July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [HSF] Freedom of speech takes a back seat to Title 17 of the US Code[OT]
by Edward Bender 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The next paragraphs might be blasphemy. Let me say first that I don9t buy into that whole 3you didn9t build that2 Obama-type rhetoric. I think that was really a Freudian-slip on his part, allowing the listener into the workings of his thoughts and attitudes. I think that what is paid for is a settled account, and that we can not ascribe future debt to individuals or businesses as an excuse for levying taxes (redistributing wealth). Having said that, let me state that my thesis is that, through direct and indirect means, state sponsored research is made possible by all of us. It is the fuel that allows the ideas and theories of authors to travel into the light of day. It is proximate support. That support allows the geniuses among us (many on this forum) to 3push the human race forward.2 Please examine the life cycle of a scholarly paper. It starts with an idea. It is supported by the hierarchy of the academic department, funds are found, experiments performed or data collected. It is written and re-written, and submitted to a journal for publication. How much do you pay to the publisher for the right of publication? It is reviewed by a panel of 3experts2 and given thumbs up or thumbs down with the potential for acceptance after revision. Those interested in the subject read the paper, perhaps comment on it, perhaps being inspired to do their own experiments or collect their own data. What role does a publisher play? They certainly collect the money. I did a pro forma for a presentation I wanted to but never gave to a company in Silicon Valley, looking at how much Elsevier made annually on the Annals of Thoracic Surgery. It was impossible to say exactly, but I think it is somewhere between $825,000 and $3.2 million, depending on the number and type of subscriptions and advertising. So here is where I blaspheme. Why do we need publishers? Why can9t we as experts self-publish our journals? What added value does a publishing house provide to science and medicine? They hold knowledge hostage. They silo and segment knowledge making it more cumbersome to access. They suck up huge sums of money. Is there still a Journal of Mechanical Circulatory Support? If not, why. If so, then why aren9t I seeing its articles? What are/were the pressures that caused success or failure? Were you given equal footing with other publications? Was it a victim of the impact factor? I propose that we do to scholarly journals what Steve Jobs did to music publishers: make an iTunes-like store. Articles are songs, journals are CD9s, and publishers become much less important and influential - yet they still live. There are no more paper journals, only files. And, breaking free of paper, we can routinely add rich media to our articles to enhance clarity and understanding. No more extra payment to Lippincott for a color photo in the article. The cost of digital storage is so cheap, that a year9s worth of a journal9s content would cost less than $1 per month. If you subscribe then you get full text access. If you don9t, then you buy an article for $1.00. Sometimes even a heart surgeon needs an article from the Annals of Internal Medicine, and, believe it or not, many doctors do not have access to an 3institutional2 subscription. There is a lot of healthcare provided in towns with populations < 50,000 people and not in a university. The new 3apps2 put forth by publishing houses are attempts to squelch evolution, not enhance it. It is a middle aged parent trying to be 3hip2 but it just doesn9t fly. It is your father9s internet, and it is the same old crap. In case your wondering, I have the infrastructure all worked out. You will love it more than getting a fresh new JTCVS in the mail every month. Ed Bender, MD On 1/14/13 1:56 PM, "Michael Firstenberg" <msfirst(a)gmail.com> wrote: > As I recall, research publications that are supported under an NIH or similar > funded grant is supposed to be available for free > Most, if not all of us, hopefully thru our hospital affiliations have some > degree of "free access" to mainstream medical literature - although clearly > not all. > Many major Journals do make their content free after a peroid of ~6-12 months > Most authors are allowed to provide free PDF copies of their work to those who > request it > Much of the article charges that you mention tend to be related to industry > activities that want to use the data in marketing > ... and while you and I may had already 'paid' for the research (I assume you > mean taxes and donations) - we have not paid for the storage and distribution > of the results or all of the work that goes into transforming your MSWord file > into an acceptable PDF layout. > > yes - this is more complex than an answer over the phone - but published > material is copyrighted and while the laws are, according to