July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Secrecy News -- 11/14/04
by Aftergood, Steven 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2004, Issue No. 100 November 14, 2004 ** THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW ** TSA THREATENS TO ARREST LEAKERS ** SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW Last month, Helen Chenoweth-Hage attempted to board a United Airlines flight from Boise to Reno when she was pulled aside by airline personnel for additional screening, including a pat-down search for weapons or unauthorized materials. Chenoweth-Hage, an ultra-conservative former Congresswoman (R-ID), requested a copy of the regulation that authorizes such pat-downs. "She said she wanted to see the regulation that required the additional procedure for secondary screening and she was told that she couldn't see it," local TSA security director Julian Gonzales told the Idaho Statesman (10/10/04). "She refused to go through additional screening [without seeing the regulation], and she was not allowed to fly," he said. "It's pretty simple." Chenoweth-Hage wasn't seeking disclosure of the internal criteria used for screening passengers, only the legal authorization for passenger pat-downs. Why couldn't they at least let her see that? asked Statesman commentator Dan Popkey. "Because we don't have to," Mr. Gonzales replied crisply. "That is called 'sensitive security information.' She's not allowed to see it, nor is anyone else," he said. Thus, in a qualitatively new development in U.S. governance, Americans can now be obligated to comply with legally-binding regulations that are unknown to them, and that indeed they are forbidden to know. This is not some dismal Eastern European allegory. It is part of a continuing transformation of American government that is leaving it less open, less accountable and less susceptible to rational deliberation as a vehicle for change. Harold C. Relyea once wrote an article entitled "The Coming of Secret Law" (Government Information Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988) that electrified readers (or at least one reader) with its warning about increased executive branch reliance on secret presidential directives and related instruments. Back in the 1980s when that article was written, secret law was still on the way. Now it is here. A new report from the Congressional Research Service describes with welcome clarity how, by altering a few words in the Homeland Security Act, Congress "significantly broadened" the government's authority to generate "sensitive security information," including an entire system of "security directives" that are beyond public scrutiny, like the one former Rep. Chenoweth-Hage sought to examine. The CRS report provides one analyst's perspective on how the secret regulations comport or fail to comport with constitutional rights, such as the right to travel and the right to due process. CRS does not make its reports directly available to the public, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Interstate Travel: Constitutional Challenges to the Identification Requirement and Other Transportation Security Regulations," Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2004: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32664.pdf Much of the CRS discussion revolves around the case of software designer and philanthropist John Gilmore, who was prevented from boarding an airline flight when he refused to present a photo ID. (A related case involving no-fly lists has been brought by the ACLU.) "I will not show government-issued identity papers to travel in my own country," Mr. Gilmore said. Mr. Gilmore's insistence on his right to preserve anonymity while traveling on commercial aircraft is naturally debatable -- but the government will not debate it. Instead, citing the statute on "sensitive security information," the Bush Administration says the case cannot be argued in open court. Further information on Gilmore v. Ashcroft, which is pending on appeal, may be found here: http://papersplease.org/gilmore/ TSA THREATENS TO ARREST LEAKERS Efforts by the Transportation Security Administration to investigate air marshals for talking to the press or the public "were appropriate under the circumstances," the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General said last week, and did not constitute a "witch hunt." However, "air marshals from two locations said that they were threatened with arrest and prosecution if they were found to have released sensitive security information (SSI), even though release of SSI is not a prosecutable offense," the Inspector General said. In a related overstatement, Federal Air Marshal Service policy says that "employees who release classified information or records in any form without authority from the Classified Documents Custodian are in violation of United States Code and are subject to arrest and prosecution," the DHS Inspector General (IG) noted. But "We question the legal accuracy of this policy statement, which seems to criminalize all releases of classified information," the IG wrote. The unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a criminal offense only in certain narrowly defined circumstances. See "Review of Alleged Actions by TSA to Discipline Federal Air Marshals for Talking to the Press, Congress, or the Public," DHS Inspector General Audit Report, November 2004: http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-ig-ssi.pdf SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS Secrecy News has a big hole in its budget for the coming year. Can you help? If you have learned something useful, valuable or interesting from Secrecy News over the past year, then please consider supporting this publication and the work of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. Donations may be made online here (click "donate now" and make sure to designate your contribution for "Secrecy News"): http://www.guidestar.org/helping/donate.adp?ein=23-7185827 Or mail a check payable to the Federation of American Scientists to: Secrecy News Federation of American Scientists 1717 K Street NW, Suite 209 Washington, DC 20036 _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, send email to secrecy_news-request(a)lists.fas.org with "subscribe" in the body of the message. To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a blank email message to secrecy_news-remove(a)lists.fas.org OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Secrecy News has an RSS feed at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.rss _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW FAS Secrecy News -- 11/14/04
