December 2005 - cypherpunks-legacy

[EMED-L] Patriot Act and HIPPA (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

Take note people! -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise? - Steve Thompson ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:10:59 -0500 From: Jeanne Lenzer <jeanne.lenzer(a)GMAIL.COM> Reply-To: EMED-L -- a list for emergency medicine practitioners. <EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU> To: EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU Subject: [EMED-… [View More]

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[Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
by R. A. Hettinga 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2005 12:31:45 -0500 To: Philodox Clips List <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR200512200…> The Washington Post Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis By Richard A. Posner … [View More]Wednesday, December 21, 2005; A31 We've learned that the Defense Department is deeply involved in domestic intelligence (intelligence concerning threats to national security that unfold on U.S. soil). The department's National Security Agency has been conducting, outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens within the United States. Other Pentagon agencies, notably the one known as Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), have, as described in Walter Pincus's recent articles in The Post, been conducting domestic intelligence on a large scale. Although the CIFA's formal mission is to prevent attacks on military installations in the United States, the scale of its activities suggests a broader concern with domestic security. Other Pentagon agencies have gotten into the domestic intelligence act, such as the Information Dominance Center, which developed the Able Danger data-mining program. These programs are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties. They are not. Their significance is in flagging the existence of gaps in our defenses against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those gaps, though there may be better ways. The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have intelligence value. This initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by any intelligence officer. The data that make the cut are those that contain clues to possible threats to national security. The only valid ground for forbidding human inspection of such data is fear that they might be used to blackmail or otherwise intimidate the administration's political enemies. That danger is more remote than at any previous period of U.S. history. Because of increased political partisanship, advances in communications technology and more numerous and competitive media, American government has become a sieve. No secrets concerning matters that would interest the public can be kept for long. And the public would be far more interested to learn that public officials were using private information about American citizens for base political ends than to learn that we have been rough with terrorist suspects -- a matter that was quickly exposed despite efforts at concealment. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct surveillance of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents unless they are suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities. That is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of terrorists, may, without knowing it, have valuable counterterrorist information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining projects such as Able Danger. The goal of national security intelligence is to prevent a terrorist attack, not just punish the attacker after it occurs, and the information that enables the detection of an impending attack may be scattered around the world in tiny bits. A much wider, finer-meshed net must be cast than when investigating a specific crime. Many of the relevant bits may be in the e-mails, phone conversations or banking records of U.S. citizens, some innocent, some not so innocent. The government is entitled to those data, but just for the limited purpose of protecting national security. The Pentagon's rush to fill gaps in domestic intelligence reflects the disarray in this vital yet neglected area of national security. The principal domestic intelligence agency is the FBI, but it is primarily a criminal investigation agency that has been struggling, so far with limited success, to transform itself. It is having trouble keeping its eye on the ball; an FBI official is quoted as having told the Senate that environmental and animal rights militants pose the biggest terrorist threats in the United States. If only that were so. Most other nations, such as Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Israel, many with longer histories of fighting terrorism than the United States, have a domestic intelligence agency that is separate from its national police force, its counterpart to the FBI. We do not. We also have no official with sole and comprehensive responsibility for domestic intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are being filled by ad hoc initiatives. We must do better. The terrorist menace, far from receding, grows every day. This is not only because al Qaeda likes to space its attacks, often by many years, but also because weapons of mass destruction are becoming ever more accessible to terrorist groups and individuals. The writer is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and a senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' [View Less]

