July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: thoughts on one time pads
by bear 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, 26 Jan 2006, Travis H. wrote: > For example, you may have occasional physical meetings with a good > friend, colleague, family member, or former co-worker. Let's say > you see them once every few years, maybe at a conference or a > wedding or a funeral or some other occasion. At such times, you > could easily hand them a CD-ROM or USB flash drive full of key > material. Then, you could use that pad to encrypt messages to them > until the next time you meet. Let's say you send them ten 1kB > messages per year. Then a $1 CD-ROM would hold enough data for > 70000 years of communication! Heck, I could put the software on the > image and make a dozen to keep with me, handing them out to new > acquaintances as a sort of preemptive secure channel. It's far easier and less error-prone to hand them a CD-ROM full of symmetric keys indexed by date. The problem is that most people will not take the care needed to properly use a one-time pad. For text communications like this forum, they're great, and a (relatively) small amount of keying material, as you suggest, will last for many years. But modern applications are concerned with communicating *DATA*, not original text; someone on the system is going to want to send their buddy a 30-minute video of the professor explaining a sticky point to the class, and where is your keying material going then? He wants to be ignorant of the details of the cryptosystem; he just hits "secure send" and waits for magic to happen. Or if not a 30-minute video, then the last six months of account records for the west coast division of the company, or a nicely formatted document in a word processor format that uses up a megabyte or two per page, or ... whatever. The OTP is nice for just plain text, but the more bits a format consumes, the less useful it becomes. And fewer and fewer people even understand how much or how little bandwidth something is; they think in terms of "human bandwidth", the number of seconds or minutes of attention required to read or listen to or watch something. An OTP, as far as I'm concerned, makes a really good system, but you have to respect its limits. One of those limits is a low-bandwidth medium like text-only messages, and in the modern world that qualifies as "specialized." Given a low-bandwidth medium, and indexing keying material into daily chunks to prevent a system failure from resulting in pad reuse, you get 600 MB on a CD-ROM. Say you want a century of secure communications, so you divide it into 8- kilobyte chunks -- each day you can send 8 kilobytes and he can send 8 kilobytes. (Note that DVD-ROMs are better). That gives you a little over 100 years (read, "all you're likely to need, barring catastrophic medical advances,") of a very secure low-bandwidth channel. Of course, the obvious application for this OTP material, other than text messaging itself, is to use it for key distribution. Bear >Bruce acknowleges this by saying "[t]he exceptions to this are >generally in specialized situations where simple key management is a >solvable problem and the security requirement is timeshifting." He >then dismisses it by saying "[o]ne-time pads are useless for all but >very specialized applications, primarily historical and non-computer." > >Excuse me? This would in fact be a _perfect_ way to distribute key >material for _other_ cryptosystems, such as PGP, SSH, IPSec, openvpn, >gaim-encryption etc. etc. You see, he's right in that the key >distribution problem is the hardest problem for most computer >cryptosystems. So the OTP system I described here is the perfect >complement for those systems; it gives them a huge tug on their >bootstraps, gets them running on their own power. > >I'm not sure it is even limited to this use case. For example, before >a ship sets out to sea, you could load it up with enough key material >to last a few millenia. How much key material could a courier carry? >I bet it's a lot. As they say, "never underestimate the bandwidth of >a station wagon full of tapes". And don't embassies have diplomatic >pouches that get taken to them and such? > >So my questions to you are: > >1) Do you agree with my assessment? If so, why has every crypto >expert I've seen poo-pooed the idea? > >2) Assuming my use case, what kind of attacks should I worry about? >For example, he might leave the CD sitting around somewhere before >putting it in his computer. If it sits around on CD, physical access >to it would compromise past and future communications. If he copies >it to flash or magnetic media, then destroys the CD, we can >incrementally destroy the pad as it is used, but we have to worry >about data remanence. > >3) How should one combine OTP with another conventional encryption >method, so that if the pad is copied, we still have conventional >cipher protection? In this manner, one could use the same system for >different use cases; one could, for example, mail the pad, or leave it >with a third party for the recipient to pick up, and you >opportunistically theoretical security if the opponent doesn't get it, >and you get empirical (conventional) security if they do. > >4) For authentication, it is simple to get excellent results from an >OTP. You simply send n bytes of the OTP, which an attacker has a >2^-8n chance in guessing. How do we ensure message integrity? Is it >enough to include a checksum that is encrypted