July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[tahoe-dev] Safely defined.
by Ted Rolle, Jr. 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Brian: Define safely. I'm in a volunteer grid. Bulletproof code is important for reliability. This does _not_ reflect your coding ability. It's a characteristic of large systems. I've written large systems and had unintended consequences from "small, harmless, guaranteed-to-work" changes. But, we didn't have a testing environment as complete as Tahoe-LAFS has. If new code passes the testing suite, it's most probably clean. Change of mind: I like to be on the cutting edge. I'll put the new code into place when it's someone says its safe to do so. Thanks for all your work, Ted _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org http://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[tor-dev] Proposal: Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping
by Mike Perry 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Also at: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/blob/consensus-boo… ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping Author: Mike Perry Created: 01-10-2012 Status: Open Target: 0.2.4.x+ Overview and Motiviation This proposal describes a way for clients to fetch the initial consensus more quickly in situations where some or all of the directory authorities are unreachable. This proposal is meant to describe a solution for bug #4483. Design: Bootstrap Process Changes The core idea is to attempt to establish bootstrap connections in parallel during the bootstrap process, and download the consensus from the first connection that completes. Connection attempts will be done in batches of three. Only one connection will be performed to one of the canonical directory authorities. Two connections will be performed to randomly chosen hard coded directory mirrors. If no connections complete within 5 seconds, another batch of three connections will be launched. Otherwise, the first connection to complete will be used to download the consensus document and the others will be closed, after which bootstrapping will proceed as normal. If at any time, the total outstanding bootstrap connection attempts exceeds 15, no new connection attempts are to be launched until existing connection attempts experience full timeout. Design: Fallback Dir Mirror Selection The set of hard coded directory mirrors from #572 shall be chosen using the 100 Guard nodes with the longest uptime. The fallback weights will be set using each mirror's fraction of consensus bandwidth out of the total of all 100 mirrors. This list of fallback dir mirrors should be updated with every major Tor release. In future releases, the number of dir mirrors should be set at 20% of the current Guard nodes, rather than fixed at 100. Performance: Additional Load with Current Parameter Choices This design and the connection count parameters were chosen such that no additional bandwidth load would be placed on the directory authorities. In fact, the directory authorities should experience less load, because they will not need to serve the consensus document for a connection in the event that one of the directory mirrors complete their connection before the directory authority does. However, the scheme does place additional TLS connection load on the fallback dir mirrors. Because bootstrapping is rare and all but one of the TLS connections will be very short-lived and unused, this should not be a substantial issue. The dangerous case is in the event of a prolonged consensus failure that induces all clients to enter into the bootstrap process. In this case, the number of initial TLS connections to the fallback dir mirrors would be 2*C/100, or 10,000 for C=500,000 users. If no connections complete before the five retries, this could reach as high as 50,000 connection attempts, but this is extremely unlikely to happen in full aggregate. However, in the no-consensus scenario today, the directory authorities would already experience C/9 or 55,555 connection attempts. The 5-retry scheme increases their total maximum load to about 275,000 connection attempts, but again this is unlikely to be reached in aggregate. Additionally, with this scheme, even if the dirauths are taken down by this load, the dir mirrors should be able to survive it. Implementation Notes: Code Modifications The implementation of the bootstrap process is unfortunately mixed in with many types of directory activity. The process starts in update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads(), which initiates a single directory connection through directory_get_from_dirserver(). Depending on bootstrap state, a single directory server is selected and a connection is eventually made through directory_initiate_command_rend(). There appear to be a few options for altering this code to perform multiple connections. Without refactoring, one approach would be to make multiple calls to directory_initiate_command_routerstatus() from directory_get_from_dirserver() if the purpose is DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS and the only directory servers available are the authorities and the fallback dir mirrors. The code in directory_initiate_command_rend() would then need to be altered to maintain a list of the dircons created for this purpose as well as avoid