July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

FC: Ashcroft tells Congress he'll take hard line on porn, piracy
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

--- Excerpts from hearing transcript: http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=01/06/08/2143247&mode=thread --- http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,44398,00.html Ashcroft's Hard Line on Hardcore By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)wired.com) 2:00 a.m. June 9, 2001 PDT WASHINGTON -- Look out, Internet sextrepreneurs: John Aschroft wants you to serve hard time. In explicit terms, the attorney general told Congress this week that hardcore sex sites would no longer be selling peeks at balloon-breasted babes. "I am concerned about obscenity and I'm concerned about obscenity as it relates to our children," Ashcroft said in his first appearance before the House Judiciary Committee. He said Justice Department prosecutors would help state officials imprison sex-site operators that feature obscene images: "We try to be especially accommodating to local law enforcement to assist them, and I would think that would be an objective of ours in this respect." A number of Republicans asked Ashcroft to pledge to prosecute raunch and ribaldry, but Rep. Bob Goodlatte of Virginia -- who also, unbelievably, is co-chair of the Internet Caucus -- was the most persistent. "The failure of the (Clinton) administration to enforce those laws has led to a proliferation of obscenity, both online and off," Goodlatte said. "And I am particularly concerned about the safety of our children on the Internet, where they're subjected to child pornography and solicitation in a massive way." [...] ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. To subscribe, visit http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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[Politech] Are the encryption wars really over? Maybe not [priv]
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Whether the crypto wars are over depends on what you consider the dispute to be about in the first place. In the export-control sense, yep, we've won. We may not have had a resounding Supreme Court victory on First Amendment grounds, but the original regs proved politically untenable. How about domestic restrictions? That never really got off the ground in the U.S., even in the darkest days of the 1990s. But either could return swiftly. All it would take for a bill to be introduced is for Al Qaeda to have encrypted information that could have saved thousands of American lives were it decrypted in time. (Life does not follow the TV show "24".) See: http://www.politechbot.com/p-02509.html http://www.politechbot.com/p-02550.html I wouldn't be surprised if such a law would permit non-escrowed crypto to be used to secure communication streams while requiring .gov backdoors in crypto used for hard drive or file encryption. In other words, GPG and PGPdisk might become verboten. Programmers might sensibly scoff, but that's the way the Feds think. How about other restrictions? I don't think the crypto-in-a-crime idea ever got enacted into law, but a Minnesota court this month moved in that direction: http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5718978.html In other words, the war is probably not over. It's just in a multi-year lull. The correct preventative tactic to employ right now is to follow the IPv6 model and seed both disk and communication-stream encryption wherever it makes sense. Then it becomes more politically difficult to outlaw. Previous Politech message: http://www.politechbot.com/2005/05/24/crypto-wars-are/ -Declan -------- Original Message -------- Subject: RE: [Politech] Ross Anderson: Crypto wars are over,and we've won! [priv] Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 18:11:25 -0400 From: Pyke, Gila <gila.pyke(a)ssha.on.ca> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Hi Declan, This email generated a fair amount of discussion amongst my peers. The assertion by someone so well known and respected that the "crypto wars are over" was met with quite a bit of skepticism. A coworker (who wishes to remain nameless) said it best: "The battles over key escrow and export controls aren't the hot topics that they used to be. But that's not because the fight is over, more that it has moved on to other things like digital IDs, biometric passports, and the other hot topics that circulate on this list. Projects like the Clipper chip died not because of politics, but because it was difficult and impractical to deploy and get industry to adopt it (similar to the problems facing technologies such as PKI and smart cards). There are still (smaller) legal battles going on over giving law enforcement the right to decrypt a suspect's hard drive, or ISPs handing out passwords to their users' accounts, or cryptographers facing prosecution for publishing cryptanalytic results, and on and on. It has become more of a privacy battle than an encryption issue, but the battle is still there. And of course, there is still the prevailing paranoia that the NSA and other intelligence agencies have already cracked the crypto algorithms currently in circulation. This isn't too far-fetched considering the number of algorithms that have been broken and retired in recent years. " As far as many of us are concerned, cryptography always was and always will be a controversial science. I don't think the government's interest in controlling it will ever go away, although the face on it may change. Incidents like this one: ------------------- --Hackers Holding Computer Files 'Hostage' (23 May 2005) A new type of extortion plot has been identified, unlike any other cyber extortion, according to the FBI. Hackers used an infected website to infect computers with a program that encrypts the users file. Then the criminal demanded money for the key to decrypt the files. Enhanced versions of this attack threaten large numbers of users with loss of important data, loss of money, or both. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20050524/ap_on_hi_te/internet_ransom ------------------- ...will make sure of that. Efforts like TOR will always feel threatening to some of the people in power, and excuses like the war on terrorism will always give those people a well-hyped excuse to do "what they think is necessary". But that is just my fundie, cynical, tired opinion. Gila Pyke Policy Analyst Privacy and Security Division Smart Systems for Health Agency 416-586-4257 _______________________________________________ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor banned in Pakistan.
