September 2010 - cypherpunks-legacy

High Qua1ityMedications + Discount On All Reorders = Best Deal Ever! Viagra50/100mg - $1.85 36f
by Hana Tasia 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

Viagra50/100mg - $1.85 |BUY NOW| High Qua1ityMedications + Discount On All Reorders + Free Shipping Options + Free Pills With Every Order = Best Deal Ever! http://rxcapsulesdrug.net

1 0

Hypnotic illusions at the Wikileaks Show
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/28/wikileaks/print.html Hypnotic illusions at the Wikileaks Show Greasepaint - check. Factoids - check. By Andrew Orlowski (andrew.orlowski(a)theregister.co.uk) Posted in Music and Media, 28th July 2010 13:05 GMT Analysis There's a theatrical quality to the publication of the Wikileaks Afghan logs that's quite at odds with what they contain. You'll recall that Wikileaks obtained a large number of classified field reports from US forces in Afghanistan and gave three media outlets, the New York Times, Der Spiegel and the Guardian, advanced copies of a small portion of the material, before publishing on Monday. We're told that they're sensational, but this mundane and arcane collection of scraps of information has landed with a thud: it doesn't really tell us anything we didn't already know. Yet everyone involved has a role to play, and is hamming it up to the full. The oohs and aahs wouldn't be out of place at a WWE Smackdown, or a Christmas panto. Something feels not quite right here, but what is it? The star actor and media manipulator is undoubtedly Wikileaks founder Julian Assange himself. Assange plays the part of "master hacker" and "international fugitive" - cliches at home in an airport thriller. But recall that the template is Cryptome [1], a site operated by New York architect John Young for 15 years. Young doesn't appear to need Assange's theatrical garb - such as never staying in the same location for two nights, requiring cryptography, and changing his number and email constantly. Young's name and address are prominent on his website, and haven't changed for 15 years. Young has arguably has far more to lose than Assange. So the fugitive role Assange adopts is a lifestyle choice, and not a necessity. Nor does Young feel the need to become part of the story himself: he doesn't do vanity PR: press conferences or proclamations are not the Cryptome style. On Cryptome, you come and get it. And crucially, you then work out whether it's genuine or not, and how important it may be. "Assange is a master at hiding his assets and providing hypnotic illusions," notes Young. The Guardian has devoted as much space to how it processed the story, as to the story itself - which is usually a warning bell that the news content might actually be quite thin. Another warning bell is that the story has dried up by day three. Nevertheless, having hyped up Assange for weeks, the paper now gets to trumpet its prowess at obtaining the forbidden - when really, it's been hand-picked by the media manipulator. It looks uncomfortably similar to "churnalism", the term that one of the skeleton team processing the files, Nick Davies, coined in his book Flat Earth News. This illustrates less of an analytical capability than a skill at buttering up a single source. Ailing newspapers have their own reasons for buying into the Wikileaks circus, of course. And the last month has sent the Assange publicity machine at the Graun into overdrive: [Profile [2] - Profile [3] - Award [4] - Profile [5] - Profile [6] - Live blog [7] - er, Jemima [8]]. The Guardian was scooped by the Telegraph with its expenses scandal and the newspaper's financial position is more precarious than the other ailing broadsheets. Its top investigative reporters such as David Hencke and David Pallister have taken voluntary redundancy - it's really down to a skeleton crew of just two, and it's outsourcing its IT operations. You can be forgiven for thinking that the Wikileaks relationship is another form of outsourcing - with the fizz of the 'glamour' provided by Assange making up for the brains cupboard looking rather bare. But none of this has stopped the Guardian - unlike Der Spiegel or the New York Times - from suggesting that it's pioneering a new form of journalism: "data-driven journalism [9]", no less. I find it odd that disclosure in itself has become a kind of performance. And I use the word 'performance' carefully, because performance is a kind of artifice. While all journalists love to obtain forbidden or secret documents, these don't become a substitute for the primary job in hand, which is explaining the world, and this is performed by the journalist. It requires analytical skills at both ends of the chain - with the reader also making rational choices, and joining the dots. Leaks typically provide the seed for a scoop, maybe a great scoop, but they don't join the dots. As many commenters have pointed out since Monday, The Afghan Logs is a subset of (apparently) 90,000 documents which don't really tell us anything new. They shed no new light on strategic motives, or even tactical alliances. By comparing the Wikileaks logs to the Pentagon Papers, our intelligence is being insulted. Information isn't knowledge Part of the problem is the weight given to "information" itself. In the Wikileaks Show, facts are a strange kind of stuff that almost appears to come from another planet; a luminous substance. This is quite similar to how a conspiracy theorist treats information. For a conspiracy theorist, a factoid is emblematic, it's a cypher: it represents and stands-in for a wide set of power relationships. In the real world, these are much more complex and contradictory. By hyping a collection of factoids, the Logs become quite symbolic. They foreclose the analysis we must perform as readers. The only journalist to explicitly highlight this problem is Brendan O'Neill, who points out [10] that the Wikileaks Show leaves us feeling a bit thicker and more poorly informed than before: "Truth becomes, not something we find out through critical study and investigation, but something we are handed by external forces b& this is Truth as a religious-style revelation rather than Truth as the endpoint of thought, interrogation, question-asking, analysis. In reality, it is only through actively engaging with the world and its problems, through gathering facts and objectively analysing and organising them, that we can arrive at any Truth worth its name," he writes. The journalist Claud Cockburn, who created the foreign policy scandalsheet The Week in the 1930s that later became the model for Private Eye, and many others, made a similar point many years ago, in his memoir A Discord of Trumpets. Cockburn wrote: "To hear people talking about facts you would think that they lay about like pieces of gold in the Yukon days, waiting to be picked up - arduous it is true, but still definitely visible - by strenuous prospectors whose subsequent problem was only how to get them to market. Such a view is evidently and dangerously naive". Cockburn's point - and do read it in his own words [11] - was that stories began with a subjective point of view, around which the facts were organised. This idea of the journalist as a flawed medium was heresy, and perhaps upsetting, Cockburn recognized - but it was healthier, as it implied a rational, critical audience and demanded a plurality of "views": "One was reminded of the atheistic young man who has told the believer that he would never believe anything he could not understand, to which the believer replied, 'Young man, your beliefs are likely to be small.'" The internet has made concealment of information much harder, and that's good. I'm not knocking the information distribution system Assange has created. But in the face of this, power doesn't simply keel over and admit defeat. And Assange may simply have invented a new form of concealment - the information disclosed is both edited and highly selective. The nature of news and journalism hasn't really changed. We want the world explained, the dots joined, and factoids are a poor substitute, no matter how sensational the trappings. We know that information isn't knowledge, and sometimes barely causes a ripple. (Young weighs into the Wikileaks-Media relationship here [12] - it's a must-read.) B.