by Jon Callas 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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Secrecy News -- 11/14/04
by Aftergood, Steven 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2004, Issue No. 100 November 14, 2004 ** THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW ** TSA THREATENS TO ARREST LEAKERS ** SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW Last month, Helen Chenoweth-Hage attempted to board a United Airlines flight from Boise to Reno when she was pulled aside by airline personnel for additional screening, including a pat-down search for weapons or unauthorized materials. Chenoweth-Hage, an ultra-conservative former Congresswoman (R-ID), requested a copy of the regulation that authorizes such pat-downs. "She said she wanted to see the regulation that required the additional procedure for secondary screening and she was told that she couldn't see it," local TSA security director Julian Gonzales told the Idaho Statesman (10/10/04). "She refused to go through additional screening [without seeing the regulation], and she was not allowed to fly," he said. "It's pretty simple." Chenoweth-Hage wasn't seeking disclosure of the internal criteria used for screening passengers, only the legal authorization for passenger pat-downs. Why couldn't they at least let her see that? asked Statesman commentator Dan Popkey. "Because we don't have to," Mr. Gonzales replied crisply. "That is called 'sensitive security information.' She's not allowed to see it, nor is anyone else," he said. Thus, in a qualitatively new development in U.S. governance, Americans can now be obligated to comply with legally-binding regulations that are unknown to them, and that indeed they are forbidden to know. This is not some dismal Eastern European allegory. It is part of a continuing transformation of American government that is leaving it less open, less accountable and less susceptible to rational deliberation as a vehicle for change. Harold C. Relyea once wrote an article entitled "The Coming of Secret Law" (Government Information Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2, 1988) that electrified readers (or at least one reader) with its warning about increased executive branch reliance on secret presidential directives and related instruments. Back in the 1980s when that article was written, secret law was still on the way. Now it is here. A new report from the Congressional Research Service describes with welcome clarity how, by altering a few words in the Homeland Security Act, Congress "significantly broadened" the government's authority to generate "sensitive security information," including an entire system of "security directives" that are beyond public scrutiny, like the one former Rep. Chenoweth-Hage sought to examine. The CRS report provides one analyst's perspective on how the secret regulations comport or fail to comport with constitutional rights, such as the right to travel and the right to due process. CRS does not make its reports directly available to the public, but a copy was obtained by Secrecy News. See "Interstate Travel: Constitutional Challenges to the Identification Requirement and Other Transportation Security Regulations," Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2004: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32664.pdf Much of the CRS discussion revolves around the case of software designer and philanthropist John Gilmore, who was prevented from boarding an airline flight when he refused to present a photo ID. (A related case involving no-fly lists has been brought by the ACLU.) "I will not show government-issued identity papers to travel in my own country," Mr. Gilmore said. Mr. Gilmore's insistence on his right to preserve anonymity while traveling on commercial aircraft is naturally debatable -- but the government will not debate it. Instead, citing the statute on "sensitive security information," the Bush Administration says the case cannot be argued in open court. Further information on Gilmore v. Ashcroft, which is pending on appeal, may be found here: http://papersplease.org/gilmore/ TSA THREATENS TO ARREST LEAKERS Efforts by the Transportation Security Administration to investigate air marshals for talking to the press or the public "were appropriate under the circumstances," the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General said last week, and did not constitute a "witch hunt." However, "air marshals from two locations said that they were threatened with arrest and prosecution if they were found to have released sensitive security information (SSI), even though release of SSI is not a prosecutable offense," the Inspector General said. In a related overstatement, Federal Air Marshal Service policy says that "employees who release classified information or records in any form without authority from the Classified Documents Custodian are in violation of United States Code and are subject to arrest and prosecution," the DHS Inspector General (IG) noted. But "We question the legal accuracy of this policy statement, which seems to criminalize all releases of classified information," the IG wrote. The unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a criminal offense only in certain narrowly defined circumstances. See "Review of Alleged Actions by TSA to Discipline Federal Air Marshals for Talking to the Press, Congress, or the