by Dave Jevans 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

DARPA has funded a project to develop a stego type communications system as a "next generation TOR". Its called SAFER Warfighter Communications. http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/SAFER_Warfighter_Communications_… On Sep 8, 2011, at 7:00 PM, "Michael Holstein" <michael.holstein(a)csuohio.edu> wrote: > >> Very disturbing. I wonder if its possible to hide encrypted traffic as >> seemingly unencrypted http traffic in much the same way as a gpg key is >> rendered as ascii armored, or stenographically inside images. Although >> such methods may be inefficient, they may be good enough for some purposes. >> > > Of course .. any number of mechanisms exist to do exactly this, although > (generally speaking) it's not to provide a "live" VPN service. A > constant HTTP stream of nothing but .jpegs would be pretty suspicious. > Video-type services might be a better bet (because the traffic would be > more believable) but if you can't encrypt it, all that's required to > render the stego useless is to (slightly) re-encode it transparently > (eg: take your 640x480 MPEG stream and run it through ffmpeg to lower > the bitrate by 10k or some such). > > One would detect this in the same way you do encrypted botnets .. you > stop looking for patterns *in* the traffic and start looking at *traffic > patterns* (ie: "that's odd, why is this machine doing a constant stream > of ICMP all of a sudden? .. what are these long DNS queries for?, why > are the HTTPS traffic ratios fairly symmetrical?" .. etc). > >> It would be good to know what technologies these ISPs will implement to >> do the packet inspection for encrypted tunnels. Half the problem is you >> don't really know what they'll be looking for and so you don't know how >> to circumvent. >> > > That's the key distinction here .. rather than try to "ban with > technology" (ie: "great firewall of china"), they went for "ban with > policy" .. meaning you'll likely never know if you're "getting away with > it" until the ISI shows up and drags you off. > > I suppose a clever service would be for Twitter (et.al.) to allow you to > upload a keypair for stego and a https "twitpic" site that allowed each > image to be checked for a valid signature and stego'd text, which would > then be published. > > Regards, > > Michael Holstein > Cleveland State University > > > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[drone-list] MeCam
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

...or, American 21st Century Death Match: Narcissism vs. Privacy liliputing (Jan 24) - "MeCam $49 flying camera concept follows you around, streams video to your phone": http://liliputing.com/2013/01/mecam-49-flying-camera-concept-follows-you-ar… gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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FC: Maine National Guard bars Green Party leader from flying
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.wartimeliberty.com/article.pl?sid=01/11/03/1813233 Military Bars Green Party Leader from Flying posted by declan on Saturday November 03, @12:36PM from the airports-are-now-a-no-speech-zone dept. As one of the U.S. Green Party's top officials, Nancy Oden is used to controversy. But Oden never expected to be hassled by National Guard troops at her hometown airport of Bangor, Maine on Thursday and barred from flying out of it. She thinks it's because of a Green Party statement she co-authored that ran in the local newspaper. The statement calls for universal health care, limitations on free trade, and a stop to "U.S. military incursions" including the bombing of Afghanistan. (The Green Party has labeled the U.S. military action an act of "state terrorism.") Oden's unsuccessful attempt to fly to Chicago for a Green Party national meeting follows a Philadelphia man's unpleasant experience after reading the wrong book at an airport, a California journalist's headaches for daring to take photos inside an airport, and the arrest of another man in Germany for bringing politically-unacceptable reading material to an airport. Also see Indymedia coverage of Oden's experience; the transcript of our interview with her from her home in Jonesboro, Maine is below. --- Interview of Nancy Oden by Declan McCullagh November 3, 2001 (Ed. Note: Nancy Oden is a top U.S. Green Party official and a member of the party's coordinating committee. An organic farmer, peace activist, and all-around firebrand, she lives in Jonesboro, Maine.) _________________________________________________________________ "Just a few weeks ago I had a piece in the Bangor paper. It's on our website, greenparty.org... I submitted it under my name alone. It's a fairly radical piece; that's what I do. I'm a political and environmental activist. "I walked into the Bangor airport. What I saw was National Guard folks all over carrying machine guns... The atmosphere was very tense... This was Thursday... I went over to the American Airlines ticket counter way down at the end. Nobody else was there, except the clerk. I gave him my name. He didn't even ask for photo ID. It was almost like they were expecting me. He put it into the computer. He stayed on the computer a long time, like 10 minutes. "He put an S on the boarding pass, for search. He said, 'You've been picked for having your bag searched.' ... I said to him, 'This wasn't random, was it?' He said, 'No you were in there to be searched, no matter what.' I went over to baggage to put my bags through the X-ray and then went into the boarding area. "There was this National Guard guy there. He yells over at me, so everyone can hear, 'Bring your bags over here.' You know how they are when they're all puffed up with themselves. He said, 'Hurry up,' so I slowed down some more. "I put my bags on the table. The two women employees were standing there. [I tried to help them with a stuck zipper.] He grabbed my left arm, he started yelling in my face, 'Don't you know what happened? Sep. 11, don't you know thousands of people died?' I said, 'You can't do that.' He went to grab my arm, and I said, 'Don't touch me.' I saw an older airline guy shake his head, 'No,' and he backed off. "That insulted his little manhood. He could not force me to listen to his idiot ideas on Sep. 11, whatever it was he wanted to say. So he was angry. I hadn't done anything except pull away from him... I think he was trying to provoke me. They did the wand thing, they were done, and I heard him say real soft, 'Don't let her on the plane,' like he was talking to himself. "Then I go to get on the plane since we're all done and everything, and the American Airlines ticket guy says,' You can't get on the plane.' I say, 'Why not?' ... He says, 'Because this guy says you didn't cooperate with the search.' ... I said, 'Didn't you see him grab my arm?' He said, 'No, your back was to me.' "He said, 'Maybe we can get you on the 4:00 plane, it's the last one today.' I felt, okay, let's put up with this aggravation now and I'll go to Chicago and we'll see what we can do... Then this little guard guy, it wasn't enough to stop me, wasn't done with me. He said, 'Come with me.' I followed very slowly, I sat down for a while. I said I'm carrying these bags; I need a rest... It's called passive resistance. "He went and found the airport police to come and talk with me. He went and got six other National Guard guys and they all approached me. Here are these six untrained, ignorant, don't-know-how-to-deal-with-the-public, machine-gun-armed