July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 10:33:29AM +0300, Maxim Kammerer wrote: > As you can see, sniffing just 25 Class-C networks (or 42 individual > nodes) lets an adversary correlate ~25% of (non-.onion) circuits. I think your numbers may not be right (there are a lot of other subtleties to the calculation), but your point is still generally correct. The Tor network doesn't have enough diversity relative to an ideal Tor network we could imagine. Worse, the Internet itself doesn't have as much diversity as we'd like either. http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#DBLP:conf:ccs:EdmanS09 http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#oakland2012-lastor all examine AS-level path diversity. See also http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#murdoch-pet2007 for another worrying concern about bottlenecks besides ASes. I also worry about the bottleneck created by trans-ocean cables. For more details calculating diversity, see https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-netw… https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6232 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6443 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/6443/exit-probab… https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6460 Help appreciated on those tickets! > All of these servers are in US/CA or EU jurisdiction, so even an > unsophisticated LE operation can issue ~20 wiretapping orders at ISP > level Really? Across jurisdictions? And for 'all traffic of those relays'? I don't want to downplay the risk too far, but I think you overestimate "unsophisticated law enforcement operations". > (many of these networks are operated by same hosting providers), > and immediately deanonymize ~25% of Tor traffic. So far for anonymity! Well, do you have an alternative design that scales adequately to 6 or 7 figures of users, provides roughly-real-time browsing and other TCP connections, works on the Internet that we have, and has better traffic confirmation resistance? Or said another way, how well do other usable low-latency anonymity systems hold up to ongoing wiretaps at 25 arbitrary network locations? I believe the answer is 'mostly less well than Tor'. tagnaq pointed to my response to a similar question on the tor-relays list: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2012-July/001436.html talking about the tradeoff between "make it faster but more concentrated" vs "make it less fast but less concentrated". https://metrics.torproject.org/performance.html?graph=torperf&start=2009-06… It would be interesting to see your stats on as AS level rather than a /24 netblock level. But the challenge really is that we need to know what networks the traffic flows traverse upstream -- e.g. how pervasive a surveiller of Tor traffic could Deutsch Telekom be? This topic goes back to my earlier blog post: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-netw… I think we still do a pretty good job explaining the risks and limitations of using a system like Tor, e.g. in each Tor talk. Tor used to print a warning message on start, to explain that it isn't perfect. But a) no Windows users saw it, and b) it backfired in surprising ways, like having journalists write "Tor recommends that you use something else for now, since they're not ready yet": https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2474 > [1] http://pastebin.com/hgtXMSyx Thanks for presenting the code too! --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[drone-list] End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports
by John Young 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-536 Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports Full 58-page report, PDF: http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/593131.pdf GAO-12-536, Jul 30, 2012 What GAO Found Since 2005, the number of countries that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75. In addition, countries of proliferation concern developed and fielded increasingly more sophisticated systems. Recent trends in new UAV capabilities, including armed and miniature UAVs, increased the number of military applications for this technology. A number of new civilian and commercial applications, such as law enforcement and environmental monitoring, are available for UAVs, but these applications are limited by regulatory restrictions on civilian airspace. The United States likely faces increasing risks as countries of concern and terrorist organizations seek to acquire UAV technology. Foreign countries' and terrorists' acquisition of UAVs could provide them with increased abilities to gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. For instance, some foreign countries likely have already used UAVs to gather information on U.S. military activities overseas. Alternatively, the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests by providing allies with key capabilities and by helping retain a strong industrial base for UAV production. For instance, the United Kingdom and Italy have used UAVs purchased from the United States to collect data on Taliban activity in Afghanistan. The United States has engaged in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address UAV proliferation concerns. The United States principally engaged the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to address multilateral UAV proliferation concerns. Since 2005, the United States proposed certain significant changes to address how MTCR controls UAVs, but members could not reach a consensus for these changes. Also, while the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) controls the export of some key dual-use UAV components, it does not control other dual-use technologies that are commonly used in UAVs. The Department