some, out-dated > by digital standard - it is the law and you are more than welcome to propose a > solution to the protection and rights of intellectual property. > > Go ask Rolling Stone or the Times (where this article was published) for a > Free copy of an article that they published and see what they say..... > > I am interested in your response when you get back to a computer...... > > -m > > > > On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 2:43 PM, Edward Bender <ebender001(a)charter.net> wrote: >> This deserves a response that can't be well written on a phone. However, as >> an intro, you and I have paid for this research. Should you pay Elsevier $20 >> for a current article? >> Ed Bender, MD >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >> On Jan 14, 2013, at 1:34 PM, Michael Firstenberg <msfirst(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Ed, >>> Being the computer guru that you are - I have a few questions.... >>> you, your company, institution whomever invests millions in hardware, >>> software, support, resource to populate and maintain a database for some >>> cause - and all of a sudden someone liberates all of that data and says it >>> must be free. Who is suppose to pay for the support and upkeep of the >>> system - or do you prefer a Facebook/Google type approach of targeted >>> advertising bombarding everyplace you visit. Or should we just raise taxes >>> more to pay for some of these systems in which a nominal support fee was >>> charged to access the data? >>> >>> Obviously these issues are a little more complex and this case is beyond >>> tragic - to lose such a brilliant mind - but also remember, as a music >>> fan/historian - many brilliant minds are lost before their time due to >>> mental health related issues. >>> >>> -michael >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Edward Bender <ebender001(a)charter.net> >>> wrote: >>>> http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/technology/aaron-swartz-a-data-crusader-a >>>> nd-now-a-cause.html >>>> >>>> This is as tragic as it gets. Even the company whom he invaded did not >>>> want to press charges (he worked with them also), but a minor league >>>> prosecutor, under the guise of self-righteous legal fundamentalism (read >>>> Taliban-like dogma) mightily contributed to the death of this poor genius. >>>> What is right about this? It may be legal, but it is certainly not right. >>>> >>>> Ed Bender, MD >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OpenHeart-L mailing list >>>> >>>> Send postings to: >>>> OpenHeart-L(a)lists.hsforum.com >>>> >>>> To UNSUBSCRIBE, to CHANGE email address, or to view archives: >>>> http://lists.hsforum.com/listinfo.cgi/openheart-l-hsforum.com >>>> >>>> All messages transmitted by the OpenHeart-L are subject to the policies and >>>> disclaimers posted at: >>>> http://www.hsforum.com/listdisclaim >>>> ----------------------------------------- >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OpenHeart-L mailing list >>> >>> Send postings to: >>> OpenHeart-L(a)lists.hsforum.com >>> >>> To UNSUBSCRIBE, to CHANGE email address, or to view archives: >>> http://lists.hsforum.com/listinfo.cgi/openheart-l-hsforum.com >>> >>> All messages transmitted by the OpenHeart-L are subject to the policies and >>> disclaimers posted at: >>> http://www.hsforum.com/listdisclaim >>> ----------------------------------------- >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OpenHeart-L mailing list >> >> Send postings to: >> OpenHeart-L(a)lists.hsforum.com >> >> To UNSUBSCRIBE, to CHANGE email address, or to view archives: >> http://lists.hsforum.com/listinfo.cgi/openheart-l-hsforum.com >> >> All messages transmitted by the OpenHeart-L are subject to the policies and >> disclaimers posted at: >> http://www.hsforum.com/listdisclaim >> ----------------------------------------- > > > > _______________________________________________ > OpenHeart-L mailing list > > Send postings to: > OpenHeart-L(a)lists.hsforum.com > > To UNSUBSCRIBE, to CHANGE email address, or to view archives: > http://lists.hsforum.com/listinfo.cgi/openheart-l-hsforum.com > > All messages transmitted by the OpenHeart-L are subject to the policies and > disclaimers posted at: > http://www.hsforum.com/listdisclaim > ----------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ OpenHeart-L mailing list Send postings to: OpenHeart-L(a)lists.hsforum.com To UNSUBSCRIBE, to CHANGE email address, or to view archives: http://lists.hsforum.com/listinfo.cgi/openheart-l-hsforum.com All messages transmitted by the OpenHeart-L are subject to the policies and disclaimers posted at: http://www.hsforum.com/listdisclaim ----------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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QNAP backdoor