Public," DHS Inspector General Audit Report, November 2004: http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-ig-ssi.pdf SUPPORT SECRECY NEWS Secrecy News has a big hole in its budget for the coming year. Can you help? If you have learned something useful, valuable or interesting from Secrecy News over the past year, then please consider supporting this publication and the work of the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. Donations may be made online here (click "donate now" and make sure to designate your contribution for "Secrecy News"): http://www.guidestar.org/helping/donate.adp?ein=23-7185827 Or mail a check payable to the Federation of American Scientists to: Secrecy News Federation of American Scientists 1717 K Street NW, Suite 209 Washington, DC 20036 _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, send email to secrecy_news-request(a)lists.fas.org with "subscribe" in the body of the message. To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a blank email message to secrecy_news-remove(a)lists.fas.org OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Secrecy News has an RSS feed at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.rss _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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THE ARRIVAL OF SECRET LAW FAS Secrecy News -- 11/14/04
by Jon Callas 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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[liberationtech] Face recognition software prefers unsmiling humans
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

A little poetry for the watchdogs. PoliceOne.com (Sep 20) - "[New Jersey] driver license face-recognition technology prohibits smiles": [1]http://www.policeone.com/police-technology/articles/5990244-N-J-driv er-license-face-recognition-technology-prohibits-smiles/ HT [2]@PoliceOne, gf -- Gregory Foster || [3]gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> [4]http://entersection.com/ References 1. http://www.policeone.com/police-technology/articles/5990244-N-J-driver-lice… 2. http://twitter.com/PoliceOne/status/248848769012076544 3. mailto:gfoster@entersection.org 4. http://entersection.com/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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re: Secret Service Raids E-Gold
by Douglas Jackson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I am the founder and Chairman of e-gold Ltd. Contrary to the luridly irresponsible and actionable headline on this article, there has been no raid on e-gold Ltd., or on Gold & Silver Reserve Inc. [dba OmniPay http://www.omnipay.net ], the company that originally developed the e-gold system and currently serves as Operator. The more edifying reality is that e-gold is the world's first electronic currency designed for borderless eCommerce, enabling the worldwide use of gold as money. It merges the digital transaction efficiencies of an electronic payment system with a universally acceptable basis of value. The advantages of e-gold include: Low transaction fees ñ The maximum payment processing fee is 50 cents (US-equiv.). For a $1000 value payment, this is less than one twentieth as much as credit cards. Immediate settlement ñ e-gold payments clear instantaneously, no matter how large or small the payment, no matter how far apart the spender and recipient. Non-repudiation ñ No chargebacks. Get paid, stay paid. Direct access with bi-directionality ñ Anyone can pay or be paid. Automation support ñ The e-gold Shopping Cart Interface is easily implemented and provides immediate authenticated notification of completed payment. Zero financial risk ñ e-gold is the worldís first remote payment system backed 100% by physical gold in allocated storage. e-gold is in fact succeeding where other electronic payment initiatives are failing because it is designed specifically for worldwide eCommerce. All others merely add additional layers of liability to legacy systems. Since online launch November 1996, the e-gold system has been growing at an accelerating pace. As of April 2000, 100,000 transactions had been settled. The one millionth transaction was November 2000 and the second million mark surpassed in March 2001. It is regrettable that the first time many people will hear of e-gold(r) will be this sloppy and damaging Wired headline. Dr. Douglas Jackson Founder of e-gold ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, 2175 Bayfield Drive, Columbus, OH 43229 (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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The Case for Banning Reduced Hop Count Implementations
by Lucky Green 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks, I have followed various discussions lately about the creation of reduced hop Tor clients that implement fewer than the three hops considered by Tor's design. Such clients represent an attack on Tor as a whole. Indeed, defenses against reduced hop clients leveraging the Tor network should be built into Tor's design to defend against this attack. Today and for the foreseeable future, Tor's network latency relates to the maximum latency that Tor users are willing to accept. As Tor gets faster, it attracts more users and more traffic, which in turn increases latency. As the Tor network increases in latency, it loses users for whom the latency becomes unacceptably high. Latency in turn relates to the number of hops. The more hops, the higher the latency. Which not coincidentally is why some with lower anonymity requirements may prefer fewer hops. Here is the catch: as traffic from those with lower anonymity and hop requirements increases, it drives the latency of three hop connections above the latency acceptable for those seeking higher anonymity. The end state, if lower than three hop implementations are permitted to use the Tor network, is that Tor's network performance will acceptable only to users of lower hop clients. This fact alone drives a need to block reduced hop clients from the network. But it gets worse. Many