July 2011 - cypherpunks-legacy

В Питере: Налоговое законодательство в 2011г.Строим налоговые схемы.
by В Питере: уменьшаем страховые взносы 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

Место проведения: г.Санкт-Петербург 15-I6 августа 2011 гoда ТЕМА: Практика в налоговых схемах с учетом изменений налогового законодательства. Поиск и принятие оптимальных решений Оптимизируем налоги (НДФЛ, страховые взносы, НДС, налог на прибыль). +7 Московский код: 7_9*2.2_I.2\2 и 44.53*96/8 День1: Методы оптимизации расходов на выплату белой зарплаты: как выжить с большими ставками страховых взносов. Ставка обязательных страховых взносов с зарплаты с 2011 года составляет 34% почти для всех плательщиков (включая субъектов УСН и ЕНВД). При этом регрессивная шкала ЕСН заменена отменой уплаты взносов с суммы дохода свыше 463 тыс. рублей, но доступно это будет только для высокооплачиваемых сотрудников. Если вспомнить про 13% НДФЛ и НДС, который тоже косвенно является налогом на зарплату, то многие предприниматели и руководители видят только один путь √ назад, к "черным" схемам. Курс посвящен поиску путей выживания компаний в новой ситуации при условии легальности всех выплат доходов физическим лицам. Участники узнают, как можно и как нельзя оптимизировать "зарплатные" налоги с учетом будущих изменений законодательства, судебной практики и тенденций развития правоприменительной практики. Программа: * Обзор изменений законодательства, связанных с повышением ставки страховых взносов Сколько и каких налогов и взносов платят предприятия и ИП на общей системе налогообложения и спецрежимах в 2011 гг. Какие схемы стали невыгодными; у каких налогоплательщиков положение даже улучшилось. * Понятие и принципы налогового планирования: платить налоги, но не переплачивать. "Черные", "серые" и "белые" схемы. Классификация методов оптимизации налогообложения доходов физических лиц. * Использование специальных налоговых режимов: * Условия применения всех схем: Непритворный характер заключаемых сделок. Экономическая целесообразность расходов ("деловая цель", "легенда", отсутствие дублирующихся функций). Грамотное обоснование цен и документальное оформление расходов. Неаффилированность, прямые и косвенные признаки аффилированности, ее негативные последствия и когда она допустима; "искусственное дробление бизнеса с целью уклонения от уплаты налогов" (подход "как к ЮКОСу"); "деловые цели", обосновывающие деление бизнеса. Самостоятельность низконалоговых субъектов. * Использование вспомогательных организаций: * Использование иностранных (низконалоговых) компаний. Корпоративные или личные пластиковые карты иностранных банков. Перевод на них или на карты российских банков зарплат, гонораров и иных легальных доходов от нерезидентов * Как компенсировать "выпадение" отчислений в Пенсионный фонд на накопительную часть пенсии, в ФСС и ФОМС при применении налоговых схем, не предусматривающих выплату зарплаты. * Использование процентных займов от физлиц. Расчет эффективности. * Специальные методы. Все виды компенсаций (за несвоевременную выплату заработной платы, за использование личного имущества, за разъездной характер работы, "золотые парашюты" и др.). Выплата арендной платы. Закуп у физлиц ТМЦ. Суточные. Обучение сотрудников с заключением ученического договора, как способ налогового планирования. * Потребительское кредитование, компенсация процентов по ипотечным кредитам и другие эффективные способы замены заработной платы безналоговыми источниками материальной выгоды, * Создание недоимки по налогам с ФОТ на фирме, не обремененной активами √ пример "серой" схемы (как нельзя "оптимизировать"!), * Способы подтверждения источников крупных расходов физлиц и когда это необходимо. * Ответы на вопросы. По желанию √ индивидуальное экспресс-моделирование схем налогового планирования для компаний-участниц семинара. ----------------------------- День2: Оптимизации налога на прибыль и НДС как антикризисная мера: как снизить расходы и увеличить прибыль Программа: 1. Понятие и принципы налогового планирования: платить налоги, но не переплачивать. Как можно и как нельзя оптимизировать налоги с учетом будущих изменений законодательства, судебной практики и тенденций развития правоприменения. "Черные", "серые" и "белые" схемы. Краткий обзор методов оптимизации налога на прибыль и НДС. Принципиальная невозможность экономии НДС "белыми" схемами и случаи, когда это все же возможно. 2. Низконалоговые субъекты: * субъекты специальных налоговых режимов √ ЕНВД и УСН, в тч. патентная система, а также субъекты УСН из "низконалоговых" регионов, где введена минимальная ставка единого налога при объекте "доходы минус расходы" (5%) на все или почти на все виды деятельности, а также простое товарищество с их участием, * зарубежные офшоры или связанные с ними компании-нерезиденты из респектабельных юрисдикций, * экзотические варианты: ИП на общей системе, физлица (при условии несистематичности извлечения дохода), "инвалидные" структуры, убыточные предприятия и фирмы, имеющие переплату НДС, Незаконные варианты: "недобросовестные налогоплательщики" и контактирующие с ними риск-структуры ("белая" - "серая" - "черная" фирмы). Примеры "серых" схем (как нельзя "оптимизировать"!). Как не стать "недобросовестным". Способы переноса налогооблагаемой базы по налогу на прибыль на низконалоговых субъектов: * нефиктивные услуги, работы, * выплата процентов по долговым обязательствам. Включение процентов в расходы в любом размере, * платежи за использование и обслуживание объектов основных средств и нематериальных активов, в т.ч. франчайзинговые, * штрафные санкции, возмещение убытков, включая демередж и прочий простой, * платежи за увеличенный срок и/или объем гарантийных обязательств, * плата за залог или поручительство, делькредере. * механизм трансфертных цен, Условия применения всех схем: Непритворный характер заключаемых сделок. Экономическая целесообразность расходов ("деловая цель", "легенда", отсутствие дублирующихся функций). Грамотное обоснование трансфертных цен. Неаффилированность, прямые и косвенные признаки аффилированности, ее негативные последствия и когда она допустима; "искусственное дробление бизнеса с целью уклонения от уплаты налогов" (подход "как к ЮКОСу"); "деловые цели", обосновывающие деление бизнеса. Самостоятельность низконалоговых субъектов. Займы как способ возвратного рефинансирования √ преимущества и недостатки, риск ведения незаконной банковской деятельности. Безналоговое рефинансирование (возврат) и капитализация выведенной прибыли предприятия (холдинга) через уставный капитал или безвозмездную передачу имущества. Ст. 27 Закона "Об ООО". 3. Простое товарищество субъектов упрощенной системы налогообложения, в т.ч. из "низконалоговых" регионов. Нужно или нет платить НДС? Перенос прибыли товарищества на низконалоговых субъектов (УСН 6%, ЕНВД, офшор и др.). Отсрочка уплаты налога при непередаче прибыли на счета товарищей. Возможен ли обход с помощью простого товарищества правил налогового учета (гл. 25 НК) и ограничений гл. 26.2 НК РФ в части перечня затрат? 4. Экономия НДС в торговле, производстве, выполнении работ, оказании услуг через разделение финансово-товарных потоков "с НДС" и "без НДС". Ограничение использования: покупатели/заказчики, не нуждающиеся в вычете НДС, как их выявить или создать искусственно. Риски и рекомендации по использованию схемы. 5. Иностранные низконалоговые компании, цели применения. Их использование при проведении внутрироссийских операций для оптимизации налога на прибыль: традиционные (торговля, проценты, дивиденды, роялти, услуги и т.п.) и нетрадиционные схемы (простое товарищество, агентские). Выбор низконалоговых юрисдикций. 6. Обзор изменений налогового законодательства в 2011 г., как они повлияют на налоговые схемы. Ответы на вопросы. По желанию √ индивидуальное экспресс-моделирование схем налогового планирования для компаний-участниц. По вопpоcам pегucтаpацuu обpащайтеcь по тел: Московский код; 4Ч5/32/66 \\// 792_2I/22

