July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Undeliverable mail--"language"
by postmaster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

=09boundary=3D"----=3D_NextPart_000_01BC2B74=2E89D1CCC0" This is a multi-part message in MIME format=2E ------=3D_NextPart_000_01BC2B74=2E89D1CCC0 Content-type: text/html; charset=3DUS-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <HTML><HEAD></HEAD><BODY> The following mail can't be sent to ContentAudit@jackpot365=3D2Ecom:<b= r>=3D From: cypherpunks@algebra=3D2Ecom To: ContentAudit@jackpot365=3D2Ecom Subject: language The attachment is the original mail</BODY></HTML> ------=3D_NextPart_000_01BC2B74=2E89D1CCC0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Description: ATT1A79=2Etmp Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Disposition: attachment /9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQEAZABkAAD/2wBDAAsICAoIBwsKCQoNDAsNERwSEQ8PESIZGhQcKSQrKigk= JyctMkA3LTA9MCcnOEw5PUNFSElIKzZPVU5GVEBHSEX/2wBDAQwNDREPESESEiFFLicuRUVFRUVF= RUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUVFRUX/wAARCACCAGIDASIA= AhEBAxEB/8QAGwAAAQUBAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAABAACAwUGBwH/xAA7EAACAQMCAwUGBQIEBwAAAAAB= 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None
by Robert J. Berger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<dave(a)farber.net> Subject: Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS Monika Ermert, Craig Morris Heise Online http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/87655 The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 as a kind of overriding department, wants to have the key to sign the DNS root zone solidly in the hands of the US government. This ultimate master key would then allow authorities to track DNS Security Extensions (DNSSec) all the way back to the servers that represent the name system's root zone on the Internet. The "key-signing key" signs the zone key, which is held by VeriSign. At the meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in Lisbon, Bernard Turcotte, president of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) drew everyone's attention to this proposal as a representative of the national top- level domain registries (ccTLDs). At the ICANN meeting, Turcotte said that the managers of country registries were concerned about this proposal. When contacted by heise online, Turcotte said that the national registries had informed their governmental representatives about the DHS's plans. A representative of the EU Commission said that the matter is being discussed with EU member states. DNSSec is seen as a necessary measure to keep the growing number of manipulations on the net under control. The DHS is itself sponsoring a campaign to support the implementation of DNSSec. Three of the 13 operators currently work outside of the US, two of them in Europe. Lars-Johan Liman of the Swedish firm Autonomica, which operates the I root server, pointed out the possible political implications last year. Liman himself nomited ICANN as a possible candidate for the supervisory function. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which handles route management within the ICANN, could be entrusted with the task of keeping the keys. An ICANN/IANA solution would offer one benefit according to some experts: there would be no need to integrate yet another institution directly into operations. After all, something must be done quickly if there is a problem with the signature during operations. If the IANA retains the key, however, US authorities still have a political problem, for the US government still reserves the right to oversee ICANN/IANA. If the keys are then handed over to ICANN/IANA, there would be even less of an incentive to give up this role as a monitor. As a result, the DHS's demands will probably only heat up the debate about US dominance of the control of Internet resources. bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb Robert J. Berger - Internet Bandwidth Development, LLC. Voice: 408-882-4755 eFax: +1-408-490-2868 http://www.ibd.com ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/@now Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Whistle-blower site platform design
by Ian G 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 23/12/10 5:44 AM, Len Sassaman wrote: > 2. Source protection. The site needs to provide a means for whistleblowers > to contact the site operators, discuss issues, and submit documents in an > anonymous manner. Wikileaks solves this with Tor, though there might be > other ways. We need a clearly defined threat model to build against, and > must keep in mind that usability is a security concern -- we have to > assume that the whistleblowers are not geeks, and the site operators may > not be, either. If I think of the 3 whistleblower cases I'm mildly familiar with, there is no commonality between the source protection aspects. I think this might be something where whatever technical system you put in place, a wise whistleblower would not be keen to trust it. Given that the typical cost of being a whistleblower is probably minimum loss of income for years, and loss of liberty likely, it might be a really high target. If that view holds, it might be better kicked out of any technical design for a publishing system. > 3. Censorship resistance. If 2. brings to mind Tor, 3. brings to mind the > Eternity Service. In this model, the publisher does not need to be > anonymous, but the data needs to be authenticated and the service > distributed. The CouchDB-based