by Alexander Klimov 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/506607> Overview: The premium and new line of QNAP network storage solutions allow for full hard disk encryption. When rebooting, the user has to unlock the hard disk by supplying the encryption passphrase via the web GUI. However, when the hard disk is encrypted, a secondary key is created, added to the keyring, and stored in the flash with minor obfuscation. Additional Weaknesses: The backdoor key is generated by rand() calls. As the rand() function produces random numbers unsuitable for cryptographic keys. The cryptographic strength of this generated key is approx 2^32, hence feasible for breaking. This would make access to the flash unnecessary. Original Vendor FUD: "The functionality for encryption the hard disk does not include a crypto backdoor." (in response to a user question why two keyslots are allocated, and if this is because of a backdoor) -- Regards, ASK --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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QNAP backdoor
by Alexander Klimov 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/506607> Overview: The premium and new line of QNAP network storage solutions allow for full hard disk encryption. When rebooting, the user has to unlock the hard disk by supplying the encryption passphrase via the web GUI. However, when the hard disk is encrypted, a secondary key is created, added to the keyring, and stored in the flash with minor obfuscation. Additional Weaknesses: The backdoor key is generated by rand() calls. As the rand() function produces random numbers unsuitable for cryptographic keys. The cryptographic strength of this generated key is approx 2^32, hence feasible for breaking. This would make access to the flash unnecessary. Original Vendor FUD: "The functionality for encryption the hard disk does not include a crypto backdoor." (in response to a user question why two keyslots are allocated, and if this is because of a backdoor) -- Regards, ASK --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [cryptography] Preserve us from poorly described/implemented crypto
by David G. Koontz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Bluetooth 4.0 specifies 128 bit AES CCM mode. http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/low-energy-tech-info.aspx Also found in IEEE 802.15 (Personal Area Networks). The 802 standards can be downloaded without cost for personal use. You have to be Bluetooth SIG member to get Bluetooth standards and they don't accept individual members. IEEE Std 802.15.1-2005 13.4 appears to describe the earlier encryption method E0 and LFSR with a 128 bit key. Annex B of IEEE Std 802.15.3b-2005 LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKSbPART 15.3: WIRELESS MAC AND PHY, specifies security considerations using AES addressing key usage and replay prevention. Without further evidence you could wonder whether or not they use E3 (SAFER+ based hash) to generate keys for AES as well (802.15.1-2005 13.6). Key exchange is upper layer stuff. Taking a lot at the previous encryption method EO (which also used a 128 bit key) see NIST Special Pubs SP800-121, Guide to Bluetooth Security[1] which also refers to a recent (CRYPTO'05) study saying 2^^38 computations and 2^^23.8 frames resistance for E0[2], also See Table 4-1. Key Problems with Existing (Native) Bluetooth Security. There doesn't appear to be a real time threat. If you include financial transactions or other high security dependent on using two factor security you need to have penetrated that too (oops), it serves as a real time anchor. You could note that the government wasn't setting off any alarms on the use of the previous method although providing quidelines and qualifying the risk[3][4]. The image here is that AES is a jump on the bandwagon response to an non-articulated problem. It'd make sense increasing the throughput to increase the security, for those things that can take advantage of a higher data rate. The new range (100m) for Bluetooth 4.0 sounds like a threat even without fancy antennas. I opened the curtains in my office and took some binoculars out in the yard along with a bluetooth device. Amazing the range on these things. You'd expect government bluetooth security guides would get updated, security is likely still be use and implementation dependent and the question still remains, how serious the threat is. Feel free to use the keyboard built in to you laptop to avoid it. Hey, is that someone with a spotter scope looking at your computer screen from across the street? Back in the days before SCIFs were quite so prevalent the euphemism was 'step into my office', a moving vehicle was considered safe. Both conditions have changed since then and I'm enjoying the lack of professional paranoia these days. We were much more likely to find illicit drug stashes than listening devices searching cable troughs, equipment rooms and offices. There's undoubtedly a distinction in the level of effective security between the average Microsoft customer feeling secure because of buying one of these keyboards and a security conscious organization implementing guidelines and adhering to recommendations. The