the experience, and so they were given the mission. The NSA's ability to eavesdrop on communications is exemplified by a technological capability called Echelon. Echelon is the world's largest information vacuum cleaner, sucking up a staggering amount of communications data -- satellite, microwave, fiber-optic, cellular, and everything else -- from all over the world: an estimated 3 billion communications per day. These communications are then processed through sophisticated data-mining technologies, looking for simple phrases like "assassinate the president" as well as more complicated communications patterns. Supposedly Echelon only covers communications outside of the United States. Although there is no evidence that the Bush administration has employed Echelon to monitor communications to and from the U.S., this surveillance capability is probably exactly what the president wanted and may explain why the administration sought to bypass the FISA process of acquiring a warrant for searches. Perhaps the NSA just didn't have any experience submitting FISA warrants, so Bush unilaterally waived that requirement. And perhaps Bush thought FISA was a hindrance -- in 2002 there was a widespread but false believe that the FISC got in the way of the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui (the presumed "20th hijacker") -- and bypassed the court for that reason. Most likely, Bush wanted a whole new surveillance paradigm. You can think of the FBI's capabilities as "retail surveillance": it eavesdrops on a particular person or phone. The NSA, on the other hand, conducts "wholesale surveillance." It, or more exactly its computers, listen to everything. An example might be to feed the computer a transcript of every conversation that mentions "Ayman al- Zawahiri" and monitor everybody who uttered the name, as well as everybody contacted. This type of surveillance was not anticipated in FISA and raises all sorts of legal issues. As Sen. Rockefeller wrote in a secret memo after being briefed on the program, it raises "profound oversight issues," and it is unclear whether FISA would have approved this activity. It is also unclear whether Echelon-style eavesdropping would prevent terrorist attacks. In the months before 9/11, Echelon noticed considerable "chatter": bits of conversation suggesting some sort of imminent attack. But because much of the planning for 9/11 occurred face-to-face, analysts were unable to learn details. The fundamental issue here is security, but it's not the security most people think of. James Madison famously said: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." Terrorism is a serious risk to our nation, but an even greater threat is the centralization of American political power in the hands of any single branch of the government. Over 200 years ago, the framers of the U.S. Constitution established an ingenious security device against tyrannical government: they divided government power among three different bodies. A carefully thought out system of checks and balances in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, ensured that no single branch became too powerful. After watching tyrannies rise and fall throughout Europe, this seemed like a prudent way to form a government. Courts monitor the actions of police. Congress passes laws that even the president must follow. Since 9/11, the United States has seen an enormous power grab by the executive branch. It's time we brought back the security system that's protected us from government for over 200 years. _______________________________________________ EPIC_IDOF mailing list EPIC_IDOF(a)mailman.epic.org https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Bruce Schneier -- An Essay on Salon
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: The dh small subgroup confinement attack and Tor
by Curious Kid 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Maybe not a good week. Browser flaws expose users to man-in-the-middle attacks http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=3950 Pretty-Bad-Proxy: An Overlooked Adversary in Browsersb HTTPS Deployments http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/79323/pbp-final-with-update.pdf ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: PeerPoint Discussion - please don't use for other topics
by Miles Fidelman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Poor Richard wrote: > I'm disappointed but not surprised that the PeerPoint project is viewed > with scorn by old-guard digital libertarians and anarchists. Please don't count me as either of those, as I am neither. > > I am accused of being naive--they've seen everything and done > everything and they have a superior, smug outlook. They argue that what > works is more of what they are accustomed to. Personally, my criticisms are based precisely on lessons learned the hard way about what NOT to do, because it hasn't worked. > > But it is exactly that approach that resulted in the present state of > affairs in which the internet is colonized and dominated by large > corporate actors. > > Anarchists and libertarians are the unwitting pawns of the powerful > actors they mean to resist. I'll certainly agree with you there. Part of the mess we're in with the Internet comes precisely from folks who refused to play in the political or business arenas - leaving