July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Dewayne-Net] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K
by dewayne＠warpspeed.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

pricetag [Note: This item comes from reader Ken DiPietro. DLH] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K pricetag 10/16/2007 @ 10:14 am Filed by Nick Juliano <http://rawstory.com/news/2007/ For_one_company_FISA_wiretaps_carry_1016.html> Although the scope of surveillance conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act remains shrouded in secrecy, newly disclosed documents show the costs one company charges the government to eavesdrop on customers. Comcast, which is among the nation's largest telecommunication companies, charges $1,000 to install a FISA wiretap and $750 for each additional month authorities want to keep an eye on suspects, according to the company's Handbook for Law Enforcement. Secrecy News obtained the document and published it Monday. "I was actually surprised that this was such a routine transaction that it would have a set fee," said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy. Aftergood, who runs the Secrecy News blog, told RAW STORY that the Comcast document was the only one he has seen outlining wiretap procedures and costs, so he couldn't compare Comcast's fees with those charged by other telecoms. The Comcast handbook says the company will comply with legal requests from federal, state and local authorities to monitor the communications of criminal suspects, and the company notes legal ambiguity surrounding some of the more controversial tools that have emerged since Sept. 11, 2001. The manual says an FBI agent must hand deliver National Security Letters to Comcast's headquarters in Philadelphia. "Upon receipt Comcast will handle all documents with the appropriate care and security as required by law," the handbook says. "Attention must be paid to the various court proceedings in which the legal status of such requests is at issue." Aftergood acknowledged that the handbook doesn't do much by way of establishing the scope of FISA surveillance or NSLs. "I think it's more or an interesting nugget" of information," Aftergood said. "Even if there are let's say 100 or 200 $1,000 payments (for FISA intercepts) over the course of a year, I think those would be indistinguishable from the larger revenue stream." ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K pricetag
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [IP] more on Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd
by Roger Weeks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dave - For IP on the laptop border searches: I'm suprised that no one else has mentioned this so far, but this type of situation is one of the many excellent reasons to use an encrypted filesystem on your laptop hard disk, and to set up other types of security. For example, my PowerBook G4 is set up to use the built-in feature of OS X called FileVault, which encrypts the user's home directory. The home directory on OS X contains the browser cache for Safari, Firefox, and Camino, and I have to assume, any other browser cache for Opera and other browsers. I have also set an Open Firmware boot password. See http://www.apple.com/downloads/macosx/apple/openfirmwarepassword.html for details. When I travel I never put my laptop to sleep, but rather I shut it all the way down. This is marginally less convenient, but it means that if my laptop is stolen or confiscated, the Open Firmware password will be the first thing that the attacker sees. Supposing that is broken, they will then have to deal with logging into my laptop. My root account is disabled, like all OS X installs. I have my login preferences set to not show the usernames on the computer, so the attacker will have to guess both a login name and password. If the attacker were to take the hard disk out of my laptop and make an image of it with forensic software, they would find an encrypted partition. I'm sure the NSA probably has the horsepower to throw at cracking AES-128 encryption, but chances are my laptop will never get to them if we're talking about local law enforcement. For those in the Windows or Linux world, you can set a BIOS password on your laptop which is very similar to the Open Firmware boot password for Apple Hardware. Windows XP and Windows 2003 both include support for encrypting filesystems using DESX or 3DES, via the Encrypted File System. PGP Corp sells a product called "PGP Whole Disk Encryption" for Windows 2000 & XP that uses AES-256 encryption. Linux users can make a loopback encrypted filesystem for storing anything they wish to be encrypted. See http://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/ Cryptoloop-HOWTO/ for details. I don't believe it is a crime in any US Federal or State law, or in Canadian law, to set passwords and use encryption. In the US, I believe that a warrant would be necessary for law enforcement to ask for your password, but I don't know if you have to comply. IANAL. -- Roger J. Weeks Systems & Network Administrator Mendocino Community Network Now offering DSL across California ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] more on Police Blotter: Laptop border searches OK'd
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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[Dewayne-Net] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K
by dewayne＠warpspeed.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

