July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[drone-list] A few odds and ends
by BeatTheChip 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, There's Telecomix dropped off some information on drone carrier designs and the DRT surveillacne description, the most detailed I have yet seen. https://twitter.com/TelecomixBSRE/status/212755861607677952 This... U.S. Drone Crashes in Maryland Swamp http://bit.ly/KSdJoc @democracynow and finally... Sen. Paul Introduces Bill to Protect Americans Against Unwarranted b*#*Drone* b, <https://twitter.com/search/%23Drone>b*#*Surveillance*b,<https://twitter.com/search/%23Surveillance> Rand Paul http://bit.ly/KQ1rN0 <http://t.co/g8mUagP4> -- BeatTheChip.org 511Campaign.org ____________________ Twitter: BeatTheChip **I am a United States citizen. My phone and electronic communications may be monitored by the NSA, the FBI, DHS and private contractors who will be held unaccountable for crimes against privacy according to illegal and unenforceable laws, FISA & The Patriot Act. Due to the invasive and unconstitutional nature of these laws, I do not recognize the authority of the surveillants and will prosecute on stalking, habitual harassment if there is no legal grounds for reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in my private conversations. Get a warrant.* _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [linux-elitists] Monday 15 Dec: first all-Open Source System-on-Chip
by Seth David Schoen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Geoff Lane writes: > If you can hear it or see it, you can rip it. > OK the quality isn't as consistent as it would be with a pure digital > copy, but the single analog->digital conversion isn't a problem and from > that point it's digital all the way. http://judiciary.senate.gov/special/content_protection.pdf http://www.cptwg.org/Assets/Presentations/ARDG/ARDG%20page.htm ... you might observe that they attained the first of the three regulatory objectives described in the Content Protection Status Report last month. (If you have the ability to read PowerPoint documents, take a look especially at the MPAA presentations at ARDG, like the introduction to the analog reconversion problem and the MPAA reference model.) -- Seth David Schoen <schoen(a)loyalty.org> | Very frankly, I am opposed to people http://www.loyalty.org/~schoen/ | being programmed by others. http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/ | -- Fred Rogers (1928-2003), | 464 U.S. 417, 445 (1984) _______________________________________________ linux-elitists http://zgp.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-elitists ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: [roy@rant-central.com: Re: [jwales@wikia.com: Re:
by Geoffrey Goodell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Wed, Sep 28, 2005 at 09:27:12AM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote: > But now we're back to the question: how can Tor be improved to deal with > this very serious and important problem? What are the steps that might > be taken, however imperfect, to reduce the amount of abuse coming from > Tor nodes? I think that we can agree that there are short-term and long-term solutions to this problem. In the short-term, we can block Tor nodes by routing address and develop special mechanisms to allow Tor users to edit Wikipedia content anyway. We can do this either via some sort of indirection or via some sort of special change to Wikipedia itself, working around the limitations in Mediawiki. We can focus on the short-term for now. However, I think that most proponents of Tor believe that in the long-term, Wikipedia should support location-independent users. So we need a plan going forward, and this plan should be sufficiently general to apply to any location-independent users, not just users of Tor. I think that many of us hope that some day the Internet will be flat and routing information will be useless in tracking identity or reputation. This will be difficult to achieve, but it is certainly my hope. As such, I am loath to encourage the design of systems that require any form of access control at the network layer, and I believe that the right thing to do is avoid such temptation, even if software tools like Mediawiki appear to be designed with network-layer access control in mind. Geoff ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [cryptography] Digital cash in the news...
