July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: hosted PBX/VOIP thru VPN?
by Aaron Wolfe 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 9:17 PM, Lorell Hathcock <lorell(a)hathcock.org> wrote: > All: > > > > My customer wants to try to improve performance to his ATAs by > creating a > VPN from his network to the VOIP provider's network through the > internet. > > > > I have to admit, the idea caught me flat footed. At the outset, it > seems > like we would want to do it just to improve security for end users. > However, > my customer wants it because he thinks it will improve performance > (i.e. > voice quality). We are suffering from poor VOIP quality due to the > Sprint / > Cogent depeering and subsequent squirming by our vendors. > > > > The only reason I can think that VOIP thru a VPN would help is that > *perhaps* routers in the middle on ASNs I have no control over *may* > prioritize VPN traffic higher than regular traffic. They opposite > could > also be true. > > > > Specifically the ASNs in the middle are Level 3, Sprint and Time > Warner. > > > > Thoughts? Should I try to dissuade him from this if performance is > his main > motivator? > Your customer may have seen this article (or a similar one): http://www.oreillynet.com/etel/blog/2006/03/strangely_ssl_vpns_can_help_vo.… After reading it a year ago, I've found their discoveries to hold true on my own (small) projects with voip. In a nutshell: "In every case, adding an SSL VPN to a VoIP call over a good broadband network improved call quality. So in effect, wrapping a VoIP call in SSL gives it more structure, kind of like the rind of good Brie. What we had not counted on was the huge difference between what VoIP requires (64Kbps) and a typical broadband connection of 500Kbps or more. Because the broadband connection was so fast, TCP was able to repair the impairments without reducing voice quality. " May or may not apply to your situation, but if bandwidth isn't scarce then I wouldn't be surprised if your customer is correct, at very least they are not crazy :) Good luck -Aaron > > > Thanks! > > > > Sincerely, > > > > Lorell Hathcock > > > > OfficeConnect.net | 832-665-3400 (o) | 713-992-2343 (f) | > lorell(a)OfficeConnect.net > > > > ocbannerjoomla

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Re: [tor-talk] US Senators Seek to Crackdown on Bitcoin
by andre76＠fastmail.fm 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, 16 Jun 2011 13:14 +0100, "Anon Mus" <my.green.lantern(a)googlemail.com> wrote: > Pad 0c wrote: > > - I bet on the fact that others will came after me. > > - I bet that bitcoin will be still used at some later point. > > > > Only the first describe a ponzi scheme and I think only the second apply for > > bitcoins. > > > > > > This is very true and is something which differentiates BitCoin from a > ponzi scheme. The ponzi scheme is ALWAYS based on nothing right to its > bitter end. > > But BC does have INTRINSIC value, because it... > > 1. has only a known/set limited availability > 2. is provably unforgeable Bitcoin fails on point 1 above as the market place and suppliers of the unit of exchange (money) can determine quantity and not some stupid computer. That's exactly what the Federal Reserve is doing now with their "quantitative easing" (inflation) methods. Bitcoin fails on point 2 above as someone will be able to figure out how to counterfeit a digital quantity. Let's see you counterfeit a 1 ounce Gold or Silver piece. > > these are the qualities desirable in ANY value based exchange token > (barter), whether it be gold bullion, chickens or sheep. This is why > England used the "tally stick", for a long time, when England had no > Gold etc, it generated a barter system based it. > > So BC is also a barter substitute (or currency), that is this all the > same, its just a token between. > > At the end of the day, it matters not a single jot what its current > comparative value is, as long a people are trading it. For day to day > transactions, it is ALL that is needed. But for horders, banksters and > other similar blood sucking manipulators, they cannot predict its value > in the long term, and this they hate, as there is no "promise to pay the > bearer" anything. So they will slander it. As more people trade in it, > then the more stable it becomes, as people get frightened a government > will collapse (not just outlaw) it, then its use will fall and so too > will its price > > I have had my own reservations about BitCoin, that is, that its > designers did not anonymize BitCoins rendezvous and had non-anonymously > centralized itself so it could be attacked by a hostile government, like > it is being attacked now by the US. > > I think it is highly likely that the drug supplier "Silk Road" is a > protected CIA black op. to attack BC and to destroy it. This was an > obvious draw-back right from the start and was the reason I stopped > generating BC's a long while back. Governments and other evil people do > not play fairly, so never assume they will. The designers of BC did > assume just that, and that was there error. To design adn test it was > one thing but the implementation had to be completely anonymous. > > What needs to be done is that a NewBitCoin (NBC) system needs to be > started up behind hidden services and for them to offer a swap with the > existing BC. Perhaps there should even be "official" completely > anonymous NBC consortium with several NBC servers each doing multiple > NBC i.e. NBC1, NBC2, NBC3 etc (all interchangeable currencies - at least > at the start), so as to be locationally robust. Bitcoins are worthless and have no value. Here's an article about Bitcoin from LewRockwell.com June 9, 2011 Bitcoin: Just Another Bogus Medium of Exchange Posted by David Kramer on June 9, 2011 03:00 PM I'm sure by now many of you have heard about Bitcoin. The fact that it's called "virtual currency" gives you an idea about its actual value as a real medium of exchange. While many people who are touting it on Facebook are enamored with the fact that it was voluntarily created by the marketplace (i.e., is not forced down our throats by a private central bank), I'm afraid that those people are losing sight of how a real medium of exchange arises in a free market. A medium of exchange arises from something that had a material use/value in the market prior to becoming a medium of exchange, i.e., it was also a good being bartered for other goods and services. Over the centuries, the commodities gold and silver won out as the two most preferred mediums of exchangebwith gold holding the number one position due to its being more scarce than silver. What was Bitcoin's prior material use/value? Zero. It is just bits in a computer. And what's with the "fixed" amount of Bitcoins? Who/what determined the "proper" amount of 21 million for Bitcoins to top out at? A computer program? (Next we'll find out what the proper minimum wage should be.) Only the free market can voluntarily determine how much of a real medium of exchange is needed in the marketplace over time. While the idea of attempting to get rid of the Bankster monopoly on creating money out of thin air is commendable, Bitcoin is also money created out of thin air. Bitcoin is just substituting one bogus medium of exchange for another. UPDATE: I've been getting a lot of reader response trying to "explain" to me the economic virtues of Bitcoin. Some responders have even mistakenly used Austrian economics to rationalize their views. I would suggest that before you write to me about the Austrian economics view of a medium of exchange, you should read the two books by one of the two giants of Austrian economics, Murray Rothbard, on what a medium of exchange is. Here is the pdf for Rothbard's What Has Government Done to Our Money and here is the pdf for Rothbard's The Case Against the Fed. For those of you who have not yet read any Austrian economics, please do not waste your time writing to me trying to explain the "scientific" breakthrough of the bogus Bitcoin computer program. (There already was a REAL digital currency, e-gold, that was backed by a real commodity until the Federalistas shut it down. Eventually, Bitcoin will be shut down too because of its anonymity capabilities.) Check out Mises.org of and search for more information about money and what it is. > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Faster than the air-speed velocity of an unladen european swallow _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [Politech] Weekly column: FBI's latest wiretapping push [priv]
by Dean Anderson 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

The one thing I try to remind people, is that "technology has no loyalty". It can be used against you as easily as you can use it against someone else. Further, the concept of an _FBI_controlled_ backdoor is completely novel in the telecom industry. With telephone tapping, the FBI is supposed to have paperwork. Then the telephone company will route the audio of that phone to a "wiretap port", a line to the FBI office in response to an FBI request, for which records are kept. The FBI is never, ever given access to the CO cableplant, or the CO facilities. FBI tapping equipment is not allowed in a Telephone Office. There is someone in the Telephone company that _can_ blow the whistle either publicly or to the FBI itself in the event of abuse. (eg, Agent soandso asked for a Tap on his ex-wife) In contrast, the kind of facilities that the FBI is installing into the internet carriers allows the FBI unsupervised access to all and any communications. There is no way to detect abuse. Futher, the FBI's own equipment is itself potentially vulnerable to cracking, and therefore, misuse by criminals. It can be misused by FBI employees, who, as we've found out with the Boston FBI Office, are themselves sometimes working for Organized Crime. The extreme ease of use of internet wiretapping and lack of accountability is not a good situation to create. --Dean ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by Dave Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

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Re: [tor-talk] US Senators Seek to Crackdown on Bitcoin
