July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
by Bob Frankston 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

After writing my comments below I was going to close by noting that there is far more to worry about with fingerprints than Google since there is still a belief that finger prints are authoritative even if there is only a small portion recovered and the matching is subjective. In the same way we can try to avoid leaving any tracks and live a very circumscribed life. Or we can hope that our trails are noisy and that a visit to whitehouse.com (vs whitehouse.gov) will not mark us for life. Who knows if the visit was intended, unintended, prurient or just curious? This isn't really about technology in isolation or Google per se. We should do what we can to make people aware of these issues -- as with Sony DRM ultimately it's people's perception. If Google is seen as spying on us then they will lose too much business. Ultimately it's that rather than users setting complex option that limits threats. It's about transparency -- we need to pry into Google's closets before they pry into ours. The average user didn't understand the Internet until it was packaged in a browser and today the internet is the web and people still don't understand it beyond the simple examples they have. But even if they think that people are watching them they don't know what it means. Even the so-called experts implement link level security instead of end to end. As to Google keeping track of your searches ... what about the trail you leave in that old world of physical objects when you use your credit cards. A few key words on Google are mild compared with you are stop at the 7-11 and the cell call you made or the email messages. The threat of Google keeping track of your keywords is very abstract. The reason this story made the news is that it is very unusual. Those who say users will never be able to use computers for word processing for have LANs at home were right. And completely wrong. There is a middle ground -- it doesn't just happen by accident. Someone has to create a bridge. If the other "side" is visible then more people would try. There is a book, "Crossing the Chasm", about getting people to make the leap. More often we have to build the bridges before people know there is even an other side. And very often there really isn't or we pick the wrong one. Handwriting recognition was a big deal but a failure until Graffiti. Today oddly enough Palm is emphasizing little keyboards and Microsoft is trying to push full handwriting recognition. So much for presuming a simple linear path. Home networking (LANs) is personal for me since I had to make sure the Windows had the enabling mechanisms and I was trying to move in the direction of encrypted IPv6 with legacy ports locked down. Unfortunately we still haven't learned the lessons of Multics and Project MAC (http://www.frankston.com/?name=Symbiosis as in Man/Machine Symbiosis) in giving users a way to understand and express their intent. Of course it's far more difficult today. At least in Multics you had to take a step to make your files visible while Unix defaulted to starting with the door wide open. We do have a way to say "no cookies" but you can't really do much that way. Same problem with the Java VM in the browser -- there is an all or nothing policy. Worrying about Google tracking you is in the same vein. If you use their single login it's like being tracked by American Express or by your library. Of course we know librarians won't track you -- but they will track which books are popular and a really good library may try to make better predictions so they can better serve you even if the chortle at some of the findings. If you don't use a single login then it's really hard to avail yourself of their set of services. Same for Yahoo, AOL, MSN etc. As much as I have problems with passport there seems to be some separation between your "identity" and its use. The reason I keep coming back to phishing is that it goes to the heart of some of our perceptions. Is "Google" a nice warm friendly site or a site that promises to be worth more than a few billion dollars? I once looked up "Sodomy in Georgia" on Yahoo which was the title of a David Bunnell editorial in the 1980's. The ads that popped up showed what they thought of my search (a good reason for not having animated GIFs in ads) and, by extension, me. BTW, just tried the search on Google in an attempt to pollute my legacy and the law was eventually repealed. Should I shy away from searching? Should I not give to political candidates (the disclosure laws are indeed a violation of the first amendment)? Should I worry too much about police finding a latent pencil line on a pad of paper in my house having the words "dead meat" on it (a reminder to buy hamburger)? -----Original Message----- From: David Farber [mailto:dave@farber.net] Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:52 To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists Begin forwarded message:

