July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Email?
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

At 09:57 AM 5/14/2003 -0400, Sunder wrote: >Yes, but how will you stop the spammer from double spending the same $0.25 >micropayment on all of his 170,000 email addresses? Depending on whether >you check that there is a payment attached or not, and also check it with >the bank before delivering it, you'd have already wasted your bandwith and >possibly have accepted a spam into your mail spool. It is true that the notions of micropayments as applied to spam (that I'm familiar with, at least) would require that the email recipient check with the bank to detect doublespending. This would introduce an additional delay before delivery from unknown senders, yes, but I fail to see how it would impose an unacceptable cost in bandwidth or CPU usage. Spammers could still try the same-micropayment-a-million-times route, just as they could try to spam without micropayments, but if their email is rejected in sufficient quantities, the cost to the spammer would outweigh the benefits. The key is achieving sufficient quantities. -Declan

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None
by Nathan Saper 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> The reason why I use "the least pain for the greatest number" instead of > "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is because the latter > justifies many not-so-great acts under act utilitarianism. Killing someone brings the amount of future pain he's gonna suffer to zero. That implies that - according to your ideas - one is morally justified in killing anyone and everyone (as painless as possible, but that's not an important point, as long as it's less than the total amount of pain that person would suffer for the rest of his life). I'd say that using happiness is a little better :) Another problem with utilitarianism is that it requires one to be able to evaluate - or at least compare - happiness (or pain), something which is impossible (subjectivism and all). [See Walter Block's utilitarian demonstration that O.J.Simpson was morally justified to kill his wife.] Not to mention that your stupidity is giving me a headache... Mark

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FC: PRI event 9/5 in DC: A "free choice approach" to privacy
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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Re: Access for the uncomputed
by Geoffrey Goodell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I see the problem as this: not everyone can run Tor on the machines from which they browse the web, and not everyone can configure their proxy settings to point at an open Tor proxy. I hacked serifos to function as a proxy that sends traffic through Tor. It is not entirely perfect, but it usually works. Known limitations include failure to properly munge image and link tags on SSL-encrypted pages and an inability to properly handle redirections resulting from Javascript code. So, you can visit: http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/TOR_HTTP_URL where TOR_HTTP_URL is any HTTP or HTTPS URL, and the Tor client running on serifos will take you to your specified URL. For example, http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/http://www.whatismyip.com/ This is how it works: First, I configured apache on serifos to use mod_proxy: <IfModule mod_proxy.c> ProxyPass /proxy/ http://localhost:8119/ </IfModule> Then, I ran my own proxy script that feeds requests to Privoxy and munges HTML replies to properly translate image and link tags. The code is here: http://afs.eecs.harvard.edu/~goodell/blossom/src/edgeproxy I invoke this script as follows: $ edgeproxy -l localhost:8119 -r localhost:8118 Finally, I ran Privoxy on port 8118, in the normal manner specified on the Tor website. Please check it out if you are interested and feed me bug reports if you find anything broken (other than what I described). Thanks, Geoff On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 11:08:43PM +0800, Patrick Coleman wrote: > CGIProxy is quite good in my experience; it seems to proxify URLs > better than CECID does. It performs exactly the same task as CECID, > though CECID has a few extra features (banned word filtering). > > I did mention a while ago that I would modify CECID to work as a > frontend for tor, but its not looking like I'm going to get time to do > that anytime soon (though I live in eternal hope). The codes all in > CVS (http://cecid.sf.net) if anyone's interested in picking it up and > working on it drop me a line. > > -Patrick > > On 20/10/05, Joel Franusic <jfranusic(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > I just ran across: CGIProxy > > (http://www.jmarshall.com/tools/cgiproxy/cgiproxy-beta.html) > > > > A Proxy over CGI of sorts, similar to CECID (?). This looks like a > > perfect front end for Tor. > > > > It supports SSL and it looks like it can be easily configured to use a > > proxy (Tor). > > > > Has anybody