the Internet ripe for colonization by both corporate types and by old style regulators. Unfortunately, nobody wanted to get involved early to help craft a regulatory environment that would protect the net. > > I've been around IT since long before the internet, since it was called > data processing. Since before email and electronic bulletin boards and > USENET. And I've been involved in every aspect of it since we operated > mainframes with teletype terminals and punched tape right through until > today. I was old guard once, very old guard. > And it shows. PeerPoint strikes me as a classic case of analyze, analyze, analyze, then design the one true solution, by committee. To a degree that was necessary in the days of expensive mainframes - but it's also what led to the "PC wars" where corporate IT tried to hold the reigns of control, while departments bought microcomputers and PCs, and suddenly everyone was a spreadsheet jockey. Made life a lot easier for folks who wanted to get their jobs done, not so good for data sharing and long term preservation. It's not clear that the best balance has been found after 30 years or so. (I lived on both sides of those wars, not fun. And I, too, punched cards and toggled boot loaders into front panel switches before that.) One of the clear lessons of the past decade or so, is that developing software in today's world is a lot more like gardening, or maybe farming, than design and manufacturing. Define simple interfaces, create a climate, fertilize, cut weeds, do some selective seeding, trim stuff, and otherwise stand back. The clearest example is SOA vs. REST. Huge amounts of time and money have gone into defining SOA architectures, but noboday actually uses them. On the other hand, we have lots of mashups. There are lessons to be learned about developing software ecosystems. My sense is that PeerPoint is based on a set of premises and approaches that simply don't work anymore. -- In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is. .... Yogi Berra ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[EPIC_IDOF] I Have An Essay on Salon
by Bruce Schneier 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2005/12/20/surveillance/ Uncle Sam is listening Bush may have bypassed federal wiretap law to deploy more high-tech methods of surveillance. By Bruce Schneier Dec. 20, 2005 | When President Bush directed the National Security Agency to secretly eavesdrop on American citizens, he transferred an authority previously under the purview of the Justice Department to the Defense Department and bypassed the very laws put in place to protect Americans against widespread government eavesdropping. The reason may have been to tap the NSA's capability for data-mining and widespread surveillance. Illegal wiretapping of Americans is nothing new. In the 1950s and '60s, the NSA intercepted every single telegram coming in or going out of the United States. It conducted eavesdropping without a warrant on behalf of the CIA and other agencies. Much of this became public during the 1975 Church Committee hearings and resulted in the now famous Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The purpose of this law was to protect the American people by regulating government eavesdropping. Like many laws limiting the power of government, it relies on checks and balances: one branch of the government watching the other. The law established a secret court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and empowered it to approve national-security-related eavesdropping warrants. The Justice Department can request FISA warrants to monitor foreign communications as well as communications by American citizens, provided that they meet certain minimal criteria. The FISC issued about 500 FISA warrants per year from 1979 through 1995, and has slowly increased subsequently -- 1,758 were issued in 2004. The process is designed for speed and even has provisions where the Justice Department can wiretap first and ask for permission later. In all that time, only four warrant requests were ever rejected: all in 2003. (We don't know any details, of course, as the court proceedings are secret.) FISA warrants are carried out by the FBI, but in the days immediately after the terrorist attacks, there was a widespread perception in Washington that the FBI wasn't up to dealing with these new threats -- they couldn't uncover plots in a timely manner. So instead the Bush administration turned to the NSA. They had the tools, the expertise, the experience, and so they were given the mission. The NSA's ability to eavesdrop on communications is exemplified by a technological capability called Echelon. Echelon is the world's largest information vacuum cleaner, sucking up a staggering amount of communications data -- satellite, microwave, fiber-optic, cellular, and everything else -- from all over the world: an estimated 3 billion communications per day. These communications are then processed through sophisticated data-mining technologies, looking for simple phrases like "assassinate the president" as well as more complicated communications patterns. Supposedly Echelon only covers communications outside of the United States. Although there is no evidence that the Bush administration has employed Echelon to monitor communications to and from the U.S., this surveillance capability