by Ian G 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/06/11 7:42 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > On Sat, Jun 11, 2011 at 02:16:55AM -0000, John Levine wrote: >> In article<021CCBA9-9203-4896-8412-481B94595B20(a)cs.columbia.edu> you write: >>> http://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/09/bitcoins-digital-currency-silk-road-char… >> >> I wouldn't call bitcoins digital cash. They're more like digital >> tulip bulbs, or bearer shares of theglobe.com. >> >> Whatever they are, it's a self limiting problem since the bubble will >> burst soon enough. > > Unlike fiat currencies, algorithms assert limit of total volume. > And the mint and transaction infrastructure is decentral, so there's > no single point of control. These both are very useful properties. Cryptographically and computer-science-wise, very elegant. But that doesn't mean they are useful properties to any particular application. We expect money to be a store of value, among a few other things. BitCoin has nothing in it that speaks to that goal, that I can see [0]. This anti-property would however make it more ideal for a bubble [1]. Quite how to fix that and retain the decentralised control aspect, I'm unsure. The essence of a contract is that someone delivers something to someone else; without that first party (which speaks to centralisation at some level) it is hard. Can we have a community promise that maintains in a distributed contract? And delivers a store of value? I'm not sure. It's certainly an interesting thought experiment, I think I can see how to make it work, but not in the current circumstance. > I don't expect Bitcoin to be it, but it is definitely a predecessor > to a number of such currencies which will become practical both > for machines and people. That could be! At an architectural level, I think that community is far too obsessed with the "big bad government" scenario when it comes to money issuance [2]. And looking for ways around this, when money is a far more complex subject than just one attacker. In this sense, DigiCash and BitCoin are cypherpunk bubbles [3]. When we run out of geeks to be fascinated with the cryptographic elegance, the currency will collapse. iang [0] It may be that people see decentralisation, and the algorithmic control over volumes as being that store of value. But this is to confuse the primary requirement (store of value) with the secondary governance techniques used by some issuers (i.e., governments) who have a particular flaw of inflation to deal with. IOW, BitCoin's design might be more appropriate if it were run by a government, perversely. [1] E.g., tulip bulbs were not a store of value (I don't think they could last over the season, they had to be grown that season) whereas it is extremely rare for housing "bubbles" to collapse more than half their peak. And normally it's like 10-20% of their peak, which is not really a bubble, just a correction from a bit too much exhuberance. [2] David Chaum made the same mistake when he replicated the hand-to-hand payments transaction in blinding digitial coins. His obsession with preserving the privacy feature implemented in the h2h method led to a very elegant cryptographic breakthrough, but took him too far away from the meaning of money and the consumer's real needs in making trade & transactions. A privacy thing that isn't used as money isn't much use. For another small example, the geeks amongst us insisted on client programs to manage the money, but the world transacts these days on browser access (Which by the bye requires some form of client-server architecture). Which can be seen with Paypal; oldtimers will recall it was originally a client program on Palm Pilots doing hand-to-hand transfers. [3] and, the various other ne'redowellers in there. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[drone-list] A few odds and ends
by BeatTheChip 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, There's Telecomix dropped off some information on drone carrier designs and the DRT surveillacne description, the most detailed I have yet seen. https://twitter.com/TelecomixBSRE/status/212755861607677952 This... U.S. Drone Crashes in Maryland Swamp http://bit.ly/KSdJoc @democracynow and finally... Sen. Paul Introduces Bill to Protect Americans Against Unwarranted b*#*Drone* b, <https://twitter.com/search/%23Drone>b*#*Surveillance*b,<https://twitter.com/search/%23Surveillance> Rand Paul http://bit.ly/KQ1rN0 <http://t.co/g8mUagP4> -- BeatTheChip.org 511Campaign.org ____________________ Twitter: BeatTheChip **I am a United States citizen. My phone and electronic communications may be monitored by the NSA, the FBI, DHS and private contractors who will be held unaccountable for crimes against privacy according to illegal and unenforceable laws, FISA & The Patriot Act. Due to the invasive and unconstitutional nature of these laws, I do not recognize the authority of the surveillants and will prosecute on stalking, habitual harassment if there is no legal grounds for reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in my private conversations. Get a warrant.* _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat
by Brian Conley 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi all, I've been trying to decide how to weigh in on this thread, I'm sure some of you are surprised its taken me this long to jump in. That said, I'll keep this brief, because I'm going to write up more detailed thoughts on a blog post that I'll share with the list. The first issue I see is related to this succinct comment from Michael: That's only speculation on my part, of course. But if it's right, it > raises a difficult question: how do we maintain rigorous standards of > critique within the information security community, without giving > potential users of our tools the counterproductive impression that > nothing works and you might as well give up? The number one issue I see here is the culture of what i call "geek rage" "fear mongering" and "black and white response" First let me say I think this is *getting better*. However, it stands that there are *many* privacy/security tools with fairly significant flaws. I'm writing a security curriculum at the moment for a new mobile reporting app that SWN is creating. In the process I've begun to see bevy of flaws in tools that I myself misunderstood previously. A few of these tools are Truecrypt, TextSecure, OTR clients, and of course Cryptocat. I think there is a lack of clarity about "safety" and "security" as well as numerous other semantic problems with the way security experts, trainers, and researchers present tools. Truecrypt's issue with journaling filesystems is a flaw that many of the members of the list are no doubt aware of. I however was not aware of this serious issue. The Protektor Services and FrontlineDefenders Digital Privacy manuals do not cover this issue, yet TrueCrypt is now considered a standard tool by most organizations doing training. I recently assisted an "internet freedom" training on TrueCrypt, yet I was unaware, which means even if the issue was covered(I am fairly certain it was not) it wasn't covered well enough that I, a relatively knowledgeable user, picked up on it. Cryptocat's web interface as has been clearly described is only as secure as SSL/TLS and the lack of a keylogger. However, the implication of this discussion is that a MITM attack or having my IP address is enough to identify me. I am sure most of you don't believe this, however that is the implication of your talk. The primary issue comes down to the semantics and lack of clarity in communications. I think this could be solved by recruiting more people with strong writing skills and a focus on training methodology, and perhaps starting to host roundtables and dinners with the technologists in the group. I would love to have been at dinner with Nadim Jacob et al. I think this could be solved by creating an open consortium of technology researchers, trainers, and practitioners. Last point, I agree we are helped by a diversity of manuals, but a lack of clear standards is frustrating. Furthermore, I'm certainly not satisfied with the guides that exist, which is why I am still working on crafting new manuals, however the curriculum I'm currently producing is essentially an effort to edit and collate the best elements of the existing manuals. I hope this will result in a hybrid that still answers a lot of needs, but does it in a more user-friendly fashion. Brian On Wed, Aug 8, 2012 at 10:22 AM, Michael Rogers <michael(a)briarproject.org>wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On 07/08/12 06:19, frank(a)journalistsecurity.net wrote: > > How many people on this list have spent time asking > > non-technologists and other users who have tried, but have since > > given up even trying to use tools like PGP? Or have examined how > > new users interact with such tools? I have a great deal of respect > > for this community. But to be honest it seems to me that neither > > the technologists nor the donors have spent much time asking such > > questions. > > Hi Frank, > > I'd just like to make an anecdotal point here. A few months ago I > spent an interesting afternoon talking to some activists in the UK > about what communication tools they use for what tasks. > > None of them regularly used PGP, Tor, or disk encryption software, but > the reasons they gave had nothing to do with usability. They were > aware of the tools and knew how to use them, but they didn't believe > that doing so provided any practical security benefits. They believed > that encryption software probably contained backdoors and could be > defeated by keyloggers. They'd seen evidence trails from computers and > phones produced in court, and rather than relying on technology to > solve technology's problems, some of them preferred to avoid > electronic communication altogether for secret work. > > It's tempting to say they were right and leave it at that. Keep your > secrets away from your gadgets and your gadgets away from your > secrets. But that wasn't what they were actually doing. They all > carried phones, even though they knew they were being tracked and > possibly bugged. They all had email accounts, and some of them used > mailing lists and forums for planning, even though they knew that if a > keylogger could get their encryption passwords it could get everything > else they typed. Why the apparent inconsistency? > > One possible interpretation is that they were assessing encryption > tools with a typical information security mindset: if there's any weak > point, the adversary will exploit it, so the strong points are > irrelevant. But they were assessing other techniques with a more > balanced mindset: weigh up the risks and potential benefits, compare > the available alternatives, and choose the best (or the least bad). > > That's only speculation on my part, of course. But if it's right, it > raises a difficult question: how do we maintain rigorous standards of > critique within the information security community, without giving > potential