tried this out? > > > > --Joel > > > > On 6/22/05, Patrick Coleman <blinken(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > Brilliant. I'll see if I cant get something going. > > > Thanks, > > > Patrick > > > > > > Roger Dingledine wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jun 22, 2005 at 10:45:17AM +0800, Patrick Coleman wrote: > > > > > > > >>shouldn't be too hard. I was actually considering interfacing it > > > with a proper anonymizer at some > > > >>point, like Tor, so I'd be happy to do that if thats what you want. > > > > > > > > > > > > That would be wonderful. We really do need something like this, that > > > > lets people point their browsers somewhere and be able to access .exit > > > > or .onion addresses. > > > > > > > > It should be even easier to find mirrors for you now too, because the > > > > mirrors don't need to be exiting the traffic themselves. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > --Roger > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 23/06/05, Patrick Coleman <blinken(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > [I'll mail this to the list - I am subscribed, but at blinken(a)gmail.com] > > > > > > > > Hey, > > > > The client certainly hasn't had any work done on it for ages, so I was > > > > thinking of ditching that, certainly after I discovered tor. It was > > > > certainly a bit more complex than I bargained for :) > > > > > > > > With the script, it hasn't been developed in quite a while. I have > > > > been intending to do some work on it, though - I've got some working > > > > code that should fix a few problems, like SSL, forms and cookies. > > > > These fixes will also mean a rewrite of the HTTP fetching code, so > > > > working in HTTP proxying shouldn't be too hard. I was actually > > > > considering interfacing it with a proper anonymizer at some point, > > > > like Tor, so I'd be happy to do that if thats what you want. > > > > > > > > The script -shouldn't- be breaking stylesheets, so I'll have a look :) > > > > Thanks, > > > > Patrick > > > > +++ > > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > On 22/06/05, Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 03:26:33PM -0700, Joel Franusic wrote: > > > > > > Some quick searches on sf.net and freshmeat.net turn up: > > > > > > http://cecid.sourceforge.net/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Links to servers running CECID: > > > > > > http://cecid.sourceforge.net/mirrors.php > > > > > > > > > > Oh hey, and Patrick Coleman runs a Tor server too: > > > > > http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu:8000/cgi-bin/desc.pl?q=hal > > > > > > > > > > Patrick, how is this going? It looks like Tor can replace the more > > > > > ambitious part of your project, but step one is still a hard task to > > > > > get right too. :) > > > > > > > > > > It looks like it's GPL, which is good. But it looks like it breaks > > > > > stylesheets of the pages it downloads (e.g. tor.eff.org) which is > > > > > bad. What about SSL to the proxy page? Does it have a back-end that can > > > > > http-proxy to privoxy, and/or socks4a-proxy to Tor? > > > > > > > > > > Is this still in development, or should I take the "Copyright 2003" > > > > > to be a bad sign? :) > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > --Roger > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > -- > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [cryptography] crypto & security/privacy balance (Re: Digital cash in the news...)
by Nico Williams 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 5:08 PM, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> wrote: > On 2011-06-15 7:05 PM, Nico Williams wrote: >> >> It's only when push comes to shove that crypto >> doesn't help. > > In the conflict with Al Quaeda, as in any war, push has come to shove, and > yet encryption does help. Encryption, assuming they use it, hasn't helped them all that much. A great many of their rank-and-file as well as their leadership are dead. At least some of them were found via intelligence processes that, from what we know, required no code breaking. Osama, for example, was found in part by traffic analysis. Maybe he should have been using Tor instead of USB sticks and couriers, but I bet usage of Tor from a sleepy Islamabad suburb would have led to his being found sooner. In other words, you've proved my point. > [...] > > The state can escalate - but so can we. Sheer lunacy. There's a real world analogy for most online situations, and if you're willing to stretch a bit, for all online situations. Crypto is no more than an equivalent of doors, locks, keys, safes, and hiding. At the end of the day the rubber has to meet the road. People need to interact with other people in order to obtain the things they need for mere survival. There are not eight billion deserted islands in which each of us can survive alone, and we'd not want to anyways because we're social beings. And when the rubber meets the road, the crypto stops helping. Anyone can build a