July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [IP] Re: 2 on fingerprinting in Japan
by Gohsuke Takama 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

for IP, if you wish. as an advisory member of Privacy International, I'd like to inform here that Privacy International sent a letter below to Japan's Ministry of Justice which manages immigration process on Nov 19, regarding to recent start of fingerprint scanning and digitized facial picture taking at the immigration. 68 organizations from 30 countries endorsed this letter reflected the issue was containing much broader problems, not just for foreigners visiting or living in Japan. BTW if you compare the US-VISIT and the Japanese system, you would notice the similarity of both and would wonder who did system intergration. Gohsuke Takama ------------------------------------------------------- http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml? cmd[347]=x-347-558619 PI leads coalition of organisations against Japanese Government plans for fingerprinting at border 19/11/2007 Today, in a coalition with 18 Japanese rights groups, Privacy International delivered a letter to the Japanese Minister of Justice to protest against the implementation of a fingerprinting system and face-scanning system at its borders. All visitors and many foreign residents to Japan will be fingerprinted under this plan. Our letter to the Minister is endorsed by 68 organisations from 30 countries. In our letter, we show that there are numerous problems with the Government's plans. On top of infringing the rights to privacy of all visitors to Japan, the Japanese will run the risk of repeating the mistakes encountered by the U.S. Government in its border management systems that have lead to serious technology and management failures. We call on the Minister to reconsider their plans for treating business visitors and tourists as though they are terrorists. The letter is available in PDF at http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/borders/lettertojapan.pdf . A version of the letter is available below, though within footnote references. -------------- The Rt Honourable Kunio Hatoyama Minister of Justice 1-1-1 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo Nippon November 19, 2007 Dear Minister Hatoyama Regarding plans to fingerprint and face-scan all visitors to Japan We, the undersigned human rights and civil liberties groups from around the world are writing to you to express our grave concerns regarding the Ministry of Justice's imminent implementation of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. We believe that your plans to fingerprint and face-scan foreign- residents and visitors to Japan are a gross and disproportionate infringement upon civil liberties, copying the most ineffective, costly and risky practices on border management from around the world. We respectfully call on you to reconsider your plans to implement this system. We also call on you to explain to the world why potential visitors should travel to your country and face these inconveniences when you have done so little to explain the nature of this human processing. We believe it is likely that the implementation of this system will create a negative impact on your tourism industry and on the flow of foreign workers to Japan, thus hurting Japan's economy and in turn giving rise to possible claims of Japanese isolationism. Background According to your plans for Immigration Control: "In order to detect and oust, at the border, terrorists or foreign nationals who have been deported from Japan or committed crimes, one effective method is to further enhance measures against forged and falsified documents and to utilize biometrics in immigration examinations. In order to take facial portraits and fingerprint data during landing examinations of foreign nationals under the b Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorismb (as adopted at the Headquarters for Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime and Other Relative Issues and International Terrorism on December 10, 2004), necessary preparations will be made by putting in order points for us to keep in mind, observing relevant measures taken by foreign countries and developing relevant law." It has come to our attention that you plan to implement this system within a matter of weeks that you will face-scan and fingerprint all visitors to Japan and retain this information for an extended period of time (some reports claim that you intend to do so for up to 80 years), and combine this data with other sources of personal information. Infringing upon the Right to Privacy Your plans are in breach of individuals' human rights, and in particular, their right to privacy. The right to privacy is recognized specifically by numerous international human rights treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to privacy under Article 12. Similar language is adopted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under Article 17, the United Nations (UN) Convention on Migrant Workers in Article 14, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child under Article 16. We note that the Japanese Supreme Court has recognized the right to privacy under Article 13 of the Japanese Constitution. Your system proposes to indiscriminately collect sensitive personal information from all foreign travellers. This mass project for the processing of human beings is tantamount to treating all visitors to your country as though they were criminals. We are surprised by the lack of information regarding proposed safeguards and appeal methods. Instead we hear rhetoric about the importance of combating