is probably exactly what the president wanted and may explain why the administration sought to bypass the FISA process of acquiring a warrant for searches. Perhaps the NSA just didn't have any experience submitting FISA warrants, so Bush unilaterally waived that requirement. And perhaps Bush thought FISA was a hindrance -- in 2002 there was a widespread but false believe that the FISC got in the way of the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui (the presumed "20th hijacker") -- and bypassed the court for that reason. Most likely, Bush wanted a whole new surveillance paradigm. You can think of the FBI's capabilities as "retail surveillance": it eavesdrops on a particular person or phone. The NSA, on the other hand, conducts "wholesale surveillance." It, or more exactly its computers, listen to everything. An example might be to feed the computer a transcript of every conversation that mentions "Ayman al- Zawahiri" and monitor everybody who uttered the name, as well as everybody contacted. This type of surveillance was not anticipated in FISA and raises all sorts of legal issues. As Sen. Rockefeller wrote in a secret memo after being briefed on the program, it raises "profound oversight issues," and it is unclear whether FISA would have approved this activity. It is also unclear whether Echelon-style eavesdropping would prevent terrorist attacks. In the months before 9/11, Echelon noticed considerable "chatter": bits of conversation suggesting some sort of imminent attack. But because much of the planning for 9/11 occurred face-to-face, analysts were unable to learn details. The fundamental issue here is security, but it's not the security most people think of. James Madison famously said: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." Terrorism is a serious risk to our nation, but an even greater threat is the centralization of American political power in the hands of any single branch of the government. Over 200 years ago, the framers of the U.S. Constitution established an ingenious security device against tyrannical government: they divided government power among three different bodies. A carefully thought out system of checks and balances in the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, ensured that no single branch became too powerful. After watching tyrannies rise and fall throughout Europe, this seemed like a prudent way to form a government. Courts monitor the actions of police. Congress passes laws that even the president must follow. Since 9/11, the United States has seen an enormous power grab by the executive branch. It's time we brought back the security system that's protected us from government for over 200 years. _______________________________________________ EPIC_IDOF mailing list EPIC_IDOF(a)mailman.epic.org https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Bruce Schneier -- An Essay on Salon
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Ridiculous Airline Security Story N+1 and N+2...
by Rohit Khare 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Executive Summary: I am near my limit of anger with the "random", "neutral" FAA passenger profiling algorithm. I have every reason to believe some programmer has coded some strictures into it which would truly offend American civil society if translated from mathematics back into the ugly politics from whence it came. Soon after my last installment, I had to turn back around and fly out of Denver. They made me X-ray my *shoes*... This time, the problem was *too much* time on their hands. The second story is how I missed the last flight back home on Thanksgiving eve because the security supervisor wouldn't show up to process me at the gate in time. That snowballed into a series of Catch-22 situations trying to find a lost pair of glasses along the way. First, Denver. A tip on avoiding the Disneyland-like lines at the two main X-ray posts -- even though, strictly speaking, that's an insult to Disneyland, since even they've instituted a take-a-number pass system for the most popular rides. Rather than take the train to one of the outlying concourses, ignore the main signage and *walk* to Terminal A over a bridge on the ticketing level. That's the X-ray post to Continental, British, etc. Much less popular, even though many a savvy traveler knew that was the way around United's silly carryon sizer templates (Contintental's machines don't use them). Then take the train to wherever you really need to get to. A co-worker and I arrived at DIA together, and I was able to purchase a new ticket, and even with the foolishness of fellow business travelers in stocking-feet waiting for their shoes back, I caught up with him in the same train car... he spent the entire time in United lines. Now, for the real outrage. Today, I was warned about massive Thanksgiving delays at Sea-Tac, so I cut short a beer with a buddy in Bellevue to race back two and a half hours in advance. I returned the car, picked up a boarding pass from a pliant robot kiosk, and got through security in a wink. Two hours in advance... no problem, right? Well, I was a selectee, presumably since it was a one-way ticket. So I sat through yet another embarassing tearing-apart of my bags, and this time they found a pocket screwdriver. A promotional pen-style screwdriver that I've had for ten years (it's a NeXT repair shop :-) 1. They think you are not allowed to board with a three-inch, 1/8-inch wide screwdriver. 