July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Work on Tor this summer, get paid by Google
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi folks, We (EFF and Tor working together) have been accepted into Google's Summer of Code 2007. This means they'll fund several students to work with us this summer on projects related to Tor. International students are welcome too. The deadline for students submitting applications is _MARCH 24_. I've put up a page with more details here: http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SummerOfCode and there's a big list of potential projects here: http://tor.eff.org/volunteer.html.en#Coding Please let us know if you're interested, and spread the word. The more applications we get, the more likely Google is to give us good students. So if you haven't filled up your summer plans yet, consider spending some time working with us to make Tor better! Thanks, --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Lucrative update
by Patrick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Re: [Politech] Wiretapping innocent people on the Internet
by John Gilmore 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The NYT covered this story, on the front page, too. But somehow it was all about "Colleges Protest Call to Upgrade Online Systems". It wasn't about the government automating the bugging of every student, professor, and staff person by typing a few commands from the basement of the FBI building. The nasty word "wiretap" didn't appear til the eighth paragraph, "below the fold", and when it did appear, it was buried in mid-sentence, right next to "criminals, terrorists and spies". (They never wiretap "citizens", "innocent bystanders", or "suspects", and everyone wiretapped is of course guilty-as-charged, though they haven't been charged with any crime yet.) There's no shortage of bias in the New York Times, but this is a particularly blatant example. Now why is it in the interest of the Times to build wiretapping into the hardware of the Internet? The story also claimed that "Because the government would have to win court orders before undertaking surveillance, the universities are not raising civil liberties issues." I think there's a civil liberties issue when the US Government wants to wire the country like the Stasi wired East Germany for indiscriminate bugging. And there's no "winning" of these court orders; they happen in secret, without the participation or knowledge of the target of the wiretap. The university cannot appear in court to argue about whether the order should be issued (and very few challenge them after issuance). In most cases the judge is *required* to issue the secret wiretap order every time the Feds merely say "we need the info". To get 99% of such orders, they don't need a warrant, nor probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. What used to be tough wiretap standards have been whittled away inch by inch by decades of aggressive pushing on the part of the FBI, DEA, CIA, NSA, and DoJ. In August, one judge woke up and published a decision that said, despite his previously regular issuance of secret orders to track the location of peoples' cellphones in real time, without probable cause or any suspicion of criminal activity, he was concerned about whether this routine secret practice was actually legal. (See http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_09.php#004002) Bravo for that one judge who found his conscience. The government argues that under the same conditions (no warrant, no reason to suspect you in particular), they can monitor about 40% of the bits you send over the Internet, in real time, including where you are, who you're talking with, what protocols you're using, and every URL, email address, IM name, or other "addressing and signaling information". (I argue that they don't have this authority, but I never get to show up in court at these discussions with the judge.) Not only is this information supposedly legal for the government to get about every citizen, it's perfect for automated software tracking of who's-talking-to-who, all the time. The NSA term for it is "traffic analysis", and most of it works even if your communications are encrypted. I understand why the authoritarian brass would want routine wiretaps of the innocent; as Orson Welles said, "Only in a police state is the job of a policeman easy." They've lost sight of their goal (keeping people safe and free), yet redoubled their efforts. Why this would be in the interest of the citizens (or the FCC, or the NY Times) is the puzzle. John Gilmore (speaking for myself) ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Wiretapping innocent people on the Internet
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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[Politech] Real ID Act regulations finally released by Homeland Security [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