fortress to protect themselves from the surrounding state. There have been many such fortresses in the U.S., yet when push came to shove in the case of the Branch Davidians in Waco, TX, the fortress didn't help. The reason: the state has more resources because they represent a larger society. Now, maybe the Davidians should have made bio/chem/nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the state into leaving them alone, but that would probably have brought them to the attention of the state sooner, soon enough, one hopes, that they never managed to get the weapons and delivery mechanisms that would make them capable of pulling off the blackmail. Nico -- _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 08:46 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > For the most part I expect users will be relying on satphones and not > modems, voice calling, SMS, and email are likely the only use cases > they might consider. > That is extremely scary. There is off the shelf hardware/software for voice print analysis, recording of data transmitted, SMS archival, etc. Such users should consider this for that use case: http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/satellite/ If someone elsewhere runs a cryptophone PBX, anyone could call in and call insecure numbers from that PBX: http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/pbx-integration/ It's not free software but I've used it with some success. Bare satphone usage is Syria is just scary. I'll just say it directly, it's dangerous. > Any thought what the timeframe for radio direction finding might be? > The saying goes "Attacks only get better" and I'm certain that the old adage applies here. There are real time systems for this exact task and they are off the shelf surveillance solutions. When you see them in action it will probably make you physically ill. > I'm also trying to determine whether iridium phones may be any > "better" than Inmarsat, and how much better, etc. it's clear thurayas > are no longer an acceptable option by any regard. > Iridium phones and Inmarsat phones aren't so different in terms of security, privacy, anonymity, etc. For example: http://www.shoghi.co.in/Thuraya-System,GSM-Interception-System,Voice,Fax-In… With that said, I think the best device in the world for an impossible job is an Iridium Satellite pager. These things are awesome. They are a receive only satellite pager that uses the Iridium constellation. It works for the entire planet and it's cheap cheap cheap. You can transmit a message to the pager by visiting a web page that works over Tor: http://messaging.iridium.com/faq/ More info here: http://www.satellitephonesdirect.com/iridium_sendamessage.html This is the best device for the job: http://www.highspeedsat.com/motorola-9501.htm This is probably also a reasonable device but I've never used it: http://www.highspeedsat.com/kyocera-sp-66k.php If two people have these pagers and both have access to the net via Tor, it's possible for them to communicate in a way that doesn't leave a trace beyond normal internet/Tor usage. Short of jamming, it's a pretty reasonable way to ensure that messages reach a person but the person isn't exposed beyond their general region. You can select multiple regions too. The Motorola 9501 is a small device and it is easily hidden. You could easily encrypt a Tor bridge IP address for your contacts in Syria and send a new one every hour. All the best, Jake _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: PRI event 9/5 in DC: A "free choice approach" to privacy
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

**********

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Re: Access for the uncomputed
by Geoffrey Goodell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I see the problem as this: not everyone can run Tor on the machines from which they browse the web, and not everyone can configure their proxy settings to point at an open Tor proxy. I hacked serifos to function as a proxy that sends traffic through Tor. It is not entirely perfect, but it usually works. Known limitations include failure to properly munge image and link tags on SSL-encrypted pages and an inability to properly handle redirections resulting from Javascript code. So, you can visit: http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/TOR_HTTP_URL where TOR_HTTP_URL is any HTTP or HTTPS URL, and the Tor client running on serifos will take you to your specified URL. For example, http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu/proxy/http://www.whatismyip.com/ This is how it works: First, I configured apache on serifos to use mod_proxy: <IfModule mod_proxy.c> ProxyPass /proxy/ http://localhost:8119/ </IfModule> Then, I ran my own proxy script that feeds requests to Privoxy and munges HTML replies to properly translate image and link tags. The code is here: http://afs.eecs.harvard.edu/~goodell/blossom/src/edgeproxy I invoke this script as follows: $ edgeproxy -l localhost:8119 -r localhost:8118 Finally, I ran Privoxy