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Evidence of GOP stealing 2004 election, redux
by J.A. Terranson 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

[Note: I've *never* heard of the source before, so read with salt at the ready.] //Alif -- I hate Missouri. Land of the free, home of the perjuriously deranged. --------------------------------------------------------------------------\ http://www.benzinga.com/news/11/07/1789905/forget-anonymous-evidence-sugges… Forget Anonymous: Evidence Suggests GOP Hacked, Stole 2004 Election By John Thorpe Benzinga Staff Writer July 21, 2011 1:07 PM Three generations from now, when our great-grandchildren are sitting barefoot in their shanties and wondering how in the hell America turned from the high-point of civilization to a third-world banana republic, they will shake their fists and mutter one name: George Effin' Bush. Ironically, it won't be for any of the things that liberals have been harping on the Bush Administration, either during or after his term in office. Sure, misguided tax cuts that destroyed the surplus, and lax regulations that doomed the economy, and two amazingly awful wars in deserts half a world away are all terrible, empire-sapping events. But they pale in comparison to what it appears the Republican Party did to get President Bush re-elected in 2004. "A new filing in the King Lincoln Bronzeville v. Blackwell case includes a copy of the Ohio Secretary of State election production system configuration that was in use in Ohio's 2004 presidential election when there was a sudden and unexpected shift in votes for George W. Bush," according to Bob Fitrakis, columnist at http://www.freepress.org and co-counsel in the litigation and investigation. If you recall, Ohio was the battleground state that provided George Bush with the electoral votes needed to win re-election. Had Senator John Kerry won Ohio's electoral votes, he would have been elected instead. Evidence from the filing suggests that Republican operatives . including the private computer firms hired to manage the electronic voting data . were compromised. Fitrakis isn't the only attorney involved in pursuing the truth in this matter. Cliff Arnebeck, the lead attorney in the King Lincoln case, exchanged emails with IT security expert Stephen Spoonamore. He asked Spoonamore whether or not SmarTech had the capability to "input data" and thus alter the results of Ohio's 2004 election. His response sent a chill up my spine. "Yes. They would have had data input capacities. The system might have been set up to log which source generated the data but probably did not," Spoonamore said. In case that seems a bit too technical and "big deal" for you, consider what he was saying. SmarTech, a private company, had the ability in the 2004 election to add or subtract votes without anyone knowing they did so. The filing today shows how, detailing the computer network system's design structure, including a map of how the data moved from one unit to the next. Right smack in the middle of that structure? Inexplicably, it was SmarTech. Spoonamore (keep in mind, he is the IT expert here) concluded from the architectural maps of the Ohio 2004 election reporting system that, "SmarTech was a man in the middle. In my opinion they were not designed as a mirror, they were designed specifically to be a man in the middle." A "man in the middle" is not just an accidental happenstance of computing. It is a deliberate computer hacking setup, one where the hacker sits, literally, in the middle of the communication stream, intercepting and (when desired, as in this case) altering the data. It's how hackers swipe your credit card number or other banking information. This is bad. A mirror site, which SmarTech was allegedly supposed to be, is simply a backup site on the chance that the main configuration crashes. Mirrors are a good thing. Until now, the architectural maps and contracts from the Ohio 2004 election were never made public, which may indicate that the entire system was designed for fraud. In a previous sworn affidavit to the court, Spoonamore declared: "The SmarTech system was set up precisely as a King Pin computer used in criminal acts against banking or credit card processes and had the needed level of access to both county tabulators and Secretary of State computers to allow whoever was running SmarTech computers to decide the output of the county tabulators under its control." Spoonamore also swore that "...the architecture further confirms how this election was stolen. The computer system and SmarTech had the correct placement, connectivity, and computer experts necessary to change the election in any manner desired by the controllers of the SmarTech computers." SmarTech was part of three computer companies brought in to manage the elections process for Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell, a Republican. The other two were Triad and GovTech Solutions. All three companies have extensive ties to the Republican party and Republican causes. In fact, GovTech was run by Mike Connell, who was a fiercely religious conservative who got involved in politics to push a right-wing social agenda. He was Karl Rove's IT go-to guy, and was alleged to be the IT brains behind the series of stolen elections between 2000 and 2004. Connell was outed as the one who stole the 2004 election by Spoonamore, who, despite being a conservative Republican himself, came forward to blow the whistle on the stolen election scandal. Connell gave a deposition on the matter, but stonewalled. After the deposition, and fearing perjury/obstruction charges for withholding information, Connell expressed an interest in testifying further as to the extent of the scandal. "He made it known to the lawyers, he made it known to reporter Larisa Alexandrovna of Raw Story, that he wanted to talk. He was scared. He wanted to talk. And I say that he had pretty good reason to be scared," said Mark Crispin Miller, who wrote a book on the scandal. Connell was so scared for his security that he asked for protection from the attorney general, then Attorney General Michael Mukasey. Connell told close friends that he was expecting to get thrown under the bus by the Rove team, because Connell had evidence linking the GOP operative to the scandal and the stolen election, including knowledge of where Rove's missing emails disappeared to. Before he could testify, Connell died in a plane crash. Harvey Wasserman, who wrote a book on the stolen 2004 election, explained that the combination of computer hacking, ballot destruction, and the discrepancy between exit polling (which showed a big Kerry win in Ohio) and the "real" vote tabulation, all point to one answer: the Republicans stole the 2004 election. "The 2004 election was stolen. There is absolutely no doubt about it. A 6.7% shift in exit polls does not happen by chance. And, you know, so finally, we have irrefutable confirmation that what we were saying was true and that every piece of the puzzle in the Ohio 2004 election was flawed," Wasserman said. Mark Crispin Miller also wrote a book on the subject of stolen elections, and focused on the 2004 Ohio presidential election. Here is what he had to say about it. There were three phases of chicanery. First, there was a pre-election period, during which the Secretary of State in Ohio, Ken Blackwell, was also co-chair of the Bush-Cheney campaign in Ohio, which is in itself mind-boggling, engaged in all sorts of bureaucratic and legal tricks to cut down on the number of people who could register, to limit the usability of provisional ballots. It was really a kind of classic case of using the letter of the law or the seeming letter of the law just to disenfranchise as many people as possible. On Election Day, there was clearly a systematic undersupply of working voting machines in Democratic areas, primarily inner city and student towns, you know, college towns. And the Conyers people found that in some of the most undersupplied places, there were scores of perfectly good voting machines held back and kept in warehouses, you know, and there are many similar stories to this. And other things happened that day. After Election Day, there is explicit evidence that a company called Triad, which manufactures all of the tabulators, the vote-counting tabulators that were used in Ohio in the last election, was systematically going around from county to county in Ohio and subverting the recount, which was court ordered and which never did take place. The Republicans will say to this day, 'There was a recount in Ohio, and we won that.' That's a lie, one of many, many staggering lies. There was never a recount. And now, it seems, there never will be. You can reach the author by email john(a)benzinga.com or on twitter @johndthorpe.

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Иностранный работник: ответственность за нарушение миграционного законодательства
by Иностранец √ привлечение на работу 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