amount of security you end up with in the two cases is only in part affected by the encryption algorithm selection. ------------------------------ [1] Guide to Bluetooth Security SP800-121, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-121/SP800-121.pdf [2] The Conditional Correlation Attack: A Practical Attack on Bluetooth Encryption, Y1 Lu, Willi meier and Serge Vaudenay http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/pub/lasec/doc/LMV05.pdf http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2005/p/16.pdf (slides) [3] Bluetooth Security http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/I732-016R-07.pdf [4] Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev3/sp800-53-rev3-final_… See pages F-15, F-16, Page A-9 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [cryptography] Preserve us from poorly described/implemented crypto
by David G. Koontz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Bluetooth 4.0 specifies 128 bit AES CCM mode. http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/low-energy-tech-info.aspx Also found in IEEE 802.15 (Personal Area Networks). The 802 standards can be downloaded without cost for personal use. You have to be Bluetooth SIG member to get Bluetooth standards and they don't accept individual members. IEEE Std 802.15.1-2005 13.4 appears to describe the earlier encryption method E0 and LFSR with a 128 bit key. Annex B of IEEE Std 802.15.3b-2005 LOCAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA NETWORKSbPART 15.3: WIRELESS MAC AND PHY, specifies security considerations using AES addressing key usage and replay prevention. Without further evidence you could wonder whether or not they use E3 (SAFER+ based hash) to generate keys for AES as well (802.15.1-2005 13.6). Key exchange is upper layer stuff. Taking a lot at the previous encryption method EO (which also used a 128 bit key) see NIST Special Pubs SP800-121, Guide to Bluetooth Security[1] which also refers to a recent (CRYPTO'05) study saying 2^^38 computations and 2^^23.8 frames resistance for E0[2], also See Table 4-1. Key Problems with Existing (Native) Bluetooth Security. There doesn't appear to be a real time threat. If you include financial transactions or other high security dependent on using two factor security you need to have penetrated that too (oops), it serves as a real time anchor. You could note that the government wasn't setting off any alarms on the use of the previous method although providing quidelines and qualifying the risk[3][4]. The image here is that AES is a jump on the bandwagon response to an non-articulated problem. It'd make sense increasing the throughput to increase the security, for those things that can take advantage of a higher data rate. The new range (100m) for Bluetooth 4.0 sounds like a threat even without fancy antennas. I opened the curtains in my office and took some binoculars out in the yard along with a bluetooth device. Amazing the range on these things. You'd expect government bluetooth security guides would get updated, security is likely still be use and implementation dependent and the question still remains, how serious the threat is. Feel free to use the keyboard built in to you laptop to avoid it. Hey, is that someone with a spotter scope looking at your computer screen from across the street? Back in the days before SCIFs were quite so prevalent the euphemism was 'step into my office', a moving vehicle was considered safe. Both conditions have changed since then and I'm enjoying the lack of professional paranoia these days. We were much more likely to find illicit drug stashes than listening devices searching cable troughs, equipment rooms and offices. There's undoubtedly a distinction in the level of effective security between the average Microsoft customer feeling secure because of buying one of these keyboards and a security conscious organization implementing guidelines and adhering to recommendations. The amount of security you end up with in the two cases is only in part affected by the encryption algorithm selection. ------------------------------ [1] Guide to Bluetooth Security SP800-121, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-121/SP800-121.pdf [2] The Conditional Correlation Attack: A Practical Attack on Bluetooth Encryption, Y1 Lu, Willi meier and Serge Vaudenay http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/pub/lasec/doc/LMV05.pdf http://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2005/p/16.pdf (slides) [3] Bluetooth Security http://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/factsheets/I732-016R-07.pdf [4] Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-53-Rev3/sp800-53-rev3-final_… See pages F-15, F-16, Page A-9 _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Re: Good comments on (djf) fingerprinting in Japan
