April 2012 - cypherpunks-legacy

Весенняя распродажа участков в Коттеджном поселке! Киевское ш.
by "Владелец поселка!" 06 Apr '12

06 Apr '12

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Re:
by Изабелла 06 Apr '12

06 Apr '12

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Явные налоговые схемы
by Серые схемы 06 Apr '12

06 Apr '12

12 апреля 2012 г. Явные признаки налоговых схем и как их избежать. Легендирование и уход от аффилированности. Конкретные примеры 8 (Ч95) 792.2I22 \\// код (499) 4Ч539-68 Программа: 1. Общие понятия. "Черные", "серые" и "белые" схемы. "Явные признаки налоговых схем": происхождение и способы выявления. 2. Прямая и косвенная аффилированность. Что такое аффилированность и взаимозависимость лиц по новому антитрансфертному законодательству. Признаки аффилированности, в тч. косвенные. Негативные последствия аффилированности и когда она допустима. "Искусственное дробление бизнеса с целью уклонения от уплаты налогов" (подход "как к ЮКОСу", примеры его использования после собственно ЮКОСа, применение к "однодневкам"). Деловые цели, обосновывающие деление бизнеса. Что делать если аффилированность уже есть: три возможных модели поведения. Примеры из практики. 3. Способы ухода от аффилированности. Использование номинальных учредителей и директоров компаний, ИП. Кто может быть номиналом? Номиналы-нерезиденты: юридические и физические лица. Траст: номиналы по закону, а не "по понятиям". Как защититься от номинала: юридические и экономические способы. Простое товарищество с физлицом-номиналом? 4. Отсутствие убедительной деловой цели сделок/действий налогоплательщика или происходящих в бизнесе изменений. Постановление ВАС ╧ 53. Для чего нужна "легенда" и кому ее рассказывать? Когда никакая легенда не спасет. Две модели построения легенды: "инициатива сверху" и "инициатива снизу". Косвенное документальное подтверждение легенды. Примеры деловых целей и типовых обосновывающих их легенд для разных схем, в т.ч. для: * отношений с недобросовестными поставщиками; * завышенных или заниженных цен реализации; * любого аутсорсинга; * управляющей компании (или управляющего); * ИП-бывших работников, в т.ч. для перевода коммерческого персонала в отдельное юрлицо или на ИП; * выделения транспортного подразделения в отдельное юрлицо; * разбиения ранее единого бизнеса √ объяснение прямой или косвенной аффилированности в прошлом или настоящем; * посреднического договора или договора простого товарищества; * платежей от нерезидентных компаний на счета физлиц; * перехода на УСН; * высоких процентов по долговым обязательствам или штрафных санкций; * крупных расходов физлиц ("откуда деньги?"). 5. Другие признаки налоговых схем: * резкие изменения в любую сторону показателей деятельности налогоплательщика; * убыточность деятельность и/или переплата по НДС; * совокупная налоговая нагрузка/рентабельность продаж или активов, средняя зарплата значительно меньше средней по отрасли; * размер вычетов по НДС выше считающегося приемлемым. 6. Ответы на вопросы. По желанию √ экспресс-анализ и разработка индивидуальных легенд для компаний-участниц. Стоимость участия: 9 000 рублей За более подробной информацuей обpащайтеcь по тел: +7 499 - 445-4О*95 и Московский код; 7922I-22

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by FDA licensed tablets 06 Apr '12

06 Apr '12

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Больше не нужно скачивать фильмы! Теперь все фильмы на одном диске!
by "Все фильмы сразу" 06 Apr '12

06 Apr '12

Заказать сборник можно на www.коллекциявидео.рф

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How China Blocks the Tor Anonymity Network
by Eugen Leitl 05 Apr '12