1 0

CIA used 'illegal, inaccurate code to target kill drones'
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/24/cia_netezza/print.html CIA used 'illegal, inaccurate code to target kill drones' 'They want to kill people with software that doesn't work' By Chris Williams Posted in Storage, 24th September 2010 11:12 GMT The CIA is implicated in a court case in which it's claimed it used an illegal, inaccurate software "hack" to direct secret assassination drones in central Asia. The target of the court action is Netezza, the data warehousing firm that IBM bid $1.7bn for on Monday. The case raises serious questions about the conduct of Netezza executives, and the conduct of CIA's clandestine war against senior jihadis in Afganistan and Pakistan. The dispute surrounds a location analysis software package - "Geospatial" - developed by a small company called Intelligent Integration Systems (IISi), which like Netezza is based in Massachusetts. IISi alleges that Netezza misled the CIA by saying that it could deliver the software on its new hardware, to a tight deadline. The Predator B When the software firm then refused to rush the job, it's claimed, Netezza illegally and hastily reverse-engineered IISi's code to deliver a version that produced locations inaccurate by up to 13 metres. Despite knowing about the miscalculations, the CIA accepted the software, court submissions indicate. IISi is now seeking an injunction to ban Netezza and the CIA from using the software or any derivative of it, in any context. The relationship between the two firms dates back to 2006, when IISi signed up to resell Netezza data warehousing kit combined with Geospatial. The code allows users, for example, "to incorporate and cross-reference vast amounts of business data with geographic location within the same database, and enable events (such as... a cell phone signal moving from one tower to another) to be matched with personal characteristics in the database (such as... the identity of the person whose cell phone signal has moved from one tower to another)", according to IISi's court filings. Such techniques - quickly combining intelligence with live mobile phone surveillance from the air - are reportedly central to the CIA's targeting of missile strikes by unmanned aircraft. They want to kill people with my software that doesn't work The partnership between the two firms strengthened, and in August 2008 Netezza acquired exclusive rights to distribute Geospatial, alongside its NPS hardware. By August last year, Netezza was starting to promote its next generation appliance, TwinFin. Whereas NPS was based on IBM's Power PC chip architecture, the TwinFin relies on cheaper x86 silicon. As a result, Geospatial would not run on the new gear. Nevertheless, Netezza sales staff sold Geospatial running on TwinFin to a "US government customer", which later turned out to be the CIA. The purchase order, totalling $1.18m, via an obscure Virginia IT consultancy, came through on 11 September last year. This despite - as claimed in IISi court documents - that the software product referred to on the order "in fact did not exist". Up to this point IISi had done little work porting Geospatial, as its engineers had not had physical access to a TwinFin. Indeed, the agreement between the two firms did not require IISi to support the new machines - a fact confirmed last month by a Boston judge - but it agreed to begin the process in September 2009. Netezza supplied the software firm with TwinFin hardware on 1 October. Within a week, Richard Zimmerman, IISi's CTO reported that porting Geospatial was "proving fraught with difficulties" and would take at least two months. Two days later, on 9 October, the relationship took a strange turn. Jon Shepherd, Netezza's "general manager, location-based solutions" called Zimmerman to pressure him to deliver the code quicker, court documents say. "He basically told me the CIA... wanted to use [Geospatial] to target Predator drones in Afganistan and that, quote/unquote, it was our patriotic duty to work with them to get [Geospatial] ported to the TwinFin as fast as possible and that we need to have a phone conversation the next day to discuss that," Zimmerman