I9 августа 2011 гoда Работники- иностранцы +7 (495) 792/\21\_22 : 79221\22 Цель: разобрать специфику и порядок привлечения и оформления специалистов среднего и низшего звена требуемых профессий и квалификации из других регионов России и стран ближнего и дальнего зарубежья, в свете изменений в законодательстве, вносимых Федеральным законом от 19 мая 2010г. №86-ФЗ Программа: 1. Нововведения в законодательство в сфере трудовой миграции: Федеральный закон от 19 мая 2010 №86-ФЗ. 2. Когда возникает дефицит рабочей силы. Варианты решения проблемы. 3. Сравнительные характеристики привлечения иностранной или иногородней рабочей силы. 4. Особенности и тенденции рынка труда и трудовой миграции в период кризиса. 5. Пути поиска, отбора и привлечения иногородней и иностранной рабочей силы в РФ. 6. Социальные и административно-хозяйственные вопросы при привлечении и использовании иногородней и иностранной рабочей силы. 7. Наем иностранного работника и оформление трудовых отношений. Особенности заключения договоров. 8. Документы, предъявляемые иностранцами при приеме на работу – перечень необходимых документов и требования к ним. 9. Порядок, особенности, новые формы и правила оформления разрешений на работу для "безвизовых" иностранцев. Основные ошибки и заблуждения работодателя при привлечении и найме иностранных работников. 10. Регистрация иностранных работников в государственных фондах. Сроки, процедура, документы. 11. Уведомления государственных органов о приеме/увольнении иностранного работника. Перечень государственных органов, сроки, процедуры подачи, документы, ответственность. 12. Пенсионное обеспечение иностранцев в России. Новый порядок в законодательстве в 2010 г. 13. Особенности при оплате больничных, декрета и детских пособий иностранным работникам. 14. Особенности уплаты НДФЛ иностранным работникам. Понятие налогового резидента и нерезидента. 15. Использование провайдеров кадровых услуг. Кадровый аутсорсинг. Лизинг иностранного персонала Стоимость участия: 8 850 рублей Информацию можно получить по телефонам: 8 (Ч95) Ч4*5З_96\8 <> ЧЧ_54.О95

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so cheap you won't believe its quality
by Kevin Barton 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

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by Tracey Clare 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

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Re: wide range of collection to choose from
by Jackie Mcginnis 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

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Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race
by Eugen Leitl 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

