July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [Fwd: High-traffic Colluding Tor Routers in Washington, D.C. Confirmed]
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Apr 13, 2007 at 03:24:40PM +0700, Vlad SATtva Miller wrote: > ...However none of the mentioned below router nicknames or fingerprints > was found in the current local cache file. > ...snip... > A group of 9 Tor routers also functioning overtly or indirectly as Tor > exit nodes have been observed colluding on the public Tor network. Yeah. This happened in mid 2006. I don't know why some random person just picked it up now. We (mainly Steven Murdoch and Richard Clayton) tracked down the fellow running them. It turned out to be an innocent mistake. He's still running quite a few, on the same network, but now he sets the MyFamily torrc option on them. This issue also prompted us to speed up the fix/feature in 0.1.2.1-alpha: "Automatically avoid picking more than one node from the same /16 network when constructing a circuit." http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Aug-2006/msg00300.html > Collusion was definitively established by the following method: For a more interesting (and more conclusive imo) method of deciding they're the same, check out slide 28 in Steven's slides from his CCS paper and 23C3 talk, where he investigated these servers: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/talks/ccc06hotornot.pdf --Roger ----- End forwarded message -----

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IP: Zero-Knowledge Conference on Privacy Compliance & Business
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > >Zero-Knowledge Systems >Presents > >PRIVACY BY DESIGN > The Future of Privacy Compliance and Business > November 19-21, 2000 > Le Chateau Montebello, Quebec > >Sponsored by IBM, Royal Bank Financial Group, Merrill Lynch, >and PricewaterhouseCoopers > >See http://www.zeroknowledge.com/privacybydesign.html > > >Strong privacy and data protection practices are vitally important >from a legal, economic and ethical perspective. > >You know that you must have a comprehensive privacy strategy in place >to address these issues, and in many cases, comply with national and >international privacy laws. > >The 'Privacy by Design' conference will advise you on how to develop, >execute and market a successful privacy strategy to avoid regulatory >breaches and differentiate yourself in the marketplace with a >demonstrable commitment to privacy. > >Attendees will learn how to: > > - Understand current privacy issues from a theoretical, legal > and technological perspective > - Comply with privacy legislation and codes > - Design and implement effective privacy policies > - Integrate privacy-enhancing technologies and processes into > business operations > - Market privacy protection achievements to foster customer > trust and long-term relationships > - Handle privacy disasters > - Differentiate themselves in the marketplace with a demonstrable > and value-added commitment to privacy protection > >Zero-Knowledge Systems has assembled a group of world-class privacy >experts drawn from the business, privacy and government communities >to share their expertise with participants at a luxurious retreat at >Le Chateau Montebello, Quebec. The two-day plenary sessions cover a >broad range of privacy topics, and will be preceded by parallel >pre-conference workshops. The first is a workshop on the technology >of privacy protection. The second is a comprehensive "how-to" >workshop on how to design and implement a privacy program compliant >with global privacy laws. > >Featured speakers include: > > - Jason Catlett, President & CEO, Junkbusters > - Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy, Commissioner for the > Province of Ontario > - Lorrie Faith Cranor, Senior Technical Staff Member, Secure > Systems Research, AT&T Labs-Research > - Carl Ellison, Senior Security Architect, Intel > - Stephanie Perrin, Chief Privacy Officer, Zero-Knowledge Systems > - Jules Polonetsky, Chief Privacy Officer, DoubleClick > - Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy > Information Center > - Mozelle Thompson, Commissioner, US Federal Trade Commission > - Alan Westin, Editor, Privacy and American Business > >Participation is limited to 100 persons. > >For complete information about 'Privacy by Design', visit >http://www.zeroknowledge.com/privacybydesign.html, call >toll-free 1-866-286-6545; or email: conference(a)zeroknowledge.com > > -- Good Privacy is Good Business -- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [Fwd: High-traffic Colluding Tor Routers in Washington, D.C. Confirmed]
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Apr 13, 2007 at 03:24:40PM +0700, Vlad SATtva Miller wrote: > ...However none of the mentioned below router nicknames or fingerprints > was found in the current local cache file. > ...snip... > A group of 9 Tor routers also functioning overtly or indirectly as Tor > exit nodes have been observed colluding on the public Tor network. Yeah. This happened in mid 2006. I don't know why some random person just picked it up now. We (mainly Steven Murdoch and Richard Clayton) tracked down the fellow running them. It turned out to be an innocent mistake. He's still running quite a few, on the same network, but now he sets the MyFamily torrc option on them. This issue also prompted us to speed up the fix/feature in 0.1.2.1-alpha: "Automatically avoid picking more than one node from the same /16 network when constructing a circuit." http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Aug-2006/msg00300.html > Collusion was definitively established by the following method: For a more interesting (and more conclusive imo) method of deciding they're the same, check out slide 28 in Steven's slides from his CCS paper and 23C3 talk, where he investigated these servers: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/talks/ccc06hotornot.pdf --Roger ----- End forwarded message -----

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic
by Maxim Kammerer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 23:04, Paul Syverson <syverson(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> wrote: > The suggestion was that people _stop_ working on > defeating the GPA, which is unrealistic as both too strong (global) > and too weak (passive). While this may be true in the theoretical sense, it doesn't mean that one can't make correlation attacks less practical. I find it hard to believe that right now NSA, for instance, has Tor traffic analysis tightly integrated into its worldwide communications sniffing framework, simply because it's too much of a logistic problem, and anonymous networks are unlikely to be sufficiently high-profile targets so as to warrant expending the resources to deal with the logistics (yet). But I think that it is entirely believable that NSA has a dedicated project (even if only for research purposes) where the traffic from all known relays (a relatively stable pool of ~3000 nodes?) is sniffed and analyzed b that would be relatively simple to setup and maintain, given the unlimited interception capabilities. And you can combat the latter b by extending and popularizing the entry bridges concept, implementing exit bridges, making all clients relays by default (even if that won't contribute significant bandwidth), etc. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Dewayne-Net] Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer Rick Merritt (02/14/2006 4:26 PM EST) URL: <http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180201688> SAN JOSE b A well known cryptographer has applied power analysis techniques to crack passwords for the most popular brand of RFID tags. Adi Shamir, professor of computer science at the Weizmann Institute, reported his work in a high-profile panel discussion at the RSA Conference here. Separately, Ron Rivest, who co-developed the RSA algorithms with Shamir, used the stage of the annual panel to call for an industry effort to create a next-generation hashing algorithm to replace todaybs SHA-1. In recent weeks, Shamir used a directional antenna and digital oscilloscope to monitor power use by RFID tags while they were being read. Patterns in power use could be analyzed to determine when the tag received correct and incorrect password bits, he said. "The reflected signals contain a lot of information," Shamir said. "We can see the point where the chip is unhappy if a wrong bit is sent and consumes more power from the environmentb&to write a note to RAM that it has received a bad bit and to ignore the rest of the string," he added. "I havenbt tested all RFID tags, but we did test the biggest brand and it is totally unprotected," Shamir said. Using this approach, "a cellphone has all the ingredients you need to conduct an attack and compromise all the RFID tags in the vicinity," he added. Shamir said the pressure to get tags down to five cents each has forced designers to eliminate any security features, a shortcoming that needs to be addressed in next-generation products. Separately, cryptographers discussed the weaknesses in the fundamental SHA-1 hashing algorithm that were announced at the groupbs panel in 2005. "That was a real wake up call for cryptographers," said Rivest, who is also professor of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT. [snip] Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: U.S. officials deny technical takedown of WikiLeaks
by Marshall Eubanks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Dec 4, 2010, at 10:45 AM, andrew.wallace wrote: > Washington (CNN) -- U.S. officials at the Pentagon and State Department denied Friday knowing of any efforts to take down the WikiLeaks website or asking companies to do so. > > http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/03/wikileaks.takedown/index.html > Yes, that is what both spokesmen literally did "I am not aware of any conversations by the United States government" - said State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley. "I am not aware that the Department of Defense is behind any of the problems that WikiLeaks is experiencing," Col. Dave Lapan, Pentagon spokesman. Not the Department, not the Secretary, not the Joint Chiefs, just the lowly old spokesman, all by himself, who is "not aware." A weaker and less convincing denial can scarcely be imagined this side of the divorce court. And the CNN headline, while technical true : U.S. officials deny they are urging technical takedown of WikiLeaks would be more accurate as Minor U.S. officials deny they are personally urging technical takedown of WikiLeaks which would have not nearly had the same punch. Regards Marshall > Andrew > > > > > ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: U.S. officials deny technical takedown of WikiLeaks
by Marshall Eubanks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Dec 4, 2010, at 10:45 AM, andrew.wallace wrote: > Washington (CNN) -- U.S. officials at the Pentagon and State Department denied Friday knowing of any efforts to take down the WikiLeaks website or asking companies to do so. > > http://edition.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/03/wikileaks.takedown/index.html > Yes, that is what both spokesmen literally did "I am not aware of any conversations by the United States government" - said State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley. "I am not aware that the Department of Defense is behind any of the problems that WikiLeaks is experiencing," Col. Dave Lapan, Pentagon spokesman. Not the Department, not the Secretary, not the Joint Chiefs, just the lowly old spokesman, all by himself, who is "not aware." A weaker and less convincing denial can scarcely be imagined this side of the divorce court. And the CNN headline, while technical true : U.S. officials deny they are urging technical takedown of WikiLeaks would be more accurate as Minor U.S. officials deny they are personally urging technical takedown of WikiLeaks which would have not nearly had the same punch. Regards Marshall > Andrew > > > > > ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tor-talk] massive automated bridge requests: why?