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Re: [Antisocial] Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps (fwd)
by Jason Coombs 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > Electronic surveillance means > (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other > surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio > communication sent by or intended to be received by ... Dear Perry, et al: I think you're missing the key clue as to what was actually done, and thus why it was done in the manner chosen, and why it is now being defended by the Bush Administration as being legal.… [View More] All of the statutes quoted, and every other one of which I am aware, prohibit the INTERCEPTION of the CONTENT of communications. Nothing presently prohibits the automated processing of the content via software when the content is not captured/intercepted, nor excerpted/preserved for law enforcement's review. A computer system, designed to circumvent the intent but comply with the letter of present law, can legally do what a person cannot. Furthermore, courts in jurisdictions in which I have worked are presently ruling that with respect to electronic equivalents of conventional PSTN pen register intercepts, all information considered to be 'routing' information rather than CONTENT of electronic communications is fair game, and may not even require a warrant, anywhere, with respect to anyone. At the very least, there is serious gray area in the lack of clear definition of the electronic communication equivalent to the conventional PSTN pen register. I suspect that what is actually being intercepted is not content, but rather is data that the administration considers to be network routing information -- e-mail and IP addresses, basically. Maybe domain names of Web sites being visited. Read more about Carnivore's known capabilities from several years ago with respect to its pen register mode of operation: http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore Then consider the consequences of the absence of explicit mention of 'electronic communications equivalent of a pen register' or the words 'or network routing information' in any of the statutes you mentioned. I wouldn't be surprised at all if the administration ultimately argues that the data they intercepted without a warrant, to the extent that ANY data was 'intercepted', was not 'content' that the sender/recipient intended to communicate to/from the other party. Furthermore they could take the position that there is no need for a warrant for 'electronic communication pen registers' as the pen register statutes are cleverly ambiguous and (probably intentionally) antiquated... Regards, Jason Coombs jasonc(a)science.org -----Original Message----- From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl(a)mfn.org> Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 23:49:30 To:antisocial@mfn.org Subject: [Antisocial] Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps (fwd) Good back and forth. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF Just once, can't we have a nice polite discussion about the logistics and planning side of large criminal enterprise? - Steve Thompson ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2005 13:04:00 -0500 From: Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> To: R. A. Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Cc: cypherpunks(a)jfet.org Subject: Re: [Clips] Why Bush Approved the Wiretaps "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> writes: [...]> > The National Review > Byron York [...] > At his news conference this morning, the president explained that he > believed the U.S. government had to "be able to act fast" to intercept the > "international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda." "Al > Qaeda was not a conventional enemy," Bush said. "This new threat required > us to think and act differently." The FISA law already allows taps to go on for 72 hours before a court is informed. That's three days. In three days people can't fill in a form and deliver it to the FISA court? The FISC has approved 15,000 wiretaps and rejected less than ten in its history. > But there's more to the story than that. In 2002, when the president made > his decision, there was widespread, bipartisan frustration with the > slowness and inefficiency of the bureaucracy involved in seeking warrants > from the special intelligence court, known as the FISA court. It is so inefficient that you don't even have to ask for THREE DAYS. Three days isn't enough time? More to the point, even if the President thinks something is "inefficient", the law is the law. If it says "those who do not seek a FISC warrant go to jail for five years", the President has to obey. > People familiar with the process say the problem is not so much with the > court itself as with the process required to bring a case before the court. > "It takes days, sometimes weeks, to get the application for FISA together," > says one source. "It's not so much that the court doesn't grant them > quickly, it's that it takes a long time to get to the court. Of course, this is in fact untrue. FISA requests are as fast as the Department of Justice and NSA wish them to be. Of course, even if it were true, the law is clear, and the President is not the legislature. The administration had years and years in which to ask Congress to alter the law. It did not do so. It chose to simply solicit the commission of felonies. All these comments about "slowness" and "cumbersomeness" etc. are attempts by the magician to keep your eye away from what he does not want you to see. Do not be distracted. A felony was solicited by the President and committed by employees of the NSA. Do not let them distract you. Keep your eye on the target. > And even though the attorney general has the > authority in some cases to undertake surveillance immediately, and then > seek an emergency warrant, that process is just as cumbersome as the normal > way of doing things. Actually, the law doesn't say "in some cases". Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the Attorney General reasonably determines that (1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and (2) the factual basis for issuance of an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists; he may authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than 72 hours after the Attorney General authorizes such surveillance. So it isn't "in some cases" -- it is basically any time the Attorney General decides to rubber stamp it. Again, don't be fooled by the smokescreen. Read the law yourself. See for yourself that the President has disobeyed a criminal statute. > Lawmakers of both parties recognized the problem in the months after the > September 11 terrorist attacks. They pointed to the case of Coleen Rowley, > the FBI agent who ran up against a number roadblocks in her effort to > secure a FISA warrant in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the al Qaeda > operative who had taken flight training in preparation for the hijackings. > Investigators wanted to study the contents of Moussaoui's laptop computer, > but the FBI bureaucracy involved in applying for a FISA warrant was > stifling, and there were real questions about whether investigators could > meet the FISA court's probable-cause standard for granting a > warrant. A fascinating story, except it is on its face false. FISA warrants are for intercepting communications, not for examining laptops: Electronic surveillance means (1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes; (2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 2511 (2)(i) of title 18; (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located within the United States; or (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes. Also, Mr. Moussaoui was not a US person, and the Attorney General can authorized anything he likes without a court order if: [...]there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party[...] As I said, the story in question is completely false on its face. The people who wrote it are counting on you not reading the law, not informing yourself, not knowing what is true and what is not. Do not be fooled. Read the law for yourself. In any case, cumbersome and unpleasant or not, the law is still in force, and the law says that the President of the United States committed a felony and solicited the commission of felonies. > Bush's order, it appears, was an attempt to change that situation. > Especially before, and even after, passage of the Patriot Act, the FISA > bureaucracy and the agencies that dealt with it were too unwieldy to handle > some fast-moving intelligence cases. There is no "FISA bureaucracy". What is there? There is a court with eleven judges. That's it: The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11 district court judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits of whom no fewer than 3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States under the procedures set forth in this chapter[...] That is the "FISA bureaucracy" they speak of. Again, do not be fooled. Do not allow the spin masters to convince you that black is white and white is black. Read the law for yourself, understand for yourself what has happened. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_36_20_I.ht… Perry _______________________________________________ Antisocial mailing list Antisocial(a)mfn.org http://lists.mfn.org/mailman/listinfo/antisocial . 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[declan@well.com: [Politech] Transcript of briefing on NSA surveillance by Alberto Gonzales and Michael Hayden [priv]]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

----- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> -----

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Exactly what part...
by R. A. Hettinga 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ...of "cypherpunks write code" doesn't anyone around here understand? Somewhere, as Aristotle might say, Antisthenes is laughing. The political mental masturbations of leftist cryptographic crypto-academicians don't actually amount to much, frankly. Of course, if you want to change the physics of eavesdropping (end-to-end encrypted VOIP is probably a good place to start, if not the best solution), then you have my complete attention. Bleating about laws, … [View More]

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] State refuses to approve Diebold voting machines]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

Will wonders never cease. ----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] Bruce Schneier -- An Essay on Salon]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] "Double Secret" Wiretaps vs. the President's 2004 Statement]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] more on LA Times on NYT spying story]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] San Francisco leaders voice concerns about Wi-Fi project]
by Eugen Leitl 21 Dec '05

21 Dec '05

Let's see how much locality tracking the free network will have, and whether they will block anonymizing services. ----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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