(caveat, the c-word) http://www.businessweek.com/printer/magazine/cyber-weapons-the-new-arms-rac… Cyber Weapons: The New Arms Race The Pentagon, the IMF, Google, and others have been hacked. Itbs war out there, and a cyber-weapons industry is exploding to arm the combatants By Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance In the early morning hours of May 24, an armed burglar wearing a ski mask broke into the offices of Nicira Networks, a Silicon Valley startup housed in one of the countless nondescript buildings along Highway 101. He walked past desks littered with laptops and headed straight toward the cubicle of one of the companybs top engineers. The assailant appeared to know exactly what he wanted, which was a bulky computer that stored Nicirabs source code. He grabbed the one machine and fled. The whole operation lasted five minutes, according to video captured on an employeebs webcam. Palo Alto Police Sergeant Dave Flohr describes the burglary as a run-of-the-mill Silicon Valley computer grab. b There are lots of knuckleheads out there that take what they can and leave,b he says. But two people close to the company say that they, as well as national intelligence investigators now looking into the case, suspect something more sinister: a professional heist performed by someone with ties to China or Russia. The burglar didnbt want a computer he could sell on Craigslist. He wanted Nicirabs ideas. Intellectual-property theft is hardly unheard of in Silicon Valley. Most often, it takes place when a hacker breaks into a network and goes after a widely used product. This was a physical break-in by an armed robber who was after arcane technology that isnbt even on the market yet. Nicira has spent the past four years quietly developing computing infrastructure software for data centers. According to the companybs sparse website, Nicirabs founders came from the computer science departments of Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley, and the company counts big venture capital names, including Andreessen Horowitz and New Enterprise Associates, as its backers. Nicira also sought a grant from the Defense Dept. to work on networking technology for the military. Nicira declined to comment for this article. (Bloomberg LP, which owns Bloomberg Businessweek, is an investor in Andreessen Horowitz.) Those familiar with the burglary refuse to talk about it on the record, citing orders handed down by the federal investigators. In private, they share a common concern: Cyber espionage and nation-state-backed hacking incidents appear to be increasing in frequency and severity. What once seemed the province of Hollywoodbhigh-tech robbers with guns; Internet worms that take out power plantsbhas become real. They fear that online skirmishes and spying incidents are escalating into a confusing, vicious struggle that involves governments, corporations, and highly sophisticated free-ranging hackers. This Code War era is no superpower stare-down; itbs more like Europe in 1938, when the Continent was in chaos and global conflict seemed inevitable. Cyber attacks used to be kept quiet. They often went undiscovered until long after the fact, and countries or companies that were hit usually declined to talk about attacks. Thatbs changed as a steady flow of brazen incursions has been exposed. Last year, for example, Google (GOOG) accused China of spying on the companybs workers and customers. It said at the time that at least 20 other companies were victims of the same attack, nicknamed Operation Aurora by the security firm McAfee (INTC). The hacked included Adobe Systems (ADBE), Juniper Networks (JNPR), and Morgan Stanley (MS). Joel F. Brenner, the head of U.S. counterintelligence until 2009, says the same operation that pulled off Aurora has claimed many more victims over several years. b Itbd be fair to say that at least 2,000 companies have been hit,b Brenner says. b And that number is on the conservative side.b Dozens of others, ranging from Lockheed Martin (LMT) and Intel (INTC) to the Indian Defense Ministry, the International Monetary Fund, and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, have suffered similar assaults. Earlier this year hackers raided the computer networks of RSA (EMC), a marquee security firm that protects other companiesb computers. They stole some of the most valuable computer code in the world, the algorithms behind RSAbs SecureID tokens, a product used by U.S. government agencies, defense contractors, and major banks to prevent hacking. It was like breaking into a heavily guarded locksmith and stealing the master combination that opened every vault in every casino on the Las Vegas Strip. This month the Pentagon revealed that it, too, had been hacked: More than 24,000 files were stolen from the computers of an unnamed defense contractor by b foreign intruders.b The most famous cyber-war incident to date, and the one with the most public details, involved the Stuxnet worm. Last year, Stuxnetbwhose existence was first reported by security blogger Brian Krebsbappeared in dozens of countries, targeting what are known as programmable logic controllers, ubiquitous industrial computers the size of cigarette cartons. Stuxnet was designed to harm only one kind: controllers processing uranium fuel at a nuclear facility in Iran. People who have analyzed the attack think someone slid a thumb drive with Stuxnet code into a Windows PC that was linked to the centrifuges, which were buried in a bunker. The worm then ordered the machinery to spin too fast, eventually destroying it. While all this happened, Stuxnet remained hidden from the Iranian technicians at the facility. The worm disabled alarms and fed the workers fake log reports that assured them the centrifuges were operating just fine. Stuxnet set Iranbs nuclear program back months. It didnbt merely compromise some database, like most computer worms; it obliterated something physical. b Stuxnet was the equivalent of a very high-powered ballistic weapon,b says Ed Jaehne, the chief strategy officer at KEYW (KEYW), a fast-growing computer security firm in Maryland. As researchers