young guys in their camouflage suits with their military gear hanging off of it. "I looked up and started laughing, 'Is all this for me, guys? What is this about?' There was this big burly guy, he was in front. He said, 'You didn't cooperate with the search.' ... I said what he did was grabbed my arm, and I backed away... He said he only hit your arm. I said even if that's all he did, he's not allowed to do that. He can't hit my arm and demand I listen to him. "They had the airport policeman tell me, 'You're not flying out of this airport today.' ... Of course I had cooperated; why do I care if they search my bags? ... What I didn't like was being singled out because of my political views. They couldn't arrest me because there was no reason for that. They had people who saw there was nothing to arrest me for. They wanted to get back at me somehow because I was not a subservient female, because I questioned their manhood. "I went to the American Airlines guy and said, 'Is this just today?' He said, 'I don't know.' One clerk said, 'You could drive to Boston [five hours away] and see if you can get out of there.' "I never made it out of Bangor. I had to turn around and drive 100 miles back home... The fact that they gave the other airlines my name... They told me they did that... That's incredible." ### ------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice. Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/ To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- End forwarded message -----

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[FoRK] Google buys Keyhole
by J. Andrew Rogers 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Finally. I've been sitting on this story for weeks, and I was looking forward to this morning because there is a lot about this deal that is worth talking about, particularly with regard to how this fits into Google's portfolio. Even though I knew about the deal, I have no clue as to the reasoning why Google bought them. All the talk about them being a "map provider" is a bit of nonsense, since Keyhole is a hell of a lot more than a map provider. If they wanted maps they could have gone to the source, since it isn't like Keyhole creates their own map data -- Keyhole is more of a data integrator. Salient points: - Keyhole is fussy Windows-only client software (something that won't change soon), which appears to be a departure from Google's normally web-centric applications. - Keyhole can consume some serious bandwidth, and isn't really something that will scale to average home use (in many different ways) without wholesale re-architecting of the system. - Keyhole has terabytes of very interesting databases, many of which are not public. For example, the US DoD has become fond of using Keyhole to process all sorts of reconnaissance, intelligence, and battle planning data. And more Federal agencies and foreign governments are moving to do the same. I've maintained for some time that Google is very aggressively trying to position themselves as a very deep data-mining operation, and are facilitating that by arranging that as much data as possible flow through their systems. I've stated in the past that they have the potential to be super-evil, if only because of the access they are being granted to vast ranges of data, which many people seem more than happy to grant. From that perspective, I find the above points worrisome. It will be very interesting to see what they do with this. cheers, j. andrew rogers _______________________________________________ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[WIKILEAKS] investigative journalists, pressure groups top new threats to national security
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

WIKILEAKS NOTABLE DOCUMENT RELEASE Mon Oct 5 00:31:35 GMT 2009 "2389 classified pages on how the UK stop leaks" http://tinyurl.com/wlmod This significant, previously unpublished document (classified "RESTRICTED", 2389 pages), is the UK military protocol for security operations, including counter-intelligence. The document includes instructions on dealing with leaks, investigative journalists, Parliamentarians, foreign agents, terrorists & criminals, sexual entrapments in Russia and China, diplomatic pouches, allies, classified documents & codewords, compromising radio and audio emissions, computer hackers.and many other related issues. The document, known in the services as the "JSP 440" ("Joint Services Protocol 440"), was referenced by the RAF Digby investigation team as the protocol justification for the monitoring Wikileaks, as mentioned in "UK Ministry of Defence continually monitors WikiLeaks: eight reports into classified UK leaks, 29 Sep 2009". Example excerpts (bolding by WikiLeaks, [see http://bit.ly/CgxBY] "D Def Sy" means Directorate of Defence Security): "Non-traditional threats The main threats of this type are posed by investigative journalists, pressure groups, investigation agencies, criminal eleme nts, disaffected staff, dishonest staff and computer hackers. The types of threat from these sources can be categorized in six broad groups: a. Confidentiality. Compromise of politically sensitive information. This threat is presented by: (1) Pressure groups and investigative journalists attempting to obtain sensitive information. (2) Unauthorized disclosure of official in formation (leaks)..." "Investigative journalists have exploited personal tax information; they also target commercial and financial information as do criminal elements seeking financial advantage. " [..] "Leaks of Official Information Leaks usually take the form of reports in the public media which appear to involve the unauthorised disclosure of official information (whether protectively marked or not) that causes political harm or embarrassment to either the UK Government or the Department concerned. Such disclosure may have been made either orally, whether deliberately or carelessly, or followi ng the unauthorised sight or passage of a document. Information that is formally reported as lost to a security authority, and subsequently appears in the public media, should not be treated as a leak but judged to be a compromise of lost information and treated as a loss. First news of a leak may come direct from a journalist attempting either to verify the information obtained or wishing the Department or agency to know what access to official information has been gained. In the rare cases where this occurs prior to publication, it may be possible to seek an injunction to prevent publication. Leaks of official information are to be reported to the appropriate PSyA or Command security staff in the first instance. Where the leak is judged to be serious, the PSyA or Command security staff are to bring it to the attention of D Def Sy as soon as practicable, and within 24 hours if possible. The consequences of leaks of official information are considered serious when they undermine government policy or cause embarrassment to the government. Examples are: a. The premature leaking of information on Defence Estimates or other financial details. b. The leaking of MOD correspondence on issues that are controversial at the time. c. The leaking of details of overseas defence equipment negotiations prior to formal agreements being signed. 