immediately queuing the directory_send_command() request for the DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS purpose. A flag would need to be set on the dircon to be checked in connection_dir_finished_connecting(). The function connection_dir_finished_connecting() would need to be altered to examine the list of pending dircons, determine if this one is the first to complete, and if so, then call directory_send_command() to download the consensus and close the other pending dircons. An additional timer would need to be installed to re-call update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads() or a related helper after 5 seconds. connection_dir_finished_connecting() would cancel this timer. The helper would check the list of pending connections and ensure it never exceeds 15. -- Mike Perry _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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None
by Adam Powell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Declan, Here's the program URL: http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13366 Thanks! Adam ********** The First Amendment Online conference March 22, 2001, co-sponsored by the Online News Association 03.01.01 Printer-friendly page At First Amendment Center/New York, 580 Madison Ave. To RSVP: Call 212/317-7592 or email Euraine Brooks at ebrooks(a)freedomforum.org. Noon -- Lunch program: Free Expression and the Net Welcome: Adam Clayton Powell III, vice president/technology and programs, The Freedom Forum Jill Blackman, Chicago Tribune, Online News Association Speaker: Li Lu, founder and general partner, Himalaya Capital 1:45 p.m. -- Technology demonstration: Mobile Journalist's Workstation of the Future John Pavlik, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism Elias Gagas, Columbia University School of Engineering 2:15 -- First Amendment Parity and New Media Moderator: Karl Idsvoog, 1stAmendmentInvestigations.com Robert Corn-Revere, Hogan and Hartson L.L.P. Declan McCullagh, Wired News Peggy Miles, International Webcasting Association Omar Wasow, blackplanet.com 3:15 -- Technology Demonstration: Immersive News Larry Pryor, University of Southern California, Annenberg School for Communication 3:45 -- Filters, Content Controls and Speech Moderator: Paul McMasters, First Amendment Center Ann Beeson, staff attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Graeme Browning, author, "Electronic Democracy" Brant Houston, executive director, Investigative Reporters and Editors Steven Levy, technology columnist, Newsweek 4:45 -- Filters and the Swedish Experience Stig Roland Rask, Foundation for Knowledge and Competence Development, Sweden 5 p.m. -- Technology Demonstration: Remote Sensing and Civilian Satellites Mark Brender, director of Washington operations, Space Imaging Dan Dubno, technologist and producer, CBS News 5:30 -- Remote Sensing, Linking and Privacy Moderator: Jill Blackman Guy Berger, Head of Department, Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, South Africa Jonathan Hart, Dow, Lohnes and Albertson Stephen Miller, New York Times Elizabeth Osder, Online News Association 6:30 -- Conclusion Adam Powell 6:45-7:30 p.m. -- reception ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if it remains intact. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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None
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[I'm on an afternoon panel. --Declan] *********

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Journalist Arresting for Criticizing Cops
by Eric Cordian 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

In today's news of the truly odd. ----- KEY WEST, Fla. (AP) -- A newspaper editor and publisher was arrested for publishing an article alleging a cover-up in an internal police investigation he had filed an official complaint about, police records show. Dennis Cooper, 66, editor of the weekly Key West The Newspaper, was arrested Friday and released two hours later on his own recognizance. The affidavit for his arrest cites a Florida statute that makes it a misdemeanor for anyone involved in an internal police investigation to disclose information before it has been entered into public record. Cooper has alleged a police lieutenant lied in court about a 1996 stop of a bicyclist, and that the Key West Police Department covered it up. He filed a complaint last month with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement accusing an internal affairs investigator of falsifying information about his review of the incident. [...] --- http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Sear…>2000->Ch0112->Section%20533 >(4) Any person who is a participant in an internal investigation, >including the complainant, the subject of the investigation, the >investigator conducting the investigation, and any witnesses in the >investigation, who willfully discloses any information obtained pursuant >to the agency's investigation, including, but not limited to, the identity >of the officer under investigation, the nature of the questions asked, >information revealed, or documents furnished in connection with a >confidential internal investigation of an agency, before such complaint, >document, action, or proceeding becomes a public record as provided in >this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as >provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. However, this subsection does not >limit a law enforcement or correctional officer's ability to gain access >to information under paragraph (2)(a). Additionally, a sheriff, police >chief, or other head of a law enforcement agency, or his or her designee, >is not precluded by this section from acknowledging the existence of a >complaint and the fact that an investigation is underway. http://legal.firn.edu/justice/01law.PDF >Unauthorized disclosure penalties: Section 112.533(4), F.S., makes it a >first degree misdemeanor for any person who is a participant in an >internal investigation to willfully disclose any information obtained >pursuant to the agency's investigation before such information becomes a >public record. However, the subsection "does not limit a law enforcement >or correctional officer's ability to gain access to information under >paragraph (2)(a)."92

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[mnet-devel] Anonymity and Performance in Peer-to-Peer Systems
by Some Guy 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

This post is supposed to get to Nikita Borisov and Jason Waddle regarding: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nikitab/projects/p2p/proposal.html Part 1: "Research a formal metric for the anonymity of a system. We are currently performing a literature search; if we fail to find a suitable metric in past research, we will propose a new one." Here's a nice paper that analizes the annonymity of Crowds: Probabilistic Analysis of Anonymity Vitaly Shmatikov SRI International http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/shmatikov02probabilistic.html "We use discrete-time Markov chains to formally model the behavior of group members in Crowds [22], specify anonymity properties of the system as temporal logic formulas, and use a probabilistic model checker to verify them. This analysis method is applicable to other probabilistic systems such as Freenet." Part 2: DOS Resistance: I've got a basic handle now on DOS resistance vs. peformance and I can almost get a faint glimmer of what the a "perfect" DHT should look like. I've posted my ideas on it to the Freenet list and I'll post them to the MNet list today too. If anyone wants to discuss how to build a better Freenet, I'd LOVE to help. __________________________________________________________________ Gesendet von Yahoo! Mail - http://mail.yahoo.de Logos und Klingeltvne f|rs Handy bei http://sms.yahoo.de ------------------------------------------------------- This SF.net email sponsored by: Enterprise Linux Forum Conference & Expo The Event For Linux Datacenter Solutions & Strategies in The Enterprise Linux in the Boardroom; in the Front Office; & in the Server Room http://www.enterpriselinuxforum.com _______________________________________________ mnet-devel mailing list mnet-devel(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/mnet-devel ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[wta-talk] Participatory Panopticon
by Guiseppe Getto 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<wta-talk(a)transhumanism.org> http://www.futurismic.com/2006/12/new_column_jamais_cascio_on_th_1.html Permanent Link: http://cyborgiterationtendency.blogspot.com/ Watching The Watchmen Watching Us by Jamais Cascio This November, comedian Michael Richards learned about the participatory panopticon. So did the UCLA police. And early in the month, Virginia Senator George Allen learned that it can have a political bite. The participatory panopticon is the emerging scenario of distributed observation of the world around us, using cheap, networked tools like mobile phones and open, web-based tools like YouTube. A rapidly-growing number of us have literally at our fingertips systems of capturing and sharing what we see. Most of what we capture will be of interest only to ourselves, or to close friends and relatives; some, however, will have a far greater reach that we might suspect. What all three of the examples I cite at the beginning of this piece have in common is that they were recordings of events that (a) the perpetrators would, in retrospect, probably wish to have done differently, if at all, and (b) would have received little notice in the era before personal networked cameras and video-sharing websites. Certainly there may have been rumors that a comedian had "gone nuts" on stage, or that UCLA cops had beaten a student, but as rumors, they'd have a limited life-span, and would soon be forgotten. Because of the participatory panopticon, however, these events will for a very long time shape how many of us think about these people. The participatory panopticon is not going to go away any time soon. The publicity associated with the Richards and UCLA cases -- and the political impact of the George Allen "macaca" incident -- virtually guarantees that more citizens will have cameraphones at the ready to capture and share damning evidence of the misbehavior of officials and celebrities. So what will the participatory panopticon explosion look like? Mass Participation: The next time we see a cameraphone-recorded, newsworthy event, chances are we'll have multiple perspectives on it, each video providing additional context and evidence. On balance, this will be useful, as a