July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[cryptography] Military chip crypto cracked with power-analysis probe
by Jeffrey Walton 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/07/27/chip_crypto_cracked/ _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[liberationtech] REVIEWERS NEEDED - Safer satellite phone guide nearing completion
by Brian Conley 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi all, You may recall before the holidays I posted some questions about research around the use of satellite phones, best security practices, etc. I have been working on a guide providing an overview about what steps users can take to provide a modicum of protection when using satellite phones. I would greatly appreciate it if a few of you would offer to review the draft, I hope to have it together by midday tomorrow, and get feedback before the end of the week. Do let me know if you can assist, when the final is published on our site I'll be sure to let everyone know here. -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley public key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xE827FACCB139C9F0 _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Re: [tor-talk] End-to-end correlation for fun and profit
by Maxim Kammerer 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 1:12 AM, Mike Perry <mikeperry(a)torproject.org> wrote: > The Raccoon has made a believer out of me, but there are some limits to > both of his/her proofs.. The full proofs can still be found here: > http://web.archive.org/web/20100416150300/http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/S… Wrt. the first proof, it seems to me that the assumed correlation accuracy rate of 99.9% is incredibly low, and I think that the Raccoon recognized that by referring to sampling and retention at the end of his post. With the targeted attack that's similar to b Example 3b in Raccoon's post that I described in my previous comment here, where one analyzes all exit traffic without missing packets, I would expect the correlation accuracy (and as a result, match confidence) to exponentially approach 100% very quickly with the number of relevant packets seen, and extremely quickly if the traffic is interactive (i.e., browsing). Actually, c/n of 30% in b Example 3b is close to the 25% that's discussed in the OP here, so let's redo the example with c/n=25% and different correlation accuracies (leaving the other numbers intact): (using b bc -lb) ca = 0.999 pm = (1/5000) * (0.25)^2 ca*pm / (pm*ca + (1-pm)*(1-ca)) ca = 0.999 .01233363786760166917 ca = 0.9999 .11110246894375430565 ca = 0.99999 .55555617284636495961 ca = 0.999999 .92592671467910125759 ca = 0.9999999 .99206358969515668554 ca = 0.99999999 .99920064946444143613 ca = 0.999999999 .99992000739924807495 So reducing correlation accuracy error to 10^-9 will give you 99.99% confidence in end-to-end correlation match. I suspect that a few seconds of interactive traffic will give you a correlation accuracy that's much better than a 10^-9 error. -- Maxim Kammerer LibertC) Linux: http://dee.su/liberte _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[ZS] Troll Attack Patterns
by Michael Hrenka 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I know a little bit about how trolls operate. There are different types of trolls, but most of them present a threat to the community that is trolled. So, the community needs some awareness of the attack patterns in order to withstand such attacks. I was an active member of a certain small community, let's call it community X. X has a charismatic leader, let's call him Z, with radical ideas about progress, community, and stuff like that. Because Z wants a large high quality community and it is hard to find candidates with the required prerequisites ("really freely thinking individuals" or so), Z resorts to an unconventional strategy of member recruitment which I call "forum fishing" for simplicity. It consists in entering forums of other communities and advertising the ideals of X. Members are encouraged to check out X, because it's really great and so on (which is not too far from the truth actually). At the same time the targeted community C is criticized in different ways: 1. It is criticised for not upholding the ideals of X. 2. It is criticised for supporting destructive ideals which are detrimental to individuals. 3. It is criticised for being stupid, dysfunctional and inefficient. 4. It is criticised for not even sticking to its own ideals and rules. 