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[IP] more on Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[Politech] Report critiques federal government's Internet voting scheme [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: the new Internet voting scheme Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 10:26:53 -0700 From: Barbara Simons <simons(a)acm.org> To: Declan McCullagh CC: info(a)servesecurityreport.org Dear Declan, PLEASE CIRCULATE: My colleagues David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, David Wagner and I have just released a short paper about the government's IVAS system that involves absentee voting using email and fax and ballot distribution over the Internet. See http://servesecurityreport.org/ivas.pdf We wanted to bring this to your attention because we believe this system poses significant risks, as described in this excerpt from our article: In summary, we see three main risks: 1. Tool One exposes soldiers to risks of identity theft. Sending personally identifiable information via unencrypted email is considered poor practice. No bank would ask their customers to send SSNs over unencrypted email, yet Tool One does exactly that. This problem is exacerbated by potential phishing attacks. 2. Returning voted ballots by email or fax creates an opportunity for hackers, foreign governments, or other parties to tamper with those ballots while they are in transit. FVAP's system does not include any meaningful protection against the risk of ballot modification. 3. Ballots returned by email or fax may be handled by the DoD in some cases. Those overseas voters using the system sign a waiver of their right to a secret ballot. However, it is one thing for a voter's ballot to be sent directly to their local election official; it is another for a soldier's ballot to be sent to and handled by the DoD b who is, after all, the soldier's employer. Regards, Barbara Simons _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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UK Government loses personal data of 25m people
by Denis Russell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave, Headline news in the UK is of a new world record. "On Tuesday the chancellor told MPs how the entire child benefit database was sent by a junior official from HMRC in Newcastle to the audit office in London through courier TNT on 18 October." ... and was lost: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7104945.stm> At least this has provoked some sensible (for a change) debate on the care of personal data. The BBC Newsnight had a good debate on the subject last night including Ross Andeson. At the moment the video is still online via <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/default.stm > and will be for a week I believe. At least there may be one silver lining to this cloud, there is now widespread comment that the security risk of large centralized databases may actually be appreciated and this may "have dealt a body blow to the government's plans for a national ID card scheme". I'll believe that when I see it. Denis. ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] UK Government loses personal data of 25m people
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[IP] more on on RFIDs in passports
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