pricetag [Note: This item comes from reader Ken DiPietro. DLH] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K pricetag 10/16/2007 @ 10:14 am Filed by Nick Juliano <http://rawstory.com/news/2007/ For_one_company_FISA_wiretaps_carry_1016.html> Although the scope of surveillance conducted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act remains shrouded in secrecy, newly disclosed documents show the costs one company charges the government to eavesdrop on customers. Comcast, which is among the nation's largest telecommunication companies, charges $1,000 to install a FISA wiretap and $750 for each additional month authorities want to keep an eye on suspects, according to the company's Handbook for Law Enforcement. Secrecy News obtained the document and published it Monday. "I was actually surprised that this was such a routine transaction that it would have a set fee," said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy. Aftergood, who runs the Secrecy News blog, told RAW STORY that the Comcast document was the only one he has seen outlining wiretap procedures and costs, so he couldn't compare Comcast's fees with those charged by other telecoms. The Comcast handbook says the company will comply with legal requests from federal, state and local authorities to monitor the communications of criminal suspects, and the company notes legal ambiguity surrounding some of the more controversial tools that have emerged since Sept. 11, 2001. The manual says an FBI agent must hand deliver National Security Letters to Comcast's headquarters in Philadelphia. "Upon receipt Comcast will handle all documents with the appropriate care and security as required by law," the handbook says. "Attention must be paid to the various court proceedings in which the legal status of such requests is at issue." Aftergood acknowledged that the handbook doesn't do much by way of establishing the scope of FISA surveillance or NSLs. "I think it's more or an interesting nugget" of information," Aftergood said. "Even if there are let's say 100 or 200 $1,000 payments (for FISA intercepts) over the course of a year, I think those would be indistinguishable from the larger revenue stream." ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[IP] For one company, FISA wiretaps carry a $1K pricetag
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [liberationtech] What's wrong with the kids these days? - On the moral decay of the Dutch hacker scene
by Shava Nerad 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

When I worked for Tor I was constantly told I did not "get" the hacker scene by the 20-30 something hackers. I am more or less a contemporary with rms and ESR. In fact I danced to Eric's flute in the halls of east coast US science fiction cons when we were both still teens, and Richard took me Balkan dancing in 78 (still teens) to pump me for advice on how to get in good with my best friend - later I was the first publicist for FSF and he "fired" me for lack of orthodoxy. ;) But the modern hacker scene at Schmoo and such often bothered me. I consider myself to have this unfashionable moral compass. Arriving at Schmoo my first year with Tor a tall Raybanned dude sidled up to me and said, "You're that little lady who's positioned Tor as a human rights tool, aren't you?" I smiled and turned to chat with him (I'd been briefed about introductions) but he just chuckled deep in his throat and said, "*Good one.*" Then he turned and walked away. Describing this moment it's hard to portray its impact. I felt slapped, dissed, and like I wanted to shower. Like I had just been sexually violated (he had that vibe) in a way that I couldn't identify but everyone in the room knew. There are some amazing personalities in this community. But we are supposed to be all so so collegial. Like it is parliament, ikr? We do a better job of staying cordial than most houses of parliament, but then - what member of parliament is likely to do pentesting on a rival if he or she gets pissed? So perhaps someone will make a heartfelt appeal at CCC for ethical hacking. But there is less criticism of the darknet and moderate means of ameliorating harm to society by net jerks without slippery slopes. We nearly avoid education because we can't divide ethics from moralizing, we don't believe we can block asshats who want to bury conversations because someone will accuse us of suppressing unpopular speech... We have no confidence in wisdom or judgement in our community. We are so bought into "operating without trust" that we can not have a real community of trust. And so we lost our children - no wonder - to the people who offer unit cohesion and belonging. Criminals and LE and jerks. Not anarchists who can't engage their hearts over time. Or engaging their words and reputations where it might risk them looking like fools, or putting them at risk. But in the US, very few people other than myself criticize Anonymous for endangering naifs by not informing participants on consequences (while organizers fully protect themselves) or creating a co-optable shell, or ducking the definition of civil disobedience. The lack of connection to traditional activist methods in this ultimately weakens the strategy imo and dooms the movement. This strengthens anti-civil-libertarians at DHS and sets up the April "cybersecurity" week in the House with more fodder than it needs. Another example of a lost generation imo. yrs, ---- Shava Nerad shava23(a)gmail.com -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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None
by owner-cypherpunks＠cyberpass.net 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