5. It is criticised for a bad administration style, which is characterized as despotic. Many points that the infiltration group of X make are thoughtful, true, and justified. But at the same time the group is quite vehement and aggressive, which sooner or later gets them flagged as trolls. They react by pointing out that they are acting in accordance with the rules, even if the C admins have erroneous differing positions and that they have good intentions. Often, a few members of C agree with the X members and consider joining X. These individuals may be painted as traitors by the C admins. But that reaction makes the accused traitors likely to question their allegiance to C and likely to join X instead. Sooner or later, the infiltrators from X are kicked out of C, possibly together with some sympathizers. But they will have incited hot discussions about values, ideals, administration styles, and perhaps even recruited a few intelligent and open minded members for X. The reactions of the C admins will have antagonized a couple of C members, so they will leave, rebel, or generally will feel unwelcome, protest, and cause further trouble. In any case, the free expression of ideas will be restricted to some degree. The community C may become more dictatorial, up to the point of becoming an empty shell that doesn't remind anyone of the what it once was. It may split up because of that or just die silently. And those were the benign trolls. Now I'll explain the methods of malignant trolls. The motive of the malignant troll is to destroy the targeted community, or to take it over, or to cause as much trouble as possible. Let's call the targeted community C. It is not without irony that I was an admin of X when it was infiltrated by malignant trolls. Malignant trolls infiltrate hard and deep. They try to earn the trust of C members, and especially C admins. If they are good, they will not come alone, but as a highly coordinated trolling troupe "T". Once a single member of T gains admin status, the other members of T will also get that status soon. Sooner or later a significant fraction of C admins belong to T. Once they are in that position, it is hard to remove them. Here's what happens if someone identifies them as infiltrators and takes action against them: 1. T denies that they are a problem for C. Instead T members claim that they are highly beneficial for C. 2. The offending C member will be accused of being unjust and will be defamed until he loses his status in C. 3. Defamation campaigns can include banning the offending member (remember: T has a lot of admins) and creating fake accounts who claim to be the banned member. The fake account write lots of nonsense which makes the original C member look bad. Additional T members or fake accounts of T members join in to corroborate that the initial C member needs to be excluded from the community forever. 4. If members of T are banned, the bans are reversed by T admins and the C member who tried to remove a T member is blamed for his "misbehaviour" and targeted for further attacks. 5. If T is threatened with defeat nevertheless, T may make serious threats: Psychological terror, physical attacks, legal action, etc. These threats are probably not serious, but the problem is that one doesn't actually know that. In general, a troll troupe T consists of many different accounts: 1. The account of the master troll 2. Accounts of other members of T 3. Fake accounts of T members for additional impact 4. Fake accounts that claim to be accounts of genuine C members. With all these fake and supporting accounts it is really hard to delineate between T members and genuine C members. Without real awareness of what might be going on, there will be hell of a chaos. C can only resist the chaos effectively if it uses communication channels with are not infiltrated, yet. Private emails, phone calls, and private meetings are generally hard to be infiltrated and can therefore be seen as rather safe. How to defend against such attacks? 1. Have a clear identity and sensible principles. 2. Stick to your principles. 3. Have a brilliant team of admins who are reasonable and not too paranoid. 4. Don't give potential trolls power. People with power should be "screened" to guarantee that they are loyal to the community. 5. Private communication - lots of it. How to differentiate between trolls and genuine members? * Know them! * Trolls are generally not very constructive * Malignant trolls are rather cynical, unfriendly, and nihilistic, but demand fair treatment nevertheless, or even preferential treatment. * Trolls are unlikely to be loyal to the ideals of the community. I hope this was helpful. Zero State is too precious to be a victim to trolls and other infiltrators. -- -- Zero State mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Doctrine Zero" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to DoctrineZero+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[Dewayne-Net] Iraq Wireless
