July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Data for those who have the power to request it
by Andy Oram 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Because the subtleties of privacy legislation are a popular topic on your IP list, readers might be interested in a paragraph buried in today's AP report on the bombing of the US embassy in Athens (I found it in my local paper): http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/01/13/ greek_militants_blamed_in_rocket_attack/ The paragraph with the privacy implications reads: The government said it was seeking permission from the courts to view video from traffic cameras, which under Greek privacy laws is officially excluded from the police investigation. Although I'd like to see the bombers caught, I'm leary of the tendency to stretch information systems beyond their intended uses. There's also an important imbalance of power involved. If the police and US embassy get their way, it will show that powerful forces can bend privacy laws--but other people can't. If I come to my parked car and find a dent in it, will I pursuade the courts to let me look at traffic photos? And even if information is open to all (if anyone could go on the Web and view footage from traffic cameras) this would benefit governments and large companies over individuals--whoever has the power to act on information. I've written about this before: http://www.praxagora.com/andyo/professional/p3p_promises.html in the section "Technology Is Not the Problem--Power Is." Andy ------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: Archives: http://archives.listbox.com/247/ Modify Your Subscription: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=125019&user_secret=59fc1126 Unsubscribe: http://v2.listbox.com/unsubscribe/?id=125019-59fc1126-jl8dphw9 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Data for those who have the power to request it
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tahoe-dev] switching from introducers to gossip?
by Greg Troxel 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Don't get me wrong -- I think the p2p style, which foolscap already implements part of -- is sweet. I'd like to improve it, in the interests of making Tahoe-LAFS deployment more automatic for end-users. However, we should probably pay attention to the fact that many of our current users do not use those features, and some of them are actively requesting the ability to turn off those features. Maybe some kind of friendly fork or more targeted packaging would help us manage these diverging deployment scenarios? What needs to be forked? Isn't it just a question of usage, with a mode of client-only, server-only, or both, perhaps enabling reverse connections, and a few other things? All these issues seem trivial in terms of code weight relative to what we have now. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03)
by Somebody 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Bob, Technically, since their signal speed is slower than light, even transmission lines act as storage devices. Wire tapping is now legal. <Somebody> ----- Original Message ----- From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> To: Clippable <rah(a)shipwright.com> Sent: Sunday, March 02, 2003 3:04 PM Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) > > --- begin forwarded text > > > Status: RO > Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2003 14:27:00 -0500 > To: Tim Dierks <tim(a)dierks.org>, "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com>, > cryptography(a)wasabisystems.com > From: "Ronald L. Rivest" <rivest(a)mit.edu> > Subject: Re: Wiretap Act Does Not Cover Message 'in Storage' For Short > Period (was Re: BNA's Internet Law News (ILN) - 2/27/03) > > > Yes, I was amazed at this ruling as well. > > This ruling seems to fly in the face of the likely intent of > Congress when it passed Wiretap Act. > > If things continue in this direction, we will soon have > rulings and regulations that say: > > -- Carriers must put all calls in storage for a minimum > period of time, sufficient to allow wiretapping. > (Indeed, regulation may not be necessary, as digitization and > buffering of communications is common practice; the > transient use of storage to effect communications > efficiency and reliability should not provide a wiretap > loophole.) > > -- Wiretapping is OK for any phone calls that are routed > through a satellite. > > -- It is OK for the government to house soldiers in your > house, as long as there is even the tiniest opening somewhere in > your house (e.g. a window open, or a chimney flue) > so that "inside" and "outside" connect. > > -- Etc. > > I can also see a market developing for "storage-free" communications > carriers. What happens when you inquire of your carrier as to > whether it can provide such a guarantee or option? > > Cheers, > Ron > > At 09:42 PM 3/1/2003, Tim Dierks wrote: > >At 01:39 PM 2/27/2003 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > >>At 9:01 AM -0500 on 2/27/03, BNA Highlights wrote: > >> > WIRETAP ACT DOES NOT COVER MESSAGE 'IN STORAGE' FOR SHORT > >> > PERIOD > >> > BNA's Electronic Commerce & Law Report reports that a > >> > federal court in Massachusetts has ruled that the federal > >> > Wiretap Act does not prohibit the improper acquisition of > >> > electronic communications that were "in storage" no matter > >> > how ephemeral that storage may be. The court relied on Konop > >> > v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc., which held that no Wiretap Act > >> > violation occurs when an electronic communication is > >> > accessed while in storage, "even if the interception takes > >> > place during a nanosecond 'juncture' of storage along the > >> > path of transmission." Case name is U.S. v. Councilman. > >> > Article at > >> > <http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/eip.nsf/is/a0a6m6y1k8> > >> > For a free trial to source of this story, visit > >> > http://web.bna.com/products/ip/eplr.htm > > > >This would seem to imply to me that the wiretap act does not apply to any > >normal telephone conversation which is carried at any point in its transit > >by an electronic switch, including all cell phone calls and nearly all > >wireline calls, since any such switch places the data of the ongoing call > >in "storage" for a tiny fraction of a second. > > > > - Tim > > > > > > > >--------------------------------------------------------------------- > >The Cryptography Mailing List > >Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to > >majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com > > Ronald L. Rivest > Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139 > Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email <rivest(a)mit.edu> > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Re: [wearables] Wearable Computers and Privacy (surveillance and...)