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message: From: Jonathan Weinberg <[1]weinberg(a)msen.com> Date: November 23, 2007 1:50:59 PM EST To: David Farber <[2]dave(a)farber.net> Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan Joi's absolutely right (as were other folks who wrote to me off-list) that the US does requires photography and fingerprinting from folks *applying* for immigrant visas and green cards -- so it would be wrong to say that the US program is much less privacy-intrusive than Japan's just by virtue of not requiring "every time" fingerprinting for green card holders. (Joi's also right that the US program is broader than Japan's in that DHS makes even folks just passing through as transit visitors satisfy full visa and fingerprinting requirements, and in his broader point that US citizens complaining about Japan's program are finding a mote in another's eye while ignoring the beam in their own.) There's still something interesting going on here, though, regarding "every time" fingerprinting for green card holders. Japan has instituted "every time" fingerprinting for permanent residents *even though* permanent residents in Japan have already been fingerprinted and photographed for their alien registration cards. That approach is consistent with a key professed reason for the US fingerprinting requirement, which is to ensure that the person presenting herself at the border is the same person to whom the travel documents were issued. If the US DHS really, really took seriously its desire to make sure that people weren't entering the US with forged or stolen green cards, it would require "every time" fingerprinting of permanent residents just as Japan seems to be doing. But it's apparently decided that it doesn't want to deal with the political fallout of such a move; in terms of their ability to push back politically, folks entering the US on temporary visas or through the Visa Waiver Program are an easier target. Jon Jonathan Weinberg Professor of Law, Wayne State University [3]weinberg(a)wayne.edu From: Joichi Ito <[4]jito(a)neoteny.com> Date: November 22, 2007 4:26:14 PM EST To: [5]dave(a)farber.net Cc: [6]ip(a)v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan The US requires fingerprints for many kinds of visas including some benefits for permanent residents. Also, I think they require a photograph showing your earlobe as another biometric. It's on your card. It is slightly different from requiring a finger print every time you enter the country, but it's not really true that "fingerprinting requirements don't apply to permanent residents." See: [7]http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9a c89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b6629c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD &vgnextchannel=b6629c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD Also, as far as I know, the Japanese are not fingerprinting transit passengers. My understanding is that even if you are just connecting via a US city, you still have to fill out the forms and get scanning. Basically I think that expecting us to go through US fingerprinting to visit the US, then deciding not to go to Japan because of fingerprinting is slightly hypocritical unless you have been vocally opposed to the fingerprinting in the US. Anyway, maybe this is a good opportunity for American who travel to Japan to take a good look at what the US does to its visitors and be reflective. I think a lot of Japanese government behavior just tracks what the US does and often is "encouraged" by the US. See crypto exports, the new Japanese corporate law or "JSOX" and copyright terms for other examples. - Joi _________________________________________________________________ [8]Archives [9][feed-icon-10x10.jpg] [10]Powered by Listbox References 1. mailto:weinberg@msen.com 2. mailto:dave@farber.net 3. mailto:weinberg@wayne.edu 4. mailto:jito@neoteny.com 5. mailto:dave@farber.net 6. mailto:ip@v2.listbox.com 7. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543… 8. http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now 9. http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ 10. http://www.listbox.com/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Re: Good comments on (djf) fingerprinting in Japan
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message: From: Jonathan Weinberg <[1]weinberg(a)msen.com> Date: November 23, 2007 1:50:59 PM EST To: David Farber <[2]dave(a)farber.net> Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan Joi's absolutely right (as were other folks who wrote to me off-list) that the US does requires photography and fingerprinting from folks *applying* for immigrant visas and green cards -- so it would be wrong to say that the US program is much less privacy-intrusive than Japan's just by virtue of not requiring "every time" fingerprinting for green card holders. (Joi's also right that the US program is broader than Japan's in that DHS makes even folks just passing through as transit visitors satisfy full visa and fingerprinting requirements, and in his broader point that US citizens complaining about Japan's program are finding a