said in a sworn deposition to the court. "Frankly, that response suggests a cavalier sales approach to a profound issue. Lives are at stake." During a conference call the next day, Netezza CEO Jim Baum repeated Shepherd's claims that national security demanded IISi's help, according to the deposition. Shepherd suggested the CIA would accept untested code in chunks, Zimmerman said. "My reaction was one of stun, amazement that they want to kill people with my software that doesn't work," he said. According to the affidavit of IISi CEO Paul Davis, who was also on the conference call, his firm did not previously know Netezza had sold the undeveloped product, let alone for deadly application by the CIA. In an email to Baum two days later, on Columbus day 2009, Davis wrote: "Jon [Shepherd's] statement, apparently endorsed by Jim [Baum] that the customer can 'just work with whatever we give them' is not consistent with how IISi works. And we don't really believe that is how our national security agencies work. Frankly, that response suggests a cavalier sales approach to a profound issue. Lives are at stake." Enter Skip Yet according to Baum's response, that is how the CIA worked. "It is the CUSTOMER who has indicated that he is willing to work with IISi and Netezza to accept code progressively," he wrote. As a follow up, Davis got a call from a man who identified himself as Skip McCormick, of the CIA, to discuss speeding up the port of Geospatial. Davis was recuperating from a heart attack and could not speak at any length. Straight after the the call, however, he received an email from McCormick with a CIA address. Hays W. "Skip" McCormick III, from his book [1] "We depend on the Geospatial tools here every day," it said. "We just upgraded to a [TwinFin], but it doesn't yet have the Geospatial tools. I'm trying to figure out what options are available for getting them asap." Davis had doubts the contact was genuine but The Register has established that a Hays W. "Skip" McCormick III, co-author of a 1998 book on software project management, has worked at the CIA for several years. Sources including conference guest lists record his involvement in software projects at the agency. According to book publicity he previously worked as a consultant to DARPA, Northrop Grumman and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further evidence of the CIA's apparent acceptance of untested software is offered by an internal Netezza email from the same day as the crucial conference call. "A US Gov customer is expecting the toolkit to be available as soon as Monday for use in a mission-critical project," wrote project manager Razi Raziuddin. "They do understand we won't have a fully-qualified, production-ready release and are OK with it." Immediately after IISi's refusal to deliver untested Geospatial code, internal emails disclosed to the court show Netezza executives began making alternative arrangements. "I want to set up some time on Thursday to get on the phone with you guys to talk about some options in the event we need an alternative TwinFin solution," Shepherd told Netezza engineers in an email. Thank God for optimists On the Thursday one of the engineers told Jim Baum via email that "it appears" Geospatial was working on TwinFin. On Friday it emerged that however Netezza adapted the software, the results were inaccurate. "For some strange reason many of the calculations are a little off, from 1 to 13 metres," wrote Joe Wiltshire, a federal account manager at Netezza. Jim Baum: "We are likely screwed" "The customer is not confident they can live with the uncertainty in meters unless we can tell them a bit about why this is happening." "No matter how you slice this, we are likely screwed," Netezza CEO Baum replied. The unreliable results were traced to a floating point problem, but less than a week later Wiltshire reported to Shepherd that in fact "they are satisfied" and believed "the minor discrepancy in metrics... is due to [TwinFin] doing a better job". "Thank God for optimists," came Shepherd's reply. to comment for this story. A CIA spokeswoman said the agency does not comment on pending litigation, especially if it is not a party to the lawsuit.