------ Forwarded Message From: Edward Hasbrouck <edward(a)hasbrouck.org> Organization: The Practical Nomad Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2005 18:15:19 -0700 To: David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> Subject: Re: [IP] More on RFIDs in passports > Moss said that since the chip will only contain information > that is printed on the days page of the passport, it will not > matter, and that "if you wish to out your passport in the > microwave, you will still have a valid travel document that > we will recognize." Accroding to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: The proposed rule ... would include a damaged electronic chip as an additional basis for possible invalidation of a passport.... Under the proposed rule, a passport that contains a damaged, defective, or otherwise nonfunctioning electronic chip ... may be invalidated by the Department of State.... If the damage were caused deliberately, the passport would be invalidated upon discovery. The proposed regulation itself provides as follows: Sec. 51.6 --Damaged, mutilated or altered passport: Any passport which has been materially changed in physical appearance or composition, or contains a damaged, defective or otherwise nonfunctioning electronic chip, or which includes unauthorized changes, obliterations, entries or photographs, ... may be invalidated. I discuss this, and some of Moss's other statements, at: http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/000558.html -------------------- Edward Hasbrouck edward(a)hasbrouck.org http://hasbrouck.org +1-415-824-0214 "The Practical Nomad: How to Travel Around the World" (3rd edition, 2004) "The Practical Nomad Guide to the Online Travel Marketplace" http://www.practicalnomad.com ------ End of Forwarded Message ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
by Lauren Weinstein 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>In the 1980s, the "average user" would never >need a local area network in his home. In the early 1990s, the >"average user" would never understand or need the Internet. And so on. In fact, the reality of the current security and privacy mess with the Internet helps to prove my point. For example, talk to the folks who drive around plotting all of the open wireless LANs that are literally everywhere in virtually every neighborhood. The vast majority of them have *no* security at all -- not even cruddy old WEP. This includes businesses, medical offices, you name it, as well as vast numbers of private homes. Yet, for years every WLAN product has included at the very least WEP capabilities, and instructions on how to set it up. Despite this, many people's open WLANs are constantly being abused, sometimes with tragic results. That situation is gradually starting to improve, but only because the setting up of *some* level of security has become part of the standard installation scripts for many products. But until this became the *default*, even when it was easy to use, most people didn't bother. Why? Most of the time, simply because they didn't believe that any associated risks applied to them -- and that view is easy to understand. The computer industry is great at promoting the vast benefits of their products, but do their best to keep the downsides to the fine print, buried in click-through license mumbo-jumbo that even many lawyers would have trouble understanding, along with lilliputian quick-start guides that are the only instructions many people read. The same thing goes for Internet services. It is utterly reasonable to expect that the *defaults* provided will respect people's privacy, security, and other rights. We are a society of laws and those laws are there (at least in theory) to help protect those rights. It is unfair in the extreme to suggest that anyone who doesn't jump through hoops to protect themselves from information abuse is somehow negligent, while asserting that legislative efforts should not be made to rein in the way that the services behave -- so that those services meet a reasonable standard that society agrees is appropriate. Yes, imposing society's will on such firms can be tough to do, especially when dealing with powerful and well-heeled interests. But not to do so -- to not even try -- is just surrendering to what most of us know in our hearts is just plain wrong. --Lauren-- Lauren Weinstein lauren(a)pfir.org or lauren(a)vortex.com or lauren(a)eepi.org Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 http://www.pfir.org/lauren Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org Co-Founder, EEPI - Electronic Entertainment Policy Initiative - http://www.eepi.org Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com DayThink: http://daythink.vortex.com - - - > > >Begin forwarded message: > >From: Phil Karn <karn(a)ka9q.net> >Date: December 3, 2005 7:10:30 PM EST >To: dave(a)farber.net >Cc: ip(a)v2.listbox.com >Subject: Re: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists > > >>From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren(a)vortex.com> > >>1) Any practical attempt to "swamp" Google's database in such a >> manner is unlikely to succeed, given the sheer volume of legit >> queries that they receive. I suspect they'd be smart enough to >> detect abuse patterns fairly easily. That kind of analysis is >> their bread and butter. > >The idea is not to "swamp" Google. It's simply to create a little >plausible deniability -- i.e., reasonable doubt -- that a given >search was entered by the user and not by the automatic daemon. > >>2) Attempts to purposely "abuse" Google in such a manner (faked >> requests) may well violate their Terms of Service, and if they >> don't now you can be sure that they will in some future version >> of the ToS. The likely result will at a minimum be bans and ISP >> actions, and at the max lawsuits. Pull out your wallet. > >Again, "swamping" or "abusing" Google is not the intent, nor is it >very likely given Google's strong emphasis on performance and >scalability. The idea is simply to create doubt that a given query >was generated by a human, not by the robot. The "quality" of the >synthetic queries is much more important than their quantity. > >Still, the extra traffic just might have the effect of encouraging >Google to adopt a stronger privacy policy. Not that I'd place much >stock in that, of course (see below.) > >>3) Routing queries through anon proxies will provide some protection >> for the technological elite who understand such things. They will >> not protect the average user, who most likely doesn't understand >> the risks and issues, and will never use such proxies, even >> assuming that they were trivial to use. > >I wish I had a nickel for everything I've been told "the average >user" would never understand, need or be able to use. Back in the >1970s, the "average user" would never understand, need or be able to >use a personal computer. In the 1980s, the "average user" would never >need a local area network in his home. In the early 1990s, the >"average user" would never understand or need the Internet. And so on. > >It is no more necessary that the "average user" understand how an >anonymizing Google proxy works to use it effectively than to >understand the fields in TCP/IP packet headers. The whole idea of >civilization and commerce is that many people can benefit from >specialized knowledge and skills that they themselves lack. The open >source movement and the Internet itself have certainly demonstrated >this. > >Personally, I prefer the anonymizing proxy over the random query >generator. The proxy is likely to be more effective, and it generates >no extra load. I mention the generator mainly to be complete. My >point is that there *are* technical defenses against potential >privacy abuses, and we can implement them ourselves instead of >naively demanding that Google respect our privacy against their own >commercial interests. > >And even if Google were completely honest, they would still be >subject to Patriot Act abuses that we would never know about. > >The sad fact is that "national security" has become the root password >to the Constitution. The only effective defense against a "rooted" >system is not to put any sensitive information in it in the first >place. > >--Phil > > ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as BobIP(a)Bobf.Frankston.com To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting- people/ ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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RE: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
by Bob Frankston 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