terrorism and threats to force the return of anyone who fails to comply with this new requirement. This is particularly worrisome because Japan's privacy laws are regarded as weak by international standards. We note that Japan has to some extent applied international standards such as the OECD's Privacy Guidelines into two recent privacy laws. The law that covers commercial entities partially follows international standards, yet the law that applies to the use and sharing of data held by government agencies is very weak. This decreases our confidence that your government has the necessary accountability structures to collect such vast amounts of personal information. The protection of human rights is at its weakest when individuals are waiting for entry at the border of a foreign country. Traditionally, governments afforded respect to visitors from other nations on the basis of reciprocity: if you treat one nation's citizens with respect that nation's government will treat yours similarly. Japan is showing a remarkable level of disrespect to the dignity of tourists and foreign business travellers by collecting detailed information on them, in an indiscriminate manner as a condition of entry, with no promise of safeguards, or any means of appeal. We also note that the Japanese Government previously criticised systems such as the one you are about to implement. In 2002 at a meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organisation the Japanese delegation stated that "the Japanese people are saddened by the approach of the United States", and the delegation could not understand "why the United States can not longer trust Japanese citizens" and that the unilateral use of biometrics will have a negative impact on the 17 million Japanese that visit the U.S. every year. We are surprised by this turn of events and opinion. A Complex and Risky System The collection of all this personal information and its centralisation into databases will create privacy risks, and will also lead to likely security risks. We believe that Japan is making a grave mistake by following the path forged by the United States of America with its US-VISIT programme. Until the implementation of your system, the U.S. was alone in the world in fingerprinting and face-scanning all visitors and retaining this information for vast periods of time. Years into their programme it is clear that the U.S. should serve as a cautionary tale rather than as an example of best practice. The US-VISIT system was approved in a similar manner to the Japanese system. That is, it was approved through a highly political environment with little public debate or policy deliberation. In the U.S., the government relied on its rhetoric about fighting terrorism and crime rather than careful policy development and deployment. Now, years later, the US-VISIT system is finally receiving some of its much needed oversight, and the reality of advanced border systems is becoming clear. According to U.S. Government reports, we now know that: b after spending $1.3 billion over 4 years, only half the U.S. system has been delivered. b expenditures continue on projects that "are not well- defined, planned, or justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks", lacking "a sufficient basis for effective program oversight and accountability". b the U.S. government has "continued to invest in US-VISIT without a clearly defined operational context that includes explicit relationships with related border security and immigration enforcement initiatives". b "management controls to identify and evaluate computer and operational problems were insufficient and inconsistently administered" and thus "continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties" as it continues to "fall short of expectations". b "lacking acquisition and financial management controls", and project managers have failed to "economically justify its investment in US-VISIT increments or assess their operational impacts", "had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope of the evaluations performed were too limited." b "contracts have not been effectively managed and overseen". b and finally, security "weaknesses collectively increase the risk that unauthorized individuals could read, copy, delete, add, and modify sensitive information, including personally identifiable information, and disrupt the operations of the US-VISIT program." According to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee, Senator Joseph Lieberman, the U.S. government "is spending $1.7 billion of taxpayer money on a program to detect potential terrorists crossing our borders yet it isn't taking the most basic precautions to keep them from hacking into and changing or deleting sensitive information." It is therefore of little surprise that the U.S. border systems occasionally fail. On a number of occasions the U.S. border systems have broken down resulting in thousands of people being forced to wait until the system problems could be resolved. For instance, in August 2007, 20,000 travellers were left stranded at Los Angeles airport, with visitors spending the night on the airport floors and planes prevented from even coming into the gates for passengers (both citizens and visitors) to de-plane because the airport was overwhelmed. More stories are emerging from around the world where weak security protocols have made personal information held on visa databases widely available to the public and potential identity thieves, and where fingerprint mismatches have lead to gross injustices. Without competent planning and care, visitors to Japan have no reason to be confident that the personal information that