NIEGPINI.EXE

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None
by owner-cypherpunks＠cyberpass.net 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

NIEGPINI.EXE

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[tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Call notes
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Folks: We had another Tahoe-LAFS Weekly Call. Here are my notes, which are patchy and could be inaccurate. You could check this publicly editable notepad for updates from the other attendees of the call. http://titanpad.com/qnudyEsEoR In attendance: Brian, David-Sarah, Zooko About leasedb schema and Python code: b" Use ascii-encoded or binary blobs in the leasedb (sqlite db)? b" Use ascii-encoded or binary strings to hold things like shareids inside the Python interpreter? About accounting: Server admin should be able to see aggregate usage per account. We have read-only admin WUIs because we don't yet have a good technology to authorize the administrator to access a WUI without exposing the same access to CSRF attacks. (Brian has a prototype solution in his "toolbed" project.) Use cases of sharing: b" Club b" For-profit service (e.g. Least Authority) Individual pairwise storage relationships: b" Social (as long as there is visibility and control, Bob doesn't need to feel like he needs something explicit specific in exchange) b" Money b" Tit for Tat b" 3-way: Bob is running a server, Alice is running a client. She is also, separately running a server (or hiring someone else to run a server that Bob can use). So, Bob wants to let Alice's client use his server because he knows that she is responsible for that other server that he can use. Somewhere along the line there is going to be a graph of who likes whom -- who has accepted storage obligations for whom. Eventually Brian wants to provide tools at *least* to visualize, and ideally to manage, this network of social relationships. People could, perhaps configure their node to give anybody storage space as long as that person is giving you at least X% as much storage space (Tit for Tat). The three messages are: 1. I will accept shares from this other person. 2. I'm willing to send shares to this other person. 3. I'm working for this other person (as a storage server). Next week: b" Try some alternate tech such as Google Hangouts or Skype? POTS quality is bad enough to interfere with communication. b" More about accounting relationship management -- present the higher-altitude picture of the roadmap from Brian's mind. The short-term decision that we have to make is whether to have one key or two keys -- a separate key for the client and for the server. After David-Sarah rang off for dinner, Zooko made the following proposal to Brian as a "baby step". Zooko's motivation is that this would be simple to understand (especially for non-Brian people), and useful (e.g. to volunteergrid2 folks), and hopefully forward-compatible with the better "invitation protocol" design that Brian has in mind. Baby Step Proposal: There is a file named "clients.txt" which is edited by a human and is treated as read-only by the Tahoe-LAFS storage server (and is ignored entirely by Tahoe-LAFS the storage client). It is a text file with one record per line. Each record is a complete ascii-encoded public key followed by an optional whitespace and pet name. If your client's public key appears in the server's "clients.txt" file, then your storage usage gets accounted for and displayed to the storage server owner with his petname for you. If your client's public key does not appear in that clients.txt, then your storage usage goes into the "open, anonymous" accounting bucket (or else maybe gets tracked under your public key?). Or, the storage server operator can turn on the mode where if your client's public key does not appear in his "clients.txt" file, then it refuses to let you store data there at all. There is an analogous file named "servers.txt" which is read but not written by Tahoe-LAFS storage clients and is ignored entirely by Tahoe-LAFS storage servers. This file contains a list of public keys and optional petnames for storage servers. In "backwards compatibility mode", it tracks which of those servers you store how much data with. In "strict mode", it refuses to store data with storage servers that don't have public keys in that file. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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