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: This item comes from reader Mike Cheponis. DLH] >From: Mike Cheponis <mac(a)Wireless.Com> >Date: July 21, 2005 12:05:53 AM PDT >To: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne(a)warpspeed.com> >Subject: iraq wireless > > >WSJ excerpt: > > >`Wireless technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. >For example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can >adjust its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see >exactly where mortar shells have landed.' > > > >------ > >Iraq's Cellphone Battle Service Provider Iraqna Tries To Meet >Demand Despite Long Outages, Insurgent Use > >By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and SARMAD ALI > >BAGHDAD, Iraq -- A video sold in Baghdad market stalls these days >shows young insurgents firing a series of mortars and calling for >the American infidels to be expelled. To adjust their aim, the >militants rely on a gadget that owes its appearance in Iraq to the >2003 U.S. invasion -- the cellphone. > >Saddam Hussein outlawed cellphones, determined to maintain an iron >grip on his subjects. But as Iraq catches up with the world's >information revolution, cellphones have become as commonplace here >as they are almost everywhere else in the world. Now, they are >increasingly being used as battle tools -- to set off bombs from >afar, to target fire and to provide insurgents with instant >communications. > >Caught in the middle of the conflict raging between the insurgents >and U.S. and Iraqi forces is the company responsible for bringing >commercial mobile-phone service to Baghdad: Iraqna. With its catchy >yellow Q emblazoned on hundreds of Baghdad storefronts, Iraqna, a >unit of Egyptian communications conglomerate Orascom Telecom >Holding SAE was supposed to be the symbol of free enterprise in a >new Iraq. But the tribulations of Iraqna (pronounced ee-RAQ-na) >since its launch in late 2003 underscore the difficulty of doing >business in a nation at war, where the freedom of wireless >communication often hits head-on the needs of security. > >Almost half of Iraqna's 300 power generators -- a necessity in >Iraqi cities, because blackouts are still a daily occurrence -- >have been stolen. Three communication sites were destroyed by >bombs. Late last year, insurgents kidnapped two Iraqna engineers, >expatriates from Egypt, and accused them of collaborating with the >U.S. Then, Iraqi security services raided Iraqna headquarters and >briefly detained the company's head of security, accusing him of >colluding with the insurgents. > >"We're between the two fires, operating in the most dangerous spot >in the world," says Shamel Hanafi, Iraqna's chief commercial >officer, who was the company's first employee on the ground here >and now co-manages the network. He sits in the company's bunker- >like office, protected against suicide bombers by concrete blast >walls and dozens of Kalashnikov-toting gunmen employed by Iraqna. >Some insurgents had accused Iraqna of helping security forces spy >on their activities -- a charge Iraqna denies, saying it >deliberately opted not to install equipment in the communications >network that would have allowed it to track and store users' >movements. > >Despite pouring more than $180 million into Iraq, making it one of >the largest private foreign investors here, Iraqna has had trouble >assuring regular service in Baghdad. Late last year and throughout >the first half of 2005 its network was plagued by frequent outages >that sometimes lasted hours or days, causing widespread resentment. >"All the Iraqis know that this is the worst provider in the whole >world. You can't contact anyone at any time," grumbles Muthanna >Anis, a vendor of cellphone accessories. > >Bombarded with complaints, Iraqna officials have pointed their >fingers in one direction: the U.S. All along, U.S. forces here have >been using jamming devices to disrupt enemy communications during >security raids and to neutralize cellphones attached to bombs that >may be waiting along the road when a convoy passes. When called, >these phones work as detonators, making the bombs explode. > >In Baghdad, fear of cellphones is so widespread that U.S. and Iraqi >security guards routinely order civilians to remove the batteries >from their phones before approaching checkpoints. Wireless >technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. For >example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can adjust >its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see exactly >where mortar shells have landed. > >Iraqna has 1.1 million subscribers, up from 537,000 at the end of >2004 -- the increase came after the company expanded in Iraq's >southern region, said Jonas Lindblad, a Middle East senior analyst >for Pyramid Research, a communications consulting firm in >Cambridge, Mass. When service was first offered in Iraq after the >war, subscribers paid a one-time fee of $69 and calling cards were >sold in denominations of $20 or $30. Now, starting Iraqna service >costs $17.50, and calling cards are as cheap as $10. Rates vary >from six to 12 cents per minute. > >Cellphones, despite Iraqna's problems, still often provide more >reliable communications than the fixed-line phone network, which >was badly damaged in Baghdad by American bombing and subsequent >looting in 2003. Most Iraqi cellphone users have prepaid cards that >they can continually replenish. > >U.S. military officials acknowledge that occasional jamming occurs >but deny that they systematically disrupt Iraqi communications >networks. Iraqna officials disagree, alleging that American >interference reached such massive proportions in recent months that >it frequently