July 2009 - cypherpunks-legacy

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Fwd: [gsc] Public Key Transaction Processor
by R.A. Hettinga 11 Jul '09

11 Jul '09

Begin forwarded message: > From: Patrick Chkoreff <patrick(a)rayservers.net> > Date: July 11, 2009 12:19:22 PM GMT-04:00 > To: gold-silver-crypto(a)rayservers.com > Subject: Re: [gsc] Public Key Transaction Processor > > Andrew McMeikan wrote, On 07/11/2009 10:44 AM: >> About seven years ago, I started coding on a program for digital >> payments using pgp keys as accounts. > ... > > I hear ya Andrew. A long time ago I messed with a system for doing > transactions via EMAIL, using PGP-signed messages. > > I even set up an auto-responder with an address like > "title(a)server.com", > where "title" represented a "Title Server". > > I was able to email it a signed message saying in effect: > > Transfer 40 units from key A to key B. > -- signed, key A > > I'd email that to title(a)server.com. I had some Perl code which > received > that message automatically, verified the signature with key A, and > returned a response signed with key T, where T represented the Title > Server itself. > > Of course, to prevent replay attacks, you need to include a nonce > (one-time random number) in the message to make it unique. And then > the > Title Server needs to keep a database of those nonces to make sure a > new > message is not a replay. And then the question arises, when can you > delete anything from that database, if ever. > > Trubanc addresses that problem by having users effectively "sign > off" on > balances at every stage, enabling old history to be deleted. > > I also played with a split/merge scheme, which is what eCache uses. > But > again, when can you ever delete a spent ID from the database, if ever? > > The larger question is: even if the Title Server does all that, you > end > up with a fundamentally account-based system, and do we really want > that? > > One answer to that is to use *new key pairs* for different > transactions. > But the Title Server could still link those keys to IP addresses if an > aggressor forced a programmer to include it in the code. > > Even with eCache, an aggressor could force a programmer to include > code > that links the cash ID with an IP address and keeps a log of it. > > eCache gets around that problem by *insisting* that you access their > server through Tor. That way there's no feasible way for the eCache > server to track a user's "real" IP address. > > eCache also provides a "mixer" function to help obscure the trail. > > Speaking of mixers, an email-based Title Server could rely on > Mixmaster > remailer technology to obscure real IPs. But as long as transfers are > specified as FROM one key TO another key, there is still a danger if a > particular key is ever linked to a human individual somehow, even if > not > by IP address. > > Loom does not overcome this problem in any ultimate sense. An > aggressor > could force a programmer to insert logging code, which would associate > Loom locations with IP addresses. > > My thought was, to hell with it, if a user wants more anonymity, let > him > use an ANONYMOUS CHANNEL, such as Tor. > > That's like the SSL mentality: if the user wants to communicate > with a > server securely, then the user should use a SECURE CHANNEL, i.e. SSL. > That way the server itself doesn't have to do any cryptography, since > the SSL layer handles that automatically. > > Similarly, the TOR layer should provide an ANONYMOUS CHANNEL -- > ideally. > In practice, it would probably never be as anonymous as BLINDED > SIGNATURES, but it's a start. > > Even with Loom over Tor, an aggressor could still force a programmer > to > insert logging code. In that case the logs would associate locations > with fairly meaningless IP addresses, so you might think privacy is > preserved. However, if *somehow* a location was ever associated > with a > human individual (not by IP but by some other means), then a pattern > of > spends would begin to emerge to the aggressor's eyes. > > > If you wanted to play with a signature-based system which does NOT > re-use keys, you might try something like Dan Bernstein's > implementation > of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, specifically a thing called > "Curve25519": > > http://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html > > That uses very compact 256-bit numbers for both private and public > keys, > unlike the giant keys used in RSA. > > > Now that I'm on that topic, I'm thinking of incorporating that > technology into Loom for the purpose of key exchange (i.e. conveying a > secret location securely). > > The nice thing about Curve25519 is that every user can have a 256-bit > private key and a 256-bit public key. If two users Alice and Bob wish > to exchange information securely, they can easily compute a shared > secret location using only their own private key and the OTHER user's > public key. (That's Diffie-Hellman key exchange.) > > > I have done a little research into blinded signatures, which could > implement truly unlinkable payments, and it would be nice to use > Curve25519 for that. However, the literature on the use of elliptic > curve cryptography for blinded signatures is a bit scarce, and the > papers which exist go very deep into some math which I am *capable* of > understanding and implementing, should I care to spend an enormous > number of hours of my life trying it. > > > I have not yet found any nice libraries for blinded signatures which I > can simply *use* in my code. I'm really surprised that GnuPG has > never > included any blinded signature functions in their program. They have > all the necessary discrete-log and strong-prime field code in their > codebase, but as far as I know they've never implemented blinding > functions. > > > > So to summarize, yes I think you can implement a PGP-email based > system, > but it would fundamentally be account-based unless you re-used keys at > every stage, which would be difficult for users. > > > You realize however that for VERY LARGE chunks of value, like let's > say > a whole 400 oz gold brick, one can use PGP-signatures manually to > transfer "ownership". > > The Title Server could simply sign a message saying in effect: > > The gold bar belongs to key A. > -- signed, T > > A would then send a message to T, saying: > > Please give the gold bar to key B. > -- signed, A > > Then the Title Server would say: > > The gold bar belongs to key B. > -- signed, T > > Of course, the Title server would need to keep a record of all these > messages so that it could justify the very latest owner. And the > messages would have to be linked in a chain probably using a nonce, to > avoid re-ordering them to justify a different owner. Then there's the > problem of what happens if the Title server "forgets" a later part of > the chain somehow, concluding that A is still the owner. But the new > owner B would still have a copy of his signed message saying that he > owns the bar. A lot of details to consider here, but in a manual > system > it might be workable, and for large asset values it could be cost- > effective. > > > END stream-of-consciousness-with-no-proofreading > > -- Patrick

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Fwd: [gsc] also
by R.A. Hettinga 11 Jul '09

11 Jul '09

Begin forwarded message: > From: Patrick Chkoreff <patrick(a)rayservers.net> > Date: July 11, 2009 12:23:23 PM GMT-04:00 > To: gold-silver-crypto(a)rayservers.com > Subject: [gsc] also > > Also, with Loom I wanted to base everything on an ultra-simple API > which > was independent of communication medium (web, email, etc.): > > https://loom.cc/grid_tutorial?help=1 > > > My attitude was: screw it, there's an ultra-simple API which > abstracts > the notion of "transfer of arbitrary assets", now deal with it. > Meaning, if you want higher-level interfaces, build them. If you want > anonymity, use an anonymous channel. Next! > > That was my attitude because I was tired of fruitlessly farting around > with certificate-based and blinding systems. Maybe someday I'll > revisit > them. > > > -- Patrick

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