July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [cryptography] ICIJ's project - comment on cryptography & tools
by ianG 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 7/04/13 09:38 AM, Nico Williams wrote: > On Sat, Apr 6, 2013 at 6:34 AM, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> wrote: >>> We hope the NSA types haven't forgotten that good guys >>> need crypto, whether LEA like it or not. >> >> I personally believe that the NSA's policy that the good guys don't need >> good crypto is the underlying root to the problem. A goodly portion if not >> all. >> >> Internally to the NSA this is known as 'the equity issue' or so I've heard. > > Well, it's like a pendulum. As China and others make use of "cyber" > warfare to fight wars by proxy the comsec folks will regain the upper > hand at NSA. Or so we should hope. We can be secure in our comms and > have a hard time eavesdropping on anyone or we can be insecure in our > comms and have a hard time eavesdropping on anyone other than our own. > It's pretty obvious, no? we need strong civilian crypto. Yes, now. I suspect going back say 20 years, pre-net, it wasn't so obvious, because the dependency on open nets just didn't exist. See comment below about AT&T & IBM. In those days, networking was telco business, a mentality which just happened to align nicely with control mentalities, which suited both swings of the pendulum. > On the flip side, no amount of crypto can get one past certain > fundamental issues in security. How do you know your peer is who you > think it is? Crypto can't truly answer that, much less the question > of whether they are doing as you wish. Right -- but it can answer the question to a sufficient degree given an absence of interference in what is the right answer. I posit. C.f, Skype. >> In economic terms, the NSA imposes a sort of tobin tax on crypto which >> results in a stupidity drag on all security, thus making it easier for all >> to avoid doing good work. >> >> Otherwise, I can't answer the question -- why as a society are we so good at >> internets, databases, apps, social networks, distribution of institutions, >> algorithms, all the good CS stuff, but we can't get our collective security >> act together? > > Oh, well, we don't need to resort to conspiracy theories to answer > _that_. Delicious Irony! Clearly my opinion is rather fruitloopy, but this 'conspiracy theory' is enacted in law -- crypto is officially a munition. It's the job description of the agency of topic, which probably employs more computing security people than any other place. It's not as if Louis Freeh went to congress in the 1990s and said "Senators, I wish to engage you in a conspiracy!" although we might grant the DEA would wish it so. What is perhaps controversial and maybe ridiculous is me saying that it worked. The NSA succeeded in created a drag on internet security sufficient to explain the general failure -- the house of cards, as you put it. OTOH, if they hadn't achieved that drag, was taxpayers' money really being used wisely? What are all these security people doing, then? Another irony -- the trend for budget is firmly down; maybe now's the time to reveal how they successfully they spent your money... > We've built a house of cards, not so much on the Internet as > on the web (but not only!). Web application security is complete > mess. And anyways, we build on foundations, but the foundations > (operating systems) we built on are now enormous and therefore full of > vulnerabilities. We're human -fallible-, and our systems reflect this > -our failures-. Yeah, this is the popular explanation -- we're not good enough. Let me pose another thought question. Most of the long termers here understand how Skype, SSH and now Bitcoin were constructed. Peter adds iMessage to the list of successful crypto systems. Many of us here could make a fair stab at duplicating that in another product. I'd personally have confidence in that statement -- given the budget I'd reckon Steve, Jon, Peter, James, and a dozen other frequent posters could do that job well, or a similar one. I therefore suggest the popular explanation doesn't really pass muster. I say we really are good enough. Why did they succeed, as an exception, but we did not, as the general rule? The strange names and origins are a possible clue. I suggest the same reason that a couple of bored scientists succeeded in creating a games platform that was then turned into a document preparation platform that then became a standard OS teaching tool and eventually by many steps is now in the hands of most of the planet: they did it without interference. iang PS: ok, that last comment about Unix requires some mental juggery. The bored scientists did something that they were banned from doing. At the time, AT&T was party to a cartel agreement with IBM that reserved computing to IBM and networking to AT&T. How quaint! This had perverse effect of turning Ritchie & Kerninghams' toy into a skunk works project, in effect allowing everyone to politely ignore it. Unix survived and grew within Bell Labs because AT&T could not commercialise it, and therefore the project was purely an academic exercise. Hence, the corporate interference was untypically low to non-existent. Hence, it grew in Universities only. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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A National I.D. Card? Yes; Run By Larry Ellison? No