of State (State) has also used diplomatic cables to address the proliferation of UAV-related technologies bilaterally. State provided to GAO about 70 cables that it sent from January 2005 to September 2011 addressing UAV-related concerns to about 20 governments and the MTCR. Over 75 percent of these cables focused on efforts by a small number of countries of concern to obtain UAV technology. U.S. agencies coordinate in several ways to control the spread of UAV technology, but could improve their UAV-related information sharing. For instance, an interagency group reviews many license applications to export UAV technology. However, there is not a formal mechanism to ensure that licensing agencies have relevant and timely intelligence information when making licensing decisions. Also, State's licensing database cannot provide aggregate data on military UAV exports State has authorized, which may impair the U.S. government's ability to oversee the release of sensitive UAV technology. The Department of Defense (DOD) and State each conduct end-use monitoring of some UAV exports, but differences in the agencies' programs may result in similar types of items being subject to different levels of oversight. _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Fwd: Finally the Computer-Internet Security Racket is Exposed
by liberationtech＠lewman.us 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 at 04:30:54PM +0100, jd.cypherpunks(a)gmail.com wrote 4.1K bytes in 93 lines about: : > Peter Neumann proposes killing computers and the Internet to start over : > and build something far worse to meticulously track every nano-bite of digital : > communications with unrevocable, implanted encrypted ID in every device to : > authenticate ID of users. Sounds like snakeoil to me. I'll just write malware that sits between the reader and the next layer into the OS. And I would attack the backend databases which have the tokens to verify everyone anyway. I've skipped the issues of surgery to swap implanted devices, cloning devices, database corruption, witness protection, identity theft, data leakage, etc. -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] More on Hayden on NSA program
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----Original Message----- From: Daniel Weitzner [mailto:djweitzner@csail.mit.edu] Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2006 9:37 AM To: dave(a)farber.net Cc: Ip; Tim Finin Subject: (for IP) Re: [IP] More on Hayden on NSA program Hi Dave and Tim, Applying 4th Amendment principles is generally a puzzle. This situation is even more complex because the Administration seems to be arguing that most of the statutory rules that usually apply (FISA, Wiretap Act) just don't. So there are really two questions: -can the Administration program avoid FISA? -if so, is it permissible under the 4th Amendment? Most of the arguments from the Administration have focused on the first part of this question -- do the statutes apply? By going to the substance of the 4th Amedment, Hayden re-opens a lot of settled questions about wiretapping. In particular, if it's the case that the surveillance was conducted in order to discover patterns of activity, rather than get at communications of people already under sufficient suspicion to justify a probably cause warrant or a FISA order, then we have to get in the question of the 4th amendment status of pattern detection. Some people characterize this a fishing expedition. I think that there are interesting parallels with suspicionless searches such as roadblocks. A recent case on this subject, Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) illuminates some of the issues Tim raises: "The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.... While such suspicion is not an "irreducible" component of reasonableness, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply." The court in Edmonds struck down an Indianapolis policy department practice of erecting roadblock that randomly stop drivers to check for illegal drugs. Though random checks to stop immediate driving- related hazards such as drunk driving had previously been approved, the Court here rejected the illegal drug roadblock because the Fourth Amendment does not allow "suspicionless searches" except in "special circumstances." Ordinary crime control is not a special circumstance, but the Supreme Court went on to say: "...the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to ***thwart an imminent terrorist attack*** or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route. See 183 F. 3d, at 662-663. The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control." (emphasis added) How does this rule on physical searches of cars (which have largely lost their 4th Amendment protection) apply to electronic surveillance? I'm sure we hear a lot about this from all sides. Danny On Jan 23, 2006, at 9:32 PM, David Farber wrote: > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Tim Finin [mailto:finin@cs.umbc.edu] > Sent: Monday, January 23, 2006 9:13 PM > To: dave(a)farber.net > Subject: More on Hayden on NSA program > > I was puzzled when I heard this exchange on the radio. > General Hayden was clearly denying that "probable cause" was > the standard for what is allowed in the fourth amendment. > But the Constitution seems to say otherwise. It turns out that > there's a trick involved, so pay close attention. > > Here's the exchange: > > Q: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. I'd like to stay on > the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by > which you use to target your wiretaps. I'm no lawyer, but my > understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the > Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to > be able to do a search that does not violate an American's > right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use -- > > HAYDEN: No, actually -- the Fourth Amendment actually > protects all of us against unreasonable search and > seizure. That's what it says. > > Q: But the measure is probable cause, I believe. > > HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure. > > Q: But does it not say probable ... > > HAYDEN: No. The amendment says unreasonable search and > seizure... Just to be very clear -- and believe me, if > there's any amendment to the Constitution that employees of > the National Security Agency are familiar with, it's the > Fourth. And it is a reasonableness standard in the Fourth > Amendment. And so what you've raised to me -- and I'm not a > lawyer, and don't want to become one -- what you've raised > to me is, in terms of quoting the Fourth Amendment, is an > issue of the Constitution. The constitutional standard is > "reasonable." And we believe -- I am convinced that we are > lawful because what it is we're doing is reasonable." > > And here is the fourth amendment: > > The right of the people to be secure in their persons, > houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches > and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall > issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or > affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be > searched, and the persons or things to be seized. > > The trick is this -- "probable cause" is only needed to get > a warrant for a search, so if you forgo asking for a > warrant to be issued, you are home free. Slam dunk. This > Law stuff is pretty neat. > > > > ------------------------------------- > You are subscribed as djweitzner(a)csail.mit.edu > To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > > Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- > people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [p2p-hackers] A globally distributed peer-to-peer data archive
by Tony Arcieri 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 9:29 AM, David Barrett <dbarrett(a)quinthar.com>wrote: > Would you and your 7 friends be equally enthusiastic early adopters if the > 9th member of your node was the RIAA/MPAA/etc? > The RIAA/MPAA could join our cluster, however the design properties of Tahoe would prevent them from accessing our data. > In these digital inquisition times, where your entire net worth can be > vaporized at a whim, how do you convince people that it's safe to share your > data even if it has a normal amount of pirated content? (After all, > everybody has *some*, and probably enough to trigger catastropic > consequences if noticed by the right party.) > Again, the design properties of Tahoe blur the concept of whose data is actually on the cluster. From the outside looking in, the contents of data you provide to the cluster is cryptographically opaque. Unless they can prove you have the cryptographic keys to access a particular piece of content, you can make the argument that you literally had no way of knowing that the encrypted data you are storing was in fact pirated content. > With this in mind, ask your testers to participate in a challenge: they use > it as normal, but offer to pay $100/instance to anyone who can prove a given > IP address pirated something -- a crowdsourced RIAA simulator. If there are > no takers, try $1000. Once you've got it to a point when nobody can tell > who has what (yet the system continues to work and provide real value), > you're onto something that might get widespread appeal. If it's usable, > that is. In the type of system I'm envisioning, it would by design allow you to easily discover which node IDs had chunks of a given file. However, that file is encrypted. Provided you can obtain the encryption keys, you may be able to prove that a particular file is, in fact, infringing on a copyright. However in order to prove that participants in the network actually engaged in an act of piracy as opposed to merely providing nodes which engage in the free exchange of encrypted data, you would also have to prove that a particular user also has the encryption keys needed to access a particular piece of content. I think this would complicate prosecuting users for copyright infringement, however IANAL. -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] More on Hayden on NSA program
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----Original Message----- From: Daniel Weitzner [mailto:djweitzner@csail.mit.edu] Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2006 9:37 AM To: dave(a)farber.net Cc: Ip; Tim Finin Subject: (for IP) Re: [IP] More on Hayden on NSA program Hi Dave and Tim, Applying 4th Amendment principles is generally a puzzle. This situation is even more complex because the Administration seems to be arguing that most of the statutory rules that usually apply (FISA, Wiretap Act) just don't. So there are really two questions: -can the Administration program avoid FISA? -if so, is it permissible under the 4th Amendment? Most of the arguments from the Administration have focused on the first part of this question -- do the statutes apply? By going to the substance of the 4th Amedment, Hayden re-opens a lot of settled questions about wiretapping. In particular, if it's the case that the surveillance was conducted in order to discover patterns of activity, rather than get at communications of people already under sufficient suspicion to justify a probably cause warrant or a FISA order, then we have to get in the question of the 4th amendment status of pattern detection. Some people characterize this a fishing expedition. I think that there are interesting parallels with suspicionless searches such as roadblocks. A recent case on this subject, Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) illuminates some of the issues