they are forced to disclose will be adequately protected by your system. Towards Effective Border Management? Japan should be careful not to follow the U.S. lead. Recent surveys have shown that the U.S. is now rated as the worst place to visit because of its immigration and entry procedures, followed by the Middle East. There are better ways of greeting visitors to your country than treating tourists and business travelers as though they were terrorists. There are privacy-friendly ways of identifying criminals at borders without invading the privacy of all visitors and making them vulnerable to identity theft through the leakage of data from your systems. For instance, border officials could verify passports against the INTERPOL list of lost and stolen passports from around the world. Remarkably so few countries actually do this. It would be a far more effective and proportionate solution. Even this step must be made with great care as errors are still likely which will inhibit the flow of travellers. As an example, in a test of 1.9 million passport records collected over 16 days by U.S. border officials, 273 documents were identified as stolen documents. Eventually however, 219 cases were cleared and 64 remained unresolved. As with any watchlist program, clear oversight and accountability structures must be established to allow for the necessary appeals against erroneous data. We have already seen numerous problems with the U.S. watchlists wrongly flagging innocent individuals as terrorists, growing out of control with serious integrity problems. We expect that any system your government implements will likely give rise to similar problems. In our experiences, technological systems fail most when they do not receive adequate policy deliberation. We also believe that immigration policy is a complex domain that rarely attracts the necessary attention and deliberative care that it deserves. Your plans to fingerprint and face-scan every visitor to your country appears to exemplify this risk. It is unfortunate that we could not offer our views earlier but your consultation was only conducted in the Japanese language. Your plans will damage Japan's standing in the world, making a wonderful and beautiful country less inviting to tourists, and will unnecessarily hurt Japan's role as a global economic leader. If serious changes to your plans are not made, we worry that individuals who are concerned about the privacy and security of their personal information will avoid travel to Japan. Please reconsider your plans. Also, please note, that if you move down this path, other governments may well follow and will start fingerprinting your own citizens on the grounds that you do it to theirs. These systems will likely be as complex, risky and insecure as yours. This is not the type of world that you, your citizens or we would like to live in. Yours sincerely, c Privacy International c Action on Rights for Children (UK) APC Africa Women (Africa) APC.au (Australia) ArabDev (Egypt) Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (Japan) Association For Progressive Communications (International) Associazione per la Liberta` nella Comunicazione Elettronica Interattiva (Italy) ATTAC Japan (Japan) Australian Privacy Foundation (Australia) AZUR Developpement (Congo) Big Brother Awards (France) Bluelink (Bulgaria) British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (Canada) BytesForAll.org (South Asia) Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (Canada) Colnodo (Colombia) Community Education Computer Society (South Africa) Digital Rights (Denmark) Digital Rights Ireland Electronic Frontier Finland (Finland) Electronic Frontier Foundation (US) Electronic Privacy Information Center (US) European Digital Rights (EU) Fantsuam Foundation (Nigeria) Focus on the Global South (Asia) Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) Foundation For Media Alternatives (Philippines) GreenNet (UK) Greenspider (Hungary) Index on Censorship (International) International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (International) International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (Japan) International Solidarity Action of the Have-Nots (Japan) IRIS - Imaginons un reB4seau Internet solidaire (France) Iuridicum Remedium (Czech Republic) Japan Computer Access for Empowerment (Japan) Japan Lawyers Network for Refugees (Japan) JCA-NET(Japan) Jinbonet (South Korea) Joint Labor Union of Christian Offices and Businesses (Japan) Laneta (Mexico) Network Against JUKINET(Japan) Networkers against Surveillance Task-force (Japan) Netzwerk Neue Medien (Germany) No2ID (UK) NODO Tau (Argentina) OneWorld Platform South West Europe (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Open Rights Group (UK) Peace Boat (Japan) Peace Not War Japan (Japan) People's Coalition against Wiretapping Law and Organized Crime Law (Japan) People's Plan Study Group(PPSG) (Japan) PINCH! Against War and Surveillance (Japan) Privacy Journal (US) RITS - Information Network for the Third Sector (Brazil) San'ya Welfare Center for Day-Laborers' Association (Japan) Sex Worker and Sexual Health (Japan) Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (Japan) Statewatch (UK) StrawberryNet (Romania) Swiss Association to Defend Fundamental Rights (Switzerland) Swiss Internet User Group (Switzerland) Ungana Afrika (Africa) VOICE (Bangladesh) Wamani (Argentina) WiLAC (Uruguay) WomensNet (South Africa) At 8:28 PM -0500 11.22.07: >Begin forwarded message: > >From: Joichi Ito <jito(a)neoteny.com> >Date: November 22, 2007 4:26:14 PM EST >To: dave(a)farber.net >Cc: ip(a)v2.listbox.com >Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan > >The US requires fingerprints for many kinds of visas including some >benefits for permanent residents. Also, I think they require a >photograph showing your earlobe as another biometric. It's on your >card. It is slightly different from requiring a finger print every >time you enter the country, but it's not really true that >"fingerprinting requirements don't apply to permanent residents." > >See: >http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543… > >Also, as far as I know, the Japanese are not fingerprinting transit >passengers. My understanding is that even if you are just connecting >via a US city, you still have to fill out the forms and get scanning. > >Basically I think that expecting us to go through US fingerprinting >to visit the US, then deciding not to go to Japan because of >fingerprinting is slightly hypocritical unless you have been vocally >opposed to the fingerprinting in the US. > >Anyway, maybe this is a good opportunity for American who travel to >Japan to take a good look at what the US does to its visitors and be >reflective. I think a lot of Japanese government behavior just >tracks what the US does and often is "encouraged" by the US. See >crypto exports, the new Japanese corporate law or "JSOX" and >copyright terms for other examples. > >- Joi > >From: "Brock N. Meeks" <bmeeks(a)cox.net> >Date: November 22, 2007 7:28:47 PM EST >To: <dave(a)farber.net> >Subject: Re: [IP] Re: fingerprinting in Japan > >Yep, it's a heinous U.S. policy as well; does that make it OK for >others to >emulate? > >But hey, I'd advocate the same thing: stay home; don't come to the >U.S. > >------------------------------------------- >Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now >RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ >Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] fingerprinting in Japan letter from Privacy Internationa
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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The use of malicious botnets to disrupt The Onion Router
by Ron Wireman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

It seems to me that we owe a lot the roughly 1,500 people who donate their bandwidth to our project at any one time. They give us a tremendous gift that allows us to participate in unpopular or even dangerous political speech and debate, to by-pass inappropriately restrictive filters, and to limit the amount of information about ourselves that we reveal to the organizations who run the Internet sites we access. I don't wish to divulge some of the ways in which I've used tor to protect myself, but I'm sure all of you reading this list can think of many examples where it has assisted you in your own life and most of you use it on a frequent basis. All of this comes at the cost of time and money from many volunteers who receive no benefit whatsoever from relaying your traffic for you. It seems to me, however, that even this gracious act of charity may be no match for the types of attacks we may be faced with as we become more popular and, as a result, more of a target. The number of users running tor nodes pales in comparison to the number of computers that may be in any one of the many individual botnets, which are groups of hijacked computers controlled in unison by a single entity. The largest of these botnets ever discovered had over 1,000 times the number of nodes that tor does. What happens when one of these botnets are commanded to join tor all at once and begin harvesting private data that people naively did not encrypt or, worse, replacing all pictures requested with goatse.jpg? These and other malicious acts could easily take place, perhaps even perpetrated by a malevolent government entity, and would cause significant disruption to our router. We must take expedient measures to prevent this type of attack, because as of now, tor is quite vulnerable, perhaps even critically so. The group of computers that make up the official Network Time Protocol pool, a network that is used to provide extremely accurate time synchronization for millions of computers around the world, has a manually administrated list. Since it has about as many nodes on it as tor has, it suggests that maintaining such a list would not be difficult. It seems to me that this would be an excellent way to prevent a node flood attack. Without it, tor will be rot. Awaiting your comments anxiously, Ron Wireman ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Bit of justice, all charges dropped against Tor-operator
by M 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi all! As I informed this maillist my companys servers (including finnish tor-exit-node) were taken by the finnisih police circa january 2008. They were very rude and called me a pedophile etc. Really nice to know that police is your friend :P... Few days ago I got a letter from the department of justice, they are not going to press any charges 'cause they finally realised that my server was just relaying traffic and that is not a crime. I've been waiting that letter for many months and I'm really glad they finally made a wise decision. Now I'm going to consult my lawyer and possibly going to demand compensation for my losses. I had to buy new servers, restore everything from backups, help the "Central Crime Police" (KRP) because I was'nt using Windows but Debian GNU/Linux and full encryption (aes-cbc-essiv:sha256). Also all the sites, domains and email-services I hosted were down about 48 hours and customers do not like that. Wish me luck =) M ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Kaspersky wants to make Tor illegal and supports a globalized policed internet.