by andre76＠fastmail.fm 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, 16 Jun 2011 13:14 +0100, "Anon Mus" <my.green.lantern(a)googlemail.com> wrote: > Pad 0c wrote: > > - I bet on the fact that others will came after me. > > - I bet that bitcoin will be still used at some later point. > > > > Only the first describe a ponzi scheme and I think only the second apply for > > bitcoins. > > > > > > This is very true and is something which differentiates BitCoin from a > ponzi scheme. The ponzi scheme is ALWAYS based on nothing right to its > bitter end. > > But BC does have INTRINSIC value, because it... > > 1. has only a known/set limited availability > 2. is provably unforgeable Bitcoin fails on point 1 above as the market place and suppliers of the unit of exchange (money) can determine quantity and not some stupid computer. That's exactly what the Federal Reserve is doing now with their "quantitative easing" (inflation) methods. Bitcoin fails on point 2 above as someone will be able to figure out how to counterfeit a digital quantity. Let's see you counterfeit a 1 ounce Gold or Silver piece. > > these are the qualities desirable in ANY value based exchange token > (barter), whether it be gold bullion, chickens or sheep. This is why > England used the "tally stick", for a long time, when England had no > Gold etc, it generated a barter system based it. > > So BC is also a barter substitute (or currency), that is this all the > same, its just a token between. > > At the end of the day, it matters not a single jot what its current > comparative value is, as long a people are trading it. For day to day > transactions, it is ALL that is needed. But for horders, banksters and > other similar blood sucking manipulators, they cannot predict its value > in the long term, and this they hate, as there is no "promise to pay the > bearer" anything. So they will slander it. As more people trade in it, > then the more stable it becomes, as people get frightened a government > will collapse (not just outlaw) it, then its use will fall and so too > will its price > > I have had my own reservations about BitCoin, that is, that its > designers did not anonymize BitCoins rendezvous and had non-anonymously > centralized itself so it could be attacked by a hostile government, like > it is being attacked now by the US. > > I think it is highly likely that the drug supplier "Silk Road" is a > protected CIA black op. to attack BC and to destroy it. This was an > obvious draw-back right from the start and was the reason I stopped > generating BC's a long while back. Governments and other evil people do > not play fairly, so never assume they will. The designers of BC did > assume just that, and that was there error. To design adn test it was > one thing but the implementation had to be completely anonymous. > > What needs to be done is that a NewBitCoin (NBC) system needs to be > started up behind hidden services and for them to offer a swap with the > existing BC. Perhaps there should even be "official" completely > anonymous NBC consortium with several NBC servers each doing multiple > NBC i.e. NBC1, NBC2, NBC3 etc (all interchangeable currencies - at least > at the start), so as to be locationally robust. Bitcoins are worthless and have no value. Here's an article about Bitcoin from LewRockwell.com June 9, 2011 Bitcoin: Just Another Bogus Medium of Exchange Posted by David Kramer on June 9, 2011 03:00 PM I'm sure by now many of you have heard about Bitcoin. The fact that it's called "virtual currency" gives you an idea about its actual value as a real medium of exchange. While many people who are touting it on Facebook are enamored with the fact that it was voluntarily created by the marketplace (i.e., is not forced down our throats by a private central bank), I'm afraid that those people are losing sight of how a real medium of exchange arises in a free market. A medium of exchange arises from something that had a material use/value in the market prior to becoming a medium of exchange, i.e., it was also a good being bartered for other goods and services. Over the centuries, the commodities gold and silver won out as the two most preferred mediums of exchangebwith gold holding the number one position due to its being more scarce than silver. What was Bitcoin's prior material use/value? Zero. It is just bits in a computer. And what's with the "fixed" amount of Bitcoins? Who/what determined the "proper" amount of 21 million for Bitcoins to top out at? A computer program? (Next we'll find out what the proper minimum wage should be.) Only the free market can voluntarily determine how much of a real medium of exchange is needed in the marketplace over time. While the idea of attempting to get rid of the Bankster monopoly on creating money out of thin air is commendable, Bitcoin is also money created out of thin air. Bitcoin is just substituting one bogus medium of exchange for another. UPDATE: I've been getting a lot of reader response trying to "explain" to me the economic virtues of Bitcoin. Some responders have even mistakenly used Austrian economics to rationalize their views. I would suggest that before you write to me about the Austrian economics view of a medium of exchange, you should read the two books by one of the two giants of Austrian economics, Murray Rothbard, on what a medium of exchange is. Here is the pdf for Rothbard's What Has Government Done to Our Money and here is the pdf for Rothbard's The Case Against the Fed. For those of you who have not yet read any Austrian economics, please do not waste your time writing to me trying to explain the "scientific" breakthrough of the bogus Bitcoin computer program. (There already was a REAL digital currency, e-gold, that was backed by a real commodity until the Federalistas shut it down. Eventually, Bitcoin will be shut down too because of its anonymity capabilities.) Check out Mises.org of and search for more information about money and what it is. > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Faster than the air-speed velocity of an unladen european swallow _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Uplifting Brin