dissected the technology and hunted for motives, some of them pointed to the U.S. or Israel as the wormbs likeliest place of origin. Not that the forensics on Stuxnet would necessarily be that helpful: If therebs a distinguishing characteristic of a Code War attack, itbs that the technology involved keeps changing. Cyber weaponry appears to be entering a golden age of rapid developmentba new arms race. The quest in Washington, Silicon Valley, and around the globe is to develop digital tools both for spying and destroying. The most enticing targets in this war are civilianbelectrical grids, food distribution systems, any essential infrastructure that runs on computers. b This stuff is more kinetic than nuclear weapons,b says Dave Aitel, founder of a computer security company in Miami Beach called Immunity, using a military term for destructive power. b Nothing says youbve lost like a starving city.b Cyber weapons have existed for years, mostly in military and national intelligence agencies. Security experts have confirmed that work by Northrop Grumman (NOC), Raytheon (RTN), and General Dynamics (GD), the stalwarts of the traditional defense industry, is helping the U.S. government develop a capacity to snoop on or disable other countriesb computer networks. The industry started to change around 2005, however, when the Pentagon began placing more emphasis on developing hacker tools specifically as a means of conducting warfare. The shift in defense policy gave rise to a flood of boutique arms dealers that trade in offensive cyber weapons. Most of these are b blackb companies that camouflage their government funding and work on classified projects. b Five years ago, there was an explosion that occurred,b says Kevin G. Coleman, the former chief strategist of Netscape and author of The Cyber Commanderbs eHandbook, a downloadable guide. b People with offensive capabilities just burst onto the scene.b Two of the primary weapons in a cyber warriorbs arsenal are botnets and exploits. A botnet is a collection of tens or even hundreds of thousands of computers that have been commandeered without their ownersb knowledge. Hackers spend years building these involuntary armies by infecting peoplesb computers with malicious codebself-propagating computer wormsbthat remains hidden and primes the computer to receive orders. When activated, a botnet can take down networks by bombarding them with digital chatter. It can also help spy on and, if needed, sabotage large numbers of machines. An exploit, in the hacker sense of the word, is a program that takes advantage of vulnerabilities in widely used software such as Windows from Microsoft (MSFT) or in the millions of lines of code that control network servers. The hacker uses an exploit to break in and insert a worm or other destructive payload. Some such software weaknesses are well known, though software vendors can still take months, even years, to create patches to plug the holes. The most valuable exploits are those that are unknown to everyone else until the first time theybre put to use. These are called zero-day exploits. (The day the attack is discovered would be Day One.) In the hacker underground, the invite-only online chat boards where illicit wares are sold, a zero-day exploit for a network running Windows can sell for up to $250,000. Stuxnet used four high-end zero days, establishing it as an all-star in hacker circles. Colemanbs handbook lists about 40 types of attacks that play off botnets and exploits. No.b 38 is assassination. Just as Stuxnet caused a centrifuge to spin out of control, a computer worm can shut off a hospitalbs computer-controlled intravenous drip or oxygen system before the medical staff knows anything is wrong. No.b 39: hacking cars. Cars are full of computers that run the brakes, transmission, engine, just about everything. Control those systems, and you control the vehicleband can crash it at will. Sounds far-fetched? Last year researchers from Rutgers University hacked into the computers of a car traveling at 60 mph via a wireless system used to monitor tire pressure. Itbs unclear whether the U.S. government has used any of these techniques. b We are able to do things which we have not yet decided are wise to do,b says General Michael V. Hayden, the former director of the CIA. What separates a typical hack from a Pentagon-scale attack in this context is not awe-inspiring power but rather the deftness with which an intruder can sneak into a network, hide his work, and then vanish. Leading up to a 10-day attack in March on South Korea, an Internet worm took control of thousands of computers belonging to students, office workers, and shop owners. The machines then bombarded government and military websites with incessant network traffic, crashing or partially disabling them. The attack destroyed thousands of computers and cost hundreds of man-hours in mitigation efforts. But according to McAfee, the security firm, its real goal was probably to test South Korean cyber defenses, suggesting more is to come. McAfee researchers trying to figure out the origin of the attack found that the worm received its commands from servers in 26 countries, including Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. A fifth of the servers were located in the U.S. Just as this digital trail began to untangle, the commandeered computers were instructed to erase some of their basic software code, rendering themselves useless. Investigators still arenbt certain who launched the assault, although McAfee suspects North Korea. The incident demonstrated one of the scariest aspects of cyber war: untraceability. Jaehne, from KEYW, says that such weird, fast-moving attacks are best handled by startups such as his. b The large corporate defense industrial base is not known for its capabilities here or its speed of innovation,b Jaehne says. b They have to reach out to smaller, more agile companies to find that innovation.b KEYW says itbs the only publicly traded pure-play b cyber superiorityb specialist. Jaehne and other founding executives of the Hanover, Md., company broke away from Northrop Grumman to start their venture