by Jacob Todd 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sun, Oct 18, 2009 at 04:38:57AM -0700, Kyle Williams wrote: > I just read two articles that moved me to bring this to the attention > of others. Kaspersky Labs thinks anonymity is the problem with the > Internet. > > http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/16/kaspersky_rebukes_net_anonymity/ > " > In Kaspersky's world, services such asB PsiphonB andB The Onion Router > (Tor)B - which are legitimately used by Chinese dissidents and Google > users alike to shield personally identifiable information - would no > longer be legal. Or at least they'd have to be redesigned from the > ground up to give police the ability to surveil them. That's not the > kind of world many law-abiding citizens would feel comfortable > inhabiting. > " > > He's talking about supporting a police state, where the "law" can > watch everything you do. > > http://www.zdnetasia.com/insight/security/0,39044829,62058697,00.htm > " > [Q:] Are you saying that people often don't understand the > complexities of the work security researchers are involved in? > Consumers, businesses and even governments? > [A:] Governments do understand because they are more and more in touch > with these problems. Enterprises, big enterprises, some of them have > dedicated teams of security experts and they really understand what's > going on. Consumers generally have no clue, but they don't need to > understand. > " > > The only thing that works better than his A/V software is a well > informed and educated user. > My mom didn't know shit about what to do and not to do on the Internet > and downloaded everything that was free, and that's why I would have > to "fix" his computer every few months even though she uses AVG and > SpyBot. Finally I sat her down, explained to her why this was > happening, and told her not to do that anymore if she wanted her > computer to work right. She listened, and hasn't had any serious > problems for a few years now. > > From the same article... > " > [Q:] If you had the power to change up to three things in the world > today that are related to IT security, what would they be? > [A:] Internet design--that's enough. > > [Q:] That's it? What's wrong with the design of the Internet? > [A:] There's anonymity. Everyone should and must have an > identification, or Internet passport. The Internet was designed not > for public use, but for American scientists and the U.S. military. > That was just a limited group of people--hundreds, or maybe thousands. > Then it was introduced to the public and it was wrongb&to introduce it > in the same way. > I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing > regulation--Internet passports, Internet police and international > agreement--about following Internet standards. And if some countries > don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut > them off. > " > > This is scary talk from a man who owns the largest anti-virus company > in the eastern hemisphere. Read these articles, and you'll see this > guy talks about a global "Internet police" or "Internet Interpol". > That's serious globalization talk from someone who millions trust to > protect their computers. All they need to do is label some code as > malicious, and it'll be removed from your PC after the next A/V > update....even if you use it to regain lost civil liberties. How long > until Kaspersky labels Tor a trojan or virus? If that happens, then > what? > > People who seek to control society fear society having anonymity, for > it's with anonymity that society can stand up against corruption of > the state when it occurs. The latest Iran election and the actions > that followed are a great example of this, and it's was technology > such as Tor that helped them get the truth out about what was being > done. When was the last time a trojan horse or virus helped a country > regain liberty or help bypass censorship? To treat Tor as such > malware is down right insulting to people's rights everywhere. > > Normally I would never think about the following, but as a developer, > I'm weighing the idea of detecting, disabling, and/or deleting > Kaspersky before installing any of the projects I work on. Such > action should be brought to the users attention, and the action to do > something about it should be evoked by the user. However, if > Kaspersky does go too far and labels Tor as malware, you can be damn > sure JanusVM, *maybe* Tor VM, and Chromium Browser VM will take > automated action to prevent itself from being attacked by Kaspersky > products, and will do so in a very harsh way. > > Something worth noting, today's A/V solutions do not scan inside > virtual machines and would not be able to detect Tor easily. Use > encryption with the VM and it'll be impossible for any A/V product to > scan the data inside. If you use an external anonymity device like > januspa or a linux router + Tor, then you would not feel the affects > of bad A/V software against your anonymity. > > Personally, I will be encouraging everyone I know to stay as far away > from this company and their products simply out of principle at this > point. I had no problem with Kaspersky until I read this. If > Kaspersky is going to treat non malicious software as malware, then we > might as well treat their software with the same regard. > > Spread the word, Kaspersky Labs is not a friend of Tor. > > Best regards, > Kyle > > "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do > nothing." - Edmund Burke > *********************************************************************** > To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majordomo(a)torproject.org with > unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/ Thanks for the link. While I don't see this as a threat in the US, some East Asian countires wouldn't surprise me if they did similar to this. -- Jake Todd // If it isn't broke, tweak it! ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[drone-list] intro, and some thoughts