with the pad? Does it >depend on our method of encipherment? Assuming the encipherment is >XOR, is a CRC sufficient, or can one flip bits in the message and CRC >field so as to cancel each other? If so, how should we compute a MIC? > Just SHA-1, and include that right after the plaintext (that is, we >encrypt the MIC so as to not reveal a preimage if SHA-1 is found to be >invertible)? > >5) How should one decouple message lengths from plaintext lengths? > >6) How should one detect and recover from lost, reordered, or partial messages? > >All I've got to say is, I'm on this like stink on doo-doo. Being the >thorough, methodical, paranoid person I am, I will be grateful for any >pointers to prior work and thinking in this area. I recall Jim Choate >from the Austin cypherpunks saying he was working on a OTP system, but >never heard any more about it (let's not discuss him though please, >this thread is about one time pads). >-- >"The generation of random numbers is too important to be left to chance." > -- Robert R. Coveyou -><- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ >GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B > >--------------------------------------------------------------------- >The Cryptography Mailing List >Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [p2p-hackers] A globally distributed peer-to-peer data archive
by Tony Arcieri 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, Aug 27, 2011 at 11:39 AM, David Barrett <dbarrett(a)quinthar.com>wrote: > Perhaps I misunderstand Tahoe. Is it intended for groups to share data > (eg, I add a file, you discover and download it), or is it purely for me to > backup my data? > > If the latter -- if it's purely for individual backup -- then I agree > there's no risk from the RIAA: you're not sharing it so there's no problem. > > But if the former -- if there's some way I can join your Tahoe cluster and > access data that's already there -- then would you be willing to let the > RIAA join your cluster with the keys to access the data there? > I think Tahoe fits either use case of a shared file repository or a distributed backup system. There are two levels of credentials you can share: the introducer furls, which grant access to your grid, and the rootcap for a particular directory on the grid, which grants access to a specific set of files. By Tahoe's design you should be able to give the RIAA the introducer furls to your grid. They can then create directories and store data on your grid, and will accept encrypted chunks of files from other peers. However, unless they actually have a rootcap for directories containing infringing content, they have no way of knowing whether or not the chunks they receive from other peers contain this data or not, since it's encrypted. > Because for something like Tahoe to work on a global scale, eventually > you're not going to know with certainty all the other members -- and any one > of those could in fact be the RIAA trolling for people to sue. > I'm envisioning a system where there wouldn't be an encrypted introducer URL to gain access to the grid, instead additional methods to provide a web of trust and collaborative filtering of particular peers would be used to prevent abuse. However, I think Tahoe's rootcap system is still essential. Cryptographic credentials would be required to access any data on the grid. For example, is it possible to determine who (username or IP) added the > content in the first place? To my knowledge Tahoe doesn't log which nodes are responsible for the creation of content on the grid. Instead there are rootcaps which control read and write access to directories on the grid, and anyone with the "writecap" can add content to a particular directory. I may be mistaken as I have just started using Tahoe. In the system I'm envisioning, the anonymity of who created a particular file would definitely be preserved. > Is there some way to differentiate between when a node is requesting a > specific piece of content from you, versus when it's just rebalancing some > tree? > > If so, then it's limited to groups of trusting friends -- still a great > tool, but not a vast treasure of human knowledge as it sounds like you want > to build. > > But if not, if it's truly impossible to know whether a node is downloading > and storing something because the user actually wants it or because the > system forced them to get it unaware, then that could be a pretty good > defense against overzealous copyright enforcement. > > Though I wonder if a simpler model is to just start with something like > BitTorrent, except every time you download anything, you also download > something else randomly. So half of the content you download/seed is what > you actually picked, and the other half is random. Then there's no way from > the outside to tell which was for you, versus which is caching random > content to increase the uptime and performance of the whole system. I'd certainly agree BitTorrent could be the underlying technology underlying this system, layering the discovery and crypto on top of a BitTorrent-based system underneath, although I'd prefer it has more filesystem-like semantics like Tahoe. Perhaps BitTorrent with an "earliest-first" instead of "rarest-first" chunk selection mechanism would work. -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] more on Who they're spying on