0258. The following factors need to be taken into account by the relevant PSyA or Command security staff in preparing to report the incident as a leak to D Def Sy: a. The medium/media and journalists (if known) concerned. b. The intrinsic importance of information leaked. (If there is any doubt as to whether or not the information is important, D Def Sy should be consulted for advice). c. d. e. How widely the information was circulated and in what form. Can a specific document be identified for the contents of the leak. The identity, if immediately apparent, of the source of the leak. f. Whether or not the Official Secrets Acts are believed to have been breached, if immediately apparent. 0259. In general there is likely to be advantage in pursuing a leak investigation in those cases where..." [..] "The threat to operations against these targets is less likely to arise from positive acts of counter-espionage, than from leakage of information through disaffected members of staff, or as a result of the at tentions of an investigative journalist, or simply by accident or carelessness. 1706. In this wider definition of Threat, the "enemy" is unwelcome publicity of any kind, and through any medium. The most effective safeguard is to reinforce those aspects of security that minimise the risk of leakage of sensitive intelligence operations or product into the public domain - whether by accidental exposure or deliberate intent. The STRAP System aims to achieve this." [..] "The security measures in this chapter are aimed primarily to cover contacts made in CSSRAs and have been drawn up to protect the individual from action by FISs, extremist groups, investigative journalists and criminals." [..] "An Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) is issued to all Government Departments giving generic statements as to the main sources of Threat. This will include personnel who may be from or influenced by Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), authorized users who, for whatever motive, may seek to gain access to official information they have no 'need to know', subversive or terrorist organizations, and investigative journalists." [..] "The threat from subversive or terrorist organisations, investigative journalists and others must also be considered." "Experience has shown that at least half the attempts to hack into systems arise from this group and that external hackers use "social engineering" techniques to trick authorised users into revealing information which may aid an external penetration. 7. The Media. Investigative journalists are increasingly interested in State IT systems, particularly those operated by the police and the Security and Intelligence agencies. There has been evidence of premeditated attempts to acquire protectively marked information from IT systems. 8. Members of the Public. The fact that inform ation held electronically may be open to novel forms of surreptitious attack provides a special attraction to certain individuals, commonly known as 'hackers'. Whilst the efforts of hackers are unlikely to be directed specifically against protectively marked information, there is added kudos in breaking into Defence systems, so much information might be discovered fortuitously. " "..The threat from subversive and terrorist organizations, criminal activity, investigative journalists, and members of the public cannot be discounted..." "..Malicious software can originate from many sources such as disaffected staff, foreign intelligence services, investigative journalists or terrorists..." [..] "..The main elements of the Audio security threat are: a. The threat from deliberate attempts to overhear conversations posed by FIS (especially at locations overseas), sophisticated terrorist and subversive organisations and in particular from criminals, investigative journalists, private investigators and some members of the public..." [..] "..Identify possible threats to your site, such as from: Foreign Intelligence Services. Terrorist groups. Disaffected staff. Criminals. Investigative journalists." [..] "The protective marking of the definitions of the BIKINI Alert States is RESTRICTED but the codewords BIKINI WHITE, BIKINI BLACK, BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL, BIKINI AMBER and BIKINI RED are not protectively marked. These codewords may be passed by telephone provided that they are not qualified in any way. Notices displaying the current Alert States are to be sited so as to minimize the likelihood of the general public seeing them. These codewords and their meanings are understood by the civil police. The codewords and their definitions are not to be communicated to the media or any other unauthorized person." [..] "Chinese Intelligence Aims 3. Chinese intelligence activity is widespread and has a voracious appetite for all kinds of information; political, military,commercial, scientific and technical. It is on this area that the Chinese place their highest priority and where we assess that the greatest risk lies. 4. The Chinese have realised that it is not productive to simply steal technology and then try to `reverse engineer it'. Through intelligence activity they now attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of production te chniques and methodologies. There is an obvious economic risk to the UK. Our hard earned processes at very little cost and then reproduce them with cheap labour. 5. It is also, potentially, more serious than the above. In certain key military areas China is at least a generation behind the West. The Chinese may be able to acquire illegally the technology that will enable them to catch up. The real danger is that they will then produce advanced weapons systems which they will sell to unstable regimes. They have a track record of doing so. The consequences for the world's trouble spots and any UK involvement there could be disastrous. Characteristics of Chinese Intelligence Activity 6. Chinese intelligence activity is very different to the portrayal of `Moscow Rules' in the novels of John Le Carre. The Chinese make no distinction between `information' and `intelligence'. Their appetite for information, particularly in the scientific and technical field, is vast and indiscriminate. They do not `run agents' <AD> they `make friends'. Although there are Chinese `intelligence officers', both civilian and military, these fade into insignificance behind the mass of ordinary students, businessmen and locally employed staff who are working (at least part-time) on the orders of various parts of the S tate intelligence gathering apparatus. Cultivation 7. The process of being cultivated as a `friend of China' (ie. an `agent') is subtle and long-term. The Chinese are adept at exploiting a visitor's interest in, and appreciation of, Chinese history and culture. They are expert flatterers and are well aware of the `softening' effect of food and alcohol. Under cover of consultation or lecturing, a visitor may be given favours, advantageous economic conditions or commercial opportunities. In return they will be expected to give information or access to material. Or, at the very least, to speak out on China's behalf (becoming an `agent of influence'). Locally Engaged Staff 8. Most companies operating in China are obliged to employ a number of locally engaged staff supplied by organisations such as the `Provincial Friendship Labour Services Corporation'. It is probable that the Chinese civilian intelligence service will have briefed such staff to copy all papers to which they are able to gain access. Many Chinese students and some businessmen also work to a brief from the Chinese intelligence services. Technical Attacks 9. The Chinese intelligence services are known to employ telephone and electronic `bugs' in hotels and restaurants. They have also been known to search hotel rooms and to use surveillance techniques against visitors of particular interest. Compromise 10. The Chinese intelligence services have been known to use blackmail to persuade visitors to work for them. Sexual involvement should be avoided, as should any activity which can possible be construed as illegal. This would include dealing in black market currency or Chinese antiques and artefacts, straying into `forbidden' areas or injudicious use of a camera or video recorder." [..] "TRAVEL BRIEF FOR VISITS TO RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS About this brief 1. The purpose of this brief is to provide security advice for travellers to Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It describes both the risks involved in travelling to Russia and the other former Soviet Republics, and the action to be taken should trouble arise. The information in the brief is based on the actual experiences of recent travellers to the FSU. Why should I read this brief? 