mirrors of the Afghanistan War Diaries > provide a promising first-attempt; to be successful, these sites need to > be able to leverage jurisdictional arbitrage and distributed hosting to > resist network denial of service attacks and legal attacks aimed at > taking their sites offline, as well as data corruption attacks aimed at > invalidating the material by attacking its credibility with the > introduction of false documents, etc. > > 3.a. would be a way for third-parties to obtain the material provided by > these services in an anonymous fashion; I see this as lower priority than > the other issues, but still something to think about. OTOH, If you wanted to make source protection strong *and* technical (e.g., uploading), then you might want to make it the same system for both uploading and downloading. Hiding the source in a crowd of downloaders is one benefit, and making the download protection high profile may help to make the overall source/sink protection better. 4. Gatekeeper role. It would seem that any pure technical system could be flooded by junk. Typically a team is needed to analyse, filter, edit and approve. > My goal here is to develop a formal, realistic model for the operation of > a legitimate journalistic whistle-blower material clearinghouse. I'm > basically proposing we replicate in public, with peer-review, the process > I assume Wikileaks itself has undergone for the design of their system. > Let's identify the likely attacks and attack vectors for given > adversaries, compose a solution based on available technology, and > assemble it in as easily deployable a manner as possible. > > Who else is interested? Let's get this discussion rolling. Some thoughts! iang _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Whistle-blower site platform design
by Ian G 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 23/12/10 5:44 AM, Len Sassaman wrote: > 2. Source protection. The site needs to provide a means for whistleblowers > to contact the site operators, discuss issues, and submit documents in an > anonymous manner. Wikileaks solves this with Tor, though there might be > other ways. We need a clearly defined threat model to build against, and > must keep in mind that usability is a security concern -- we have to > assume that the whistleblowers are not geeks, and the site operators may > not be, either. If I think of the 3 whistleblower cases I'm mildly familiar with, there is no commonality between the source protection aspects. I think this might be something where whatever technical system you put in place, a wise whistleblower would not be keen to trust it. Given that the typical cost of being a whistleblower is probably minimum loss of income for years, and loss of liberty likely, it might be a really high target. If that view holds, it might be better kicked out of any technical design for a publishing system. > 3. Censorship resistance. If 2. brings to mind Tor, 3. brings to mind the > Eternity Service. In this model, the publisher does not need to be > anonymous, but the data needs to be authenticated and the service > distributed. The CouchDB-based mirrors of the Afghanistan War Diaries > provide a promising first-attempt; to be successful, these sites need to > be able to leverage jurisdictional arbitrage and distributed hosting to > resist network denial of service attacks and legal attacks aimed at > taking their sites offline, as well as data corruption attacks aimed at > invalidating the material by attacking its credibility with the > introduction of false documents, etc. > > 3.a. would be a way for third-parties to obtain the material provided by > these services in an anonymous fashion; I see this as lower priority than > the other issues, but still something to think about. OTOH, If you wanted to make source protection strong *and* technical (e.g., uploading), then you might want to make it the same system for both uploading and downloading. Hiding the source in a crowd of downloaders is one benefit, and making the download protection high profile may help to make the overall source/sink protection better. 4. Gatekeeper role. It would seem that any pure technical system could be flooded by junk. Typically a team is needed to analyse, filter, edit and approve. > My goal here is to develop a formal, realistic model for the operation of > a legitimate journalistic whistle-blower material clearinghouse. I'm > basically proposing we replicate in public, with peer-review, the process > I assume Wikileaks itself has undergone for the design of their system. > Let's identify the likely attacks and attack vectors for given > adversaries, compose a solution based on available technology, and > assemble it in as easily deployable a manner as possible. > > Who else is interested? Let's get this discussion rolling. Some thoughts! iang _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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None
by Robert J. Berger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