by Titus Brown 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-> Some members of this list seem more eager to engage in bitter -> denunciation -> of the present administration, than to offer ideas about how best to -> reconcile the conflicting interests of freedom and security. Dave -- for IP if you wish... Mr. Bray and the others are talking past each other in an eerily familiar way. There's no doubt in my mind that there are people who would like nothing more than to kill as many Americans as possible, e.g. by setting off a nuclear weapon in the middle of New York City. I'd really like this not to happen. There's also little doubt in my mind that the current administration is using this kind of threat -- which is a real, rational threat -- to justify the use of a sweeping set of surveillance tactics. Some (or even many) of these tactics, as currently employed, are probably unconstitutional. They're also prone to abuse, especially without oversight. So there are at least three items for discussion -- 1) what is the real nature of the threat to the US, both here and abroad? 2) what is an effective way to prevent terrorist attacks that involve WMDs or large loss of life, both here and abroad? 3) what is an effective way to safeguard civil liberties in the process, and a good set of tradeoffs? I bet Mr. Bray is tired of hearing *only* about #3 and not about #1 or #2; I bet others are equally tired of hearing only about #2. I don't think it's possible to have a useful discussion that doesn't include all three. My reason for opposing pretty much everything Bush has done in the "War on Terror" is that I don't think it's *effective*, and there is clearly no *oversight* -- that is, it provides no solution to either #2 or #3. The war in Iraq has done nothing to make us safer; if anything, Iraq is now an excellent training and recruiting ground for anti-American terrorists. I have no doubts that the NSA wiretapping is hideously ineffective due to too many false positives. Our DHS has become a pork subsidy program. Our interrogation tactics are not only against the Geneva convention, but are brutal, inhumane, and violate the "innocent until proven guilty" clause that is at the very heart of our justice system. And there's no oversight of any of it, and no evidence that it's remotely effective or anything other than a colossal waste of money. Even worse, the single biggest short-term threat (IMO) -- a nuclear-armed terrorist, with nuclear material swiped from or donated by Russia, NK, Pakistan, or Iran -- receives essentially no attention from this administration. Nuclear proliferation by (currently) friendly countries is unopposed, and in some cases is even encouraged (India). Down the line, biological WMDs are going to become easy to manufacture in the lab. What should we do about that? My challenge to Mr. Bray and like-minded Administration supporters is this: do you have any positive evidence that this Administration has been effective at preventing terrorism? If not, why do you support these efforts, especially if many smart people think that they are technically flawed and unlikely to work? And what is the appropriate oversight structure that should be put in place, regardless? My challenge to the rest of us (including me ;;): is there an effective (and maybe even politically viable!) alternative that we should think about and support? I'd be very interested in pointers to information that discusses or suggests answers to questions like: * how can we effectively stop nuclear proliferation? * how can we help to leave Iraq a stable country? * what is a *short-term* solution to the strong desire of many, many people in the Middle East and elsewhere to kill as many Americans as possible? * since most of us believe that technological eavesdropping is generally ineffective, how can we educate our political servants about this? Heck, who's telling them that they're *effective*, anyway? (Heck^2, maybe they actually *are* effective!) I'd also be very interested in hearing a discussion -- here or elsewhere -- about any of these issues. The last one might even be appropriate for this list ;). cheers, --titus p.s. As an aside, I don't think the sort of motive-removal that Mr. Fairlie supports is effective in the short term. I agree education and trade are the only plausible long-term strategies -- we're never going to kill every Islamic fundamentalist on the planet, and conflict doesn't usually work well as a way to change people's minds -- but we have to deal with issues here and now, as well. Eyes have been poked, and are not going to be "unpoked" anytime soon... ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Who they're spying on
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[IP] EFF: Court Protects Email from Secret Government Searches