2. As a visitor to Russia and the FSU you may attract the attention of the local security and intelligence services. Although most travellers experience little or no trouble, it would be unwise for you to assume you are immune to this attention. As you will see from the examples given in this brief, all visitors to Russia and the FSU are potentially of interest to foreign intelligence services, irrespective of the purpose of the visit. What are the RFIS after? 3. In view of the poor state of the Russian economy, the Russian Federation Intelligence Services (RFIS) place a high priority on information to bolster their economy, scientific and technical information, and on information to help advance their pol itical influence. This extends to the theft of patents and to seeking detailed information on Western scientific developments. They also have an interest in political reporting, alongside their more traditional targets such as Western Defence and Security, eg NATO. The SVR (foreign intelligence service) and the GRU (military intelligence) try to recruit British subjects to work for them in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, often initially in minor support roles. They are always on the watch for any British subject who may be induced, either wittingly or unwittingly, to cooperate. They do not necessarily concentrate on those who already have access to information of value to them. The approach to Overseas Visitors 4. From the moment a visitor enters the country, he or she may be reported on by a wide variety of people, including officials, business contacts, tourist guides, hotel employees and apparent casual contacts. People who speak the visitor's own language may be introduced in such a way as to make him think that it was the visitor who took the initiative, or that their meeting was entirely fortuitous. We know it sounds like a spy movie, but as well as having wide networks of agents and informers, the FSB (Russian security service) makes extensive use of sophisticated technical devices. In the main hotels all telephones c an be tapped and in some rooms visual or photographic surveillance can be carried out, if necessary using infrared cameras to take photographs in the dark. If is perfectly possible for the FSB to ensure that the visitor is placed in such a room. There is also a wide range of technical devices, which can be used outside and even in places such as restaurants and cars. These technical devices pick up indiscreet talk which could be of use to the FSB. Methods of Compromise 5. Careful behaviour should be sufficient to avoid difficulties with the FSB, but visitors should bear in mind that they can get into trouble in many ways. Unofficial financial transactions, such as obtaining local currency at favourable rates or sel ling personal possessions to acquaintances, are all in contravention of local laws. A Russian friend or acquaintance may ask a visitor to deliver a letter or a present to some relative living in the West, but this is again in breach of local regulations. Taking works of art out of Russia is a serious offence, while drink-driving regulations are rigorous. There are strict r ules about taking photographs in Russia and it is advisable to find out in advance where cameras may be used. 6. Irregularity in personal behaviour may also lead to trouble. The FSB may attempt to capitalise on sexual liaisons between visitors and lo cal nationals. In addition, the FSB may attempt to compromise and subsequently blackmail through knowledge of marital infidelity or sexual activity the target may wish to hide. Risk of Arrest 7. A visitor who commits any offence against local laws runs the risk of being arrested and threatened with the withdrawal of business facilities, imprisonment or exposure unless he or she agrees to work for the FSB. Attempts may be made to induce the victim to sign a confession or to agree to cooperate. Alternatively, the evidence may be stored away for use at a later date, perhaps when their circumstances have changed (for example, after the visitor has married, or entered a different field of employment). 8. Visitors may face any of these hazards whenever they visit Russia but the FSB is especially active during Trade Fairs. At these times particular care should be taken. SVR and GRU Approaches Worldwide 9. As a general point, it should be borne in mind that both the SVR and GRU are known to have approached British nationals, in particular businessmen, in many parts of the world. The threat is especially high in some Third World countries where the R FIS believe they have little to fear from the local security services. People who have been regular visitors to Russia are more likely to come to notice since the FSB will hold some record of their personal details, which can be passed onto the SVR a nd the GRU. An indiscretion or irregularity committed in Russia, even if apparently unnoticed at the time, may be exploited by RFIS officers elsewhere. In addition, RFIS officers may make approaches using the cover of another nationality, for example Eastern European or Scandinavian, to disguise their true allegiance. Advice about visits to Other Former Soviet Republics 10. Visitors to the other former Soviet Republics should heed the advice given to visitors to Russia. Although these republics now have their own independent security services, many of them continue to cooperate closely with the RFIS. The RFIS are so comfortable operating in some former Soviet Republics that they regard them as virtually home territory. The advice about co mpromising offences and risk of arrest also applies. It should be noted that many of these republics are not used to Western visitors and may pay particular attention to them." [..] For more information, see: http://tinyurl.com/wlmod +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Worried about being watched? You already are
