February 2006 - cypherpunks-legacy

Thanks for being a good friend!
by Angelina Mcconnell 14 Feb '06

14 Feb '06

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HOPE Number Six call for participation
by Greg Newby 14 Feb '06

14 Feb '06

Call for Participation HOPE Number Six July 21-23 2006 The Hotel Pennsylvania New York City HOPE Number Six (www.hopenumbersix.net) is this summer's hacker conference sponsored by 2600 Magazine. Presenters and artists from all nationalities and disciplines are again invited to participate in this forum. HOPE Number Six covers all aspects of hacking, the community surrounding it, and its effects across the world. For three days, The Hotel Pennsylvania will be the nexus of discussion, planning, and activity for hacker ideas, opportunities, and understanding. There are several ways to participate: * Speak: Presentation ideas should be submitted with a synopsis of the topic along with presenter bio, and will be chosen by relevance and peer review. Panels, talks, tutorials, debates, or other types of presentations are all welcome. Most presentations will be 55 minutes. * Interact: Demonstrations of new and interesting technologies or system elements as well as artistic exhibits are welcome. We have 20,000 square feet of presentation space to fill, so projects of all sizes will be considered. Robots, Segways, Legos, RFID, digital graffiti -- submit your creative ideas! * Display: All sorts of presentations, demos, workshops, classes, posters, and other ways of sharing information are encouraged. Space and time will be provided to accommodate proposals. * Sell: Space is also available for vendors. Prospects should describe their group and the items they are selling. Vendors are chosen by relevance to the conference topic and organization size. Topics related to all aspects of hackers and hacking are welcome. In past years, sessions have included these themes: * New technologies * Effects of new laws and business models * Hackers and activism * Telephone systems * Radio communication * Intelligence gathering * Lockpicking * Privacy * System internals vulnerabilities * Copy protection * Governments * Strong crypto * Data exchange * Voting systems * Social engineering * Programming techniques * Hacker Ethics * Stories from K-12 * Surveillance * Systems administration * Worms and viruses * The man and how to avoid him * Information privacy * International cooperation * Peer to peer networks * Wireless * Culture jamming * Low-power radio * Black hats and white hats * Cyberterrorism and cyber protests * Teaching hacking * The media Other topics are welcome, especially those offering fresh views and new variants on old themes. Submissions should be sent to "speakers(a)2600.com" and include names (or aliases) and email addresses in addition to the information requested above. Conference planning is ongoing throughout the spring, so submit your ideas or suggestions as early as possible. Late proposals will be considered only if space is still available. For more information about HOPE Number Six, check the web pages at www.hopenumbersix.net. These pages provide opportunities to volunteer, as well as information about travel, the hotel, and more specific info on speakers, tutorials, and the many activities that will be ongoing.

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ADPI American Dental Partners
by Bianca Easley 14 Feb '06

14 Feb '06

Skyler, ADPI American Dental Partners - http://es.geocities.com/dynamical2548 Bianca Easley Acct. Rep. hps0735

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Re: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
by Jay Goodman Tamboli 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

On 2006.02.13, at 16:37, Gregory Hicks wrote: > The big change here is that the SecreT Service UD is moved from the > Treasury Department to the Department of Homeland Defense... > except as > designated by the Prez... when it moves to SecState... 3 USC 202 (http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode03/ usc_sec_03_00000202----000-.html) already has the SSUD under DHS. The powers to carry firearms, make arrests, and "perform other duties" are not currently given explicitly, but I'd assume they're encompassed under "privileges and powers similar to those of the members of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia," unless Congress is planning to disarm the Metropolian Police sometime soon. /jgt -- http://tamboli.cx/

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Hmm... how soon you forget about me!
by Tara Hooker 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