users of our tools the counterproductive impression that > nothing works and you might as well give up? > > Cheers, > Michael > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) > > iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQIqBNAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMRLEH/04+ESJyNH9S6NYEwno1BvKe > J8kMLCmR6OpolJ15nu3K7GkE4wQnhTmZVIrHApjWGz+8TACGiIQg7rOBl19r4MvA > o/7tANsoUEgLRAO2hHQzA5tg+ZRtS+9oDe6LBVE3arHTCt9dYMW711ToOkgQwdoD > ekNWbC4Ba2aKm3t8JmSUF+goDiadF+nSP0HByvNhKHCjzP/2SLBxDOQqeOMF/kpK > Zej+0BZPCUGLaN6XaqoWw7DxgYfa9uUgx3E2ljwYnZZqcXr41kJp2uHQTZlExyxN > TfiI+2P4bQfJtkK7KcOZtp/QWCAz3whmqV6F5y3tjfcHiEywzByInnKFr3tT5D0= > =mHhw > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech > -- Brian Conley Director, Small World News http://smallworldnews.tv m: 646.285.2046 Skype: brianjoelconley public key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xCEEF938A1DBDD587<http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xE827FACCB139C9F0> _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Reply from Zero-Knowledge
by Dov Smith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hey Declan, I want to start by saying that Zero-Knowledge absolutely does not track or profile the users of its Freedom Privacy & Security Tools 3.0 software. Our software loads updates (e.g. Ad Manager files and e-wallet scripts) as well as privacy-related content via HTTP. This was the case with previous versions of the software and is still true today, although today it may appear more prominent since we have designed Freedom 3.0 with a new user interface and are carrying more privacy content. This HTTP activity is covered by our privacy policies. As for cookies, Zero-Knowledge has always used cookies on its websites, for the purposes of store-, affiliate- and state-management. These practices are also reflected in our privacy policies. Declan, if you still think this is worth forwarding on, I'd appreciate your at least changing the subject header you sent me. The implication that delivering web content means tracking users, is mistaken. Best regards, Dov __________________________________________ Dov Smith PR Director, Zero-Knowledge Systems 514.350.7553 / dov(a)zeroknowledge.com Join us at Privacy By Design 2001 Dec. 3-5, 2001 in Montreal www.zeroknowledge.com/privacybydesign2001 __________________________________________ ********

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FC: What info does Zero Knowledge collect on users of Freedom 3.0?
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[I agreed to delete Anonymous' name before posting, but it is fair to point out that Anonymous works for a company that is in some areas a competitor to ZKS. I offered ZKS the opportunity to reply; their response follows. My own thoughts: If ZKS wants to display tailored ads, it makes sense that Freedom clients will communicate with the mother ship on a more-or-less regular basis. This is what Eudora and Opera do, and what Freedom 3.0 apparently does (I haven't used it). The question is whether users are aware of the potential privacy risks. --Declan] ********

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[Dewayne-Net] San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Fi project Reply-To: dewayne(a)warpspeed.com San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-Fi project Agency members want to avoid a restrictive franchise deal News Story by Stephen Lawson <http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/technology/story/ 0,10801,107216,00.html?source=x596> DECEMBER 19, 2005 (IDG NEWS SERVICE) - San Francisco's plan for citywide Wi-Fi ran into some friction Friday from a local regulatory agency. The government of the City and County of San Francisco is readying a request for proposal (RFP) for the wireless network, which is intended to provide free or affordable Internet access throughout most of the city. Several possible partners, including Google Inc., EarthLink Inc., Motorola Inc. and a local nonprofit project called SFLan, have already expressed interest in the project through an earlier request for information. The San Francisco plan would become one of the largest rollouts yet of government-initiated broadband, a concept that has generated heated political discussion in the past several months. At a hearing Friday, some members of San Francisco's Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) grilled Chris Vein, director of the city's Department of Technology and Information Services (DTIS), about the process of deciding how to build and operate the network. LAFCO, made up of San Francisco county supervisors and members of the public, has a broad oversight role, including approval of district boundaries and annexation of land as well as contract approvals. The agency's aim in the hearing was to stimulate discussion, supervisor and LAFCO member Jake McGoldrick said in an interview after the meeting. County Supervisor Ross Mirkarimi and other LAFCO members said they fear a deal like San Francisco's current franchise agreement with cable operator Comcast Corp., in which the board of supervisors has been presented with already negotiated franchise deals that it must approve or vote down. DTIS handles cable franchise administration and other communications and IT responsibilities for the city as well as spearheading the Wi-Fi project. [snip] Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-Fi project
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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