by Eugen Leitl 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, 29 Jun 2002, Tom wrote: > Ithink Brin has got some cool ideas about opening up the window of > visability on the gov but where he falls down is the trust is issue. Brin's ideas only look cool if you think that we're living in a perfect anarchy, and that there's no intrinsic edge in centralism. Surveillance technology favours centralism, however, and we all know why anarchy is unstable with current type of agents, right? So he built the foundations of his glass castle on a pile of stinky poo. > Brin forget the adage that power corupts and absolute power corupts > absolutley. Brin is confabulating an alternative reality. This reality doesn't give a flying fuck about what he thinks is going to happen. He's actually doing damage, because quite a few people find his ideas superficially appealing, and stagnate in happy complacency. Sheep like the idea of Brinworld. Goverments love the idea of Brinworld, because it makes selling the current brand of FUD much easier. Happy sheep don't mind being shorn so much. > The Cypherpunks do come off often as being the > lonegunmen-dressed-in-black -knights-of-the-impossible-cause.....but Dunno, they come off a lot like narcistic wankers to me. Maybe some of them are writing code, but they must be damn secretive about it. There are literally very few people in the world who're good architects, and actually develop stuff. > thats a very needed role to have on most any society. While .001% of > the populace is doing that role they are comming up witht he means and > ways to subvert things if they should all get "one way or the > highway"esque. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Uplifting Brin
by Eugen Leitl 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Sat, 29 Jun 2002, Tom wrote: > Ithink Brin has got some cool ideas about opening up the window of > visability on the gov but where he falls down is the trust is issue. Brin's ideas only look cool if you think that we're living in a perfect anarchy, and that there's no intrinsic edge in centralism. Surveillance technology favours centralism, however, and we all know why anarchy is unstable with current type of agents, right? So he built the foundations of his glass castle on a pile of stinky poo. > Brin forget the adage that power corupts and absolute power corupts > absolutley. Brin is confabulating an alternative reality. This reality doesn't give a flying fuck about what he thinks is going to happen. He's actually doing damage, because quite a few people find his ideas superficially appealing, and stagnate in happy complacency. Sheep like the idea of Brinworld. Goverments love the idea of Brinworld, because it makes selling the current brand of FUD much easier. Happy sheep don't mind being shorn so much. > The Cypherpunks do come off often as being the > lonegunmen-dressed-in-black -knights-of-the-impossible-cause.....but Dunno, they come off a lot like narcistic wankers to me. Maybe some of them are writing code, but they must be damn secretive about it. There are literally very few people in the world who're good architects, and actually develop stuff. > thats a very needed role to have on most any society. While .001% of > the populace is doing that role they are comming up witht he means and > ways to subvert things if they should all get "one way or the > highway"esque. --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[drone-list] Reddit AMA w/ Predator pilots in Afghanistan
by Gregory Foster 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Reddit (Jan 29) - "We are the Predator UAV Pilot/Operators currently in Afghanistan. AMAA!": http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/17j9wa/we_are_predator_uav_pilotopera… Haven't had a chance to review thoroughly, but looks like there's some interesting questions posed about the training the pilots received (a 6-month course compressed to 1-month resulting in an FAA license) and similarities w/ video games. Please share any interesting quotes you find. gf -- Gregory Foster || gfoster(a)entersection.org @gregoryfoster <> http://entersection.com/ _______________________________________________ drone-list mailing list drone-list(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/drone-list If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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nym-0.2 released
by Jason Holt 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