by Jack Dean 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.techcentralstation.com/NewsDesk.asp?FormMode=MainTerminalArticle… Thursday, October 25, 2001 A National I.D. Card? Yes; Run By Larry Ellison? No By: James K. Glassman, Host, Tech Central Station Would you trust this man with a National I.D. System? When I first heard that Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle Corp., had proposed a national I.D. card to help fight terrorism, I thought it was a joke. Not the I.D. card idea. But that Ellison was proposing it. [...] Dershowitz contends that the cards might actually increase freedoms. "Four Arab-looking guys reading the Koran are much less suspicious if they have the cards and can just slash them through card readers," he said. It is the lack of an I.D. card, however, that makes the United States almost unique among nations. "You do have a right to be left alone in the most literal sense," says Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties Union. "If you have an I.D. card," says former Rep. Tom Campbell (R-Calif.), now a law professor at Stanford, "it is solely for the purpose of allowing the government to compel you to produce it. This would essentially give the government the power to demand that we show our papers. It is a very dangerous thing." Dangerous? Yes, there are dangers to a mandatory national I.D. card, but there may be greater dangers without one. The fact is, to live in a society as vulnerable as ours, we may have to give up something - but I disagree that what's lost is freedom. Instead, it's privacy, and maybe not even that. In an interview with SiliconValley.com, Ellison expressed this reality in his typical over-the-top fashion, showing once again why he is the wrong guy to be making the pitch. "This privacy you're concerned about is largely an illusion. All you have to give up is your illusions, not your privacy." The truth is that an I.D. card may force you to give up some of your privacy - though probably no more than driver's licenses, Social Security cards, credit cards and even electronic toll-readers like EasyPass force you to give up now. But even if privacy is lost, the question is whether such an exchange is worth the benefits? More and more, I believe that it is. ### ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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FC: James Glassman wants national IDs: "We have to give up" privacy
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[You can see James Glassman's bio here: http://www.techcentralstation.com/Bios.asp?FormMode=Bio&ID=6 His column is not merely poorly-reasoned, but poorly researched as well: He makes some factual errors, such as saying the lack of a national ID card makes the U.S. "almost unique." Try Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Sweden, Mexico, and so on. --Declan] ***********

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Why Political Liberty Depends on Software Freedom More Than Ever / was Some Clarifications regarding Egypt
by Marc Manthey 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Am 20.02.2011 um 00:31 schrieb David Barrett: > > > I think the Freedom Box should take a similar approach. It should > arrive pre-configured with the wifi network name and network printed > on > a (removable) sticker on the side. The first browser to connect to it > should get a happy webpage explaining how it works and ask the fewest > possible configuration steps. In fact, maybe the first time any new > MAC > address connects to it, show a nice welcome page. Yes i think the technologie is developed allready, imagine " zeroconf" for the hassle free configuration and publishing of services http://www.dns-sd.org/ and http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/uia/ All things just need to put together like eben said. :) or a commercial solution AllJoynb" is a peer-to-peer technology that enables ad hoc, proximity- based, device-to-device communication without the use of an intermediary server. https://www.alljoyn.org/ greetings Marc > > Then have a big "reset" button on the side that wipes the brick and > restores it to factory settings. The wipe should be so thorough as to > make it literally impossible to know if anybody has ever used it. > This > is good for security, as well as for just fixing it when something > goes > wrong. > > -david > > On 02/19/2011 03:18 PM, Mats Henricson wrote: >> Well, a lot of people are willing to take a hit when it comes to >> ease of use >> to get more privacy. We're even willing to pay for one of these >> plugs. >> >> Mats >> >> On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 11:12 PM, Chris Palmer >> <chris(a)noncombatant.org >> <mailto:chris@noncombatant.org>> wrote: >> >> Eugen Leitl writes: >> >>> Tor, Tahoe-LAFS, i2p, tinc, some kind of opportunistic >>> encryption are obvious candidates, but what else? >> >> The purpose of Freedom Box is to compete with cloud services, >> which are >> notable for their ease of use. That is much less true of these >> technologies. >> I don't see how Freedom Box can succeed without taking the >> usability >> problem >> head-on. >> >> >> -- >> http://noncombatant.org/ >> >> "These days, though, you have to be pretty technical before you >> can even >> aspire to crudeness." --- William Gibson >> >> _______________________________________________ >> p2p-hackers mailing list >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com <mailto:p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com> >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> p2p-hackers mailing list >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers -- Les enfants teribbles - research / deployment Marc Manthey- Vogelsangerstrasse 97 50823 KC6ln - Germany Tel.:0049-221-29891489 Mobil:0049-1577-3329231 blog: http://let.de project : http://opencu.org twitter: http://twitter.com/macbroadcast/ facebook : http://opencu.tk Opinions expressed may not even be mine by the time you read them, and certainly don't reflect those of any other entity (legal or otherwise). _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Why Political Liberty Depends on Software Freedom More Than Ever / was Some Clarifications regarding Egypt