Tim raises: "The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.... While such suspicion is not an "irreducible" component of reasonableness, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule does not apply." The court in Edmonds struck down an Indianapolis policy department practice of erecting roadblock that randomly stop drivers to check for illegal drugs. Though random checks to stop immediate driving- related hazards such as drunk driving had previously been approved, the Court here rejected the illegal drug roadblock because the Fourth Amendment does not allow "suspicionless searches" except in "special circumstances." Ordinary crime control is not a special circumstance, but the Supreme Court went on to say: "...the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to ***thwart an imminent terrorist attack*** or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route. See 183 F. 3d, at 662-663. The exigencies created by these scenarios are far removed from the circumstances under which authorities might simply stop cars as a matter of course to see if there just happens to be a felon leaving the jurisdiction. While we do not limit the purposes that may justify a checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control." (emphasis added) How does this rule on physical searches of cars (which have largely lost their 4th Amendment protection) apply to electronic surveillance? I'm sure we hear a lot about this from all sides. Danny On Jan 23, 2006, at 9:32 PM, David Farber wrote: > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Tim Finin [mailto:finin@cs.umbc.edu] > Sent: Monday, January 23, 2006 9:13 PM > To: dave(a)farber.net > Subject: More on Hayden on NSA program > > I was puzzled when I heard this exchange on the radio. > General Hayden was clearly denying that "probable cause" was > the standard for what is allowed in the fourth amendment. > But the Constitution seems to say otherwise. It turns out that > there's a trick involved, so pay close attention. > > Here's the exchange: > > Q: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. I'd like to stay on > the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by > which you use to target your wiretaps. I'm no lawyer, but my > understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the > Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to > be able to do a search that does not violate an American's > right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use -- > > HAYDEN: No, actually -- the Fourth Amendment actually > protects all of us against unreasonable search and > seizure. That's what it says. > > Q: But the measure is probable cause, I believe. > > HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure. > > Q: But does it not say probable ... > > HAYDEN: No. The amendment says unreasonable search and > seizure... Just to be very clear -- and believe me, if > there's any amendment to the Constitution that employees of > the National Security Agency are familiar with, it's the > Fourth. And it is a reasonableness standard in the Fourth > Amendment. And so what you've raised to me -- and I'm not a > lawyer, and don't want to become one -- what you've raised > to me is, in terms of quoting the Fourth Amendment, is an > issue of the Constitution. The constitutional standard is > "reasonable." And we believe -- I am convinced that we are > lawful because what it is we're doing is reasonable." > > And here is the fourth amendment: > > The right of the people to be secure in their persons, > houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches > and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall > issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or > affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be > searched, and the persons or things to be seized. > > The trick is this -- "probable cause" is only needed to get > a warrant for a search, so if you forgo asking for a > warrant to be issued, you are home free. Slam dunk. This > Law stuff is pretty neat. > > > > ------------------------------------- > You are subscribed as djweitzner(a)csail.mit.edu > To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > > Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- > people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [p2p-hackers] A globally distributed peer-to-peer data archive
by Tony Arcieri 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Aug 26, 2011 at 9:29 AM, David Barrett <dbarrett(a)quinthar.com>wrote: > Would you and your 7 friends be equally enthusiastic early adopters if the > 9th member of your node was the RIAA/MPAA/etc? > The RIAA/MPAA could join our cluster, however the design properties of Tahoe would prevent them from accessing our data. > In these digital inquisition times, where your entire net worth can be > vaporized at a whim, how do you convince people that it's safe to share your > data even if it has a normal amount of pirated content? (After all, > everybody has *some*, and probably enough to trigger catastropic > consequences if noticed by the right party.) > Again, the design properties of Tahoe blur the concept of whose data is actually on the cluster. From the outside looking in, the contents of data you provide to the cluster is cryptographically opaque. Unless they can prove you have the cryptographic keys to access a particular piece of content, you can make the argument that you literally had no way of knowing that the encrypted data you are storing was in fact pirated content. > With this in mind, ask your testers to participate in a challenge: they use > it as normal, but offer to pay $100/instance to anyone who can prove a given > IP address pirated something -- a crowdsourced RIAA simulator. If there are > no takers, try $1000. Once you've got it to a point