nym-0.2 is now available at: http://www.lunkwill.org/src/nym/ My tor server is currently down, so I can't set up a public trial of this, but perhaps someone else will. This release makes the following improvements: * Tokens are now issued one-per-IP to clients via a "token" CGI script. Tokens are still blindly issued, so nobody (including the token issuer) can associate tokens with IP addresses. The list of already-served IPs could be periodically removed, allowing users to obtain new pseudonyms on a regular basis. (Abusers will then need to be re-blocked assuming they re-misbehave). * A token can be used to obtain a signature on a client certificate from a separate "CA" CGI script (potentially on a different machine). Tokens can only be "spent" to obtain one cert. Code to make a CA, client certs and have the certs signed is included. * The CA public key can be installed on a third web server (or proxy) to require that users have a valid client certificate. Servers can maintain a blacklist of misbehaving client certs. Misbehavers will then be unable to access the server until they obtain a new token and client cert (via a new IP). My proposal for using this to enable tor users to play at Wikipedia is as follows: 1. Install a token server on a public IP. The token server can optionally be provided Wikipedia's blocked-IP list and refuse to issue tokens to offending IPs. Tor users use their real IP to obtain a blinded token. 2. Install a CA as a hidden service. Tor users use their unblinded tokens to obtain a client certificate, which they install in their browser. 3. Install a wikipedia-gateway SSL web proxy (optionally also a hidden service) which checks client certs and communicates a client identifier to MediaWiki, which MediaWiki will use in place of the REMOTE_ADDR (client IP address) for connections from the proxy. When a user misbehaves, Wikipedia admins block the client identifier just as they would have blocked an offending IP address. -J ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Dewayne-Net] Tracking Secret Operatives Not Too Tough
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: This item comes from reader Randall. DLH] >From: Randall <rvh40(a)insightbb.com> >Date: March 11, 2006 9:39:16 PM PST >To: Dave <dave(a)farber.net>, Dewayne Hendricks ><dewayne(a)warpspeed.com>, Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com>, JMG ><johnmacsgroup(a)yahoogroups.com> >Subject: Tracking Secret Operatives Not Too Tough > ><http://htdaw.blogsource.com/post.mhtml?post_id=276539> > > >Sunday, March 12, 2006 at 12:37 AM EST >Internet blows CIA cover >It's easy to track America's covert operatives. All you need to >know is >how to navigate the Internet > >..By John Crewdson >Tribune senior correspondent > >March 11, 2006, 12:00 PM CST > >WASHINGTON -- She is 52 years old, married, grew up in the Kansas City >suburbs and now lives in Virginia, in a new three-bedroom house. > >Anyone who can qualify for a subscription to one of the online >services >that compile public information also can learn that she is a CIA >employee who, over the past decade, has been assigned to several >American embassies in Europe. > >The CIA asked the Tribune not to publish her name because she is a >covert operative, and the newspaper agreed. But unbeknown to the CIA, >her affiliation and those of hundreds of men and women like her have >somehow become a matter of public record, thanks to the Internet. > >When the Tribune searched a commercial online data service, the result >was a virtual directory of more than 2,600 CIA employees, 50 internal >agency telephone numbers and the locations of some two dozen secret >CIA >facilities around the United States. > >Only recently has the CIA recognized that in the Internet age its >traditional system of providing cover for clandestine employees >working >overseas is fraught with holes, a discovery that is said to have >"horrified" CIA Director Porter Goss. > >"Cover is a complex issue that is more complex in the Internet age," >said the CIA's chief spokeswoman, Jennifer Dyck. "There are things >that >worked previously that no longer work. Director Goss is committed to >modernizing the way the agency does cover in order to protect our >officers who are doing dangerous work." > >Dyck declined to detail the remedies "since we don't want the bad guys >to know what we're fixing." > >Several "front companies" set up to provide cover for CIA >operatives and >its small fleet of aircraft recently began disappearing from the >Internet, following the Tribune's disclosures that some of the planes >were used to transport suspected terrorists to countries where they >claimed to have been tortured. > >Although finding and repairing the vulnerabilities in the CIA's cover >system was not a priority under Goss' predecessor, George Tenet, one >senior U.S. official observed that "the Internet age didn't get >here in >2004," the year Goss took over at the CIA. > >CIA names not disclosed > >The Tribune is not disclosing the identities of any of the CIA >employees >uncovered in its database searches, the searching techniques used or >other details that might put agency employees or operatives at >risk. The >CIA apparently was unaware of the extent to which its employees >were in >the public domain until being provided with a partial list of names by >the Tribune.' > >At a minimum, the CIA's seeming inability to keep its own secrets >invites questions about whether the Bush administration is doing >enough >to shield its covert CIA operations from public scrutiny, even as the >Justice Department focuses resources on a two-year investigation into >whether someone in the administration broke the law by disclosing to >reporters the identity of clandestine CIA operative Valerie Plame. > >Not all of the 2,653 employees whose names were produced