knocked out their entire system. > >"We understand the circumstances here, and we can accept some >interference three or four hours a day -- but not around the clock, >24 hours," says Mr. Hanafi. "The customers don't understand. They >think it's our mistake. People come here and complain, saying we >stole their money, we're crooks." > >Most U.S. officials in Baghdad, and select Iraqis, rely on a >separate, restricted cellphone network managed by MCI Inc. that >uses the 914 area code of New York's Westchester County. Another >mobile-phone competitor, Atheer Telecom, a company part-owned by >Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, has been expanding into Baghdad in >recent months, poaching clients unhappy with Iraqna's performance. > >Iraq's cellular licenses, issued when the nation was governed by >the U.S. occupation authority in 2003, divided the country into >three monopoly areas, initially restricting Iraqna to Baghdad and >central Iraq, cellphone company Asiacell to the northern part, and >Atheer to southern regions. These limits were lifted last year, >allowing competition. The three licenses expire at the end of 2005; >authorities plan a conference in London starting today to discuss >possible renewal. > >Iraqna has repeatedly taken jamming complaints to the Iraqi >government's telecommunications ministry, urging it to intercede >with the U.S. military and to confirm for irate clients that such >interference does indeed go on. Nasi Abachi, the ministry's head of >frequency management, says he and his team have responded to >several Iraqna tip-offs in recent months. > >On at least one occasion, he says, the Iraqi investigators >discovered a "clone" broadcast tower operating in central Baghdad >that falsely identified itself as part of the Iraqna network. The >result of such "intelligent jamming" was that all the phones in the >area tried to abandon the real antenna and switch to the clone, >causing a network overload and a massive disruption of service. > >Investigators have no proof that U.S. forces operated the clone >antenna, but no one else in Iraq is believed to have the technical >capability to do so. "We have good reason to believe that what >Iraqna is saying is right," Mr. Abachi says. > >Despite the problems, Iraqna is pushing ahead to gain new business. >It is targeting Iraq's southern region because it's heavily >populated, with roughly nine million people, and has a more stable >security environment than Baghdad. Like the incumbents and several >potential newcomers, Iraqna plans to compete for the new Iraq >mobile licenses. > >Plus, Iraqna's increasingly public complaints seem to have had some >effect. While jamming still occurs, it has been causing "much less >impact on the network" in recent weeks, says Iraqna's Mr. Hanafi. > > > Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0

[IP] Iraq Wireless
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

1 0

[Operational] Internet Police
by Michael Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My question is what architectural recommendations will you make to your employer if/when the US Govt compels our employers to accept our role as the "front lines of this "cyberwar"? I figure once someone with a relevant degree of influence in the govts realizes that the "cyberwar" is between content/service controllers and eyeballs. With involuntary and voluntary botnets as the weapons of "the eyeballs", relying exclusively on a line of defense near to the content (services) leaves a great expanse of "battlefield". I would expect the content/service controllers to look for means to move the battleline as close to the eyeballs as possible (this community) So... if/when our employers are unable to resist the US Govt's demand that we "join in the national defense", wouldn't this community be the ones asked to guard the border? Assuming the govt won't send federal agents into each of our NOCs, won't our employers ask us "what can we do?" If inspecting and correlating every single packet/flow for attack signatures is not feasible (on scale), are there name/address registration/resolution measures that could effectively lock-down the edge? ...will we look toward China/Saudi Arabia/etc for lessons learned in there 'great firewalls' to develop a distributed version where central control pushes policy out to the edge (into the private networks that currently provide the dreaded "low barrier for entry")? Obviously the environment is created by layers 8/9, but I'm interested in the layer 1-7 solutions that the community would consider/recommend. -Michael ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[Operational] Internet Police