by Brian Randell 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave: This article, from today's (UK) Guardian, about the extent of existing and planned use of automatic car number plate recognition in the UK, might be of interest to IP. cheers Brian >Worried about being watched? You already are > >Objections to road pricing include fears about privacy. But number- >plate recognition is in use now > >SA Mathieson >Thursday February 15, 2007 >The Guardian > >More than 1.3m people have signed an online petition against road- >pricing - part of the objection to it being that it would require >the government to track all vehicle journeys. But police forces >have been tracking motorists for a decade - and are in the process >of joining up their systems nationally. > >In 1997, the City of London Police introduced automatic number- >plate recognition (ANPR) cameras on roads at the edge of the City. >These cameras are now used by police nationwide, both in vehicles >and at fixed locations. Forces use ANPR for anti-terrorism work and >it is also used to enforce London's congestion charge. > >The National ANPR Data Centre, run by the Association of Chief >Police Officers with funding from the Home Office, will centralise >all ANPR data from the 43 forces in England and Wales - although >not from the London congestion charge - and the system is set to go >live in stages between April and July. > >Checks on numberplates > >It will draw on several thousand cameras, according to John Dean, >the association's national co-ordinator on ANPR. Individual forces >already run real-time checks on every plate read. The City of >London police use 20 fixed ANPR sites and three mobile units: >"We're reasonably content that everything gets covered in the >City," says chief superintendent Alex Robertson of around 100,000 >daily vehicle movements. Registrations are checked against hotlists >from the Police National Computer, including vehicles of interest >to the police for crimes such as burglary or theft of petrol. The >check takes four seconds. "If we get a match, that comes back to >our control room," says Robertson. "We assess it, and decide if >it's a priority at that time." > >The data is also stored for later analysis: if a vehicle is used >for a crime in the City, the force should have an image of it >entering the area, which may also show the driver and passenger. >Robertson says this can help both include and exclude people and >vehicles from an inquiry. > >Given the way ANPR works, the national centre will not know about >every vehicle journey from start to finish, and those that do not >pass a camera will not be traced. What it will have is around 9m >sightings a day initially, with the capacity for 50m a day. The >details will be kept for two years, both at the data centre and by >the force concerned. > >The central system uses an Oracle database, with data for analysis >extracted to a Postgres database to avoid affecting core >performance, and custom-written Java software with specific police >networks rather than the internet used to send and receive data. > >For every sighting, a "plate patch" - a photo of the numberplate - >is also stored as a check: the technology aims to be 95% reliable >for UK plates, although this falls slightly in adverse conditions >and with foreign plates. Plate patches can be used as corroborative >evidence in court. > >The national centre will allow analysis that has been difficult to >do across police force boundaries. Dean gives the example of three >similar crimes that have been committed within one force's area, >all of which took place near ANPR cameras. The police checked the >vehicles scanned around the times of the crimes and were compared: >"There were two vehicles that were seen in the vicinity at those >times," Dean says, adding: "One was responsible for that crime." > >It will also carry out automated data-mining, including a search >for cloned vehicles: these can result in an innocent person >receiving speeding fines or worse. The software will look for >impossibly quick journeys: if the same plate is read in London, >then 10 minutes later in Liverpool, it will be added immediately to >a hotlist. "The clone will be identified even before an innocent >person is targeted, we hope," says Peter Wilson, assistant national >ANPR co-ordinator. . . . full article at: http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,,2012729,00.html Cheers Brian -- School of Computing Science, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK EMAIL = Brian.Randell(a)ncl.ac.uk PHONE = +44 191 222 7923 FAX = +44 191 222 8232 URL = http://www.cs.ncl.ac.uk/~brian.randell/ ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/@now Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Worried about being watched? You already are
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[WIKILEAKS] investigative journalists, pressure groups top new threats to national security
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

WIKILEAKS NOTABLE DOCUMENT RELEASE Mon Oct 5 00:31:35 GMT 2009 "2389 classified pages on how the UK stop leaks" http://tinyurl.com/wlmod This significant, previously unpublished document (classified "RESTRICTED", 2389 pages), is the UK military protocol for security operations, including counter-intelligence. The document includes instructions on dealing with leaks, investigative journalists, Parliamentarians, foreign agents, terrorists & criminals, sexual entrapments in Russia and China, diplomatic pouches, allies, classified documents & codewords, compromising radio and audio emissions, computer hackers.and many other related issues. The document, known in the services as the "JSP 440" ("Joint Services Protocol 440"), was referenced by the RAF Digby investigation team as the protocol justification for the monitoring Wikileaks, as mentioned in "UK Ministry of Defence continually monitors WikiLeaks: eight reports into classified UK leaks, 29 Sep 2009". Example excerpts (bolding by WikiLeaks, [see http://bit.ly/CgxBY] "D Def Sy" means Directorate of Defence Security): "Non-traditional threats The main threats of this type are posed by investigative journalists, pressure groups, investigation agencies, criminal eleme nts, disaffected staff, dishonest staff and computer hackers. The types of threat from these sources can be categorized in six broad groups: a. Confidentiality. Compromise of politically sensitive information. This threat is presented by: (1) Pressure groups and investigative journalists attempting to obtain sensitive information. (2) Unauthorized disclosure of official in formation (leaks)..." "Investigative journalists have exploited personal tax information; they also target commercial and financial information as do criminal elements seeking financial advantage. " [..] "Leaks of Official Information Leaks usually take the form of reports in the public media which appear to involve the unauthorised disclosure of official information (whether protectively marked or not) that causes political harm or embarrassment to either the UK Government or the Department concerned. Such disclosure may have been made either orally, whether deliberately or carelessly, or followi ng the unauthorised sight or passage of a document. Information that is formally reported as lost to a security authority, and subsequently appears in the public media, should not be treated as a leak but judged to be a compromise of lost information and treated as a loss. First news of a leak may come direct from a journalist attempting either to verify the information obtained or wishing the Department or agency to know what access to official information has been gained. In the rare cases where this occurs prior to publication, it may be possible to seek an injunction to prevent publication. Leaks of official information are to be reported to the appropriate PSyA or Command security staff in the first instance. Where the leak is judged to be serious, the PSyA or Command security staff are to bring it to the attention of D Def Sy as soon as practicable, and within 24 hours if possible. The consequences of leaks of official information are considered serious when they undermine government policy or cause embarrassment to the government. Examples are: a. The premature leaking of information on Defence Estimates or other financial details. b. The leaking of MOD correspondence on issues that are controversial at the time. c. The leaking of details of overseas defence equipment negotiations prior to formal agreements being signed. 