by Steve Mann 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> By concentrating sensing and data storage on the body, a wearable > computer allows its user to ``control his own bits.'' The user > determines when and where his data is released and how much to trust > the infrastructure around him. For example, when a wearable user > enters work in the morning, he may instruct his wearable to inform his > office of his arrival so that his office unlocks his door or starts a > pot of coffee. However, the user would probably tell his wearable not > to share his identity with billboards he walks past to avoid the sort > of targeted advertising portrayed in the film ``Minority Report.'' Of > course, some bargain hunters may choose to share their identity with > advertisers to obtain better deals, much like membership cards in > today's grocery stores. .. > By using a combination of physical sensor limitations, legal recourse, Some of the social, legal, ethical, moral, and policy issues you raise are very relevant. In thinking about our recent Special Issue on cyborglaw, here is a comparison of architecture-based recording (surveillance) and person-based recording (sousveillance). You might find this comparison interesting and useful for your article. We'd also welcome thoughts from the whole group on this dichotomy: Surveillance Sousveillance God's eye view from above. Human's eye view. (Authority watching from on-high.) ("Down-to-earth.") Cameras usually mounted on high Cameras down at ground-level, poles, up on ceiling, etc.. e.g. at human eye-level. Architecture-centered Human-centered (e.g. cameras usually mounted on (e.g. cameras carried or worn or in structures). by, or on, people). Recordings made by authorities, Recordings of an activity remote security staff, etc.. made by a participant in the activity. Note that in most states it's In most states it's legal to illegal to record a phone record a phone conversation of conversation of which you are which you are a party. Perhaps not a party. Perhaps the same the same would apply to an would apply to an audiovisual audiovisual recording of your own recording of somebody else's conversations, i.e. conversations conversation. in which you are a party. Recordings are usually kept in Recordings are often made public secret. e.g., on the World Wide Web. Process usually shrouded in Process, technology, etc., are secrecy. usually public, open source, etc.. Panoptic origins, as described Community-based origins, e.g. by Foucault, originally in the a personal electronic diary, context of a prison in which made public on the World Wide Web. prisoners were isolated from Sousveillance tends to bring each other but visible at all together individuals, e.g. it times by guards. Surveillance tends to make a large city tends to isolate individuals function more like a small town, from one another while setting with the pitfalls of gossip, but forth a one-way visibility to also the benefits of a sense of authority figures. community participation. Privacy violation may go Privacy violation is usually un-noticed, or un-checked. immediately evident. Tends Tends to not be self-correcting. to be self-correcting. It's hard to have a heart-to-heart At least there's a chance you can conversation with a lamp post, talk to the person behind the on top of which is mounted a sousveillance camera. surveillance camera. When combined with computers, we When combined with computers, we get ubiquitous computing get wearable computing. ("ubiqcomp") or pervasive ("wearcomp"). Wearcomp usually computing ("pervcomp"). doesn't require the cooperation Ubiq./perv. comp. tend to rely on of any infrastructure in the cooperation of the infrastructure environments around us. in the environments around us. With surveillant-computing, the With sousveillant-computing, it locus of control tends to be with is possible for the locus of the authorities. control to be more distributed. Eventually, we will probably end up with a combination of ubiq/pervcomp (surcomp/souscomp) and wearcomp (sousveillant-computing). There will eventually be some kind of equilibrium ("equivellance") between surveilance and sousveillance. We will wear or carry some but not all of the technology. Obviously we don't wear big batteries to run head-mounted lights, so there are some elements like shelter, lighting, electrical wiring, and plumbing (except for diapers which are wearable restrooms) that are best-served by the architecture. But new emerging technologies of miniaturization will shift the equiveillance (sur/sous equilibrium) a little more from architecture of buildings to human-scale architecure. I believe that the "heavy currents" like the 600 Amp 3phase service that comes into our building will stay in the architecture, whereas the "light currents" (informatic electrical signals) will move more and more onto and into the body. Thus the shift in equiveillance will be primarily informatic, encompassing also personal information like lifelong video capture "cyborglog" personal diaries. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: NSA knows who you've called.