when nobody can tell > who has what (yet the system continues to work and provide real value), > you're onto something that might get widespread appeal. If it's usable, > that is. In the type of system I'm envisioning, it would by design allow you to easily discover which node IDs had chunks of a given file. However, that file is encrypted. Provided you can obtain the encryption keys, you may be able to prove that a particular file is, in fact, infringing on a copyright. However in order to prove that participants in the network actually engaged in an act of piracy as opposed to merely providing nodes which engage in the free exchange of encrypted data, you would also have to prove that a particular user also has the encryption keys needed to access a particular piece of content. I think this would complicate prosecuting users for copyright infringement, however IANAL. -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [drone-list] D news / politics
by Al Mac Wow 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Drone Video of high quality: http://www.dronereport.net/awesome-phot-of-snowboarder-louie-vito-with-a-dro ne/ Adding driverless cars, and unmanned aircraft, to the USA implies some laws may be out dated. https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/press/rise-robots-means-rethinking-our-laws https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/how-do-you-ticket-driverless-car Map of 37 states which want to be one of those 6 FAA test sites. http://www.dronereport.net/drones-will-save-us-drones-will-destroy-us-citize ns-sound-off-at-faa-meeting/ Civilian impact of drone strikes: http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone-st rikes/civilian-impact-drone-strikes-unexamined-costs-unanswered-questions Counting deaths from drone strikes: http://web.law.columbia.edu/human-rights-institute/counterterrorism/drone-st rikes/counting-drone-strike-deaths Statistics on drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen have been updated thru March 2013 http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones Truth and Government can be stranger than Fiction. JSOC/SOCOM vs. existence of drone kill list - how long does it take to review a FOIA? https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/kill-list-jsocsocom -1376/?authkey=ac6810bb032fd679812a5a01f50442bc7839e64c#682901-no-responsive -documents DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms See April 12 http://cryptome.org/ 2013-0364.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/04/uas-operational-policy.pdf> FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operational Policy 2013-0358.pdf <http://cryptome.org/2013/04/dc-drone-club.pdf> DC Drone Club Drone attacks have consequences, altering what groups are allied with what other groups, for what goals. This leads to CIA relocating their bases of operation. Here is a tale of one Ugly American, from the perspective of Pakistan. Article adapted from "The Way of the Knife: The C.I.A., a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth," published by the Penguin Press. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html?_r=0 Former Blackwater employee Raymond Davis, and a C.I.A. team, had set up operations from a safe house in the city of Lahore Pakistan, where some of these groups were apparently based. As I have shared earlier, both under international law, as the US interprets TNIAC,[1] and as UN investigations of targeted killing and state-sponsored assassinations have written,[2] CIA agents, and their civilian contractors, do not enjoy any kind of diplomatic immunity for their actions where there is no war going on. They are also legitimate targets for their enemies, because they are engaged in a war, where otherwise there is peace. From the perspective of the nation where they are operating, they are no different than criminal gangs. While Davis had been navigating dense traffic in Lahore, two young men had approached his car on a black motorcycle, their guns drawn, at an intersection congested with cars, bicycles and rickshaws. Davis took his semiautomatic Glock pistol and shot through the windshield, shattering the glass and hitting one of the men numerous times. As the other man fled, Davis got out of his car and shot several rounds into his back. He radioed the American Consulate for help, and within minutes a Toyota Land Cruiser was in sight, careering in the wrong direction down a one-way street. But the S.U.V. struck and killed a young Pakistani motorcyclist and then drove away. So the Pakistani police picked up Mr. Davis, for questioning. An assortment of bizarre paraphernalia was found, including a black mask, approximately 100 bullets and a piece of cloth bearing an American flag. The camera inside Davis's car contained photos of Pakistani military installations, taken surreptitiously. The evidence at the time indicated that the men Davis killed had carried out a string of petty thefts that day, but there was an added problem: the third man killed by the unmarked American S.U.V. fleeing the scene. Davis was taken to Kot Lakhpat prison. Washington DC demands his release. Pakistani people demand a death sentence. What Davis and the CIA had been doing in Lahore was NOT to fight US enemies, but allegedly to get entangled in the India-Pakistan disputes. Eventually leaders on both sides agreed to a deal. The reckoning for Davis's actions would come in the form of "blood money," or diyat, a custom under Shariah law <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/sharia_islam ic_law/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier> that compensates the families of victims for their dead relatives. The matter would be handled quietly, and Davis would be released from jail. After weeks of discussions, the parties agreed on a total of 