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Electronic Frontier Foundation Media Release For Immediate Release: Monday, June 18, 2007 Contact: Kevin Bankston Staff Attorney Electronic Frontier Foundation bankston(a)eff.org +1 415 436-9333 x126 Court Protects Email from Secret Government Searches Landmark Ruling Gives Email Same Constitutional Protections as Phone Calls San Francisco - The government must have a search warrant before it can secretly seize and search emails stored by email service providers, according to a landmark ruling Monday in the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The court found that email users have the same reasonable expectation of privacy in their stored email as they do in their telephone calls -- the first circuit court ever to make that finding. Over the last 20 years, the government has routinely used the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) to secretly obtain stored email from email service providers without a warrant. But today's ruling -- closely following the reasoning in an amicus brief filed the by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and other civil liberties groups -- found that the SCA violates the Fourth Amendment. "Email users expect that their Hotmail and Gmail inboxes are just as private as their postal mail and their telephone calls," said EFF Staff Attorney Kevin Bankston. "The government tried to get around this common-sense conclusion, but the Constitution applies online as well as offline, as the court correctly found. That means that the government can't secretly seize your emails without a warrant." Warshak v. United States was brought in the Southern District of Ohio federal court by Steven Warshak to stop the government's repeated secret searches and seizures of his stored email using the SCA. The district court ruled that the government cannot use the SCA to obtain stored email without a warrant or prior notice to the email account holder, but the government appealed that ruling to the 6th Circuit. EFF served as an amicus in the case, joined by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Democracy & Technology. Law professors Susan Freiwald and Patricia Bellia also submitted an amicus brief, and the case was successfully argued at the 6th Circuit by Warshak's counsel Martin Weinberg. For the full ruling in Warshak v. United States: http://eff.org/legal/cases/warshak_v_usa/ 6th_circuit_decision_upholding_injunction.pdf For EFF's resources on the case, including its amicus brief: http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/warshak_v_usa/ For this release: http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2007_06.php#005321 About EFF The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading civil liberties organization working to protect rights in the digital world. Founded in 1990, EFF actively encourages and challenges industry and government to support free expression and privacy online. EFF is a member-supported organization and maintains one of the most linked-to websites in the world at http://www.eff.org/ -end- _______________________________________________ presslist mailing list https://falcon.eff.org/mailman/listinfo/presslist ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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End of ROCKate soon
by Benjamin Schieder 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi people. In response to a law that passed the german legislative today, I will cease production, development and distribution of ROCKate binaries and - maybe - even source code soon. The reasen is '202c StGB which states (IANAL translation): "Producing, acquiring, selling, giving, distributing or making-accessible of passwords or other access codes as well as computer programs whose aim it is to commi a crime ... will be punished with up to one year in jail or a fine." See also: http://www.phenoelit.de/202/202.html Basically, these waters are too hot for me to tread in. Though the official reading of the wall - reading from politicians that is - says that they only target 'criminals' and there is no need to worry with the wording, nobody knows when some underworked lawyer thinks he might go on to sue the ass off of everyone in IT. If someone wants to mirror/host/develop ROCKate further, be my guest. If you need technical assistance, I can offer guidance, but I probably won't write a single line of code anymore. Sorry. Greetings, Benjamin -- The Nethack IdleRPG! Idle to your favorite Nethack messages! http://pallas.crash-override.net/nethackidle/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[cryptography] Gregory Perry's follow-up to the FBI OpenBSD / OCF backdoors thread (was: Fwd: [gsc] Fwd: OpenBSD IPSEC backdoor(s))
by Alfonso De Gregorio 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Back in December 2010, we discussed the OpenBSD IPSec backdoor allegations. Two days ago, Cryptome.org published the Gregory Perry's follow-up to the this story. FBI OpenBSD Backdoors and RSA Cipher Vulnerability http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0032.htm Cheers, -- alfonso blogs at http://Plaintext.crypto.lo.gy tweets @secYOUre _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [ExI] battle tanks to a five yr old
by ddraig 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi weird synchronicity, I started reading this book yesterday: http://www.amazon.com/New-Model-Army-Adam-Roberts/dp/0575083638/ref=sr_1_1?… "A giant has brought war to the fields and towns of England's heartland. When the British army brings in air support and deploys heavy weapons he simply melts away, only to form again somewhere else and deliver another devastating blow. He is called Pantegrel, and he is a New Model Armyba giant whose thoughts flow through countless wireless connections, whose intelligence comes from the internet and real-time camera updates, whose mind is made up of thousands of minds, each deciding what he will choose to do. He has chosen the joy of the fight, and his fury is truly democraticbhe is me and you. This is a terrifying vision of a near future war as new technologies allow the world's first truly democratic army to wrest control from the powers that be. Taking advances in modern communication and the new eagerness for power from the bottom upwards, Adam Roberts has produced at once an exciting war novel and a philosophical examination of war and democracy. It shows an exciting and innovative literary voices working at the height of his powers and investing SF with the literary significance that is its due." Dwayne -- B ddraig(a)pobox.com irc.bluesphereweb.com #dna B B B B B ...r.e.t.u.r.n....t.o....t.h.e....s.o.u.r.c.e... B B B B http://tinyurl.com/he-is-right-you-know-jpg our aim is wakefulness,B our enemy is dreamless sleep _______________________________________________ extropy-chat mailing list extropy-chat(a)lists.extropy.org http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [IP] more on Who they're spying on