<dave(a)farber.net> Subject: Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS Monika Ermert, Craig Morris Heise Online http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/87655 The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created after the attacks on September 11, 2001 as a kind of overriding department, wants to have the key to sign the DNS root zone solidly in the hands of the US government. This ultimate master key would then allow authorities to track DNS Security Extensions (DNSSec) all the way back to the servers that represent the name system's root zone on the Internet. The "key-signing key" signs the zone key, which is held by VeriSign. At the meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in Lisbon, Bernard Turcotte, president of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) drew everyone's attention to this proposal as a representative of the national top- level domain registries (ccTLDs). At the ICANN meeting, Turcotte said that the managers of country registries were concerned about this proposal. When contacted by heise online, Turcotte said that the national registries had informed their governmental representatives about the DHS's plans. A representative of the EU Commission said that the matter is being discussed with EU member states. DNSSec is seen as a necessary measure to keep the growing number of manipulations on the net under control. The DHS is itself sponsoring a campaign to support the implementation of DNSSec. Three of the 13 operators currently work outside of the US, two of them in Europe. Lars-Johan Liman of the Swedish firm Autonomica, which operates the I root server, pointed out the possible political implications last year. Liman himself nomited ICANN as a possible candidate for the supervisory function. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which handles route management within the ICANN, could be entrusted with the task of keeping the keys. An ICANN/IANA solution would offer one benefit according to some experts: there would be no need to integrate yet another institution directly into operations. After all, something must be done quickly if there is a problem with the signature during operations. If the IANA retains the key, however, US authorities still have a political problem, for the US government still reserves the right to oversee ICANN/IANA. If the keys are then handed over to ICANN/IANA, there would be even less of an incentive to give up this role as a monitor. As a result, the DHS's demands will probably only heat up the debate about US dominance of the control of Internet resources. bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb Robert J. Berger - Internet Bandwidth Development, LLC. Voice: 408-882-4755 eFax: +1-408-490-2868 http://www.ibd.com ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/@now Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] Department of Homeland and Security wants master key for DNS
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[drone-list] Canada's Project JUSTAS
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Looks like the Canadian military is ready to embrace drones after a few forays during the past decade. [1]@NoDronesCanada has posted a link to a Google Doc with an interesting (looking?) RFI for Project JUSTAS (Joint UAS Surveillance and Target Acquisition System): [2]http://twitter.com/NoDronesCanada/status/228200081474613249 Here's a mention of this project in May: [3]http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2012/05/16 /nl-mackay-5wing-plans-517.html gf -- Gregory Foster || [4]gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> [5]http://entersection.com/ References 1. http://twitter.com/NoDronesCanada 2. http://twitter.com/NoDronesCanada/status/228200081474613249 3. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/story/2012/05/16/nl-mac… 4. mailto:gfoster@entersection.org 5. http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[gsc] USC. 486
by Ragnar 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks, ' 486. Uttering coins of gold, silver or other metal Whoever, except as authorized by law, makes or utters or passes, or attempts to utter or pass, any coins of gold or silver or other metal, or alloys of metals, intended for use as current money, whether in the resemblance of coins of the United States or of foreign countries, or of original design, shall be fined under this title [1] or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. -- Click here to compare rates and find the best deal on renting a car. http://tagline.hushmail.com/fc/Ioyw6h4eRvDwuz9P8m2D4s4zsdl6iHIgravRnCU4NwqN… --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[PGP-USERS] Another Flaw in PGP found.
by Keith 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 It seems a programer has found another security flaw in PGP. Details tomorrow and the web page is at: http://www.security.nl/artikel.php3?id=2293 if you read Dutch. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.8 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> iQA/AwUBO5PU3bwKMbGJKZceEQI7FACgwMnUV0zDjIF4TG5Df636NQaRmuoAoOub rbDtGn3YmaId3B8AstQ59m4f =KhFO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Best Regards, Keith YahooIM:strongsignals_com AIM:KeithYit23 ========================================================== Find Windows Freeware @ http://strongsignals.com/ The rec.radio.swap Email List http://groups.yahoo.com/group/recradioswap/ Microsoft said OE5 or better so I installed Pegasus V4! ========================================================== .................................................................... Unsubscribe: <mailto:pgp-users-listbot@cryptorights.org?body=unsubscribe> Automated Help/Info: <mailto:pgp-users-listbot@cryptorights.org?body=help> List Homepage: <http://cryptorights.org/pgp-users/> List Admin (human): <mailto:pgp-users-admin-human@cryptorights.org> Please do not send administrative commands to the list address! Thanks. --- end forwarded text --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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