We've had plenty of discussions about the Real ID Act here on Politech, including these: http://www.politechbot.com/2007/02/09/california-officials-like/ http://www.politechbot.com/2007/01/25/maine-becomes-first/ http://www.politechbot.com/2005/03/24/john-gilmore-on/ But so far it's been difficult to figure out how bad the bloody law will be in practice. That's because the Department of Homeland Security has remarkably broad power to come up with regulations, which they finally did in draft form: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nprm_realid.pdf Here's a summary I wrote trying to put this in perspective: http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6163509.html Among the outstanding unanswered questions: Will the final rules include an RFID tag? Will all drivers licenses have a standard design dictated by Homeland Security? Will the information that has to be stored on the nationalized licenses (in the form of a 2D barcode) be encrypted? The deadline extension by Homeland Security was cunning. It's almost certainly intended to fragment opposition in state capitals. If the federalized ID card doesn't have to be complete until 2013 -- the earlier date was 2008 -- state DMVs won't be as alarmed right now and voters won't be either. Here's some more background: http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/ http://www.realnightmare.org/ -Declan _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Work on Tor this summer, get paid by Google
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi folks, We (EFF and Tor working together) have been accepted into Google's Summer of Code 2007. This means they'll fund several students to work with us this summer on projects related to Tor. International students are welcome too. The deadline for students submitting applications is _MARCH 24_. I've put up a page with more details here: http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SummerOfCode and there's a big list of potential projects here: http://tor.eff.org/volunteer.html.en#Coding Please let us know if you're interested, and spread the word. The more applications we get, the more likely Google is to give us good students. So if you haven't filled up your summer plans yet, consider spending some time working with us to make Tor better! Thanks, --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Deal on EU data retention law
by Stefan Kelm 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/019-3536-348-12-50-902 -20051206IPR03225-14-12-2005-2005--false/default_en.htm] Deal on EU data retention law The European Parliament adopted today by 378 votes in favour, 197 against and 30 abstentions a directive on data retention in first reading. The final text negotiated beforehand with the Council aims to facilitate judicial co-operation in criminal matters by approximating Member States' legislation on the retention of data processed by telecommunications companies. The directive covers traffic and location data generated by telephony, SMS and internet, but not the content of the information communicated. The new EU law will help national authorities to track down possible criminals and terrorists by granting them access to a list of all telephone calls, SMS or Internet connections made by suspects during the previous few months. The amendments finally adopted were a compromise between the PES and EPP groups with the Council and differed in some key points to the draft directive adopted initially by the Civil Liberties Committee. The GUE, Greens and UEN groups and some members from the ALDE group voted against the directive in the final vote. Alexander Nuno ALVARO (ALDE, DE) was unhappy with the result of the compromise adopted and withdrew his name as rapporteur. Limited access to data In the final text adopted, Parliament is proposing a number of amendments to the Commission text to restrict the use of retained data and ensure that the future law fully respects the privacy of the telephone and internet users. On the aim of the directive, MEPs agree with the need to retain data for the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime, but only for ?specified forms? of serious criminal offences (terrorism and organised crime), and not for the mere ?prevention? of all kinds of crime. MEPs feel that the concept of prevention is too vague and could lead to abuse of the system from national authorities. The directive will provide for data to be retained by the telecommunications companies for a minimum of six months and a maximum of 24. MEPs also added a provision for ?effective, proportionate and dissuasive? penal sanctions for companies who fail to store the data or misuse the retained information. Only the competent authorities determined by Member States should have access to the retained data from phone or internet providers. Furthermore, each national government will designate an independent authority responsible for monitoring the use of the data. MEPs also establish that access to retained data should be limited to specific purpose and on a case by case basis (push system): each time, the authorities would need to request to the telecom company that the data related to a concrete suspect, instead of having granted access to the whole database. As for the type of data to be retained, MEPs finally supported the registration of location data on calls, SMS and internet use, including unsuccessful calls. This point was controversial due to the fact that telecom companies do not currently register lost calls for billing purposes and so to do this using new technologies would be expensive. Spanish MEPs strongly supported the Council