in 2008. Most of the approximately 800 employees at KEYW have clearance to work on classified projects for U.S. intelligence agencies, where the company derives most of its revenue. Last year, revenue rose 175 percent, from $39 million to $108 million. When asked about the types of digital munitions KEYW makes, Jaehne replies, b Therebs nothing I can say about that.b Immunitybs Aitel, too, declines to discuss his companybs government work. According to one person familiar with Immunity, it makes weaponized b rootkitsb: military-grade hacking systems used to bore into other countriesb networks. (The person didnbt want to be identified because of the sensitivity of the work.) Clients include the U.S. military and intelligence agencies. In fact, all these companies clam up when it comes to what they make, which is the way the U.S. government likes it. Some, such as a three-year-old startup called Endgame Systems, prefer not to talk at all. On a leafy block in midtown Atlanta, across from the campus of the Georgia Institute of Technology, sits the old Biltmore Hotel, a bygone focal point of the citybs social life once billed as b the Southbs supreme hotel.b The 1924 building was converted to office space in 1999 and now houses a Kwik Kopy and a barber shop with red leather chairs. On the seventh floor, behind locked glass doors, is a black, red, and gray honeycomb logo that reads b Endgame Systems.b The companybs website described Endgame as a commercial computer security company but gave few salient details. That was until recently; by early July the website had disappeared. Endgame does sell commercial products. Itbs also a major supplier of digital weaponry for the Pentagon. It offers a smorgasbord of wares, from vulnerability assessments to customized attack technology, for a dizzying array of targets in any region of the world. Last year, Endgame raised $30 million from venture capital firms including Bessemer Venture Partners and Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. An Endgame press release at the time said the companybs products protect organizations from viruses and botnets. What really whet the VCsb appetites, though, according to people close to the investors, is Endgamebs shot at becoming the premier cyber-arms dealer. (Endgame declined repeated requests for an interview. Bessemer and Kleiner Perkins declined to discuss their investments in the company on the record.) The company started in 2008 when a group of elite hackers decided to have a crack at building a computer security company tuned for this era of heightened conflict. Many of the key engineers were part of the X-Force, a team of b white hatb hackers at a company called Internet Security Systems. The X-Force concentrated on breaking into secure networks to find holes before someone with bad intentions could do the same. b That group was about finding a door and then picking it or punching it or doing whatever it takes to get it open,b says Christopher Klaus, a founder of ISS. b There are maybe 500 people in the world who could do this kind of stuff.b IBM (IBM) acquired ISS in 2006 for $1.3 billion. Christopher J. Rouland, a member of X-Force, left IBM and recruited some of his hacking brethren to Endgame. According to two former associates, Rouland has an intense demeanor and a tendency toward angry outbursts. He also receives praise as a brilliant manager able to recruit top talent that would otherwise shy away from government work. Thatbs in part because Rouland was once a hacker himself, known by the handle Mr. Fusion. According to the 2000 book Cybershock, by security consultant Winn Schwartau, Rouland was interviewed by U.S. Air Force investigators in 1990 after he hacked into the Pentagon. Federal authorities recognized skills they could use, says a former ISS colleague, and rather than charge him with a crime, they turned him. Rouland declined to comment on the incident. Today, Roulandbs firm deals in zero-day exploits. Some of Endgamebs technology is developed in-house; some of it is acquired from the hacker underground. Either way, these zero days are militarizedbtheybve undergone extensive testing and are nearly fail-safe. b Endgame is a well-known broker of zero days between the community and the government,b says David Baker, vice-president for services at the security firm IOActive. By b community,b he means hackers. b Some of the big zero days have ended up in government hands via Endgame,b Baker says. People who have seen the company pitch its technologyband who asked not to be named because the presentations were privatebsay Endgame executives will bring up maps of airports, parliament buildings, and corporate offices. The executives then create a list of the computers running inside the facilities, including what software the computers run, and a menu of attacks that could work against those particular systems. Endgame weaponry comes customized by regionbthe Middle East, Russia, Latin America, and Chinabwith manuals, testing software, and b demo instructions.b There are even target packs for democratic countries in Europe and other U.S. allies. Maui (product names tend toward alluring warm-weather locales) is a package of 25 zero-day exploits that runs clients $2.5 million a year. The Cayman botnet-analytics package gets you access to a database of Internet addresses, organization names, and worm types for hundreds of millions of infected computers, and costs $1.5 million. A government or other entity could launch sophisticated attacks against just about any adversary anywhere in the world for a grand total of $6 million. Ease of use is a premium. Itbs cyber warfare in a box. Those prices come from a trove of Endgamebs secrets that were exposed earlier this year. Some of the companybs communications were made public in February when the shadowy activist group Anonymous hacked a computer security firm named HBGary Federal. That firmbs entire cache of e-mail, including documents from Endgame, turned up online. Endgamebs allies believe the leak hurt national security and say the company has moved to lower its profile even further, which may explain the recent