by Cleve Higgins 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Heyo all, I have been reading a lot about the role of drone technology in military, surveillance, and law enforcement, and the thinking about the ways in which it is part of a larger blurring of these domains (especially in the US). I'm based in Montreal, a city in the business of aeronautics, and also computer simulation, and drones have become an important aspect of both of these industries in recent years. My research has focused on these local connections, especially when they're related to the universities. Finally, I'm intrigued by use of drones by social movements for counter-surveillance purposes (such as the occucopter), as well as emerging examples of hacking drone communications and control systems. I'm glad to hear that people other than security and military agencies have been finding positive uses for drones (such as the humanitarian uses that have been mentioned already). Though I have skeptical thoughts on increasing media attention on this side of the drone story. Does it risk having the role (intentional or not) of glossing over or mitigating the rapidly emerging new forms of war\repression being carried out by the US government? And specifically the brutal effects this is having in northern Pakistan? This is not to say that these problems are being completely ignored - the critical stories are being written, and that is good. Though I also suspect that an effect of the surge of these critical stories is that the US government is trying to come up with ways to defend and legitimize their actions, and one way to do that could be to emphasize (and even support) the "dual-use" aspects of drone technology. I see this in the context of the myth of inevitable, unilinear technological (and social) progress, and how it downplays the important role that military funding and direction has in technological developments in countries such as the US. Many technologies exist in the form they do because of their military applications. If not for this military support, it is very possible that the technologies would not exist at all, or at least not in the form that they do. Innumerable social choices are made that shape our world, including our technology, and it is always possible that different choices could have been made (about how much of our collective social effort we put into military and security areas, for example). An important aspect of this perspective is that technologies are very connected to the social relations and values of the contexts in which they emerge. I think the development of ARPANET by the US military as a means of better surviving nuclear attack is an example of this, but that's a whole other discussion. I haven't thought much yet about the context for the emergence of drones, and I don't want this email to get much longer than it already is by attempting to do so now, but for starters think it would be related to the "war on terror", asymmetrical warfare, and the contradictions of the (declining) US empire as the only military superpower (attempting military solutions to "policing" problems). I look forward to hearing anyone's thoughts on these topics. Thanks for creating this list! Sorry if this first email is somewhat long and tangential. Mostly I plan on using this list to share articles as I find them, with brief thoughts sometimes. More in-depth or contentious discussion is sometimes good though. adelante, Cleve _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] Your people are growing increasingly worried about a
by Brad Templeton 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

'police state.' For such an educated audience, >Subj: Your people are growing increasingly worried about a 'police >state.' >For such an educated audience, they seem to lack any sense of >proportion, a sense of history or an > awareness of human nature. > Indeed, as you cite, there are many police states and history is littered with ones that have risen and fallen as well. Each time a police state rose, there were those who cried that a police state was coming and were called paranoid. There were those who actively assisted the police state in coming, seeking the security it promised. There were those who assisted the police state in coming, not wanting one, but feeling those who called out the warnings were paranoid. There were those who said and did nothing. Free states are the abberation in the history of mankind. Police states (for the level of technology of the day) the norm. So perhaps when Mr. Ashcroft erodes civil rights, you can make a valid claim that it introduces only a very slight risk of a police state, or is only the start of a trend. How much risk is enough? If events only presented a 1% chance of taking the path to a police state, would you want to tolerate it? Would you find it acceptable to teeter on the edge of a police state, because you were still on the free side of the line? Often, in the defence of free speech, we find ourselves defending people expressing ideas we loathe. Nazis, pedophiles and other scum. We do it not because we welcome a world full of their messages, but because we know that if the Holocaust deniers can publish, we are _really, really_ sure that we can publish. It's not paranoia. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[IP] Your people are growing increasingly worried about a 'police