by Marc Manthey 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Am 20.02.2011 um 00:31 schrieb David Barrett: > > > I think the Freedom Box should take a similar approach. It should > arrive pre-configured with the wifi network name and network printed > on > a (removable) sticker on the side. The first browser to connect to it > should get a happy webpage explaining how it works and ask the fewest > possible configuration steps. In fact, maybe the first time any new > MAC > address connects to it, show a nice welcome page. Yes i think the technologie is developed allready, imagine " zeroconf" for the hassle free configuration and publishing of services http://www.dns-sd.org/ and http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/uia/ All things just need to put together like eben said. :) or a commercial solution AllJoynb" is a peer-to-peer technology that enables ad hoc, proximity- based, device-to-device communication without the use of an intermediary server. https://www.alljoyn.org/ greetings Marc > > Then have a big "reset" button on the side that wipes the brick and > restores it to factory settings. The wipe should be so thorough as to > make it literally impossible to know if anybody has ever used it. > This > is good for security, as well as for just fixing it when something > goes > wrong. > > -david > > On 02/19/2011 03:18 PM, Mats Henricson wrote: >> Well, a lot of people are willing to take a hit when it comes to >> ease of use >> to get more privacy. We're even willing to pay for one of these >> plugs. >> >> Mats >> >> On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 11:12 PM, Chris Palmer >> <chris(a)noncombatant.org >> <mailto:chris@noncombatant.org>> wrote: >> >> Eugen Leitl writes: >> >>> Tor, Tahoe-LAFS, i2p, tinc, some kind of opportunistic >>> encryption are obvious candidates, but what else? >> >> The purpose of Freedom Box is to compete with cloud services, >> which are >> notable for their ease of use. That is much less true of these >> technologies. >> I don't see how Freedom Box can succeed without taking the >> usability >> problem >> head-on. >> >> >> -- >> http://noncombatant.org/ >> >> "These days, though, you have to be pretty technical before you >> can even >> aspire to crudeness." --- William Gibson >> >> _______________________________________________ >> p2p-hackers mailing list >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com <mailto:p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com> >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> p2p-hackers mailing list >> p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com >> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers > _______________________________________________ > p2p-hackers mailing list > p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com > http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers -- Les enfants teribbles - research / deployment Marc Manthey- Vogelsangerstrasse 97 50823 KC6ln - Germany Tel.:0049-221-29891489 Mobil:0049-1577-3329231 blog: http://let.de project : http://opencu.org twitter: http://twitter.com/macbroadcast/ facebook : http://opencu.tk Opinions expressed may not even be mine by the time you read them, and certainly don't reflect those of any other entity (legal or otherwise). _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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A National I.D. Card? Yes; Run By Larry Ellison? No
by Jack Dean 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.techcentralstation.com/NewsDesk.asp?FormMode=MainTerminalArticle… Thursday, October 25, 2001 A National I.D. Card? Yes; Run By Larry Ellison? No By: James K. Glassman, Host, Tech Central Station Would you trust this man with a National I.D. System? When I first heard that Larry Ellison, the CEO of Oracle Corp., had proposed a national I.D. card to help fight terrorism, I thought it was a joke. Not the I.D. card idea. But that Ellison was proposing it. [...] Dershowitz contends that the cards might actually increase freedoms. "Four Arab-looking guys reading the Koran are much less suspicious if they have the cards and can just slash them through card readers," he said. It is the lack of an I.D. card, however, that makes the United States almost unique among nations. "You do have a right to be left alone in the most literal sense," says Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties Union. "If you have an I.D. card," says former Rep. Tom Campbell (R-Calif.), now a law professor at Stanford, "it is solely for the purpose of allowing the government to compel you to produce it. This would essentially give the government the power to demand that we show our papers. It is a very dangerous thing." Dangerous? Yes, there are dangers to a mandatory national I.D. card, but there may be greater dangers without one. The fact is, to live in a society as vulnerable as ours, we may have to give up something - but I disagree that what's lost is freedom. Instead, it's privacy, and maybe not even that. In an interview with SiliconValley.com, Ellison expressed this reality in his typical over-the-top fashion, showing once again why he is the wrong guy to be making the pitch. "This privacy you're concerned about is largely an illusion. All you have to give up is your illusions, not your privacy." The truth is that an I.D. card may force you to give up some of your privacy - though probably no more than driver's licenses, Social Security cards, credit cards and even electronic toll-readers like EasyPass force you to give up now. But even if privacy is lost, the question is whether such an exchange is worth the benefits? More and more, I believe that it is. ### ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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FC: James Glassman wants national IDs: "We have to give up" privacy
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[You can see James Glassman's bio here: http://www.techcentralstation.com/Bios.asp?FormMode=Bio&ID=6 His column is not merely poorly-reasoned, but poorly researched as well: He makes some factual errors, such as saying the lack of a national ID card makes the U.S. "almost unique." Try Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Sweden, Mexico, and so on. --Declan] ***********