mote in another's eye while ignoring the beam in their own.) There's still something interesting going on here, though, regarding "every time" fingerprinting for green card holders. Japan has instituted "every time" fingerprinting for permanent residents *even though* permanent residents in Japan have already been fingerprinted and photographed for their alien registration cards. That approach is consistent with a key professed reason for the US fingerprinting requirement, which is to ensure that the person presenting herself at the border is the same person to whom the travel documents were issued. If the US DHS really, really took seriously its desire to make sure that people weren't entering the US with forged or stolen green cards, it would require "every time" fingerprinting of permanent residents just as Japan seems to be doing. But it's apparently decided that it doesn't want to deal with the political fallout of such a move; in terms of their ability to push back politically, folks entering the US on temporary visas or through the Visa Waiver Program are an easier target. Jon Jonathan Weinberg Professor of Law, Wayne State University [3]weinberg(a)wayne.edu From: Joichi Ito <[4]jito(a)neoteny.com> Date: November 22, 2007 4:26:14 PM EST To: [5]dave(a)farber.net Cc: [6]ip(a)v2.listbox.com Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan The US requires fingerprints for many kinds of visas including some benefits for permanent residents. Also, I think they require a photograph showing your earlobe as another biometric. It's on your card. It is slightly different from requiring a finger print every time you enter the country, but it's not really true that "fingerprinting requirements don't apply to permanent residents." See: [7]http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9a c89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b6629c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD &vgnextchannel=b6629c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD Also, as far as I know, the Japanese are not fingerprinting transit passengers. My understanding is that even if you are just connecting via a US city, you still have to fill out the forms and get scanning. Basically I think that expecting us to go through US fingerprinting to visit the US, then deciding not to go to Japan because of fingerprinting is slightly hypocritical unless you have been vocally opposed to the fingerprinting in the US. Anyway, maybe this is a good opportunity for American who travel to Japan to take a good look at what the US does to its visitors and be reflective. I think a lot of Japanese government behavior just tracks what the US does and often is "encouraged" by the US. See crypto exports, the new Japanese corporate law or "JSOX" and copyright terms for other examples. - Joi _________________________________________________________________ [8]Archives [9][feed-icon-10x10.jpg] [10]Powered by Listbox References 1. mailto:weinberg@msen.com 2. mailto:dave@farber.net 3. mailto:weinberg@wayne.edu 4. mailto:jito@neoteny.com 5. mailto:dave@farber.net 6. mailto:ip@v2.listbox.com 7. http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543… 8. http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now 9. http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ 10. http://www.listbox.com/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[gsc] iPhone Loom
by Patrick Chkoreff 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

News Update: https://loom.cc/?function=news 2008-01-27 Bill St. Clair has released his iPhone interface for Loom. https://billstclair.com/loom/ip.php Here's a blog entry for it: http://billstclair.com/blog/loom_iphone_client.html -- Patrick

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None
by Catherine Meadows 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Paul: The IETF has been discussing setting up a working group for anonymous IPSec. They will have a BOF at the next IETF in DC in November. They're also setting up a mailing list you might be interested in if you haven't heard about it already. Information is below. At 10:08 PM -0700 9/6/04, Joe Touch wrote: >Hi, all, > >To follow-up on related presentations at both SAAG and TCPM, we've >created a mailing list for discussions of anonymous security. > >Further information on the list and how to join it, as well as >pointers to related resources can be found at: > > http://www.postel.org/anonsec > >The mailing list address is: anonsec(a)postel.org > >Joe > Cathy ----- End forwarded message ----- _______________________________________________ NymIP-res-group mailing list NymIP-res-group(a)nymip.org http://www.nymip.org/mailman/listinfo/nymip-res-group --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec
by Paul Syverson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

----- Forwarded message from Catherine Meadows <meadows(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> -----

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