of those that would be satisfied with fewer hops engage in comparatively low risk behavior (which is why they are satisfied with lower anonymity), such as downloading large files of questionable origin. The protocols commonly used for such downloads can accept higher latency than the interactive protocols needed by the part of the user population seeking higher anonymity levels. Pushing the latency of three hop clients farther out of the usability envelope. Though the above is more than sufficient cause to block reduced hop clients from corrupting the Tor network, it deserves mention that single hop clients in particular remove the protection that Tor's design until now afforded to exit node operators. If only three hop clients can use the Tor network, the Tor exit node operator can be confident that capture of an exit hop's connection log will fail to provide the attacker with useful tracking information. This discourages both legal and illegal attacks on Tor exit hops and thus increases the overall number and capacity of Tor exits. Removing this protection will lead to an increase in attacks on exit hops, which in turn will lead to decreased exit capacity. Further negatively impacting Tor network latency. In summary, reduced hop clients are deleterious to Tor a whole and users with the level of anonymity that Tor was design to provide in particular. Users with lower anonymity needs should be guided towards the many other systems available today that provide lower anonymity than Tor. Most importantly, Tor should implement a (potentially blinded) hop verification that ensures that lower hop count clients cannot abuse the Tor network. --Lucky Green *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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The Case for Banning Reduced Hop Count Implementations
by Lucky Green 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks, I have followed various discussions lately about the creation of reduced hop Tor clients that implement fewer than the three hops considered by Tor's design. Such clients represent an attack on Tor as a whole. Indeed, defenses against reduced hop clients leveraging the Tor network should be built into Tor's design to defend against this attack. Today and for the foreseeable future, Tor's network latency relates to the maximum latency that Tor users are willing to accept. As Tor gets faster, it attracts more users and more traffic, which in turn increases latency. As the Tor network increases in latency, it loses users for whom the latency becomes unacceptably high. Latency in turn relates to the number of hops. The more hops, the higher the latency. Which not coincidentally is why some with lower anonymity requirements may prefer fewer hops. Here is the catch: as traffic from those with lower anonymity and hop requirements increases, it drives the latency of three hop connections above the latency acceptable for those seeking higher anonymity. The end state, if lower than three hop implementations are permitted to use the Tor network, is that Tor's network performance will acceptable only to users of lower hop clients. This fact alone drives a need to block reduced hop clients from the network. But it gets worse. Many of those that would be satisfied with fewer hops engage in comparatively low risk behavior (which is why they are satisfied with lower anonymity), such as downloading large files of questionable origin. The protocols commonly used for such downloads can accept higher latency than the interactive protocols needed by the part of the user population seeking higher anonymity levels. Pushing the latency of three hop clients farther out of the usability envelope. Though the above is more than sufficient cause to block reduced hop clients from corrupting the Tor network, it deserves mention that single hop clients in particular remove the protection that Tor's design until now afforded to exit node operators. If only three hop clients can use the Tor network, the Tor exit node operator can be confident that capture of an exit hop's connection log will fail to provide the attacker with useful tracking information. This discourages both legal and illegal attacks on Tor exit hops and thus increases the overall number and capacity of Tor exits. Removing this protection will lead to an increase in attacks on exit hops, which in turn will lead to decreased exit capacity. Further negatively impacting Tor network latency. In summary, reduced hop clients are deleterious to Tor a whole and users with the level of anonymity that Tor was design to provide in particular. Users with lower anonymity needs should be guided towards the many other systems available today that provide lower anonymity than Tor. Most importantly, Tor should implement a (potentially blinded) hop verification that ensures that lower hop count clients cannot abuse the Tor network. --Lucky Green *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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re: Secret Service Raids E-Gold
by Douglas Jackson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I am the founder and Chairman of e-gold Ltd. Contrary to the luridly irresponsible and actionable headline on this article, there has been no raid on e-gold Ltd., or on Gold & Silver Reserve Inc. [dba OmniPay http://www.omnipay.net ], the company that originally developed the e-gold system and currently serves as Operator. The more edifying reality is that e-gold is the world's first electronic currency designed for borderless eCommerce, enabling the worldwide use of gold as money. It merges the digital transaction efficiencies of an electronic payment system with a universally acceptable basis of value. The advantages of e-gold include: Low transaction fees ñ The maximum payment processing fee is 50 cents (US-equiv.). For a $1000 value payment, this is less than one twentieth as much as credit cards. Immediate settlement ñ e-gold payments clear instantaneously, no matter how large or small the payment, no matter how