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Science Defense Force
by Bryan Bishop 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hey all: We are starting to document IP addresses associated with anti-science activity, especially evil IP addresses that are scanning the web for science articles, watermarks, anti-regime content, etc. There are other IP block lists out there, but none of them seem to have a mission of anti-anti-infringement and most of them look dead. For now, this information is compiled here: http://diyhpl.us/wiki/users/superkuh/sdf However, maybe we will make up some automatic update mechanism for nginx, or something that can detect HTTP referers/user agents/ip addresses with nightly updates. For instance, certain referers are obviously worrisome (like web dashboard products for publishers, which have distinct urls) and their users should be blocked immediately. I welcome any contributions you can offer... including organization names, system design criticism, IP ranges, or contributions to pdfparanoia ( https://github.com/kanzure/pdfparanoia) for watermark removal. SDF is a play on Superdimensional Fortress. - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "science-liberation-front" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to science-liberation-front+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[FoRK] How To Attack Scale-Free Networks
by Contempt for Meatheads 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Great new bits up on Global Guerillas: http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/ scalefree_terro.html HOW TO ATTACK SCALE-FREE NETWORKS Scale-free networks are everywhere. The can be seen in airline traffic routes, connections between actors in Hollywood, weblog links, sexual relationships, and terrorist networks. So what exactly is a scale-free network? A scale-free network is one that obeys a power law distribution in the number of connections between nodes on the network. Some few nodes exhibit extremely high connectivity (essentially scale-free) while the vast majority are relatively poorly connected. The reason that scale-free networks emerge, as opposed to evenly distributed random networks, is due to these factors: * Rapid growth confers preference to early entrants. The longer a node has been in place the greater the number of links to it. First mover advantage is very important. * In an environment of too much information people link to nodes that are easier to find. This preferential linking reinforces itself by making the easier to find nodes even more easy to find. * The greater the capacity of the hub (bandwidth, work ethic, etc.) the faster its growth. The Strength and Weaknesses of Scale-Free Networks The proliferation of scale-free networks and our increasing dependence on them (particularly given their prevalence in energy, transportation, and communications systems) begs the question: how reliable are these networks? Here's some insight into this: * Scale-free networks are extremely tolerant of random failures. In a random network, a small number of random failures can collapse the network. A scale-free network can absorb random failures up to 80% of its nodes before it collapses. The reason for this is the inhomogeneity of the nodes on the network -- failures are much more likely to occur on relatively small nodes. * Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks on their hubs. Attacks that simultaneously eliminate as few as 5-15% of a scale-free network's hubs can collapse the network. Simultaneity of an attack on hubs is important. Scale-free networks can heal themselves rapidly if an insufficient number of hubs necessary for a systemic collapse are removed. * Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to epidemics. In random networks, epidemics need to surpass a critical threshold (a number of nodes infected) before it propogates system-wide. Below the threshold, the epidemic dies out. Above the threshold, the epidemic spreads exponentially. Recent evidence indicates that the threshold for epidemics on scale-free networks is zero. What this means for Counter-terrorists Given the vulnerability of scale-free networks to intentional disruption, what does this mean for counter-terrorist planners (which I hope, but doubt, they are thinking about)? This theory has strong implications for defense as well as offense. Here's what it means: * Eliminating terrorist scale-free network hubs will likely not be effective. Non-state terrorist networks are not only scale-free they also exhibit small world properties (see "TERRORIST CELLS" for more). This means that while large hubs still dominate the network, the presence of tight clusters (cells), continues to provide local connectivity when the hubs are removed. This implies that the attack on al Qaeda's Afghanistan training camps (the location of multiple hubs) did not collapse its network in any meaningful way. Rather, it atomized the network into anonymous clusters of connectivity until the hubs could reassert their priority again. Additionally, many of these clusters, even without the global connectivity provided by the hubs, will still be able to conduct attacks if they are of sufficient size and complexity (a variety of skill sets). A better approach may be to observe the hubs covertly to assertain the location of local clusters that need to be shut down. * Critical terrorist social network hubs cannot be identified based on the number of links alone. Hubs vary in value depending on multiple vectors such as depth of connections (strong face-to-face social history is extremely important for trust development in covert networks -- see MAPPING TERRORIST NETWORKS for more), frequency of contact (which may indicate the individual is a conduit for information flow rather than an resource), and duration of links (which is tied to the importance of that individuals skill set to ongoing operations of cells they connect to). Analysis of the network along each of vectors can make for better decision making. * Defense against attacks on hubs can be achieved in ways other than physical defense. These methods include: increasing the capacity of all hubs to absorb the taffic of failed hubs (a kind of surge protection), limiting or decreasing the maximum number of connections to any one hub (reduction in criticality), and increasing the cross connectivity of the network (local pooling of resources). Posted by John Robb on 07.05.2004 at 09:50 AM | Permalink _______________________________________________ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[FoRK] How To Attack Scale-Free Networks