position to include the retention of unsuccessful calls, since the terrorist attacks in Madrid were prosecuted thanks to the investigation of specific lost calls from mobile phones. Who foots the bill? Finally, MEPs decided to delete the paragraph in which it was mandatory for Member States to reimburse telecom companies for all additional costs of retention, storage and transmission of data. In the draft directive adopted by the Civil Liberties Committee, MEPs had initially called for the full reimbursement of costs. ------------------------------------------------------- Stefan Kelm Security Consultant Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH Ettlinger Strasse 12-14, D-76137 Karlsruhe Tel. +49 721 255171-304, Fax +49 721 255171-100 stefan.kelm(a)secorvo.de, http://www.secorvo.de/ ------------------------------------------------------- PGP Fingerprint 87AE E858 CCBC C3A2 E633 D139 B0D9 212B --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Deal on EU data retention law
by Stefan Kelm 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[http://www.europarl.eu.int/news/expert/infopress_page/019-3536-348-12-50-902 -20051206IPR03225-14-12-2005-2005--false/default_en.htm] Deal on EU data retention law The European Parliament adopted today by 378 votes in favour, 197 against and 30 abstentions a directive on data retention in first reading. The final text negotiated beforehand with the Council aims to facilitate judicial co-operation in criminal matters by approximating Member States' legislation on the retention of data processed by telecommunications companies. The directive covers traffic and location data generated by telephony, SMS and internet, but not the content of the information communicated. The new EU law will help national authorities to track down possible criminals and terrorists by granting them access to a list of all telephone calls, SMS or Internet connections made by suspects during the previous few months. The amendments finally adopted were a compromise between the PES and EPP groups with the Council and differed in some key points to the draft directive adopted initially by the Civil Liberties Committee. The GUE, Greens and UEN groups and some members from the ALDE group voted against the directive in the final vote. Alexander Nuno ALVARO (ALDE, DE) was unhappy with the result of the compromise adopted and withdrew his name as rapporteur. Limited access to data In the final text adopted, Parliament is proposing a number of amendments to the Commission text to restrict the use of retained data and ensure that the future law fully respects the privacy of the telephone and internet users. On the aim of the directive, MEPs agree with the need to retain data for the detection, investigation and prosecution of crime, but only for ?specified forms? of serious criminal offences (terrorism and organised crime), and not for the mere ?prevention? of all kinds of crime. MEPs feel that the concept of prevention is too vague and could lead to abuse of the system from national authorities. The directive will provide for data to be retained by the telecommunications companies for a minimum of six months and a maximum of 24. MEPs also added a provision for ?effective, proportionate and dissuasive? penal sanctions for companies who fail to store the data or misuse the retained information. Only the competent authorities determined by Member States should have access to the retained data from phone or internet providers. Furthermore, each national government will designate an independent authority responsible for monitoring the use of the data. MEPs also establish that access to retained data should be limited to specific purpose and on a case by case basis (push system): each time, the authorities would need to request to the telecom company that the data related to a concrete suspect, instead of having granted access to the whole database. As for the type of data to be retained, MEPs finally supported the registration of location data on calls, SMS and internet use, including unsuccessful calls. This point was controversial due to the fact that telecom companies do not currently register lost calls for billing purposes and so to do this using new technologies would be expensive. Spanish MEPs strongly supported the Council position to include the retention of unsuccessful calls, since the terrorist attacks in Madrid were prosecuted thanks to the investigation of specific lost calls from mobile phones. Who foots the bill? Finally, MEPs decided to delete the paragraph in which it was mandatory for Member States to reimburse telecom companies for all additional costs of retention, storage and transmission of data. In the draft directive adopted by the Civil Liberties Committee, MEPs had initially called for the full reimbursement of costs. ------------------------------------------------------- Stefan Kelm Security Consultant Secorvo Security Consulting GmbH Ettlinger Strasse 12-14, D-76137 Karlsruhe Tel. +49 721 255171-304, Fax +49 721 255171-100 stefan.kelm(a)secorvo.de, http://www.secorvo.de/ ------------------------------------------------------- PGP Fingerprint 87AE E858 CCBC C3A2 E633 D139 B0D9 212B --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [liberationtech] Security / reliability of cryptoheaven ?