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

state.' For such an educated audience, X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.618) Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net Begin forwarded message:

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New Technique Could Trace Documents By Printer
by brian-slashdotnews＠hyperreal.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/10/14/1742224 Posted by: timothy, on 2004-10-14 18:28:00 from the better-than-a-notch-in-the-e dept. An anonymous reader submits "From [1]this article at Purdue News, 'Researchers at Purdue University have developed a method that will enable authorities to trace documents to specific printers, a technique law-enforcement agencies could use to investigate counterfeiting, forgeries and homeland security matters.' The neat thing is that they are exploiting the characteristics of the print process itself to identify the printer." One of the folks e-mailed me to say that [2]the HP LaserJet 9000dn was one of the big ones tested with. IFRAME: [3]pos6 References 1. http://news.uns.purdue.edu/UNS/html4ever/2004/041011.Delp.forensics.html 2. http://productguide.itmanagersjournal.com/page.pl?tid=10541 3. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=2936&alloc_id=10685&site_id=1&request_id=2825914 ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: [declan@well.com: [Politech] E.U. Parliament votes to force "data
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

retention" on telecom, Net firms [priv]] User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i Reply-To: or-talk(a)freehaven.net On Thu, Dec 15, 2005 at 01:20:19AM -0500, Jeffrey F. Bloss wrote: > On Wednesday 14 December 2005 08:00 pm, nile wrote: > > Correct me if I'm mistaken, but I believe the laws do not require > > holding onto the content of the call/data, just the routing information > > or phone numbers. If so, it's interesting to note that that's exactly > > what Tor is for - defeating _traffic_ analysis. > > It seems to me that traffic analysis is the one major thing Tor is susceptible > to. Being a real time, the Tor network can be compromised by someone who has > the ability to colate ingress and egress traffic, and this legislation gives > the "EU" the ability to sit back and examine an entire regional network at > its leisure. [snip] > Prior to this "broad" loggin being in place it would have been necessary for > Johnny Law to have some prior knowledge. They'd have to suspect Joe, and then > invest the time and resources in logging both Joe and the blog site. Now, > they can simply sift through the already collected data looking for people > who use Tor connections at the same time the blog is accessed. Alas, I think Jeffrey has it right. Tor aims to provide protection in a scenario where the adversary cannot observe the whole network (or a substantial piece of it). The EU data retention directives directly threaten the security that the current Tor design can provide. There are some anonymity designs that aim to provide protection against this strong level of adversary -- see e.g. http://mixminion.net/ -- but they carry unacceptably high latency for Tor-style connections. As I understand it we're still a ways off from understanding exactly what laws will be passed in each country, and only a while after that will we start to understand what each law will mean. It may turn out to be impractical (or illegal) to put out a blanket query to every ISP in Europe saying "please tell me all users who connected to any of the following 1000 IP addresses in this 10 second period". But even so, once we have a sense of what sorts of attacks are likely, we can also start looking at some specialized padding techniques for Tor users to blend together better without paying too high a price in overhead. The goal is not to beat arbitrary statistical attacks, but to increase false positives (and maybe false negatives) with respect to specific attacks. We may also be able to take advantage of the fact that these adversaries are only partial attackers: even in the best attacks they can only observe perhaps half the network. We may be able to arrange things to increase the doubt in their findings -- though as Jeffrey points out, a patient attacker will use statistics to become increasingly convinced that he has found his target. It really is a shame that Europe has chosen to cripple the security of its citizens and companies in this way. The bad people will continue to break laws and not get caught by this (breaking into computers around the world and using them as stepping stones, using open wireless networks, using botnets, you name it), and honest people and organizations in Europe will always be wondering who has broken into their ISP and grabbed their traffic data -- for espionage, for advertising purposes, for stalking, for who knows. This is reminiscent of the U.S.'s earlier crypto export fiasco, when they chose to undermine their position as the world leader in cryptography, as well as ensure that the good guys were vulnerable while the bad guys were safe. I wonder how this one will turn out. --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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