far apart the spender and recipient. Non-repudiation ñ No chargebacks. Get paid, stay paid. Direct access with bi-directionality ñ Anyone can pay or be paid. Automation support ñ The e-gold Shopping Cart Interface is easily implemented and provides immediate authenticated notification of completed payment. Zero financial risk ñ e-gold is the worldís first remote payment system backed 100% by physical gold in allocated storage. e-gold is in fact succeeding where other electronic payment initiatives are failing because it is designed specifically for worldwide eCommerce. All others merely add additional layers of liability to legacy systems. Since online launch November 1996, the e-gold system has been growing at an accelerating pace. As of April 2000, 100,000 transactions had been settled. The one millionth transaction was November 2000 and the second million mark surpassed in March 2001. It is regrettable that the first time many people will hear of e-gold(r) will be this sloppy and damaging Wired headline. Dr. Douglas Jackson Founder of e-gold ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, 2175 Bayfield Drive, Columbus, OH 43229 (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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Re: [liberationtech] Bitcoin and The Public Function of Money
by Dmytri Kleiner 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 04.11.2012 00:53, StealthMonger wrote: > Bitcoin prevents inflation and helps tax evation [sic] (the system > itself is hard to regulate) [3] Bitcoin is not unique at being useful for tax evasion, in fact it's not even popular among large scale tax evaders, who have better means. In any case, the majority of producers will not be evading taxes, especially significant producers. We can not eliminate the State-based tax system by evading it, only by replacing the socially necessary functions it performs with actually-existing non-state forms, an unwillingness to understand and come to terms with this is what makes so many revolutionaries, ancaps especially, continue to be baffled by the continued existence of the State, or even actively support a "night-watchman state" with the State reduced to being nothing more that a brutal enforcer of property rights, since deep down they must realized that private property itself is a social construction, and worry that in a truly free society their property privileged would surely vanish. One of the main components of the delusion that tax evasion is somehow a threat to the State is the false belief that States require taxation to spend. States do not spend taxes, rather they simply spend money into existence. Taxes are used to manage demand, and sometimes to create incentives, their primary function is to manage prices. Tax obligations also create the base demand for government money or securities. This has been the case even before fiat money, see for instance the history of split tally sticks in the UK. >> Under US law, for example, Barter in Bitcoins is just as taxable as >> ... > > States describe their pronouncements as "law" in an effort make them > respectable. Once again, you are unwilling to distinguish between form and function. laws are agreements among people, and as such, are socially necessary, States make laws that enforce the interests of the ruling class, because the State is the instrument of the ruling class. >> Many Bitcoin users I know are kind and thoughtful people and all of >> the developers I know are. > > Are you suggesting that there is something unkind or thoughtless about > promoting a free market? It's not a suggestion, it's a fact. The "free market" is a psychopathic ideology, there is zero doubt about this, except among cultists. As Robert Shiller argued, the efficient market hypothesis is "one of the most remarkable errors in the history of economic thought." Humans are not utility maximizing, dis-utility minimizing "hedonistic calculators" (to use Veblen's term), the behavioral assumptions of market fundamentalism are well know to be untenable. Also well know is the fact that there is such a thing as "market power," that results from inequality of distribution and advantage among market participants. Market mechanisms do not protect against misallocation of productive resources, and certainly do not guarantee justice. Markets have a place in society, they allow social production on a larger scale than gift or communal economies, but they are not some sort of ideal, and can only exist when supported and managed by social institutions that are not "markets." Particularly markets that use money, because transactions that are based on a commodity-money-commodity circuit effective money supply is affected by economic cycles and sectoral balances, and thus needs to be actively adjusted to prevent crisis and glut. This is well studied and understood in monetary economics, and not even your fellow cultists like David Friedman would not deny it, for instance, in a 2002 article for The Los Angeles Times, Friedman wrote "Until U.S. economic growth is more balanced and its emerging public finance challenge more manageable, it's likely that our economic prospects will fail to fire investors' and consumers' enthusiasm. An expanding public sector may be necessary at a time of global terrorism." To get beyond authoritarian, centralized State forms, we need to develop alternatives. We can only develop alternatives by recognizing that the current forms came to exist and continue to exist because, no matter how badly, they do perform socially necessary functions, and thus any new forms can only come to exist when they can perform these functions in better ways. > Resource starvation? Anonymous markets have thrived throughout > history, and probably before. Do you care to inform us of any period of history where markets thrived while not supported and managed by non-market social institutions? Best, -- Dmytri Kleiner Venture Communist -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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