by D J Capelis 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Oct 9, 2012 at 5:01 AM, Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> wrote: > On Wed, Oct 3, 2012 at 2:41 PM, D J Capelis <djcapelis(a)cs.ucsc.edu> wrote: > > I like the part where you say the problem is easy and then point to a > > solution with issues that make it anything but easy, tenable or > > workable. > > Why? The solution (if you refer to cables in LibertC)) is easy to use, > is robust, and it works. Until it works with gmail and other commonly used communications systems and/or works across multiple common devices and allows a user to extend their identity and ability to communicate securely using it across *all* of their devices we're not there yet. I know that's frustrating, but I think it's true. I realize that many of these systems are great tradeoffs that work in *some* niches, but pretending the problem of secure communications is simple and solved when most users do not have access to a usable solution goes too far IMO. I'm not saying the technology we have is bad, or that anything that's been developed isn't good, I'm just saying that calling the problem easy or solved erases the huge amount of space for work and progress that still remains. > There is apparently no solution to this > tradeoff b see Zooko's triangle in [2]. Yes. The fact that some levels of usability is *impossible* under some designs constraints contributes to the fact that writing this problem off as easy or solved is probably unwise. > [2] http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/petnames/IntroPetNames.html For what it's worth, I think the PetNames are the right approach if you focus on Zooko's triangle as your solution space. (As Jake noted, it may be possible the square the triangle in some cases.) I think we often fail when it comes to good interfaces to make PetNames work in both a secure and usable way. (It should be so simple, but people have a tendency to mess it up.) But I'll note I haven't reviewed the interfaces for some of the systems discussed in this thread thoroughly. > That's why you need self-authenticating addresses, or another way of > non-optional recipient authentication. No disagreement from me. > > And that's not even getting into platform inter-op issues that > > drive so many people to want to do their crypto in a web interface or on > > some other person's server. > > You can't provide interoperability between secure and insecure systems > while leaving the security intact. That's why the military uses > compartmentalization and air gaps. That's certainly one approach, but are you *certain* it's the only one? It's a hard problem, but there are sometimes ways to bootstrap certain types of things on certain types of legacy systems. It gets really specific to the type of application in each case and exactly what parts of the system you want to try calling legacy and unchangeable vs. parts you want to say you can change. (Have you thought about the types of systems you could build with a bit of software and a bit hardware attached to a USB key? The possibilities there have been interesting. I like designing systems using sandwich stacks, where you control things under and over an otherwise insecure legacy system.) It is true that you usually can't get everything, but sometimes you can what you need. > > Pretending it's an easy problem because technologies exist that aren't > > usable ignore the real technology issues we haven't solved yet. > > Only if you want to use technologies that weren't developed with > security in mind. I like talking to people using technologies they already use. When and if I can do that securely, I'm happy. When and if I cannot, I'm aware that there is a lot more progress left to be made on problems that aren't easy, aren't solved and often aren't tech issues. My objection wasn't about the technology, it was about declaring problems as solved and easy when they aren't solved yet. Which isn't to say we haven't made progress and shouldn't celebrate that progress, but I think we can and should do that in a way that keeps a sharp focus on the challenges which remain. ~DJ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[MTNews] Schlage Introduces Web- and Mobile Phone-controlled
by MacTech News Moderator 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Locks This message comes to you from MacTech News -- the Mac(tm) OS Technical News and Info server. See below for more info on this list (including sub/unsub details). __________________________ Schlage Introduces Innovative Web- and Mobile Phone-controlled Locks CARMEL, Ind., Sept. 3 -- Schlage, the most trusted brand of door locks, today unveiled the latest consumer electronic innovation that fuses home security and automation with mobile technology. The new Schlage LiNK deadbolts and locks provide homeowners the power to remotely control and monitor access to their home 24/7 with any web-enabled mobile phone or computer. The new Schlage LiNK deadbolts and locks provide keyless entry through 4-digit access codes that can be entered, activated, deleted or disabled on the lock's 11-digit push button keypad, or via the Schlage LiNK web portal or mobile application. This solution gives homeowners the freedom of never having to carry or circulate multiple sets of keys, coupled with the ability to instantaneously grant access to family members, friends, unexpected house guests, and service providers such as handymen and housekeepers. Via the Schlage LiNK online portal, homeowners also have the control to set up user codes for specific days and times, receive text or e-mail notifications when certain codes are used and track codes that have been used over the past 90 days. These features deliver peace of mind to the parents of active families so they know exactly when their children, family members, friends and even service providers are entering their home. It also does away with the need to regularly replace locks for rental properties and second