disappearance of its website. A demonstration product, detailed in the e-mails, charts the computer vulnerabilities of key institutions in Russia, such as the Ministry of Finance. Those vulnerabilities can be used to gain access to computer networks for spying; they can also be used to implant more destructive software for whatbs known as a CNA, or computer network attack, military jargon for cyber warfare. Targets for which Endgame has collected details include an oil refinery in the Russian city of Achinsk, the National Reserve Bank, and the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. Endgamebs price list may be the most important document in the collection. If the company were offering those products only to American military and intelligence agencies, such a list would be classified and would never have shown up in the HBGary e-mails, according to security experts. The fact that a nonclassified list exists at allbas well as an Endgame statement in the uncovered e-mails that it will not provide vulnerability maps of the U.S.bsuggests that the company is pitching governments or other entities outside the U.S. Endgame declined to discuss the specifics of any part of the e-mails, including who its clients might be. Richard A. Clarke, former Assistant Secretary of State and special adviser to President George W. Bush on network security, calls the price list b disturbingb and says Endgame would be b insaneb to sell to enemies of the U.S. The global market may be disturbing to people like Clarke, but U.S. companies donbt appear to face export restrictions, as the Pentagonbs manufacturers of bombs and fighter jets do. In fact, companies like Endgame have cropped up all over the world. Appin Technologies, to cite one example, is a New Delhi company that offers a wide variety of computer security services, including helping countries analyze attacks and, if needed, respond in kind. b This represents a true dilemma for U.S. security policy makers,b says Richard Falkenrath, a principal at Chertoff Group, a consulting firm started by former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff that sits at the center of Washingtonbs defense-intelligence community. He says government monitors are simply choosing not to look too carefully. b They need these capabilities. On the other hand, they donbt want to see them offshored more quickly than necessary as the result of a blunt export restriction.b On occasion, someone in the military establishment will brag about the U.S. cyber-war arsenal. b Are we the best in the globe? Absolutely,b says Hayden, the ex-CIA chief whobs also a principal at Chertoff Group. For the most part, though, U.S. officials keep mum about the Pentagonbs capabilities. This is, in part, because the Code War does not reward shows of force. Cyber weapons fall into the category of b brittleb technology, susceptible to the swift development of countermeasures. b Once you know how a weapon works in cyberspace, it can cease to become a weapon,b says Martin Libicki, a digital warfare expert at RAND Corp., the think tank. The best weapon is one an enemy never knows exists. Therebs another reason for the silence. Traditional military logic falls apart in the Code War. Deterrence and arms treaties are but philosophical concepts when invisible weapons are involved. Assigning certain blame for an attack may be impossible when itbs conducted through computers in dozens of countries. The fear of retaliationbwhich kept the Cold War from becoming hotbmay not apply. The U.S. government has spent the past couple of years formalizing its operations and thinking around computer warfare. In 2009 the Obama Administration announced the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command, headquartered at Fort Meade, Md. President Barack Obama recently signed executive orders that gave the military the all-clear to use weapons that can perform tasks ranging from espionage to the crippling of an enemybs electrical grid. (The latter would require a Presidential directive.) Itbs a moment of rapid and frightening change. b Itbs like the early days of the American-Soviet nuclear balance,b says Clarke. b We donbt know the rules of the road.b Gunter Ollmann, a computer security expert and former X-Force director, says the seductive power of cyber weapons may override governmentsb fear of the instability their use may cause. But he also believes the weapons may reduce the risk of conflicts fought with tanks and missiles. Stuxnet prevented the open conflict that would have ensued from bombing the Iranian nuclear facility. Nations with advanced digital arsenals could use the technology to bend rogue states to their will, shutting off the lights in Caracas, for example, or disabling the harbor in the Libyan capital. b It shifts from being a kinetic battle to siege warfare,b Ollmann says. b I can control your water or your power remotely. And when the whole mess gets sorted out, I can switch them back on again.b To deal with the Code War, which amounts to a constant state of threat, governments and companies can always try to develop their own technology. As with smart bombs, fighter jets, and other real-world countermeasures, though, itbs often easier to buy than build. b The hacking industry is way ahead in terms of being able to deploy something like a massive botnet,b says Amichai Shulman, chief technology officer at Imperva, a security specialist. b If a nation wants to launch an attack that distributes some kind of malware, it makes more sense for them to just rent an existing botnet.b And so the unregulated cyber-weapons makers flourish, selling to the highest bidder. Business is great. In a June article in the Atlanta Business Chronicle, Rouland said revenue is b more than doubling yearly.b He recently opened an office in Washington and is increasing head count from 40 to 100 this year. On June 15, just before his firm disappeared from the Internet, the Metro Atlanta Chamber named Rouland the 2011 Business Person of the Year, Early-Stage Entrepreneur category. Riley is a reporter for Bloomberg News. Vance is a technology writer for Bloomberg Businessweek.