200 million Pakistani rupees, approximately $2.34 million, to offer "forgiveness" to the jailed C.I.A. officer. Alister William Macintyre Linked In: http://www.linkedin.com/in/almacintyre Google Plus: https://plus.google.com/u/0/108007903544513887227/about _____ _____ [1] Part III Sunday April-14. [2] If you have trouble getting at the 29 page UN report <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.A dd6.pdf>, I have downloaded a copy, where I named it: UN Drone Legalities A.HRC.14.24.Add6 2010 May. I can e-mail it to someone as an attachment, by request. It is 190k in size. -- Want to unsubscribe? Want to receive a weekly digest instead of daily emails? Change your preferences: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list or email companys(a)stanford.edu ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [roy@rant-central.com: Re: [jwales@wikia.com: Re:
by Jimmy Wales 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Eugen Leitl wrote: >>What is it that we don't get? > > That Tor is working as designed, and that the problem with bad actors using its > cloak is a problem with the actors themselves. "Finally, we note that exit abuse must not be dismissed as a peripheral issue: when a system's public image suffers, it can reduce the number and diversity of that system's users, and thereby reduce the anonymity of the system itself." I'm pleased to report that the original design documents rightly agree with me that the it is in the interest of the longterm success of the Tor project that an attitude of throwing up our hands in defeat is not enough. > Those people are not sticking their heads in the sand. They're correctly noting > that nothing is broken except the bad actors. That *is* sticking their heads in the sand. Yes, we can lay moral blame on the bad actors. That's fine. Let's all stop typing for a minute or two and just _hate_ them for it. Ok, now we all feel better. :-) But now we're back to the question: how can Tor be improved to deal with this very serious and important problem? What are the steps that might be taken, however imperfect, to reduce the amount of abuse coming from Tor nodes? --Jimbo ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[p2p-hackers] f2f for purposes other than privacy
by zooko＠zooko.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Ian Clarke wrote: > > We (Freenet) have > been concerned about the fact that Freenet was harvestable for several > years now. Around spring this year I made the observation that if > human relationships form a small world network, it should be possible > to assign locations to people such that we form a Kleinberg-style > small world network, and thus we could make the network routable. > Oskar Sandberg then suggested a way to do this, and we set about > validating the concept using simulations. I would love to learn more. Is there a white-paper or design document beyond these slides from DefCon [1]? > Are you aware of any current or proposed f2f > networks for which concealment of user activity is not a goal? Well, I think of the links between two friends in f2f to be not solely communication channels but also to have other meaning. For example, if friends transmit music files to one another, then in addition to any privacy properties that the network may have, it also serves as a decentralized, attack-resistant recommendation engine for music. Honestly, this area of research is ripe for exploration, but I can give you at least a couple of examples. Doceur set it up with a claimed general negative result in "The Sybil Attack" in 2002 [2]. But his general negative result isn't quite true, as disproven by e.g. Advogato, 2000 [3, 4, 5]. Recently George Danezis, Chris Lesniewski-Laas, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Ross Anderson smashed these two ideas together and mixed in some DHT routing: [6]. [6] is an excellent paper, which proposes a concrete DHT design and which really nails the fact that the introduction graph or "bootstrap graph" contains information which can defeat the allegedly undefeatable Sybil Attack. [6] references some related work which looks interesting, but I haven't followed those links yet myself. I guess [6] is somewhat relevant to the Freenet v0.7 design. So, uh, anyway, this shows that there is interest in the notion of using friendship networks for purposes other than privacy, namely attack resistance of DHT routing and attack resistance of metadata [7 (self-citation)]. I think there's a lot more value to be mined from this concept, and I'm really glad that it has finally gotten the attention of some p2p researchers. Oh, and here's another perspective on this idea -- a post I wrote to my blog a few years ago suggesting that all sorts of DHT innovations which were intended to improve network performance could be applied to attack resistance: "trust is just another topology" [8]. Regards, Zooko [1] http://freenetproject.org/papers/vegas1_dc.pdf [2] http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/douceur02sybil.html [3] http://www.advogato.org/trust-metric.html [4] http://www.levien.com/thesis/compact.pdf [5] http://www.levien.com/free/tmetric-HOWTO.html [6] http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/cgi-bin/pubs-date.cgi?match=Sybil-resistant+DHT+r… ting [7] http://conferences.oreillynet.com/cs/p2p2001/view/e_sess/1200 [8] http://www.zooko.com/log-2003-01.html#d2003-01-23-trust_is_just_another_top… ogy _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)zgp.org http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers _______________________________________________ Here is a web page listing P2P Conferences: http://www.neurogrid.net/twiki/bin/view/Main/PeerToPeerConferences ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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