After writing my comments below I was going to close by noting that there is far more to worry about with fingerprints than Google since there is still a belief that finger prints are authoritative even if there is only a small portion recovered and the matching is subjective. In the same way we can try to avoid leaving any tracks and live a very circumscribed life. Or we can hope that our trails are noisy and that a visit to whitehouse.com (vs whitehouse.gov) will not mark us for life. Who knows if the visit was intended, unintended, prurient or just curious? This isn't really about technology in isolation or Google per se. We should do what we can to make people aware of these issues -- as with Sony DRM ultimately it's people's perception. If Google is seen as spying on us then they will lose too much business. Ultimately it's that rather than users setting complex option that limits threats. It's about transparency -- we need to pry into Google's closets before they pry into ours. The average user didn't understand the Internet until it was packaged in a browser and today the internet is the web and people still don't understand it beyond the simple examples they have. But even if they think that people are watching them they don't know what it means. Even the so-called experts implement link level security instead of end to end. As to Google keeping track of your searches ... what about the trail you leave in that old world of physical objects when you use your credit cards. A few key words on Google are mild compared with you are stop at the 7-11 and the cell call you made or the email messages. The threat of Google keeping track of your keywords is very abstract. The reason this story made the news is that it is very unusual. Those who say users will never be able to use computers for word processing for have LANs at home were right. And completely wrong. There is a middle ground -- it doesn't just happen by accident. Someone has to create a bridge. If the other "side" is visible then more people would try. There is a book, "Crossing the Chasm", about getting people to make the leap. More often we have to build the bridges before people know there is even an other side. And very often there really isn't or we pick the wrong one. Handwriting recognition was a big deal but a failure until Graffiti. Today oddly enough Palm is emphasizing little keyboards and Microsoft is trying to push full handwriting recognition. So much for presuming a simple linear path. Home networking (LANs) is personal for me since I had to make sure the Windows had the enabling mechanisms and I was trying to move in the direction of encrypted IPv6 with legacy ports locked down. Unfortunately we still haven't learned the lessons of Multics and Project MAC (http://www.frankston.com/?name=Symbiosis as in Man/Machine Symbiosis) in giving users a way to understand and express their intent. Of course it's far more difficult today. At least in Multics you had to take a step to make your files visible while Unix defaulted to starting with the door wide open. We do have a way to say "no cookies" but you can't really do much that way. Same problem with the Java VM in the browser -- there is an all or nothing policy. Worrying about Google tracking you is in the same vein. If you use their single login it's like being tracked by American Express or by your library. Of course we know librarians won't track you -- but they will track which books are popular and a really good library may try to make better predictions so they can better serve you even if the chortle at some of the findings. If you don't use a single login then it's really hard to avail yourself of their set of services. Same for Yahoo, AOL, MSN etc. As much as I have problems with passport there seems to be some separation between your "identity" and its use. The reason I keep coming back to phishing is that it goes to the heart of some of our perceptions. Is "Google" a nice warm friendly site or a site that promises to be worth more than a few billion dollars? I once looked up "Sodomy in Georgia" on Yahoo which was the title of a David Bunnell editorial in the 1980's. The ads that popped up showed what they thought of my search (a good reason for not having animated GIFs in ads) and, by extension, me. BTW, just tried the search on Google in an attempt to pollute my legacy and the law was eventually repealed. Should I shy away from searching? Should I not give to political candidates (the disclosure laws are indeed a violation of the first amendment)? Should I worry too much about police finding a latent pencil line on a pad of paper in my house having the words "dead meat" on it (a reminder to buy hamburger)? -----Original Message----- From: David Farber [mailto:dave@farber.net] Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:52 To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists Begin forwarded message:

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[IP] more on Google search and seizure, etc. vs. technologists
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

1 0

[Politech] Report critiques federal government's Internet voting scheme [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: the new Internet voting scheme Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2006 10:26:53 -0700 From: Barbara Simons <simons(a)acm.org> To: Declan McCullagh CC: info(a)servesecurityreport.org Dear Declan, PLEASE CIRCULATE: My colleagues David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, David Wagner and I have just released a short paper about the government's IVAS system that involves absentee voting using email and fax and ballot distribution over the Internet. See http://servesecurityreport.org/ivas.pdf We wanted to bring this to your attention because we believe this system poses significant risks, as described in this excerpt from our article: In summary, we see three main risks: 1. Tool One exposes soldiers to risks of identity theft. Sending personally identifiable information via unencrypted email is considered poor practice. No bank would ask their customers to send SSNs over unencrypted email, yet Tool One does exactly that. This problem is exacerbated by potential phishing attacks. 2. Returning voted ballots by email or fax creates an opportunity for hackers, foreign governments, or other parties to tamper with those ballots while they are in transit. FVAP's system does not include any meaningful protection against the risk of ballot modification. 3. Ballots returned by email or fax may be handled by the DoD in some cases. Those overseas voters using the system sign a waiver of their right to a secret ballot. However, it is one thing for a voter's ballot to be sent directly to their local election official; it is another for a soldier's ballot to be sent to and handled by the DoD b who is, after all, the soldier's employer. Regards, Barbara Simons _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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