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Bellovin paper on the OTP discovery
by John Young 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

Bellovin paper on the OTP discovery: https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1460

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Steve Bellovin Discovers Earliest One Time Pad Inventor
by John Young 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/science/26code.html Excerpts: The 1882 monograph that Dr. Bellovin stumbled across in the Library of Congress was "Telegraphic Code to Insure Privacy and Secrecy in the Transmission of Telegrams," by Frank Miller, a successful banker in Sacramento who later became a trustee of Stanford University. In Millers preface, the key points jumped off the page: "A banker in the West should prepare a list of irregular numbers to be called shift numbers," he wrote. "The difference between such numbers must not be regular. When a shift-number has been applied, or used, it must be erased from the list and not be used again." That sent the astonished Dr. Bellovin to the Internet to try to find out whether Mr. Millers innovation was known to the later inventors. The results of his largely online detective work can be found in the July issue of the journal Cryptologia. ... According to several independent specialists in cryptography, Mr. Miller was undoubtedly the first to propose the concept of the one-time pad. "Miller probably invented the one-time pad, but without knowing why it was perfectly secure or even that it was," said David Kahn, the author of the definitive 1967 book "The Codebreakers." "Moreover, unlike Mauborgnes conscious invention, or the Germans conscious adoption of the one-time pad to superencipher their Foreign Office codes, it had no echo, no use in cryptology. It sank without a trace until Steve found it by accident."

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Эффективные оффшорные решения
by Налоговый консультант 26 Jul '11

26 Jul '11

29 Июля ОФФШОРНЫЙ БИЗНЕС: О ЧЕМ МОЛЧАТ ДРУГИЕ +7 Московский код: Ч45\32*66 **** 4.Ч5.4_0/95 Программа: 1. Оффшорные, низконалоговые и престижные европейские юрисдикции: критерии выбора. * Сравнительная характеристика наиболее популярных оффшорных юрисдикций (Британские Виргинские острова, Белиз, Сейшелы, Панама и т.д.). * Оффшоры, Гонконг и Кипр в современном бизнесе. * Низконалоговые юрисдикции: преимущества по сравнению с "классическими" орами и Гонконгом. * Структура управления иностранными компаниями и доступа к банковскому счету. * Использование престижных юрисдикций: Швейцария, Люксембург, Нидерланды и т.д. – когда это обоснованно? * Соглашения об избежании двойного налогообложения – моменты, на которые нужно обратить внимание. * "Черные списки" ФАТФ, ОЭСР, Минфина, ЦБ РФ. 2. Кипр как сбалансированный инструмент налогового планирования. Практика использования кипрских компаний * Основные налоги на Кипре (ставки, порядок уплаты, освобождения): * налог на прибыль (Corporate Income Tax); * предварительный налог на прибыль (Preliminary Tax) и авансовые платежи (Installments); налог на оборону (Defence Contribution Tax); * НДС. * Проведение аудита и сдача отчетности. * Изменения в Соглашении об избежании двойного налогообложения между Кипром и РФ: * анализ каждой поправки и предпосылок к ним, сравнение с новой редакцией конвенции ОСЭР; * прогноз: последствия для российского бизнеса. 3. Схемы, применяемые в международном налоговом планировании. * Предварительный краткий обзор особенностей европейского законодательства * Внешнеторговые операции (экспорт/импорт) * схемы с использованием оффшоров и Гонконга; * схемы с использование английских партнерств LLP; * схемы с использованием Кипра и английской компании со статусом резидентства на Кипре. * агентские схемы (на примере английской LTD) и возможность использования прочих юрисдикций. * Эстонские, Датские, Нидерландские, Ирландские компании в торговых схемах. * Выплаты дивидендов и построение холдинговых структур с использованием Кипра * Финансирование через Кипр, Люксембург и Нидерланды (на примере займов и процентных выплат). * Правила тонкой капитализации и принцип недискриминации в схемах финансирования. Позиция судов. * (Суб)лицензионные договоры и выплаты роялти за использование прав интеллектуальной собственности. * Схемы владения недвижимостью через иностранные юридические лица. * Схемы, использования которых следует избегать 4. Конфиденциальность бизнеса: номинальные директора и акционеры, акции на предъявителя, трасты и фонды. * Номинальный сервис: * инструменты контроля номинальных директоров и номинальных акционеров; * лица, которым будут известны имена бенефициаров. * Могут ли налоговые органы РФ получить информацию о компании путем запроса в регистрирующие органы иностранного государства? * Акции на предъявителя: целесообразность применения. * Трасты/фонды как инструмент защиты активов и конфиденциальности. * "Подводные камни" при использовании номинального сервиса и трастов/фондов. 5. Открытие счетов на иностранные компании. * Какой иностранный банк выбрать? * Требования к держателям счетов: поиск наиболее лояльного банка. * Тарифы популярных кипрский и прибалтийских банков. * Рублевый счет в иностранном банке. Стоимость участия: 9000 рублей Информацию можно получить по телефонам: код: (четыре девять пять) Ч45-З2_66 **** 4Ч54095

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