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[Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision
by R. A. Hettinga 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2006 18:47:47 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com <http://newsmax.com/scripts/printer_friendly.pl?s=pf&page=http://newsmax.com…> Reprinted from NewsMax.com Land Mine in Patriot Act Provision Paul Craig Roberts Thursday, Jan. 26, 2006 A provision in the "Patriot Act" creates a new federal police force with power to violate the Bill of Rights. You might think that this cannot be true, as you have not read about it in newspapers or heard it discussed by talking heads on TV. However, it is a looming reality. Go to House Report 109-333 - "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005," and check it out for yourself. Sec. 605 states the following: "There is hereby created and established a permanent police force, to be known as the 'United States Secret Service Uniformed Division.'" This new federal police force is "subject to the supervision of the secretary of homeland security." The new police are empowered to "make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such felony." The new police are assigned a variety of jurisdictions, including "an event designated under Section 3056(e) of Title 18 as a special event of national significance," or SENS. "A special event of national significance" is neither defined nor does it require the presence of a "protected person" such as the president in order to trigger it. Thus, the administration, and perhaps the police themselves, can place the SENS designation on any event. Once a SENS designation is placed on an event, the new federal police are empowered to keep out and to arrest people at their discretion. The language conveys enormous discretionary and arbitrary powers. What is "an offense against the United States"? What are "reasonable grounds"? You can bet that the Alito-Roberts court will rule that it is whatever the executive branch says. The obvious purpose of the act is to prevent demonstrations at Bush-Cheney events. However, nothing in the language limits the police powers from being used only in this way. Like every law in the United States, this law also will be expansively interpreted and abused. It has dire implications for freedom of association and First Amendment rights. We can take for granted that the new federal police will be used to suppress dissent and break up opposition. The Brownshirts are now arming themselves with a Gestapo. Many naive Americans will write to me to explain that this new provision in the reauthorization of the "Patriot Act" is necessary to protect the president and other high officials from terrorists or from harm at the hands of angry demonstrators, "No one else will have anything to fear." Some will accuse me of being an alarmist, and others will say that it is unpatriotic to doubt the law's good intentions. Americans will write such nonsense despite the fact that the president and foreign dignitaries are already provided superb protection by the Secret Service. The naive will not comprehend that the president cannot be endangered by demonstrators at SENS when the president is not present. For many Americans, the light refuses to turn on. In Nazi Germany, did no one but the Jews have anything to fear from the Gestapo? By Stalin's time, Lenin and Trotsky had eliminated all members of the "oppressor class," but that did not stop Stalin from sending millions of "enemies of the people" to the Gulag. It is extremely difficult to hold even local police forces accountable. Who is going to hold accountable a federal police protected by Homeland Security and the president? -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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13 Feb '06

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[Clips] Executive Power on Steroids
by R. A. Hettinga 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 06:28:47 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] Executive Power on Steroids Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113980208779772206.html> The Wall Street Journal February 13, 2006 COMMENTARY Executive Power on Steroids By RICHARD A. EPSTEIN February 13, 2006; Page A16 President Bush's domestic surveillance program against al Qaeda has spawned multiple controversies. Intelligence skeptics ask, for example, whether the potential gains from snooping are worth the hassle. Civil libertarians doubt whether the warrantless surveillance and wiretaps can be squared with the Fourth Amendment. On both these disputes, my sympathies run with the president. I support his efforts to renew the Patriot Act; and I believe our first order of business should be to retool the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to meet the challenges of modern communications technology. Yet the key legal struggles over domestic spying go not to its wisdom, but to the thorny issue of whether the president has exceeded his constitutional powers in disregarding FISA. He has. The Constitution gives Congress the power to set policy; it gives to the president the right, and the duty, to execute it. The president claims first that he has secured the needed congressional blessing for the NSA's domestic surveillance through the Authorization of Use of Military Force Act, passed in the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001. Not so. AUMF does not contain one word that dislodges FISA, and the law disfavors any "implied repeal" of major legislation. Right now, the president can both hound al Qaeda and follow FISA requirements for domestic warrants. If he wants to go further, he should seek explicit congressional authorization. The administration's more aggressive claim is that an "inherent commander in chief power" lets the president act on his own. To see why this claim fails, it is critical to set out -- they're short -- the precise provisions that implement the constitutional separation of powers in matters of war and peace. First off, the Constitution gives the Congress the power "to declare" war. Next, only Congress can appropriate the funds to operate the land and naval forces. Most critically for the spying dispute, Congress has the explicit power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." It has similar powers for setting the standards (or "discipline") for the state militia. Congress's power applies in both peace and wartime, and is subject to no express limitations on the nature and content of its general rules. On the other side of the ledger, "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia when called into actual service of the United States." Note the word "power" appears no where in this sentence. The operative verb is "shall be." The choice of words is not inadvertent. Later in the same section the Constitution provides that the president "shall have the Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment," and the "Power, by and with the Advice and consent of the Senate to make Treaties." Elsewhere the president shall "receive" ambassadors and "require" reports from his subordinates. Words matter. Only powers allow for a change in legal status of the persons over whom some power is directed. Thus the president's power to grant reprieves and pardons is rightly described as "plenary," precisely because Congress has no stated power to hedge it in by legislation, for example by declaring certain offenses unpardonable. The president's power to make treaties is likewise plenary, but now subject to the explicit check of Senatorial advice and consent. At no time, however, can Congress send its own delegation off to negotiate with Iraq. So understood, subtly adding in some "inherent commander in chief power" upsets a carefully wrought constitutional balance. Let the president have plenary power over military affairs, then it becomes an inevitable political tussle over whether his inherent power is stronger than Congress's stated one. But why twist accurate constitutional language to make a shambles of our basic governance structure? Congress gets to set the general rules governing military efforts. The Constitution does not confer the identical power on the president. This view does not reduce the commander-in chief-clause to some ceremonial nullity; rather, it has four critical functions. First, it guarantees the civilian control over the military. Second, Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else. Only the president can execute any laws that Congress puts in place, and all inferior military officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on down answer only to him. Third, the Congress is barred from making any specific order on military matters once it lays down the rules. It cannot micromanage the military, nor put inferior military personnel in the impossible position of deciding whose commands to follow, or why. Fourth, the president, like any inferior military commander, can respond on his own initiative to an immediate attack, without congressional authorization. The president's defenders insist that any gap in his power is filled because the Constitution provides that the president "shall take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." But this clause cuts in exactly the opposite direction. FISA is one law that the president must "take care" to enforce: He cannot choose to flout or ignore it, even if he has wide discretion in how to implement it. Nor can the president obviate the need for legislation by making selective disclosures of his activities to certain members of Congress whom he then subjects to a vow of secrecy. Our constitutional structure of checks and balances is not subject to unilateral presidential circumvention by ad hoc procedures. The precise detailed enumeration of powers and responsibilities in Article II just do not confer on the president a roving commission over foreign and military affairs. He is a coordinate player, not a dominant one. So who cares about these close textual and formal arguments? We all do, or should. The major danger with presidential surveillance does not lie in this particular overreaching of executive power. It's what comes next. If President Bush can ignore FISA, then he can disregard a congressional prohibition against the use of nuclear force. His defenders often claim that national defense is too important to be left to a wobbly Congress -- which on my view might prohibit the use of live ammunition in combat. And so it could. But political forces are always in play, and no legal institutions are simultaneously robust against all forms of incompetence. As Madison reminds us, "Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm." If we accept executive power on steroids, then what's to be done if a reckless president drags our nation into foolish conflicts? Over the long haul, we'll do best by sticking to the original game plan on military matters rather than rewriting the Constitution to let the president alter the rules of the game. Under our Constitution, that power belongs to Congress. May it use the power wisely. Mr. Epstein, the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago and the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author, most recently, of "How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution" (Cato Institute, 2006). -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] cloning of chip The Financial Times: US group implants electronic tags in workers]]]
by Eugen Leitl 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[somelist: Questions about the illegal wiretaps]
by Eugen Leitl 13 Feb '06