05 Apr '12

http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/27697/ How China Blocks the Tor Anonymity Network Security analysts reveal the inner workings of China's efforts to block the Tor anonymity network--and how to get around this censorship. kfc 04/04/2012 The Tor Project is a free network run by volunteers that hides users' locations and usage from surveillance and traffic analysis. Essentially, it provides online anonymity to anybody who wants it. Tor users can send email and instant messages, surf websites, and post content online without anyone knowing who or where they are. Consequently, it is widely acknowledged as an important tool for freedom of expression. That's clearly a worry for authoritarian regimes that want to control and limit their citizens' access to the outside world. The biggest and most powerful of these is China, and the government there operates a firewall that denies its citizens online access to the outside world. It's no surprise then that the Great Firewall of China, as it is called, actively blocks access to the Tor network. So an interesting question is how this censorship works and how it might be circumvented. Today, Philipp Winter and Stefan Lindskog at Karlstad University in Sweden provide an answer. These guys have conducted a comprehensive analysis of the way the Great Firewall of China blocks Tor and how these measures might be sidestepped. First, a bit of background about Tor. Let's imagine a fictional user called Alice. To use the Tor network, Alice must first download the free software package, which she runs on her computer. This software encrypts Alice's online communication and sends it to a Tor server called an entry relay, which then directs it randomly through a network of Tor relays operated by volunteers around the world. Anybody receiving information from Alice can trace the message back only to the last Tor server. Also, since the Internet address of the sender and receiver are encrypted while they are in the network, an eavesdropper cannot tell who sent a message or where it is going. The obvious way for China to prevent access to Tor is to block access from inside the country to the entry relays. That's easy because the entry relays are publicly listed, and, indeed, the Great Firewall of China does exactly this. However, in anticipation of this tactic, the Tor network always operates a number of entry relays without publishing their details. These are much harder to block and can easily be changed. The trouble is that the Great Firewall of China seems to have found a way to detect and block these secret relays as well. Now Winter and Lindskog think they've worked out how this is done. The trick has been to set up their own secret relay and to try to connect to it from inside China (building on previous work by Tim Wilde at Team Cymru). The Tor software that Alice runs must connect with any Tor relay it contacts using a special handshake protocol. This protocol contains unique sequences of code. Winter and Lindskog say the firewall uses deep pattern inspection to look for this code in any outgoing communications. If it finds it, it assumes a potential Tor connection. It then attempts to make its own connection. If that works, the firewall then blocks future access to this IP address. Impressively, Winter and Lindskog have worked out the details of how the deep packet inspection does this. Even more impressively, these guys have used Google's reverse DNS lookup service to work out who seems to be behind this censorship. The evidence points strongly to two of China's largest telecom companies: China Telecom and China Unicom. Both of these organisations are government-owned and clearly well placed to operate a firewall on this scale. So what to do? With their newfound knowledge of how the Great Firewall of China works, Winter and Lindskog suggest a number of strategies that Tor users could exploit to beat it. One idea is packet fragmentation--dividing up the packets to confuse the deep packet inspection system so that it cannot easily find and block secret relays. However, that relies on all Tor users using packet fragmentation. A single Tor user who connects to a secret relay in the conventional way will give it away, allowing the authorities to block it. Perhaps the most promising avenue is a tool currently being developed called Obfsproxy. This camouflages Tor traffic, making it look like something else, such as Skype traffic, for example. China is clearly worried about this approach. The Great Firewall of China currently blocks all published relays designed to use Obfsproxy. However, Winter and Lindskog set up a private Obfsproxy relay in Sweden and successfully connected to it from inside China. "We initiated several connections to it over several hours and could always successfully establish a Tor circuit," they say. That seems to prove that the deep packet inspection system cannot spot private Obfsproxy relays and so looks like a promising route forward. The main reason the Great Firewall is able to detect Tor traffic is that it is easily distinguishable from other types of Internet traffic. "It is crucial that this distinguishability is minimised," conclude Winter and Lindskog. There is a broader issue of course. Because Tor is an open and transparent organisation, these kinds of discussions about how best to circumvent the Chinese firewall inevitably take place in public, in full view of the Chinese authorities they are attempting to outwit. The mere publication of Winter and Lindskog's paper gives the Chinese authorities full view of the techniques these guys have used to reveal how the firewall works. Security analysts and the developers behind Tor must be sorely tempted to hide their deliberations and protect their future work behind an impenetrable veil of secrecy. That must be resisted. These kinds of open discussion may be like fighting with one hand tied behind your back. But surely such is the price of freedom. Ref: arxiv.org/abs/1204.0447: How China Is Blocking Tor

