July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: [IP] Police use cameras to track vehicles of suspects
by gailbracy 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

For what it's worth, I just finished a cross-country drive from San Diego to NC via I-40 and was quite curious about the other fixtures attached to the cell towers planted on nearly every mile of the Interstate. Creepier still, was the fact that I saw virtually no Highway Patrols through any of the states I crossed with the exceptions of Tennessee, and at a few construction sites. Gail Bracy -----Original Message----- From: owner-ip(a)v2.listbox.com [mailto:owner-ip@v2.listbox.com] On Behalf Of David Farber Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2005 8:49 AM To: Ip ip Subject: [IP] Police use cameras to track vehicles of suspects Begin forwarded message:

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[EPIC_IDOF] Police use cameras to track vehicles of suspects
by Bruce Schneier 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I've written about this in New Haven, CT: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/10/license_plate_g.html This new story is from Scotland. Bruce **************************** Police use cameras to track vehicles of suspects http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/43417.html LUCY ADAMS, Home Affairs Correspondent July 20 2005 POLICE have created a database of more than 6000 vehicles of suspects which they can track on special cameras as they move around the country. On major roads across Scotland, the cameras, which look similar to the speed ones, record thousands of licence plates every hour and scan them against the database. Those on the list are flagged up with the local force control room with details of the direction in which they are travelling. Depending on the intelligence held on the motorist, the vehicle could be stopped immediately by officers or monitored during its journey. Senior police say there are a "substantial number" of cameras across the country aimed at detecting drugs traffickers, sex offenders, suspected terrorists and banned or unlicensed drivers. Owners on the list are not told, and civil rights campaigners have raised concerns about whether the scheme is compatible with human rights legislation. However, officers say Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), originally created for counter-terrorism, is a vital tool in collecting intelligence on criminals and suspected terrorists. Alan Burnett, spokesman on the system for the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, and assistant chief constable of Fife, said: "It is directed against detecting travelling housebreakers, potential terrorists, bogus callers and drug traffickers. This technology is very much geared towards disrupting criminals such as drug traffickers and it is not about prosecuting the motorist." He said it was nothing to do with speeding or Big Brother, adding that there were various lengths of time over which they could hold the information: "A stolen vehicle may be on the list for two days, but more serious intelligence may be kept on the list for up to 90 days." The Scottish Executive has spent ?1.5m on ANPR machines which can check up to 3000 licence plates an hour on vehicles travelling at speeds of up to 100mph. Forces are planning to connect this database to the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID) to allow every officer to be able to request that a vehicle of interest should be checked. It is managed by the Scottish Criminal Records Office where a sergeant is responsible for checking the information is held only for a certain time and that it is compliant with human rights legislation. John Scott, head of the Scottish Human Rights Centre, said he was concerned about the lack of judicial scrutiny. _______________________________________________ EPIC_IDOF mailing list EPIC_IDOF(a)mailman.epic.org https://mailman.epic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/epic_idof ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as gbi(a)actti.com To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Police use cameras to track vehicles of suspects
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[liberationtech] Could the U.S. Government Start Reading Your Emails?
by Rebecca MacKinnon 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://news.discovery.com/tech/government-reading-emails-privacy-111203.html Could the U.S. Government Start Reading Your Emails? A new security research project is designed to scan millions of IMs, texts and emails every day. Sat Dec 3, 2011 12:34 PM ET | content provided by John Brandon, FoxNews.com/SciTech Cherie Anderson runs a travel company in southern California, and she's convinced the federal government is reading her emails. But she's all right with that. "I assume it's part of the Patriot Act and I really don't mind," she says. "I figure I'm probably boring them to death." It's likely Anderson is not alone in her concerns that the government may be monitoring what Americans say, write, and read. And now there may be even more to worry about: a newly revealed security research project called PRODIGAL -- the Proactive Discovery of Insider Threats Using Graph Analysis and Learning -- which has been built to scan IMs, texts and emails . . . and can read approximately a quarter billion of them a day. PHOTOS: 5 Ways to Protect Yourself Online "Every time someone logs on or off, sends an email or text, touches a file or plugs in a USB key, these records are collected within the organization," David Bader, a professor at the Georgia Tech School of Computational Science and Engineering and a principal investigator on the project, told FoxNews.com. PRODIGAL scans those records for behavior -- emails to unusual recipients, certain words cropping up, files transferred from unexpected servers -- that changes over time as an employee "goes rogue." The system was developed at Georgia Tech in conjunction with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army's secretive research arm that works on everything from flying cars to robotic exoskeletons. DNEWS VIDEO: IPHONE IN SPACE EXPLAINED Initially, PRODIGAL will scan only