by Contempt for Meatheads 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Great new bits up on Global Guerillas: http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/05/ scalefree_terro.html HOW TO ATTACK SCALE-FREE NETWORKS Scale-free networks are everywhere. The can be seen in airline traffic routes, connections between actors in Hollywood, weblog links, sexual relationships, and terrorist networks. So what exactly is a scale-free network? A scale-free network is one that obeys a power law distribution in the number of connections between nodes on the network. Some few nodes exhibit extremely high connectivity (essentially scale-free) while the vast majority are relatively poorly connected. The reason that scale-free networks emerge, as opposed to evenly distributed random networks, is due to these factors: * Rapid growth confers preference to early entrants. The longer a node has been in place the greater the number of links to it. First mover advantage is very important. * In an environment of too much information people link to nodes that are easier to find. This preferential linking reinforces itself by making the easier to find nodes even more easy to find. * The greater the capacity of the hub (bandwidth, work ethic, etc.) the faster its growth. The Strength and Weaknesses of Scale-Free Networks The proliferation of scale-free networks and our increasing dependence on them (particularly given their prevalence in energy, transportation, and communications systems) begs the question: how reliable are these networks? Here's some insight into this: * Scale-free networks are extremely tolerant of random failures. In a random network, a small number of random failures can collapse the network. A scale-free network can absorb random failures up to 80% of its nodes before it collapses. The reason for this is the inhomogeneity of the nodes on the network -- failures are much more likely to occur on relatively small nodes. * Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to intentional attacks on their hubs. Attacks that simultaneously eliminate as few as 5-15% of a scale-free network's hubs can collapse the network. Simultaneity of an attack on hubs is important. Scale-free networks can heal themselves rapidly if an insufficient number of hubs necessary for a systemic collapse are removed. * Scale-free networks are extremely vulnerable to epidemics. In random networks, epidemics need to surpass a critical threshold (a number of nodes infected) before it propogates system-wide. Below the threshold, the epidemic dies out. Above the threshold, the epidemic spreads exponentially. Recent evidence indicates that the threshold for epidemics on scale-free networks is zero. What this means for Counter-terrorists Given the vulnerability of scale-free networks to intentional disruption, what does this mean for counter-terrorist planners (which I hope, but doubt, they are thinking about)? This theory has strong implications for defense as well as offense. Here's what it means: * Eliminating terrorist scale-free network hubs will likely not be effective. Non-state terrorist networks are not only scale-free they also exhibit small world properties (see "TERRORIST CELLS" for more). This means that while large hubs still dominate the network, the presence of tight clusters (cells), continues to provide local connectivity when the hubs are removed. This implies that the attack on al Qaeda's Afghanistan training camps (the location of multiple hubs) did not collapse its network in any meaningful way. Rather, it atomized the network into anonymous clusters of connectivity until the hubs could reassert their priority again. Additionally, many of these clusters, even without the global connectivity provided by the hubs, will still be able to conduct attacks if they are of sufficient size and complexity (a variety of skill sets). A better approach may be to observe the hubs covertly to assertain the location of local clusters that need to be shut down. * Critical terrorist social network hubs cannot be identified based on the number of links alone. Hubs vary in value depending on multiple vectors such as depth of connections (strong face-to-face social history is extremely important for trust development in covert networks -- see MAPPING TERRORIST NETWORKS for more), frequency of contact (which may indicate the individual is a conduit for information flow rather than an resource), and duration of links (which is tied to the importance of that individuals skill set to ongoing operations of cells they connect to). Analysis of the network along each of vectors can make for better decision making. * Defense against attacks on hubs can be achieved in ways other than physical defense. These methods include: increasing the capacity of all hubs to absorb the taffic of failed hubs (a kind of surge protection), limiting or decreasing the maximum number of connections to any one hub (reduction in criticality), and increasing the cross connectivity of the network (local pooling of resources). Posted by John Robb on 07.05.2004 at 09:50 AM | Permalink _______________________________________________ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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