2. You are not allowed to ask the aircrew to hold it for you on the flight. 3. You are not allowed to leave the selectee table until a "GSC" supervisor comes to look it over. At this point, there's twenty minutes left.... tick-tock... now, the flight is almost completely boarded. You're still waiting. And now you suddenly realize you've lost your $400 prescription sunglasses. 4. You keep all your metal -- everything -- in your jacket at all times, so that you can x-ray a jacket rather than begin to empty out pockets. Your sunglasses have fallen out at some checkpoint. At this point, you start tracing back your steps. It's 7 minutes or so to push-back. 5. If you leave the selectee table, you will have to be searched all over again when you return to the gate 6. They do not have walkie-talkies to ask security if your glasses were stuck in the X-ray tunnel 7. See #3: You are not allowed to leave at all until the mythical GSC arrives. Finally, a GSC arrives. Two minutes or so to departure, you haven't been given any chance to run down and solve the mystery. 8. The screwdriver must be confiscated or bags must be checked. 9. Just because you have been flying with it all week means nothing. "We're supposed to randomly change what the FAA is looking for every day". Parse that, if you dare! 10. Any carry-on bag may be gate-checked *except* those containing "forbidden carry-on items". Catch-22 #1. So now you're finally free to run back to the X-ray post and miss your flight. 11. With about fifteen uniformed personnel of various stripes (National Guard, Argenbright, Alaska, and United), none of the first half-dozen people you ask claims to know about lost articles. 12. Before you can find a supervisor, the GSC has wandered back to warn them you are carrying a screwdriver. 13. So at this point, instead of any sympathy for a harried traveler asking for a supervisor, it's time for a lecture about "having committed two federal crimes, bringing a forbidden item into a screening area, lying about it to a ticket agent, two fines at $11,000 each" -- which they take the pompous time to warn you adds up to "a potential total fine of $22,000" since you're not paying enough attention to the supercillious bastard who won't admit to knowing who to ask about lost articles. Note that A) you are not allowed to leave your bags unaccompanied; and B) the only way for a solo traveler to speak to a security supervisor is to enter the screening area. Catch-22 #2. 14. Sufficiently alarmed, I am ordered to walk around, get back in line, and wait to be escorted back to the *front* of the metal detector to be handed my bags back. At this point, my interest is in going back to the Rental car desk and asking if I left the glasses there. At no point has anyone volunteered a back-up flight alternative for how I might every make it back to Northern California tonight. Ultimately, when rebooking my ticket for a later flight to SFO, I mention that I missed my flight because as a selectee, the personnel needed to inspect me were not available in time. I get snapped at for suggesting I was at all inconvenienced. And I'm marked as a selectee again. And when I finally wade through security for the fourth time, the same super is there to claim that the glasses must have been swept up to Port of Seattle Lost and Found. But that he doesn't know what their phone number is. 15. Seattle is the only airport in the world without white courtesy telephones :-) But while looking for those phones, the wandering GSC comes back around and huddles with the supervisor, staring at me. She's obviously asking him how I could have come back in without having checked my bag - and my dreaded screwdriver. Gingerly, they begin to follow me back out of the screening area. I decide to placate their fears that I got back through their infallible dragnet with contraband. "Oh, I mailed it to myself, first-class air-mail!" ... Clever solutions aside, the outcome of this story is that a very harried, very frequent traveling US citizen was at no point treated like an innocent person anxious to solve a problem. Instead, every contact is an opportunity to be treated like a suspect criminal. In three hours, I was patted down four times, had my bags X-rayed twice, hand-searched twice more, and went through metal detectors six times. The irony of it all is that the selectee program was created by the FAA for those passengers who choose NOT to provide photo identification as a matter of right. CAPPS, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System, deserves to be sued out of existence. I'm almost ready to join the ACLU. These so-called "confidential" criteria are not convincingly as neutral as the cheery pink "You have been randomly selected"! flyers in your ticket indicate. And the time-filling additional random searches by the gate security supervisor were even more visibly biased towards brown young men. Even one Army soldier on Thanksgiving leave. I am sick of being treated as guilty until proven innocent! Not least by such a patently fallible and placebo-driven security system... The Feds will be *such* an improvement. -- not! Yours, Rohit http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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