the communications of military volunteers and people who work in federal agencies. But the very existence of such a project is sure to unnerve citizens like Anderson. Is the government reading my emails? Are they already monitoring me? "Some people say it's one step further toward a police state," said Anthony Howard, a book author and security expert who has consulted for the Department of Homeland Security. But Bader and other experts are quick to dismiss the idea that PRODIGAL could be used to monitor everyone in America. The scans work only on internal systems, they say -- not across the entire Internet. And the experts say such a project is long overdue: by monitoring for "anomalies" and predicting extreme behavior, catastrophes can be prevented, such as a soldier in good mental health becoming homicidal or a government employee sharing key classified information. ANALYSIS: Is the Internet Destroying Privacy? "Today, an analyst may receive tens of thousands of 'anomalies' per day, where an anomaly is an unexplained event," Bader said. The new system is designed to aid analysts in processing those anomalies. And it's not alone. Bader equated the PRODIGAL system to Raytheon SureView, an internal scanning system that looks for suspicious activity and alerts federal agencies about possible threats. Another system is the Einstein project, which was developed after 9/11 and scans government employees for key words and links suspicious activity to National Security Agency databases. But PRODIGAL scans vastly more data than those systems: as much as a terabyte or more per day, what Georgia Tech described as "massive data sets." PRODIGAL is part of an existing DARPA security project called Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS), which was announced earlier this year. Details about how ADAMS works are not widely known; Georgia Tech's recent announcement is one of the first reports to explain how these detection engines work. According to Bader, PRODIGAL uses complex "graph-processing" algorithms to analyze threats and piece together a jigsaw puzzle of communications. The system then ranks the unusual activity before feeding the most suspicious threats to agents. Cyber-security expert Joseph Steinberg, CEO of Green Armor Solutions, said ADAMS is unique in that it scans through a massive stream of data. He says the new project, which will take about two years to develop and will cost $9 million, will be more effective at analyzing threats and determining if they are valid. But the issue is not the scanning technology itself; it's how the information is interpreted -- and whether it ultimately helps at all, Howard told FoxNews.com. "Since there is no real data publicly available to substantiate that any of this technology is preventing terrorist attacks or strengthening our borders from within, [we can't] really say definitively that this technology is doing any good," he said. The challenge, he said, is that criminals and terrorists often use multiple channels of communication, some encrypted -- and know how to avoid existing detection systems. Nevertheless, PRODIGAL's ability to scan reams of data is clearly the next step in tracking unusual activity, and it's guaranteed to raise a red flag for Anderson and others. "Since people tend to be imperfect, the data captured can easily be mishandled. Where does it end?" Howard said. -- Rebecca MacKinnon Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation Cofounder: GlobalVoicesOnline.org Author: ConsentoftheNetworked.com Cell: +1-617-939-3493 Twitter: @rmack _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Chromebooks for Risky Situations?
by T N 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The word "Linux" doesn't refer to anything, other than maybe the kernel. Chrome OS is linux. But it's a massively stripped down "distribution" that has a radical design, including the fact that it will ONLY run if all of the cryptographic checks are verified from the root of trust. That root of trust is Google's massively large PKI public key that is burned into the firmware. For a journalist in the field, that's a great reassurance. Take your Chromebook to China. The Chinese government can not alter what you are running without either (a) modifying your hardware, which means they take possession of it for a period of time and manage to do something that is tricky to do (i.e. circumstances under which you'd no longer trust your computer anyways) or (b) you will know they tried to hack it and your Chromebook will refuse to boot, and will instead wipe away the hacks and update itself and won't boot unless the update is a legitimate one signed by Google. Yes, you can't compare Chrome OS's attack surface to a typical linux distribution, or even a highly customized linux install which doesn't have the hardware root of trust. On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 12:15 PM, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim(a)nadim.cc> wrote: > The biggest (and very important) difference between Linux and Chromebooks > is the hugely smaller attack surface. > > > NK > > > On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 2:36 PM, Brian Conley <brianc(a)smallworldnews.tv>wrote: > >> Andreas, >> >> Plenty of Syrians do have internet access, and use it on a regular basis. >> >> Also, lack of appropriateness for one use-case doesn't necessitate lack >> of appropriateness across the board. >> >> Linux is a great solution for many use cases, but as has been elaborated, >> quite a terrible one for many others. >> >> Brian >> >> >> On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 7:44 AM, Andreas Bader <noergelpizza(a)hotmail.de>wrote: >> >>> On 02/06/2013 04:24 PM, Tom Ritter wrote: >>> > Nadim, I'm with you. I'm not sure it's the perfect solution for >>> > everyone, but like Nathan said, if you already trust Google, I think >>> > it's a good option. >>> > >>> > On 6 February 2013 07:12, Andreas Bader <noergelpizza(a)hotmail.de> >>> wrote: >>> >> Why don't you use an old thinkpad or something with Linux, you have >>> the >>> >> same price like a Chromebook but more control over the system. And you >>> >> don't depend on the 3G and Wifi net. >>> > We started with the notion