typical response by those caught on video is that the recording misses what happened before, or after; the more witnesses, the greater the accuracy. Moreover, having multiple recordings helps to mitigate the effect of... Fakes: The combination of the impact of these recordings, the low quality of the actual video, and the rise of easy-to-use digital image and video tools means we are almost certain to see faked cameraphone recordings of seemingly volatile incidents, whether involving celebrities or civic officials. A video uploaded to YouTube can be highly disruptive to the "story" a movie star or presidential candidate wants told, even if the video is later shown to be a hoax. The initial scandal usually carries more memetic weight than the subsequent correction. Especially given what happened to George Allen, expect to see one or more faked videos used to attack candidates in the run-up to the 2008 election in the US. That's why we'll see more... Self-recording for self-defense: A key lesson from the 2004 presidential campaign in the US was that it's vitally important for protestors to make their own (multiple) video recordings of protests and arrests. The NY police videotaped protestors, but apparently edited the recordings later on to justify the arrests -- edits that were exposed by comparisons to the protestor videos. If the UCLA cops that beat the kid in the library last month had been wearing their own personal cameras, they'd be able to demonstrate that the kid was, as they claimed, behaving in a way that warranted the beating prior to the point where the citizen cameraphone recording started. Self-recording for self-defense won't be much help if the individual does, in fact, mess up -- it wouldn't have helped Michael Richards or George Allen, for example. In the case of public officials, however, that's a good thing. If a police officer or elected leader knows that every contact he or she has with the public is being recorded, they will presumably be less inclined to behave in careless or corrupt ways. This deterrent effect would be even greater if the recordings were made available to the public soon after they're made (with appropriate blurring or muting to protect the privacy rights of the citizens involved). For police officials, the use of personal cameras to record citizen interactions would be a small step from the current use of dashboard-mounted cameras in many police vehicles, used to record traffic stops and the like. As the proliferation of "true life video" programs on television shows, these recordings can be very useful as evidence if someone attacks an officer; clearly, a badge-mounted camera would offer even greater evidentiary value. The proliferation of cameras this scenario suggests is undoubtedly troubling for many civil libertarians and privacy advocates. The problem is, these cameras have already proliferated -- the majority of mobile phones sold around the world have a camera, and more cameraphones were sold in 2005 than any other kind of camera, digital or film. We will have more examples of the participatory panopticon in action in the coming weeks and months. Similarly, surveillance cameras have become a commonplace part of urban policing, whether mounted on buildings, street lights, or police car dashboards. What we need are rules and practices that make the use of these tools more responsible and transparent. David Brin refers to this as "reciprocal accountability," a phrase I particularly like because it recognizes that we have laws and public officials for very good reasons, but that they need to be accountable to the public in substantive ways. The participatory panopticon is the emergence of an uncoordinated, haphazard form of reciprocal accountability, relying more on scandal than on process. We will need to pay more attention to how these practices are formalized for one very important reason: The participatory panopticon watches us all; This isn't simply a concern for police officers, politicians and comedians. Everyday citizens who behave in ways that draw notice -- for good and for ill -- will increasingly find themselves captured on cameraphones and featured on video sharing websites. We're already seeing example of this, from the "dog poop girl" in South Korea to student recordings of abusive teachers around the world. As more people see the value of making these recordings, and as the tools for making and sharing the videos become even easier, we will see this become a commonplace part of news stories and public discourse. The participatory panopticon isn't a scenario of the future; the participatory panopticon is here. Comments There are 0 comments and trackbacks on this entry. Add yours now. _________________________________________________________________ Stay up-to-date with your friends through the Windows Live Spaces friends list. http://clk.atdmt.com/MSN/go/msnnkwsp0070000001msn/direct/01/?href=http://sp… es.live.com/spacesapi.aspx?wx_action=create&wx_url=/friends.aspx&mk _______________________________________________ wta-talk mailing list wta-talk(a)transhumanism.org http://www.transhumanism.org/mailman/listinfo/wta-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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None