by Michael Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My question is what architectural recommendations will you make to your employer if/when the US Govt compels our employers to accept our role as the "front lines of this "cyberwar"? I figure once someone with a relevant degree of influence in the govts realizes that the "cyberwar" is between content/service controllers and eyeballs. With involuntary and voluntary botnets as the weapons of "the eyeballs", relying exclusively on a line of defense near to the content (services) leaves a great expanse of "battlefield". I would expect the content/service controllers to look for means to move the battleline as close to the eyeballs as possible (this community) So... if/when our employers are unable to resist the US Govt's demand that we "join in the national defense", wouldn't this community be the ones asked to guard the border? Assuming the govt won't send federal agents into each of our NOCs, won't our employers ask us "what can we do?" If inspecting and correlating every single packet/flow for attack signatures is not feasible (on scale), are there name/address registration/resolution measures that could effectively lock-down the edge? ...will we look toward China/Saudi Arabia/etc for lessons learned in there 'great firewalls' to develop a distributed version where central control pushes policy out to the edge (into the private networks that currently provide the dreaded "low barrier for entry")? Obviously the environment is created by layers 8/9, but I'm interested in the layer 1-7 solutions that the community would consider/recommend. -Michael ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

[zooko@zooko.com: Re: scalable flooding information distribution]
by Kragen Javier Sitaker 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I really should start setting reply-to. ----- Forwarded message from Zooko O'Whielacronx <zooko(a)zooko.com> -----

1 0

[Dewayne-Net] Iraq Wireless
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: This item comes from reader Mike Cheponis. DLH] >From: Mike Cheponis <mac(a)Wireless.Com> >Date: July 21, 2005 12:05:53 AM PDT >To: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne(a)warpspeed.com> >Subject: iraq wireless > > >WSJ excerpt: > > >`Wireless technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. >For example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can >adjust its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see >exactly where mortar shells have landed.' > > > >------ > >Iraq's Cellphone Battle Service Provider Iraqna Tries To Meet >Demand Despite Long Outages, Insurgent Use > >By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and SARMAD ALI > >BAGHDAD, Iraq -- A video sold in Baghdad market stalls these days >shows young insurgents firing a series of mortars and calling for >the American infidels to be expelled. To adjust their aim, the >militants rely on a gadget that owes its appearance in Iraq to the >2003 U.S. invasion -- the cellphone. > >Saddam Hussein outlawed cellphones, determined to maintain an iron >grip on his subjects. But as Iraq catches up with the world's >information revolution, cellphones have become as commonplace here >as they are almost everywhere else in the world. Now, they are >increasingly being used as battle tools -- to set off bombs from >afar, to target fire and to provide insurgents with instant >communications. > >Caught in the middle of the conflict raging between the insurgents >and U.S. and Iraqi forces is the company responsible for bringing >commercial mobile-phone service to Baghdad: Iraqna. With its catchy >yellow Q emblazoned on hundreds of Baghdad storefronts, Iraqna, a >unit of Egyptian communications conglomerate Orascom Telecom >Holding SAE was supposed to be the symbol of free enterprise in a >new Iraq. But the tribulations of Iraqna (pronounced ee-RAQ-na) >since its launch in late 2003 underscore the difficulty of doing >business in a nation at war, where the freedom of wireless >communication often hits head-on the needs of security. > >Almost half of Iraqna's 300 power generators -- a necessity in >Iraqi cities, because blackouts are still a daily occurrence -- >have been stolen. Three communication sites were destroyed by >bombs. Late last year, insurgents kidnapped two Iraqna engineers, >expatriates from Egypt, and accused them of collaborating with the >U.S. Then, Iraqi security services raided Iraqna headquarters and >briefly detained the company's head of security, accusing him of >colluding with the insurgents. > >"We're between the two fires, operating in the most dangerous spot >in the world," says Shamel Hanafi, Iraqna's chief commercial >officer, who was the company's first employee on the ground here >and now co-manages the network. He sits in the company's bunker- >like office, protected against suicide bombers by concrete blast >walls and dozens of Kalashnikov-toting gunmen employed by Iraqna. >Some insurgents had accused Iraqna of helping security forces spy >on their activities -- a charge Iraqna denies, saying it >deliberately opted not to install equipment in the communications >network that would have allowed it to track and store users' >movements. > >Despite pouring more than $180 million into Iraq, making it one of >the largest private foreign investors here, Iraqna has had trouble >assuring regular service in Baghdad. Late last year and throughout >the first half of 2005 its network was plagued by