of Linux, and we were attracted to >>> > Chromebooks for a bunch of reasons. Going back to Linux loses all the >>> > things we were attracted to. >>> > >>> > - ChromeOS's attack surface is infinitely smaller than with Linux >>> > - The architecture of ChromeOS is different from Linux - process >>> > separation through SOP, as opposed to no process separation at all >>> > - ChromeOS was *designed* to have you logout, and hand the device over >>> > to someone else to login, and get no access to your stuff. Extreme >>> > Hardware attacks aside, it works pretty well. >>> > - ChromeOS's update mechanism is automatic, transparent, and basically >>> > foolproof. Having bricked Ubuntu and Gentoo systems, the same is not >>> > true of Linux. >>> > - Verified Boot, automatic FDE, tamper-resistant hardware >>> > >>> > Something I'm curious about is, if any less-popular device became >>> > popular amoung the activist community - would the government view is >>> > as an indicator of interest? Just like they block Tor, would they >>> > block Chromebooks? It'd have to get pretty darn popular first though. >>> > >>> > -tom >>> > -- >>> > >>> But you can't use it for political activists e.g. in Syria because of >>> its dependence on the internet connection. This fact is authoritative. >>> For Europe and USA and so on it might be a good solution. >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> >> Brian Conley >> >> Director, Small World News >> >> http://smallworldnews.tv >> >> m: 646.285.2046 >> >> Skype: brianjoelconley >> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-research] Drone hacking
by Andy Robinson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Anyone wanting to know what he's on about without the exaggerations and technical-speak: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/business/30privacy.html?_r=3&em=&pagewant… http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2008/tc20080323_387127.htm Rough appearance from these more sober accounts: it has some dangerous implications for privacy, and its advocates are pretty blase about overriding privacy concerns for supposed general goods, but it does not allow intelligent manipulation at an individual level. It allows discerning of trends, certain amounts of individualised tracking, and that's about it. It does have network/p2p versions as well as centralised versions. It is also highly dependent on the cooperation or unawareness of people in their uses of the particular technologies on which it depends. (It is not much use in low-tech settings or in conflictual settings against determined adversaries). There are thus a range of different scenarios. One being that, due to consumer concerns or judicial pressure, technologies be modified to avoid their use in this way. A second, that their capabilities for individual tracking are technologically limited or prohibited, but they keep being used for measuring mass trends. Still another being that the population be divided between those who make routine use of these technologies and those who either do not use them or strategically limit their use. Fourth, that they move in networked directions, with the data being fed through horizontal applications as well as vertical ones, in effect levelling the playing-field. Fifth, ad hoc counter-measures are developed to recreate privacy when needed, similar to the measures which already exist to get around online monitoring and attempts to identify filesharers. Or sixth, an Orwellian scenario, which would have to be imposed by force (such as implanting everyone with a VeriChip at birth and locking up anyone caught deactivating or scrambling it). Really not all it's cracked up to be I would say from this. _______________________________________________ p2presearch mailing list p2presearch(a)listcultures.org http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-research] Drone hacking
by Andy Robinson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Anyone wanting to know what he's on about without the exaggerations and technical-speak: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/business/30privacy.html?_r=3&em=&pagewant… http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2008/tc20080323_387127.htm Rough appearance from these more sober accounts: it has some dangerous implications for privacy, and its advocates are pretty blase about overriding privacy concerns for supposed general goods, but it does not allow intelligent manipulation at an individual level. It allows discerning of trends, certain amounts of individualised tracking, and that's about it. It does have network/p2p versions as well as centralised versions. It is also highly dependent on the cooperation or unawareness of people in their uses of the particular technologies on which it depends. (It is not much use in low-tech settings or in conflictual settings against determined adversaries). There are thus a range of different scenarios. One being that, due to consumer concerns or judicial pressure, technologies be modified to avoid their use in this way. A second, that their capabilities for individual tracking are technologically limited or prohibited, but they keep being used for measuring mass trends. Still another being that the population be divided between those who make routine use of these technologies and those who either do not use them or strategically limit their use. Fourth, that they move in networked directions, with the data being fed through horizontal applications as well as vertical ones, in effect levelling the playing-field. Fifth, ad hoc counter-measures are developed to recreate privacy when needed, similar to the measures which already exist to get around online monitoring and attempts to identify filesharers. Or sixth, an Orwellian scenario, which would have to be imposed by force (such as implanting everyone with a VeriChip at birth and locking up anyone caught deactivating or scrambling it). Really not all it's cracked up to be I would say from this. _______________________________________________ p2presearch mailing list p2presearch(a)listcultures.org http://listcultures.org/mailman/listinfo/p2presearch_listcultures.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Why Bluecoat?