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CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on You Through Your Dishwasher
by Eugen Leitl 05 Apr '12

05 Apr '12

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/petraeus-tv-remote/ CIA Chief: Webll Spy on You Through Your Dishwasher By Spencer Ackerman March 15, 2012 | 5:35 pm | Categories: Info War, Spies, Secrecy and Surveillance CIA Director David Petraeus unwinds with some Wii Golf, 2008. Photo: Wikimedia More and more personal and household devices are connecting to the internet, from your television to your car navigation systems to your light switches. CIA Director David Petraeus cannot wait to spy on you through them. Earlier this month, Petraeus mused about the emergence of an b Internet of Thingsb b that is, wired devices b at a summit for In-Q-Tel, the CIAbs venture capital firm. b bTransformationalb is an overused word, but I do believe it properly applies to these technologies,b Petraeus enthused, b particularly to their effect on clandestine tradecraft.b All those new online devices are a treasure trove of data if youbre a b person of interestb to the spy community. Once upon a time, spies had to place a bug in your chandelier to hear your conversation. With the rise of the b smart home,b youbd be sending tagged, geolocated data that a spy agency can intercept in real time when you use the lighting app on your phone to adjust your living roombs ambiance. b Items of interest will be located, identified, monitored, and remotely controlled through technologies such as radio-frequency identification, sensor networks, tiny embedded servers, and energy harvesters b all connected to the next-generation internet using abundant, low-cost, and high-power computing,b Petraeus said, b the latter now going to cloud computing, in many areas greater and greater supercomputing, and, ultimately, heading to quantum computing.b Petraeus allowed that these household spy devices b change our notions of secrecyb and prompt a rethink of b our notions of identity and secrecy.b All of which is true b if convenient for a CIA director. The CIA has a lot of legal restrictions against spying on American citizens. But collecting ambient geolocation data from devices is a grayer area, especially after the 2008 carve-outs to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Hardware manufacturers, it turns out, store a trove of geolocation data; and some legislators have grown alarmed at how easy it is for the government to track you through your phone or PlayStation. Thatbs not the only data exploit intriguing Petraeus. Hebs interested in creating new online identities for his undercover spies b and sweeping away the b digital footprintsb of agents who suddenly need to vanish. b Proud parents document the arrival and growth of their future CIA officer in all forms of social media that the world can access for decades to come,b Petraeus observed. b Moreover, we have to figure out how to create the digital footprint for new identities for some officers.b Itbs hard to argue with that. Online cache is not a spybs friend. But Petraeus has an inadvertent pal in Facebook. Why? With the arrival of Timeline, Facebook made it super-easy to backdate your online history. Barack Obama, for instance, hasnbt been on Facebook since his birth in 1961. Creating new identities for CIA non-official cover operatives has arguably never been easier. Thank Zuck, spies. Thank Zuck. Danger Room senior reporter Spencer Ackerman recently won the 2012 National Magazine Award for Reporting in Digital Media. Follow @attackerman and @dangerroom on Twitter. Tags: CIA, David Petraeus, Facebook, In-Q-Tel, Info War

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Срочно и недорого продам участок 30 соток. Киевское ш.
by "Собствениkk" 05 Apr '12

05 Apr '12

Срочно и недорого продам земельный участок 30 cоток в Коттеджном поселке по Киевскому шоссе в 90 км от Мкад Позвоните Участок в очень красивом месте 8..(915)-498-96-06..

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Re: [tor-talk] access sites
by Eugen Leitl 05 Apr '12

05 Apr '12

----- Forwarded message from Paul Syverson <syverson(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> -----

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Please confirm your US Airways online registration.
by US Airways - Reservations 05 Apr '12

05 Apr '12

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