0258. The following factors need to be taken into account by the relevant PSyA or Command security staff in preparing to report the incident as a leak to D Def Sy: a. The medium/media and journalists (if known) concerned. b. The intrinsic importance of information leaked. (If there is any doubt as to whether or not the information is important, D Def Sy should be consulted for advice). c. d. e. How widely the information was circulated and in what form. Can a specific document be identified for the contents of the leak. The identity, if immediately apparent, of the source of the leak. f. Whether or not the Official Secrets Acts are believed to have been breached, if immediately apparent. 0259. In general there is likely to be advantage in pursuing a leak investigation in those cases where..." [..] "The threat to operations against these targets is less likely to arise from positive acts of counter-espionage, than from leakage of information through disaffected members of staff, or as a result of the at tentions of an investigative journalist, or simply by accident or carelessness. 1706. In this wider definition of Threat, the "enemy" is unwelcome publicity of any kind, and through any medium. The most effective safeguard is to reinforce those aspects of security that minimise the risk of leakage of sensitive intelligence operations or product into the public domain - whether by accidental exposure or deliberate intent. The STRAP System aims to achieve this." [..] "The security measures in this chapter are aimed primarily to cover contacts made in CSSRAs and have been drawn up to protect the individual from action by FISs, extremist groups, investigative journalists and criminals." [..] "An Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) is issued to all Government Departments giving generic statements as to the main sources of Threat. This will include personnel who may be from or influenced by Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), authorized users who, for whatever motive, may seek to gain access to official information they have no 'need to know', subversive or terrorist organizations, and investigative journalists." [..] "The threat from subversive or terrorist organisations, investigative journalists and others must also be considered." "Experience has shown that at least half the attempts to hack into systems arise from this group and that external hackers use "social engineering" techniques to trick authorised users into revealing information which may aid an external penetration. 7. The Media. Investigative journalists are increasingly interested in State IT systems, particularly those operated by the police and the Security and Intelligence agencies. There has been evidence of premeditated attempts to acquire protectively marked information from IT systems. 8. Members of the Public. The fact that inform ation held electronically may be open to novel forms of surreptitious attack provides a special attraction to certain individuals, commonly known as 'hackers'. Whilst the efforts of hackers are unlikely to be directed specifically against protectively marked information, there is added kudos in breaking into Defence systems, so much information might be discovered fortuitously. " "..The threat from subversive and terrorist organizations, criminal activity, investigative journalists, and members of the public cannot be discounted..." "..Malicious software can originate from many sources such as disaffected staff, foreign intelligence services, investigative journalists or terrorists..." [..] "..The main elements of the Audio security threat are: a. The threat from deliberate attempts to overhear conversations posed by FIS (especially at locations overseas), sophisticated terrorist and subversive organisations and in particular from criminals, investigative journalists, private investigators and some members of the public..." [..] "..Identify possible threats to your site, such as from: Foreign Intelligence Services. Terrorist groups. Disaffected staff. Criminals. Investigative journalists." [..] "The protective marking of the definitions of the BIKINI Alert States is RESTRICTED but the codewords BIKINI WHITE, BIKINI BLACK, BIKINI BLACK SPECIAL, BIKINI AMBER and BIKINI RED are not protectively marked. These codewords may be passed by telephone provided that they are not qualified in any way. Notices displaying the current Alert States are to be sited so as to minimize the likelihood of the general public seeing them. These codewords and their meanings are understood by the civil police. The codewords and their definitions are not to be communicated to the media or any other unauthorized person." [..] "Chinese Intelligence Aims 3. Chinese intelligence activity is widespread and has a voracious appetite for all kinds of information; political, military,commercial, scientific and technical. It is on this area that the Chinese place their highest priority and where we assess that the greatest risk lies. 4. The Chinese have realised that it is not productive to simply steal technology and then try to `reverse engineer it'. Through intelligence activity they now attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of production te chniques and methodologies. There is an obvious economic risk to the UK. Our hard earned processes at very little cost and then reproduce them with cheap labour. 5. It is also, potentially, more serious than the above. In certain key military areas China is at least a generation behind the West. The Chinese may be able to acquire illegally the technology that will enable them to catch up. The real danger is that they will then produce advanced weapons systems which they will sell to unstable regimes. They have a track record of doing so. The consequences for the world's trouble spots and any UK involvement there could be disastrous. Characteristics of Chinese Intelligence Activity 6. Chinese intelligence activity is very different to the portrayal of `Moscow Rules' in the novels of John Le Carre. The Chinese make no distinction between `information' and `intelligence'. Their appetite for information, particularly in the scientific and technical field, is vast and indiscriminate. They do not `run agents' <AD> they `make friends'. Although there are Chinese `intelligence officers', both civilian and military, these fade into insignificance behind the mass of ordinary students, businessmen and locally employed staff who are working (at least part-time) on the orders of various parts of the S tate intelligence gathering apparatus. Cultivation 7. The process of being cultivated as a `friend of China' (ie. an `agent') is subtle and long-term. The Chinese are adept at exploiting a visitor's interest in, and appreciation of, Chinese history and culture. They are expert flatterers and are well aware of the `softening' effect of food and alcohol. Under cover of consultation or lecturing, a visitor may be given favours, advantageous economic conditions or commercial opportunities. In return they will be expected to give information or access to material. Or, at the very least, to speak out on China's behalf (becoming an `agent of influence'). Locally Engaged Staff 8. Most companies operating in China are obliged to employ a number of locally engaged staff supplied by organisations such as the `Provincial Friendship Labour Services Corporation'. It is probable that the Chinese civilian intelligence service will have briefed such staff to copy all papers to which they are able to gain access. Many Chinese students and some businessmen also work to a brief from the Chinese intelligence services. Technical Attacks 9. The Chinese intelligence services are known to employ telephone and electronic `bugs' in hotels and restaurants. They have also been known to search hotel rooms and to use surveillance techniques against visitors of particular interest. Compromise 10. The Chinese intelligence services have been known to use blackmail to persuade visitors to work for them. Sexual involvement should be avoided, as should any activity which can possible be construed as illegal. This would include dealing in black market currency or Chinese antiques and artefacts, straying into `forbidden' areas or injudicious use of a camera or video recorder." [..] "TRAVEL BRIEF FOR VISITS TO RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS About this brief 1. The purpose of this brief is to provide security advice for travellers to Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It describes both the risks involved in travelling to Russia and the other former Soviet Republics, and the action to be taken should trouble arise. The information in the brief is based on the actual experiences of recent travellers to the FSU. Why should I read this brief? 2. As a visitor to Russia and the FSU you may attract the attention of the local security and intelligence services. Although most travellers experience little or no trouble, it would be unwise for you to assume you are immune to this attention. As you will see from the examples given in this brief, all visitors to Russia and the FSU are potentially of interest to foreign intelligence services, irrespective of the purpose of the visit. What are the RFIS after? 3. In view of the poor state of the Russian economy, the Russian Federation Intelligence Services (RFIS) place a high priority on information to bolster their economy, scientific and technical information, and on information to help advance their pol itical influence. This extends to the theft of patents and to seeking detailed information on Western scientific developments. They also have an interest in political reporting, alongside their more traditional targets such as Western Defence and Security, eg NATO. The SVR (foreign intelligence service) and the GRU (military intelligence) try to recruit British subjects to work for them in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, often initially in minor support roles. They are always on the watch for any British subject who may be induced, either wittingly or unwittingly, to cooperate. They do not necessarily concentrate on those who already have access to information of value to them. The approach to Overseas Visitors 4. From the moment a visitor enters the country, he or she may be reported on by a wide variety of people, including officials, business contacts, tourist guides, hotel employees and apparent casual contacts. People who speak the visitor's own language may be introduced in such a way as to make him think that it was the visitor who took the initiative, or that their meeting was entirely fortuitous. We know it sounds like a spy movie, but as well as having wide networks of agents and informers, the FSB (Russian security service) makes extensive use of sophisticated technical devices. In the main hotels all telephones c an be tapped and in some rooms visual or photographic surveillance can be carried out, if necessary using infrared cameras to take photographs in the dark. If is perfectly possible for the FSB to ensure that the visitor is placed in such a room. There is also a wide range of technical devices, which can be used outside and even in places such as restaurants and cars. These technical devices pick up indiscreet talk which could be of use to the FSB. Methods of Compromise 5. Careful behaviour should be sufficient to avoid difficulties with the FSB, but visitors should bear in mind that they can get into trouble in many ways. Unofficial financial transactions, such as obtaining local currency at favourable rates or sel ling personal possessions to acquaintances, are all in contravention of local laws. A Russian friend or acquaintance may ask a visitor to deliver a letter or a present to some relative living in the West, but this is again in breach of local regulations. Taking works of art out of Russia is a serious offence, while drink-driving regulations are rigorous. There are strict r ules about taking photographs in Russia and it is advisable to find out in advance where cameras may be used. 6. Irregularity in personal behaviour may also lead to trouble. The FSB may attempt to capitalise on sexual liaisons between visitors and lo cal nationals. In addition, the FSB may attempt to compromise and subsequently blackmail through knowledge of marital infidelity or sexual activity the target may wish to hide. Risk of Arrest 7. A visitor who commits any offence against local laws runs the risk of being arrested and threatened with the withdrawal of business facilities, imprisonment or exposure unless he or she agrees to work for the FSB. Attempts may be made to induce the victim to sign a confession or to agree to cooperate. Alternatively, the evidence may be stored away for use at a later date, perhaps when their circumstances have changed (for example, after the visitor has married, or entered a different field of employment). 8. Visitors may face any of these hazards whenever they visit Russia but the FSB is especially active during Trade Fairs. At these times particular care should be taken. SVR and GRU Approaches Worldwide 9. As a general point, it should be borne in mind that both the SVR and GRU are known to have approached British nationals, in particular businessmen, in many parts of the world. The threat is especially high in some Third World countries where the R FIS believe they have little to fear from the local security services. People who have been regular visitors to Russia are more likely to come to notice since the FSB will hold some record of their personal details, which can be passed onto the SVR a nd the GRU. An indiscretion or irregularity committed in Russia, even if apparently unnoticed at the time, may be exploited by RFIS officers elsewhere. In addition, RFIS officers may make approaches using the cover of another nationality, for example Eastern European or Scandinavian, to disguise their true allegiance. Advice about visits to Other Former Soviet Republics 10. Visitors to the other former Soviet Republics should heed the advice given to visitors to Russia. Although these republics now have their own independent security services, many of them continue to cooperate closely with the RFIS. The RFIS are so comfortable operating in some former Soviet Republics that they regard them as virtually home territory. The advice about co mpromising offences and risk of arrest also applies. It should be noted that many of these republics are not used to Western visitors and may pay particular attention to them." [..] For more information, see: http://tinyurl.com/wlmod +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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