by Ronald Deibert 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi LibTech Citizen Lab is undertaking research on the commercial market for censorship, surveillance, and computer network attack capabilities -- hence the interest in Blue Coat, but among many other reports we have done either alone or collaboratively with others on the topic. That would include reports going back to the mid 2000s on the use commercial filtering products, published under the auspices of the ONI, and including reports on Fortinet in Burma, Smart Filter in Iran, Websense in a variety of MENA / Gulf countries, and more recently Netsweeper. We have also published several reports on Gamma Group, and one on Hacking Team. Additionally, we are working collaboratively with Privacy International and Agentura.Ru on the commercial surveillance market in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Our interest is to document what's going on in the first instance, typically employing a mixed methods approach that we are refining -- and a lot of that can be opportunistic depending on the modalities of deployment. A second, growing concern of ours is around the question of what can be done about this market. Specifically on Blue Coat, readers of lib tech might be interested in an oped that Sarah McKune and I wrote that talks about the issue of shareholder pressure on Blue Coat as one approach short of regulation, after we determined that the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan is a majority owner of Blue Coat systems. You can read that oped here: http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2013/02/06/teachers_pension… I should mention that we posted questions directly to Blue Coat in our report here: https://citizenlab.org/2013/01/planet-blue-coat-mapping-global-censorship-a… ...and sent a letter directly to Blue Coat systems and the OTPP reiterating those questions. To date we have not received any reply. Our various publications on this topic can be found here: http://citizenlab.org/publications/ Regards Ron On 2013-04-06, at 12:14 PM, Kate Krauss wrote: > To me, the real question is, *If* Bluecoat, why are things going so well > for them when they are a 45 minute drive from activists in San Francisco? > Happy to explain--off this list--what this means in terms of political > strategy and offline, nonviolent direct action. > > This is definitely not an indictment of any group--there's amazing activism > going on an a zillion fires to put out. > > But there are great opportunities to be explored. > > Kate Krauss > (formerly of ACT UP Golden Gate, a group that successfully targeted major > companies on the peninsula, from SF) > > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Jillian C. York <jilliancyork(a)gmail.com>wrote: > >> Honestly? Because there is ample evidence to support it at the moment. I >> would also suggest that it's only "singled out" in the US - in Europe, the >> focus right now is on Gamma (FinFisher) and Amesys, largely. >> >> Activists have been accused in the past of "singling out" Cisco as well. >> Attention has now turned to Bluecoat. When there is evidence of another >> company's misdeeds, attention will surely turn there. >> >> Is that sufficient logic for you? >> >> On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Bernard Tyers - ei8fdb <ei8fdb(a)ei8fdb.org >>> wrote: >> >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >>> Hash: SHA1 >>> >>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I've been thinking about this for a while, and can't find a logical >>> reason. Possibly I'm not thinking about it hard enough. >>> >>> I'm curious as to why Bluecoat seem to be singled out for all this >>> attention regarding use in countries where the governments are "not nice"? >>> Is it because they are a public, well known company? A lot the same stories >>> repeat the same stories of Bluecoat equipment being used in the same >>> oppressive regimes. >>> >>> As someone who worked in ISP level infrastructure for a while (thankfully >>> no longer), I've seen the equipment used "for neutral uses" - network >>> management, etc. >>> >>> However, there are a lot more sinister and disgusting companies who's >>> products *sole-purpose* is surveillance and censorship, and sole market is >>> those oppressive countries we talk about on this list. >>> >>> My point of view is not to defend Bluecoat, quite the opposite, but there >>> are nastier and uglier fish out there. >>> >>> Can anyone set me right, or give an opinion? On or off list is fine. >>> >>> thanks, >>> Bernard >>> >>> - -------------------------------------- >>> Bernard / bluboxthief / ei8fdb >>> >>> IO91XM / www.ei8fdb.org >>> >>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >>> Version: GnuPG/MacGPG2 v2.0.17 (Darwin) >>> Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org >>> >>> iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJRX+/0AAoJENsz1IO7MIrrMQcH/1vOMQvty80EZkCGcqbXiT9t >>> SI0o9OOU+wn3Am5ERwDfXlcXy+V/28vbXxPvbhRtjIukF1X94fgJ95+ODn2dOY6g >>> B4wnOmLzvDT8HovPhf1zH4Dkot3N50Rkt4V4k29163EYVPgLkkuRrPgU6HGwB9IH >>> dVW54KNXnZX3sXFsYle0j8rayI1tgPWpesPpWCe/J5pI+ljLTFbLEJ+Ytz6rPbqu >>> y4c/Irjknh8NCVr1LLaGnTkeZQstv5oWZErRrv0bl9Qkm737PAkUCmhTjvBoJw7+ >>> kJ9b7lFjJ2h9TRdw54RwTomRrhe4yYmPYlWnSyy4k6d6PK1B7bjKdUT89xjn4jY= >>> =PYRZ >>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >>> -- >>> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >>> emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 >> site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | * >> twitter: @jilliancyork* * >> >> "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the >> seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel* >> >> -- >> Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by >> emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > -- > Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Ronald Deibert Director, the Citizen Lab and the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies Munk School of Global Affairs University of Toronto (416) 946-8916 PGP: http://deibert.citizenlab.org/pubkey.txt http://deibert.citizenlab.org/ twitter.com/citizenlab r.deibert(a)utoronto.ca -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Quantum computation & communication
by Maxim Kammerer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Dec 19, 2012 at 8:38 AM, Gregory Foster <gfoster(a)entersection.org> wrote: > Aerospace & Defense News (Dec 19) - "Army Researchers Seek Secure Quantum > Communications": > http://www.asdnews.com/news-46753/Army_Researchers_Seek_Secure_Quantum_Comm… > >> "Quantum computers will be able to easily decrypt communications that are >> currently secure," Meyers said. "We're talking decryption in seconds instead >> of years. That's one reason why it's vital for us to explore quantum >> encryption." I am yet to see evidence that quantum computing is viable for any non-trivial number of qubits. I think it is more likely that we will see the idealized notion of quantum superposition break once QC is pushed far enough, resulting in physics, but not computation breakthrough, and in ability to still use finite fields-based cryptography, just with bigger key lengths. Also, as pointed by Matt Mackall above, there is a frequent misconception that quantum computers are anything like non-deterministic Turing machines b they are not, and shuffling-based (i.e., symmetric-key, classical) cryptography is still resistant to QC, assuming it's actually resistant to classic computing as well (which is generally seen as a much stronger assumption than, e.g., assuming that factoring is hard). Caveat emptor: not my field, inb4 hate from QC people. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux: http://dee.su/liberte -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Baku attendees compromised
by Alex Comninos 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I really have a problem with Ryan Heath's allegations not being backed up by disclosure/evidence. I think it was not very diplomatic and undermines Neelie Kroes's good work recently done in Baku which consisted of evidence-based statements. I have just come back from Baku and have witnessed first hand some of the governments activities there (e.g. trying to stop dissemination of publications on freedom of expression in the country). While I do not discount at all the incident as a possibility, I think however such a blatant hack would be contrary to the legitimation strategies the Azerbaijani government was trying to pursue there. I look forward to further disclosure and evidence. I hope also the Azerbaijani government is not going to narrate Heath's allegations as being part of the "fiction" (in the words of an official in the closing ceremony) of foreign governments and NGOs operating there. Me and many others have asked him (via Twitter) for further evidence, as well as a description at least of the symptoms, but none is forthcoming. Let us focus more on Kroes's statements as well as the statements of Azerbaijani activists, e.g. http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/11/06/azerbaijan-open-letter-to… On 10 November 2012 23:43, John Scott-Railton <john.scott.railton(a)gmail.com> wrote: > If this isn't already on your radar, AP and others are reporting that EU > Officials at the Baku conference report being hacked in their hotel. > > SNIP > "...spokesman Ryan Heath told The Associated Press that the attack occurred > while they were in their hotel. He declined to say who might be responsible, > adding that the computers would be analyzed for clues. > > It wasnbt immediately clear whether the attack resulted in theft of any > information. > > Kroes criticized her hosts during the forum Wednesday, attacking the Azeri > government for allegedly spying on activists online and b violating the > privacy of journalists and their sources.b... > > SNIP > > Link is: > http://www.salon.com/2012/11/10/eu_officials_we_were_hacked_at_web_conferen… > > > > John Scott-Railton > www.johnscottrailton.com > > PGP key ID: 0x3e0ccb80778fe8d7 > Fingerprint: FDBE BE29 A157 9881 34C7 8FA6 3E0C CB80 778F E8D7 > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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