by Titus Brown 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-> Some members of this list seem more eager to engage in bitter -> denunciation -> of the present administration, than to offer ideas about how best to -> reconcile the conflicting interests of freedom and security. Dave -- for IP if you wish... Mr. Bray and the others are talking past each other in an eerily familiar way. There's no doubt in my mind that there are people who would like nothing more than to kill as many Americans as possible, e.g. by setting off a nuclear weapon in the middle of New York City. I'd really like this not to happen. There's also little doubt in my mind that the current administration is using this kind of threat -- which is a real, rational threat -- to justify the use of a sweeping set of surveillance tactics. Some (or even many) of these tactics, as currently employed, are probably unconstitutional. They're also prone to abuse, especially without oversight. So there are at least three items for discussion -- 1) what is the real nature of the threat to the US, both here and abroad? 2) what is an effective way to prevent terrorist attacks that involve WMDs or large loss of life, both here and abroad? 3) what is an effective way to safeguard civil liberties in the process, and a good set of tradeoffs? I bet Mr. Bray is tired of hearing *only* about #3 and not about #1 or #2; I bet others are equally tired of hearing only about #2. I don't think it's possible to have a useful discussion that doesn't include all three. My reason for opposing pretty much everything Bush has done in the "War on Terror" is that I don't think it's *effective*, and there is clearly no *oversight* -- that is, it provides no solution to either #2 or #3. The war in Iraq has done nothing to make us safer; if anything, Iraq is now an excellent training and recruiting ground for anti-American terrorists. I have no doubts that the NSA wiretapping is hideously ineffective due to too many false positives. Our DHS has become a pork subsidy program. Our interrogation tactics are not only against the Geneva convention, but are brutal, inhumane, and violate the "innocent until proven guilty" clause that is at the very heart of our justice system. And there's no oversight of any of it, and no evidence that it's remotely effective or anything other than a colossal waste of money. Even worse, the single biggest short-term threat (IMO) -- a nuclear-armed terrorist, with nuclear material swiped from or donated by Russia, NK, Pakistan, or Iran -- receives essentially no attention from this administration. Nuclear proliferation by (currently) friendly countries is unopposed, and in some cases is even encouraged (India). Down the line, biological WMDs are going to become easy to manufacture in the lab. What should we do about that? My challenge to Mr. Bray and like-minded Administration supporters is this: do you have any positive evidence that this Administration has been effective at preventing terrorism? If not, why do you support these efforts, especially if many smart people think that they are technically flawed and unlikely to work? And what is the appropriate oversight structure that should be put in place, regardless? My challenge to the rest of us (including me ;;): is there an effective (and maybe even politically viable!) alternative that we should think about and support? I'd be very interested in pointers to information that discusses or suggests answers to questions like: * how can we effectively stop nuclear proliferation? * how can we help to leave Iraq a stable country? * what is a *short-term* solution to the strong desire of many, many people in the Middle East and elsewhere to kill as many Americans as possible? * since most of us believe that technological eavesdropping is generally ineffective, how can we educate our political servants about this? Heck, who's telling them that they're *effective*, anyway? (Heck^2, maybe they actually *are* effective!) I'd also be very interested in hearing a discussion -- here or elsewhere -- about any of these issues. The last one might even be appropriate for this list ;). cheers, --titus p.s. As an aside, I don't think the sort of motive-removal that Mr. Fairlie supports is effective in the short term. I agree education and trade are the only plausible long-term strategies -- we're never going to kill every Islamic fundamentalist on the planet, and conflict doesn't usually work well as a way to change people's minds -- but we have to deal with issues here and now, as well. Eyes have been poked, and are not going to be "unpoked" anytime soon... ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Who they're spying on
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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