by the >Tribune >search are supposed to be working under cover. More than 160 are >intelligence analysts, an occupation that is not considered a covert >position, and senior CIA executives such as Tenet are included on the >list. > >Covert employees discovered > >But an undisclosed number of those on the list--the CIA would not say >how many--are covert employees, and some are known to hold jobs that >could make them terrorist targets. > >Other potential targets include at least some of the two dozen CIA >facilities uncovered by the Tribune search. Most are in northern >Virginia, within a few miles of the agency's headquarters. Several are >in Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah and Washington state. There is >one >in Chicago. > >Some are heavily guarded. Others appear to be unguarded private >residences that bear no outward indication of any affiliation with the >CIA. > >A senior U.S. official, reacting to the computer searches that >produced >the names and addresses, said, "I don't know whether Al Qaeda could do >this, but the Chinese could." > >Down on "The Farm" > >For decades the CIA's training facility at Camp Peary, Va., near >historic Williamsburg, remained the deepest of secrets. Even after >former CIA personnel confirmed its existence in the 1980s the agency >never acknowledged the facility publicly, and CIA personnel >persisted in >referring to it in conversation only as "The Farm." > >But an online search for the term "Camp Peary" produced the names and >other details of 26 individuals who according to the data are employed >there. Searching aviation databases for flights landing or taking off >from Camp Peary's small airstrip revealed 17 aircraft whose ownership >and flight histories could also be traced. > >Although the Tribune's initial search for "Central Intelligence >Agency" >employees turned up only work-related addresses and phone numbers, >other >Internet-based services provide, usually for a fee but sometimes for >free, the home addresses and telephone numbers of U.S. residents, as >well as satellite photographs of the locations where they live and >work. > >Asked how so many personal details of CIA employees had found their >way >into the public domain, the senior U.S. intelligence official replied >that "I don't have a great explanation, quite frankly." > >The official noted, however, that the CIA's credo has always been that >"individuals are the first person responsible for their cover. If they >can't keep their cover, then it's hard for anyone else to keep it. If >someone filled out a credit report and put that down, that's just >stupid." > >One senior U.S. official used a barnyard epithet to describe the >agency's traditional system of providing many of its foreign >operatives >with easily decipherable covers that include little more than a post >office box for an address and a non-existent company as an employer. > >Coverts especially important > >And yet, experts say, covert operatives who pose as something other >than >diplomats are becoming increasingly important in the global war on >terror. > >"In certain areas you just can't collect the kind of information you >need in the 21st Century by working out of the embassy. They're >just not >going to meet the kind of people they need to meet," said Melvin >Goodman, who was a senior Soviet affairs analyst at the CIA for more >than 20 years before he retired. > >The problem, Goodman said, is that transforming a CIA officer who has >worked under "diplomatic cover" into a "non-official cover" >operator, or >NOC--as was attempted with Valerie Plame--creates vulnerabilities that >are not difficult to spot later on. > >The CIA's challenge, in Goodman's view, is, "How do you establish a >cover for them in a day and age when you can Google a name ... and >find >out all sorts of holes?" > >In Plame's case, online computer searches would have turned up her >tenure as a junior diplomat in the U.S. Embassy in Athens even >after she >began passing herself off as a privately employed "energy consultant." > >The solution, Goodman suggested, is to create NOCs at the very >outset of >their careers, "taking risks with younger people, worrying about the >reputation of people before they have one. Or create one." > >Shortage of `mentors' > >But that approach also has a downside, in that "you're getting into >the >problem of very junior, inexperienced people, which a lot of >veteran CIA >people feel now is part of the problem. Porter Goss has to double the >number of operational people in an environment where there are no >mentors. Who's going to train these people?" > >In addition to stepping up recruiting, Goss has ordered a "top-down" >review of the agency's "tradecraft" following the disclosure that >several supposedly covert operatives involved in the 2003 abduction >of a >radical Muslim preacher in Milan had registered at hotels under their >true names and committed other amateurish procedural violations that >made it relatively easy for the Italian police to identify them and >for >Italian prosecutors to charge them with kidnapping. > >----- > >Tribune researcher Brenda J. Kilianski contributed to this article >from >Chicago. >jcrewdson(a)tribune.com > ><http://tinyurl.com/qhe2d> Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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