1 0

Obama administration revives Draconian communications intercept plans
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> -----

1 0

Luxury at a Discount!
by Luxury-4-LESS 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

Dozens of new Watches and Jewelry Added each Day http://bit.ly/bTdpwp

1 0

Обучение и оценка эффективности торгового персонала
by Затраты: прямые и косвенные 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

Тема: Торговый персонал √ подбор, обучение, оценка эффективности Внешний и внутренний консультант по управлению предприятием и работе с персоналом, практик-консультант по реструктуризации и построению управленческих структур, сертифицированный специалист по ИСО стандартам, постановщик задач по вопросам оценки и аттестации для программы "Босс-кадровик". +7 (Ч95) 44_5.ЧО-_95 и 4Ч5.З2.66 29 Сentяbря (продолжительность 8 часов) Цель: Торговый персонал отличается большой текучестью. Там где есть такая категория работников, никогда не перестают искать и принимать новых сотрудников. Большая часть вновь принятых увольняются в первые три месяца работы. Как минимизировать ошибки при приеме торгового персонала и отсечь на этапе подбора совершенно неподходящие кандидатуры, какие приемы при собеседовании помогут выявить полную профнепригодность кандидатов. И как не потерять потенциально хороших работников в начале их работы на предприятии Кого, когда и чему следует обучать Как узнать результативность обучения Для чего нужны периодические и внеплановые оценки (аттестации) Как организовать оценку, чтобы она прошла с наименьшим отвлечением персонала, но в то же время дала практические результаты Программа мероприятия: Подбор торгового персонала: 1.1 Особенности торгового персонала 1.2 Виды торгового персонала 1.3 Как минимизировать ошибки при приеме: 1.3.1 Тесты 1.3.2 Проверка на стрессоустойчивость 1.3.3 "Плохие" вопросы 1.4 Коллективные испытания 1.5 Испытательный срок: 1.5.1 Конкретные задания 1.5.1 Шефство 1.5.1 Выводы по результатам испытательного срока 1.6 Образцы документов по подбору и приему Обучение: 2.1 Непрерывность обучения 2.2 Категории обучающихся 2.3 Программы обучения 2.4 Плюсы и минусы внешнего и внутреннего обучения 2.5 Оценка результативности обучения 2.6 Образцы документов по обучению (повышению квалификации) Оценка, аттестация торгового персонала: 3.1 Подготовка процедуры оценки: 3.1.1 Вопросы 3.1.2 Практические задания 3.1.3 Отзывы 3.1.4 Тесты 3.1.5 Анонимный покупатель 3.2 Сроки и частота оценки 3.3 Цели оценки 3.4 Результаты оценки 3.5 Действия после оценки: 3.5.1 Резерв 3.5.2 Перемещение 3.5.3 Обучение 3.5.4 Увольнение 3.6 Образцы документов по подготовке и проведению оценки (аттестации) Практические рекомендации, ответы на вопросы слушателей Cтоимоcть: 7 900 рублей По вопpоcам pегucтаpацuu обpащайтеcь по тел: 8 Моск. код: Ч4*539_68 \\// Ч4/54_О95