13 Feb '06

At 2/6/2006 04:47 AM, A**** A. G**** wrote: >Let's face it, there's no way that Bush supporters are going to care >if the wiretaps are illegal. We have to convince them that they are >lousy policy. Fortunately, there's one thing about these wiretaps >that makes it easy to argue that. > >It's fucking stupid. > >Here is a list of questions that I would like to see asked about >these wiretaps: > >1. How much money have we spent on this program? >2. How much is that per taxpayer? >3. According to the Washington Post, we had a backlog of > hundreds of thousands of hours of untranslated wiretaps. Do > we still have this backlog? >4. What's the point of conducting wiretaps when we can't > translate them? >5. How many translators could we have hired for the price of > this program? >6. In your opinion, which would make us safer--more translators, > or more untranslated wiretaps? >[etc] You miss the point. Money is no object; they can quibble over a dime for an aspirin for a poor person, but ten billion for a military project is a rounding error. This is cheaper than ten billion. Besides, American suck at math, especially Republicans. They are not manually listening to the conversations. They are not mostly conversations in foreign languages. They are bulk-tapping the circuits flowing in and out of the United States, and selectively tapping Americans' phones. Most of these calls are in English. To decipher the calls, they use the advanced stored-voice-recognition technology that BBN developed for them, then so cleverly exposed to the world in Podzinger. Treat these stored phone calls as podcasts and have a roomful of Opterons decode them, then search them for "interesting" content. Again, it's all on display on Podzinger, except that those were meant to be listened to by the public at large. AMD probably makes a lot of money at this too. Maybe even Intel gets to supply the kit for some of this covert intel. Finally, because these were not sent to the FISA court, it can be assumed that they would not have passed the FISA test, which basically consists of telling a judge what you want to do and not having the judge die of laughter on the spot. The FISA court has rejected six out of 16,000 requests. So what are they listening for? I am quite convinced that the primary goal was to collect political intelligence. They probably were getting good intel on the Kerry campaign, on some tight Senate races, and on the overall Democratic Party operations. Since the Google-like search technology allows the system's user to search for essentially anything, and play back just the calls of interest, they had access to a wealth of political information. The WaPo apparently claims that the FISA-risky activity was doing data mining on suspicious patterns of behavior, profiling massive numbers of callers' activities hoping, with little success, to uncover real links to foreign enemies. That was probably the most benign interpretation. But with absolutely no oversight, it's pretty obvious that the wealth of wiretap bulk data so collected could be used in ways that would impress even the most corrupt tinpot despot. The way to get the more marginal Bush-symps to oppose this crime is to suggest that if Bush could do it, so could Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, Russ Feingold, or some other future Democratic president. Yeah, President Al Sharpton, give him that power; that'll scare 'em off. -- *****censored******** ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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