homes. "Schlage LiNK deadbolts and locks give homeowners the control and peace of mind of always knowing that even if their home is not in sight, it's never out of reach," says Dwight Gibson, general manager, Intelligent Residential Security, for Ingersoll Rand, the parent company of Schlage. "Schlage has been the leading lock brand for the residential security market for more than 85 years and we are dedicated to continually developing product innovations that not only deliver first-rate security but also add convenience to our customers' busy lives." Additional product attributes include: -- Schlage LiNK locks are the first Z-Wave-enabled locks and work seamlessly with more than 300 other Z-Wave-enabled home automation devices including products ranging from lighting and temperature to pool and spa controls. -- The Schlage LiNK web portal utilizes the same Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protection used by the banking industry and the Z-Wave Bridge's RF signals are fully encrypted using AEC 128 bit encryption protocols. -- Designed with plug and play simplicity, the wireless Z-Wave Bridge easily plugs into an Ethernet port on the home computer's Internet router and the light module plugs into any standard 3 prong electrical outlet. -- Schlage LiNK locks are powered by regular batteries and typically install in less than 30 minutes with only a screwdriver. -- The Schlage LiNK Starter Kit retails for $299 and includes one Schlage LiNK deadbolt or lock, a wireless Z-Wave Bridge and a compatible light module. Additional Schlage LiNK deadbolts or locks will retail for $199. -- There is also a $12.99 monthly subscription fee for use of the Schlage LiNK online portal and mobile applications. With the monthly subscription, homeowners also receive 100 MB of memory to store IP camera video, if installed with the system. -- Schlage LiNK deadbolts and locks can be used anywhere in the home a traditional lock is used and are available in bright brass, satin nickel and aged bronze, to complement any decor. Schlage LiNK deadbolts and locks will be available at Fry's Electronics Retail Stores, on Fry's web site (www.frys.com) and through select professional builders in late October. About Schlage & Ingersoll Rand Security Technologies Schlage is the leader in security devices, trusted for more than 85 years, spanning both the commercial and residential markets. Commercial grade quality is built into every Schlage product. The brand is on the forefront of developing cutting-edge technology and innovation such as wireless security products and biometrics, among others. www.schlage.com Ingersoll Rand Security Technologies is a leading global provider of products and services that make environments safe, secure and productive. The sector's market-leading products include electronic and biometric access control systems; time and attendance and personal scheduling systems; mechanical locks and portable security, door closers and exit devices, steel doors and frames, architectural hardware and technologies and services for global security markets. Ingersoll Rand Security Technologies is a sector of Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited, a global provider of products, services and solutions to industries as diverse as transportation, manufacturing, food retailing, construction and agriculture. www.ingersollrand.com About Z-Wave Z-Wave is the first technology to bring affordable, reliable and easy-to-use wireless control to every aspect of daily life -- the home, consumer electronics, healthcare, and energy use, to name a few. Z- Wave is an award-winning, proven and interoperable wireless mesh networking technology that allows a wide array of devices in and around the home to communicate including lighting, appliances, HVAC, entertainment centers, and security systems. Z-Wave brings many benefits to everyday life including remote home monitoring, home healthcare, safety and security, and energy conservation. Z-Wave certified products are currently available from leading consumer brands in more than 170 products. Z-Wave is the recipient of the 2006 Wall Street Journal Technology Innovation Award in the wireless category, the CNET "Best of CES Award" in the enabling technologies category, along with PC World's 2006 World Class Award, which recognizes the 100 best technologies and products of the year. For more information about Z-Wave please visit www.z-wave.com About the Z-Wave Alliance Formed in January 2005, the Z-Wave Alliance is a consortium of leading companies in the home technology space dedicated to solidifying Z-Wave as the standard for wireless home control products. The principal members include Cooper Wiring Devices, Danfoss, FAKRO, Ingersoll Rand Security Technologies, Intel, Intermatic, Leviton, Monster Cable, Wayne-Dalton, Universal Electronics Inc. (UEI) and Zensys. Its members lead the home controls market, providing leading edge products and systems that deliver increased comfort, convenience, safety and security. Z-Wave technology is the foundation of all products manufactured by the Alliance members. For more information about the Z-Wave Alliance, visit www.zwavealliance.org . __________________________ Please visit our sponsors: BetterRAM.com(sm): Your Source for RAM. Memory built to order. http://www.betterram.com, mailto:info@betterram.com Or call 800-895-3493 MacTech(r) Magazine: The journal of Macintosh technolog. http://www.mactech.com, mailto:info@mactech.com, or 877-MACTECH To submit a posting to MacTech News, mailto:press_releases@mactech.com. To subscribe to MacTech News, send mail to listserv(a)listmail.xplain.com with the SUBJECT line reading "SUBSCRIBE MacTechNews". To unsubscribe, the SUBJECT line should read "UNSUBSCRIBE MacTechNews". MacTech, Xplain Corporation and its sponsors are not responsible for any errors, omissions, or other inaccuracies in this message. MacTech is a registered trademark of Xplain Corporation. 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