1 0

Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO
by Eugen Leitl 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-719726,00.html 09/27/2010 11:23 AM Recruited by West Germany Former Stasi Cryptographers Now Develop Technology for NATO By Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West Germans were desperate to prevent the Stasi's top codebreakers from falling into the wrong hands. from falling into the wrong hands and set up a company to hire the East German cryptographers. Now the former Stasi scientists develop technology used by Angela Merkel and NATO. Every morning, while going to his office in Berlin's Adlershof district, Ralph W. passes a reminder of his own past, a small museum that occupies a room on the ground floor of the building. The museum could easily double as a command center run by the class enemy in an old James Bond film. A display of coding devices from various decades includes the T-310, a green metal machine roughly the size of a huge refrigerator, which East German officials used to encode their telex messages. The device was the pride of the Stasi, the feared East German secret police, which was W.'s former employer. Today he works as a cryptologist with Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH (SIT), a subsidiary of Rohde & Schwarz, a Munich-based company specializing in testing equipment, broadcasting and secure communications. W. and his colleagues encode sensitive information to ensure that it can only be read or heard by authorized individuals. Their most important customers are NATO and the German government. Rohde & Schwarz is something of an unofficial supplier of choice to the German government. Among other things, the company develops bugproof mobile phones for official use. Since 2004, its Berlin-based subsidiary SIT, which specializes in encryption solutions, has been classified as a "security partner" to the German Interior Ministry, which recently ordered a few thousand encoding devices for mobile phones, at about b,1,250 ($1,675) apiece. Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel has used phones equipped with SIT's encryption technology. In other words, the Stasi's former cryptographers are now Merkel's cryptographers. Secret Operation The transfer of Ralph W. and other cryptologists from the East German Ministry for State Security, as the Stasi was officially known, to West Germany was handled both seamlessly and discreetly. West German officials were determined to make sure that no one would find out about the integration of East Germany's top cryptologists into the west. The operation was so secret, in fact, that it has remained unknown to this day. Only a handful of officials were involved in the operation, which was planned at the West German Interior Ministry in Bonn. In January 1991, Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH was founded. The company was established primarily to provide employment for particularly talented Stasi cryptologists that the Bonn government wanted to keep in key positions. Ralph W. is one of those specialists. W., who holds a doctorate in mathematics, signed a declaration of commitment to the Stasi on Sept. 1, 1982. By the end of his time with the Stasi, he was making 22,550 East German marks a year -- an excellent salary by East German standards. And when he was promoted to the rank of captain in June 1987, his superior characterized W. as one of the "most capable comrades in the collective." While with the Stasi, W. worked in Department XI, which also boasted the name "Central Cryptology Agency" (ZCO). Looking for the Top Performers The story begins during the heady days of the East German revolution in 1990. Officially, the East German government, under its last communist premier, Hans Modrow, had established a government committee to dissolve the Ministry for State Security which reported to the new East German interior minister, Peter-Michael Diestel. In reality, the West German government was already playing a key role in particularly sensitive matters. Then-West German Interior Minister Wolfgang SchC$uble (who is the current German finance minister) had instructed two senior Interior Ministry officials, Hans Neusel and Eckart Werthebach, to take care of the most politically sensitive remnants of the 40-year intelligence war between the two Germanys. The government of then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl was interested in more than just the politically explosive material contained in some of the Stasi's files. It also had its eye on the top performers in the former East German spy agency. The cryptologists were of particular interest to the Kohl government, which recognized that experts capable of developing good codes would also be adept at breaking them. The Stasi cryptologists were proven experts in both fields. Documents from the Stasi records department indicate that the one of the Stasi cryptologists' achievements was to break Vericrypt and Cryptophon standards that had been used until the 1980s. This meant that they were capable of decoding encrypted radio transmissions by the two main West German intelligence agencies -- the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) -- and the West German border police. The East Germans even managed to decode the BND's orders to members of the clandestine "Gladio" group, which