on port 8118, in the normal manner specified on the Tor website. Please check it out if you are interested and feed me bug reports if you find anything broken (other than what I described). Thanks, Geoff On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 11:08:43PM +0800, Patrick Coleman wrote: > CGIProxy is quite good in my experience; it seems to proxify URLs > better than CECID does. It performs exactly the same task as CECID, > though CECID has a few extra features (banned word filtering). > > I did mention a while ago that I would modify CECID to work as a > frontend for tor, but its not looking like I'm going to get time to do > that anytime soon (though I live in eternal hope). The codes all in > CVS (http://cecid.sf.net) if anyone's interested in picking it up and > working on it drop me a line. > > -Patrick > > On 20/10/05, Joel Franusic <jfranusic(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > I just ran across: CGIProxy > > (http://www.jmarshall.com/tools/cgiproxy/cgiproxy-beta.html) > > > > A Proxy over CGI of sorts, similar to CECID (?). This looks like a > > perfect front end for Tor. > > > > It supports SSL and it looks like it can be easily configured to use a > > proxy (Tor). > > > > Has anybody tried this out? > > > > --Joel > > > > On 6/22/05, Patrick Coleman <blinken(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > Brilliant. I'll see if I cant get something going. > > > Thanks, > > > Patrick > > > > > > Roger Dingledine wrote: > > > > On Wed, Jun 22, 2005 at 10:45:17AM +0800, Patrick Coleman wrote: > > > > > > > >>shouldn't be too hard. I was actually considering interfacing it > > > with a proper anonymizer at some > > > >>point, like Tor, so I'd be happy to do that if thats what you want. > > > > > > > > > > > > That would be wonderful. We really do need something like this, that > > > > lets people point their browsers somewhere and be able to access .exit > > > > or .onion addresses. > > > > > > > > It should be even easier to find mirrors for you now too, because the > > > > mirrors don't need to be exiting the traffic themselves. > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > --Roger > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 23/06/05, Patrick Coleman <blinken(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > [I'll mail this to the list - I am subscribed, but at blinken(a)gmail.com] > > > > > > > > Hey, > > > > The client certainly hasn't had any work done on it for ages, so I was > > > > thinking of ditching that, certainly after I discovered tor. It was > > > > certainly a bit more complex than I bargained for :) > > > > > > > > With the script, it hasn't been developed in quite a while. I have > > > > been intending to do some work on it, though - I've got some working > > > > code that should fix a few problems, like SSL, forms and cookies. > > > > These fixes will also mean a rewrite of the HTTP fetching code, so > > > > working in HTTP proxying shouldn't be too hard. I was actually > > > > considering interfacing it with a proper anonymizer at some point, > > > > like Tor, so I'd be happy to do that if thats what you want. > > > > > > > > The script -shouldn't- be breaking stylesheets, so I'll have a look :) > > > > Thanks, > > > > Patrick > > > > +++ > > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > On 22/06/05, Roger Dingledine <arma(a)mit.edu> wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Jun 21, 2005 at 03:26:33PM -0700, Joel Franusic wrote: > > > > > > Some quick searches on sf.net and freshmeat.net turn up: > > > > > > http://cecid.sourceforge.net/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Links to servers running CECID: > > > > > > http://cecid.sourceforge.net/mirrors.php > > > > > > > > > > Oh hey, and Patrick Coleman runs a Tor server too: > > > > > http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu:8000/cgi-bin/desc.pl?q=hal > > > > > > > > > > Patrick, how is this going? It looks like Tor can replace the more > > > > > ambitious part of your project, but step one is still a hard task to > > > > > get right too. :) > > > > > > > > > > It looks like it's GPL, which is good. But it looks like it breaks > > > > > stylesheets of the pages it downloads (e.g. tor.eff.org) which is > > > > > bad. What about SSL to the proxy page? Does it have a back-end that can > > > > > http-proxy to privoxy, and/or socks4a-proxy to Tor? > > > > > > > > > > Is this still in development, or should I take the "Copyright 2003" > > > > > to be a bad sign? :) > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > --Roger > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > > > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > > > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt > > > > > > > > -- > Public Key ID 0x4A6880B2 > Key Fingerprint: 7867 E238 1608 1A20 89C4 BA6C 8FC3 C6EB 4A68 80B2 > http://warhn.org/pcoleman/pubkey.txt ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [cryptography] crypto & security/privacy balance (Re: Digital cash in the news...)