by Russ Nelson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

dan(a)geer.org writes: > You and I are in agreement, but how do we get > the seemingly (to us) plain truth across to > others? I've been trying for a good while now, > reaching a point where I'd almost wish for a > crisis of some sort as persuasiveness is not > working. > > We are probably well off-topic for this list. First they came for the terrorists, and I said nothing because I wasn't a terrorist. Then they came for my phone calls, and I said nothing because I had nothing to hide. Then they came for the cryptographers, and I said nothing because I coulldn't even spel the word. Now I can't hide anything. -- --my blog is at http://blog.russnelson.com | Microsoft as wall, Crynwr sells support for free software | PGPok | OSI are the sappers. 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315-323-1241 | Walls fall stone by stone Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | Sheepdog | --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Data for those who have the power to request it
by Andy Oram 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Because the subtleties of privacy legislation are a popular topic on your IP list, readers might be interested in a paragraph buried in today's AP report on the bombing of the US embassy in Athens (I found it in my local paper): http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/01/13/ greek_militants_blamed_in_rocket_attack/ The paragraph with the privacy implications reads: The government said it was seeking permission from the courts to view video from traffic cameras, which under Greek privacy laws is officially excluded from the police investigation. Although I'd like to see the bombers caught, I'm leary of the tendency to stretch information systems beyond their intended uses. There's also an important imbalance of power involved. If the police and US embassy get their way, it will show that powerful forces can bend privacy laws--but other people can't. If I come to my parked car and find a dent in it, will I pursuade the courts to let me look at traffic photos? And even if information is open to all (if anyone could go on the Web and view footage from traffic cameras) this would benefit governments and large companies over individuals--whoever has the power to act on information. I've written about this before: http://www.praxagora.com/andyo/professional/p3p_promises.html in the section "Technology Is Not the Problem--Power Is." Andy ------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: Archives: http://archives.listbox.com/247/ Modify Your Subscription: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=125019&user_secret=59fc1126 Unsubscribe: http://v2.listbox.com/unsubscribe/?id=125019-59fc1126-jl8dphw9 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Data for those who have the power to request it
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [tahoe-dev] switching from introducers to gossip?
by Greg Troxel 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Don't get me wrong -- I think the p2p style, which foolscap already implements part of -- is sweet. I'd like to improve it, in the interests of making Tahoe-LAFS deployment more automatic for end-users. However, we should probably pay attention to the fact that many of our current users do not use those features, and some of them are actively requesting the ability to turn off those features. Maybe some kind of friendly fork or more targeted packaging would help us manage these diverging deployment scenarios? What needs to be forked? Isn't it just a question of usage, with a mode of client-only, server-only, or both, perhaps enabling reverse connections, and a few other things? All these issues seem trivial in terms of code weight relative to what we have now. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] Google's Web Accelerator is a big privacy risk
by Seth David Schoen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

David Farber writes: >From: Brian Carini <bcarini(a)gmail.com> >Date: May 5, 2005 11:06:12 AM EDT >To: David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> >Subject: Google's Web Accelerator is a big privacy risk >Reply-To: brian(a)carini.org > >I've said this before: I really like Google, but they are getting >dangerous. Google has a great image as a good company. They have >engendered a great amount of trust through their "Don't Be Evil" >motto. And I think they really mean it. But the fact is that they >are stockpiling a perilous amount of personal information about their >users. > >Already, Google logs every search request with its IP address. >Google has acknowledged this log in a number of interviews. But, >they have never answered why they keep such a log. The search log by >itself is not too harmful since the IP address identifies a computer >and not a person. The searches cannot easily be traced to a >particular person without help from the ISP, unless a person likes to >Google their own name frequently. > A bigger problem is that many Google search users are also Gmail users, and a cookie is shared between Gmail and Google search (because they use the same domain, google.com) Therefore, if a person uses Gmail and Google search from the same computer, even with a long period of time in between, Google will know the identity of the person responsible for those search queries. Google doesn't need to infer your identity from the content of your other web searches; it already knows it, if you're a Gmail user. This identification can be retroactive. If you used Google search for 3 years on a particular PC, and then signed up for a Gmail account, your search cookie from that PC would be sent to Google and the name you provided for your Gmail account could then be associated retroactively with your entire saved search history. Google cookies last as long as possible -- until 2038. If you've ever done a Google search on a given computer with a given web browser, you probably still have a descendant of the original PREF cookie that Google gave you upon your very first search, with the very same ID field (a globally unique 256-bit value). This problem is ubiquitous in the web portal industry, and Google is right to say that its privacy policy is better than many of its competitors'. However, Google is still assembling a treasure trove of personal information, possibly stretching back for years, that Google may release in response to any civil subpoena or "governmental request": http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/privacy.html#disclose -- Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/ | being programmed by others. http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/ | -- Fred Rogers (1928-2003), | 464 U.S. 417, 445 (1984) ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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