by Adam Powell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Declan, Here's the program URL: http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=13366 Thanks! Adam ********** The First Amendment Online conference March 22, 2001, co-sponsored by the Online News Association 03.01.01 Printer-friendly page At First Amendment Center/New York, 580 Madison Ave. To RSVP: Call 212/317-7592 or email Euraine Brooks at ebrooks(a)freedomforum.org. Noon -- Lunch program: Free Expression and the Net Welcome: Adam Clayton Powell III, vice president/technology and programs, The Freedom Forum Jill Blackman, Chicago Tribune, Online News Association Speaker: Li Lu, founder and general partner, Himalaya Capital 1:45 p.m. -- Technology demonstration: Mobile Journalist's Workstation of the Future John Pavlik, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism Elias Gagas, Columbia University School of Engineering 2:15 -- First Amendment Parity and New Media Moderator: Karl Idsvoog, 1stAmendmentInvestigations.com Robert Corn-Revere, Hogan and Hartson L.L.P. Declan McCullagh, Wired News Peggy Miles, International Webcasting Association Omar Wasow, blackplanet.com 3:15 -- Technology Demonstration: Immersive News Larry Pryor, University of Southern California, Annenberg School for Communication 3:45 -- Filters, Content Controls and Speech Moderator: Paul McMasters, First Amendment Center Ann Beeson, staff attorney, American Civil Liberties Union Graeme Browning, author, "Electronic Democracy" Brant Houston, executive director, Investigative Reporters and Editors Steven Levy, technology columnist, Newsweek 4:45 -- Filters and the Swedish Experience Stig Roland Rask, Foundation for Knowledge and Competence Development, Sweden 5 p.m. -- Technology Demonstration: Remote Sensing and Civilian Satellites Mark Brender, director of Washington operations, Space Imaging Dan Dubno, technologist and producer, CBS News 5:30 -- Remote Sensing, Linking and Privacy Moderator: Jill Blackman Guy Berger, Head of Department, Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, South Africa Jonathan Hart, Dow, Lohnes and Albertson Stephen Miller, New York Times Elizabeth Osder, Online News Association 6:30 -- Conclusion Adam Powell 6:45-7:30 p.m. -- reception ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if it remains intact. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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None
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[I'm on an afternoon panel. --Declan] *********

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Journalist Arresting for Criticizing Cops
by Eric Cordian 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

In today's news of the truly odd. ----- KEY WEST, Fla. (AP) -- A newspaper editor and publisher was arrested for publishing an article alleging a cover-up in an internal police investigation he had filed an official complaint about, police records show. Dennis Cooper, 66, editor of the weekly Key West The Newspaper, was arrested Friday and released two hours later on his own recognizance. The affidavit for his arrest cites a Florida statute that makes it a misdemeanor for anyone involved in an internal police investigation to disclose information before it has been entered into public record. Cooper has alleged a police lieutenant lied in court about a 1996 stop of a bicyclist, and that the Key West Police Department covered it up. He filed a complaint last month with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement accusing an internal affairs investigator of falsifying information about his review of the incident. [...] --- http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Sear…>2000->Ch0112->Section%20533 >(4) Any person who is a participant in an internal investigation, >including the complainant, the subject of the investigation, the >investigator conducting the investigation, and any witnesses in the >investigation, who willfully discloses any information obtained pursuant >to the agency's investigation, including, but not limited to, the identity >of the officer under investigation, the nature of the questions asked, >information revealed, or documents furnished in connection with a >confidential internal investigation of an agency, before such complaint, >document, action, or proceeding becomes a public record as provided in >this section commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as >provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. However, this subsection does not >limit a law enforcement or correctional officer's ability to gain access >to information under paragraph (2)(a). Additionally, a sheriff, police >chief, or other head of a law enforcement agency, or his or her designee, >is not precluded by this section from acknowledging the existence of a >complaint and the fact that an investigation is underway. http://legal.firn.edu/justice/01law.PDF >Unauthorized disclosure penalties: Section 112.533(4), F.S., makes it a >first degree misdemeanor for any person who is a participant in an >internal investigation to willfully disclose any information obtained >pursuant to the agency's investigation before such information becomes a >public record. However, the subsection "does not limit a law enforcement >or correctional officer's ability to gain access to information under >paragraph (2)(a)."92

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