by Nico Williams 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Jun 15, 2011 at 5:08 PM, James A. Donald <jamesd(a)echeque.com> wrote: > On 2011-06-15 7:05 PM, Nico Williams wrote: >> >> It's only when push comes to shove that crypto >> doesn't help. > > In the conflict with Al Quaeda, as in any war, push has come to shove, and > yet encryption does help. Encryption, assuming they use it, hasn't helped them all that much. A great many of their rank-and-file as well as their leadership are dead. At least some of them were found via intelligence processes that, from what we know, required no code breaking. Osama, for example, was found in part by traffic analysis. Maybe he should have been using Tor instead of USB sticks and couriers, but I bet usage of Tor from a sleepy Islamabad suburb would have led to his being found sooner. In other words, you've proved my point. > [...] > > The state can escalate - but so can we. Sheer lunacy. There's a real world analogy for most online situations, and if you're willing to stretch a bit, for all online situations. Crypto is no more than an equivalent of doors, locks, keys, safes, and hiding. At the end of the day the rubber has to meet the road. People need to interact with other people in order to obtain the things they need for mere survival. There are not eight billion deserted islands in which each of us can survive alone, and we'd not want to anyways because we're social beings. And when the rubber meets the road, the crypto stops helping. Anyone can build a fortress to protect themselves from the surrounding state. There have been many such fortresses in the U.S., yet when push came to shove in the case of the Branch Davidians in Waco, TX, the fortress didn't help. The reason: the state has more resources because they represent a larger society. Now, maybe the Davidians should have made bio/chem/nuclear weapons with which to blackmail the state into leaving them alone, but that would probably have brought them to the attention of the state sooner, soon enough, one hopes, that they never managed to get the weapons and delivery mechanisms that would make them capable of pulling off the blackmail. Nico -- _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 08:46 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > For the most part I expect users will be relying on satphones and not > modems, voice calling, SMS, and email are likely the only use cases > they might consider. > That is extremely scary. There is off the shelf hardware/software for voice print analysis, recording of data transmitted, SMS archival, etc. Such users should consider this for that use case: http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/satellite/ If someone elsewhere runs a cryptophone PBX, anyone could call in and call insecure numbers from that PBX: http://www.cryptophone.de/en/products/pbx-integration/ It's not free software but I've used it with some success. Bare satphone usage is Syria is just scary. I'll just say it directly, it's dangerous. > Any thought what the timeframe for radio direction finding might be? > The saying goes "Attacks only get better" and I'm certain that the old adage applies here. There are real time systems for this exact task and they are off the shelf surveillance solutions. When you see them in action it will probably make you physically ill. > I'm also trying to determine whether iridium phones may be any > "better" than Inmarsat, and how much better, etc. it's clear thurayas > are no longer an acceptable option by any regard. > Iridium phones and Inmarsat phones aren't so different in terms of security, privacy, anonymity, etc. For example: http://www.shoghi.co.in/Thuraya-System,GSM-Interception-System,Voice,Fax-In… With that said, I think the best device in the world for an impossible job is an Iridium Satellite pager. These things are awesome. They are a receive only satellite pager that uses the Iridium constellation. It works for the entire planet and it's cheap cheap cheap. You can transmit a message to the pager by visiting a web page that works over Tor: http://messaging.iridium.com/faq/ More info here: http://www.satellitephonesdirect.com/iridium_sendamessage.html This is the best device for the job: http://www.highspeedsat.com/motorola-9501.htm This is probably also a reasonable device but I've never used it: http://www.highspeedsat.com/kyocera-sp-66k.php If two people have these pagers and both have access to the net via Tor, it's possible for them to communicate in a way that doesn't leave a trace beyond normal internet/Tor usage. Short of jamming, it's a pretty reasonable way to ensure that messages reach a person but the person isn't exposed beyond their general region. You can select multiple regions too. The Motorola 9501 is a small device and it is easily hidden. You could easily encrypt a Tor bridge IP address for your contacts in Syria and send a new one every hour. All the best, Jake _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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