was intended to continue anti-communist operations in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The West German government was determined to prevent these highly trained East German experts from entering the free market. The idea that specialists who had spent decades working with West German encryption methods and had successfully cracked West German intelligence's codes could defect to Middle Eastern countries like Syria was a nightmare. Until then, the BND had had no difficulties listening in on intelligence communications in the Middle East, an ability the potential defection of Stasi experts would likely have compromised. Bonn also hoped to use their skills to break into regions where its own agents were making no headway. All of this meant that the Stasi experts had to be brought on board in the West -- even if it involved unconventional methods. Cherrypicking the Stasi's Top Brains The government officials in Bonn turned to an expert for advice: Otto Leiberich, a cryptologist and mathematician who had headed the Central Office for Cryptology, the equivalent of the Stasi's ZCO at the West German BND, until the mid-1970s. Leiberich's task, after he was brought in as a member of the secret operation, was to evaluate the professional abilities of the Stasi experts. Leiberich still has vivid memories of his first official trip to the town of Hoppegarten, next to Berlin. One of the East German cryptologists at the meeting greeted the members of the West German delegation as "comrades," Leiberich recalls. He was impressed by the East Germans' expertise, says Leiberich. "They were excellent mathematicians who were not personally guilty of any misconduct." Leiberich says he would have liked to hire them, particularly the Stasi's then "chief decoder," the ZCO department head, Horst M. A gaunt chain-smoker who wore horn-rimmed glasses, M. was born in 1937 and had earned a degree in mathematics at East Berlin's Humboldt University. But the West was also interested in younger people, in the expectation that they would be of greater value in the nascent computer age. A Free-Market Solution Leiberich could have used the extra manpower, especially after 1990, when the West German Central Office for Cryptology was spun off from the BND and a law was enacted to form the new Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). Leiberich, who was named the BSI's first president, headed a team consisting mainly of former intelligence colleagues. But Neusel, the senior official from the West German Interior Ministry, dismissed the idea as too precarious. Firstly, the government had decided not to integrate former Stasi officials, because of their past activities, into the bureaucracy of a unified Germany. Additionally, as one person involved in the operation recalls, concerns about potential traitors gave rise to a "sacred principle," namely that "no one from the Stasi was to be transferred to the West German intelligence agenciewith the Stasi for eight years, also fitted the desired profile, as did his colleagues Wolfgang K. and Volker S. In total, about a dozen former Stasi employees, most of them mathematicians, were given the chance to embark on a second cryptology career in post-reunification Germany. The federal government provided whatever assistance it could, but only with the utmost discretion. SIT was initially headquartered in the town of GrC<nheide in the eastern state of Brandenburg, in a former Stasi children's home. 'Cosmic Top Secret' An episode from the 1990s shows how conspiratorially the operation was handled, even within the West German intelligence community. When the BND needed a "D-channel filter" -- a precursor to today's firewalls -- to protect communications networks, it contacted the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI). But BND officials pricked up their ears when they discovered that the work was being done by SIT. A private company protecting the computers of Germany's foreign intelligence agency? Nevertheless, the BND officials were told that it was "totally OK," and that the BSI would take responsibility for SIT. For the parent company Rohde & Schwarz, the former problem child in Brandenburg soon became a success story. SIT took over the cryptology division of German engineering giant Siemens, and the company now employs about 150 mathematicians, engineers and computer scientists at its three locations. SIT, which proudly refers to itself as the "preferred supplier of high-security cryptography" for NATO, even includes in its product line devices classified as "Cosmic Top Secret," NATO's highest secrecy level. SIT's Elcrodat solution, standard equipment on NATO submarines, frigates and military helicopters, has provided the company with orders worth millions for years. When approached by SPIEGEL, Rohde & Schwarz declined to comment on this previously unknown part of its company history. To show its gratitude for the company's efforts, the federal government did more than just provide it with lucrative contracts. Eckart Werthebach, the Interior Ministry official, awarded the former managing director of SIT, a senior Rohde & Schwarz executive originally from West Germany, the Order of Merit o at Villa Hammerschmidt in Bonn, the former official residence of the German president. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