frequent outages >that sometimes lasted hours or days, causing widespread resentment. >"All the Iraqis know that this is the worst provider in the whole >world. You can't contact anyone at any time," grumbles Muthanna >Anis, a vendor of cellphone accessories. > >Bombarded with complaints, Iraqna officials have pointed their >fingers in one direction: the U.S. All along, U.S. forces here have >been using jamming devices to disrupt enemy communications during >security raids and to neutralize cellphones attached to bombs that >may be waiting along the road when a convoy passes. When called, >these phones work as detonators, making the bombs explode. > >In Baghdad, fear of cellphones is so widespread that U.S. and Iraqi >security guards routinely order civilians to remove the batteries >from their phones before approaching checkpoints. Wireless >technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. For >example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can adjust >its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see exactly >where mortar shells have landed. > >Iraqna has 1.1 million subscribers, up from 537,000 at the end of >2004 -- the increase came after the company expanded in Iraq's >southern region, said Jonas Lindblad, a Middle East senior analyst >for Pyramid Research, a communications consulting firm in >Cambridge, Mass. When service was first offered in Iraq after the >war, subscribers paid a one-time fee of $69 and calling cards were >sold in denominations of $20 or $30. Now, starting Iraqna service >costs $17.50, and calling cards are as cheap as $10. Rates vary >from six to 12 cents per minute. > >Cellphones, despite Iraqna's problems, still often provide more >reliable communications than the fixed-line phone network, which >was badly damaged in Baghdad by American bombing and subsequent >looting in 2003. Most Iraqi cellphone users have prepaid cards that >they can continually replenish. > >U.S. military officials acknowledge that occasional jamming occurs >but deny that they systematically disrupt Iraqi communications >networks. Iraqna officials disagree, alleging that American >interference reached such massive proportions in recent months that >it frequently knocked out their entire system. > >"We understand the circumstances here, and we can accept some >interference three or four hours a day -- but not around the clock, >24 hours," says Mr. Hanafi. "The customers don't understand. They >think it's our mistake. People come here and complain, saying we >stole their money, we're crooks." > >Most U.S. officials in Baghdad, and select Iraqis, rely on a >separate, restricted cellphone network managed by MCI Inc. that >uses the 914 area code of New York's Westchester County. Another >mobile-phone competitor, Atheer Telecom, a company part-owned by >Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, has been expanding into Baghdad in >recent months, poaching clients unhappy with Iraqna's performance. > >Iraq's cellular licenses, issued when the nation was governed by >the U.S. occupation authority in 2003, divided the country into >three monopoly areas, initially restricting Iraqna to Baghdad and >central Iraq, cellphone company Asiacell to the northern part, and >Atheer to southern regions. These limits were lifted last year, >allowing competition. The three licenses expire at the end of 2005; >authorities plan a conference in London starting today to discuss >possible renewal. > >Iraqna has repeatedly taken jamming complaints to the Iraqi >government's telecommunications ministry, urging it to intercede >with the U.S. military and to confirm for irate clients that such >interference does indeed go on. Nasi Abachi, the ministry's head of >frequency management, says he and his team have responded to >several Iraqna tip-offs in recent months. > >On at least one occasion, he says, the Iraqi investigators >discovered a "clone" broadcast tower operating in central Baghdad >that falsely identified itself as part of the Iraqna network. The >result of such "intelligent jamming" was that all the phones in the >area tried to abandon the real antenna and switch to the clone, >causing a network overload and a massive disruption of service. > >Investigators have no proof that U.S. forces operated the clone >antenna, but no one else in Iraq is believed to have the technical >capability to do so. "We have good reason to believe that what >Iraqna is saying is right," Mr. Abachi says. > >Despite the problems, Iraqna is pushing ahead to gain new business. >It is targeting Iraq's southern region because it's heavily >populated, with roughly nine million people, and has a more stable >security environment than Baghdad. Like the incumbents and several >potential newcomers, Iraqna plans to compete for the new Iraq >mobile licenses. > >Plus, Iraqna's increasingly public complaints seem to have had some >effect. While jamming still occurs, it has been causing "much less >impact on the network" in recent weeks, says Iraqna's Mr. Hanafi. > > > Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

1 0