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi folks, Over the past few months the number of bridge users has spiked, most prominently in Italy, but also plenty in Spain, Brazil, Israel, and others. https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#bridge-users https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-06-… https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-06-… https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-06-… https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=bridge-users&start=2011-06-… I believe it started out with a Tor bundle that somebody made that had three bridges pre-configured -- we found a torrc file along with an unofficial Windows Tor bundle. At the beginning, those few bridges had tens of thousands of users each, and that was it. Since then, we've seen an enormous spike in automated connections to https://bridges.torproject.org/ -- more than a million requests an hour. Now just about every bridge that's given out via the https pool (as opposed to the gmail pool or the reserve pool) is seeing many many thousands of users from Italy and these other countries. It seems clear that somebody's unofficial Tor bundle automatically grabs some bridges for its users, and that this somebody didn't understand the notion of being polite to a remote service -- I think each user is hitting the bridges page roughly every 30 seconds. We've taken steps to defend the bridgedb service from this overload. And I can imagine further steps, like finally rolling out a captcha on that page, to block people from using it like a remote API (which I always thought was kind of a neat option). Or heck, just moving to a different URL and abandoning that one. But the question first is: what's going on? Can those of you near or in these countries please ask around and try to get some answers? I don't think it's a censoring adversary trying to collect the list of bridges. For one, it's way overkill; for another, why use the bridges afterwards? I don't think it's malware or some automated botnet that happens to use bridges -- if it were, we should be seeing spikes in well-connected countries like Japan. --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic
by Maxim Kammerer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 23:04, Paul Syverson <syverson(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> wrote: > The suggestion was that people _stop_ working on > defeating the GPA, which is unrealistic as both too strong (global) > and too weak (passive). While this may be true in the theoretical sense, it doesn't mean that one can't make correlation attacks less practical. I find it hard to believe that right now NSA, for instance, has Tor traffic analysis tightly integrated into its worldwide communications sniffing framework, simply because it's too much of a logistic problem, and anonymous networks are unlikely to be sufficiently high-profile targets so as to warrant expending the resources to deal with the logistics (yet). But I think that it is entirely believable that NSA has a dedicated project (even if only for research purposes) where the traffic from all known relays (a relatively stable pool of ~3000 nodes?) is sniffed and analyzed b that would be relatively simple to setup and maintain, given the unlimited interception capabilities. And you can combat the latter b by extending and popularizing the entry bridges concept, implementing exit bridges, making all clients relays by default (even if that won't contribute significant bandwidth), etc. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux (discussion / support: http://dee.su/liberte-contribute) _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[Dewayne-Net] Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Cellphone could crack RFID tags, says cryptographer Rick Merritt (02/14/2006 4:26 PM EST) URL: <http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=180201688> SAN JOSE b A well known cryptographer has applied power analysis techniques to crack passwords for the most popular brand of RFID tags. Adi Shamir, professor of computer science at the Weizmann Institute, reported his work in a high-profile panel discussion at the RSA Conference here. Separately, Ron Rivest, who co-developed the RSA algorithms with Shamir, used the stage of the annual panel to call for an industry effort to create a next-generation hashing algorithm to replace todaybs SHA-1. In recent weeks, Shamir used a directional antenna and digital oscilloscope to monitor power use by RFID tags while they were being read. Patterns in power use could be analyzed to determine when the tag received correct and incorrect password bits, he said. "The reflected signals contain a lot of information," Shamir said. "We can see the point where the chip is unhappy if a wrong bit is sent and consumes more power from the environmentb&to write a note to RAM that it has received a bad bit and to ignore the rest of the string," he added. "I havenbt tested all RFID tags, but we did test the biggest brand and it is totally unprotected," Shamir said. Using this approach, "a cellphone has all the ingredients you need to conduct an attack and compromise all the RFID tags in the vicinity," he added. Shamir said the pressure to get tags down to five cents each has forced designers to eliminate any security features, a shortcoming that needs to be addressed in next-generation products. Separately, cryptographers discussed the weaknesses in the fundamental SHA-1 hashing algorithm that were announced at the groupbs panel in 2005. "That was a real wake up call for cryptographers," said Rivest, who is also professor of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT. [snip] Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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