1 0

Please review the attached resume.
by Abel Bliss 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

Please find attached.

1 0

Заявку на обучение по Бизнес планированию подтверждаем
by бизнес план хозяйства 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

МЕТОДЫ, РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ПО РАЗРАБОТКЕ БИЗНЕС ПЛАНА ДЛЯ ИНВЕСТИЦИОННЫХ ФОНДОВ И БАНКОВ. Информацию можно получить по телефонам: +7 Московский код: 445/З968 \\\/// 445_З_9*6.8 Дата проведения: 4-5 Октября Краткая информация о семинаре: Методы из практики по разработке БП и технико-экономических обоснований. Применение литературы (на что требуется обращать внимание), использование электронных таблиц, правильный выбор и работа со специализированным ПО. Восприятие подготовленной документации инвестором или партнером √ как правильно подготовить и оформить документацию. Методы и практические рекомендации: Построение структуры бизнес плана; Инвестиционная программа: учет, правильное построение и классификация затрат. Организовать анализ целесообразности инвестиционных затрат с использованием простых и динамических критериев эффективности. Сбор и подготовка информации для оценивания проекта: назначение классов структуре затрат, определение с получаемыми доходами для: новых компаний.проектов на действующем производстве. Определение и построение источников финансирования: кредиты, не распределенная прибыль, инвестиционный капитал. Инфляция и ее влияние на расчеты и результаты проекта. ДИСКОНТИРОВАНИЕ √ критерий разногласия! Вопрос применения и понятия метода. Подготовка финансового плана: Требования к расчетам и их объем;Фин. План его структура финансовыхКак самостоятельно подготовить электронные таблицы;Объем расчетов и описание в финансовом приложений;Финансовые показатели их определение и необходимые коррективы;Определение фин. показателей и их анализ;Точа (0), определение финансовой прочности проекта;Полученные данные и их использование. Доходность проекта, анализ, показатели, которые определяют критерии рентабельности и прибыли. Финансовые результаты проекта. Нестандартные проекты и особенности их расчета. Грамотно подготовить текстовую часть документа. Где можно почерпнуть информацию для маркетинговых исследований. Обработка информации для маркетинговых исследований √ управление объемом информации, понятие, что такое Маркетинговые исследования в стандартном варианте и использование обработанной информации в структуре бизнес плана. Информацию можно получить по телефонам: (код Москвы) 4Ч5*З9.68 Ч45Ч095

1 0

Order Now! HYDROCODONE BRAND Watson 540 10mg/mg, 60 Pills - $479, 90 Pills - $656, 120 Pills - $838 td
by Alice Spring 27 Sep '10

27 Sep '10

HYDROCODONE BRAND Watson 540 10mg/mg Buy Your HYDROCODONE Online 30 Pills - $260, 60 Pills - $479, 90 Pills - $656, 120 Pills - $838. NoPRESCRIPTION REQUIRED Safe, Easy and Discreet Delivery! Order Now! http://pillkerk51v.ru

1 0