November 2005 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: How broad is the SPEKE patent.
by James A. Donald 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

-- From: Charlie Kaufman > The right question is whether there is any strong > password protocol - either known or that you invent > yourself - that you can implement without fear of > being sued for patent infringement. > > And the answer is no. One cannot scratch one's bum without fear of being sued for patent infringment. The wheel, and a common story line in novels, were recently patented.Why should strong passwrod protocols be different? > Patent claims, like the U.S. Constitution, mean > whatever the courts decide they mean. The only way to > have confidence that you won't be sued for > implementing any technology is to observe that lots of > other people in similar situations to yours are doing > it and not being sued. But in practice, patent claims are seldom resolved in court. > I am not aware of anyone who is publicly shipping - > either in a commercial product or as open source - an > implementation of a strong password protocol without > having paid protection money to either Lucent or > Phoenix (or both). It would be great if someone would. It seems to me that this is more a matter of normal deployment delays, than widespread fear of patents. With early deployments, it is far from clear whether those paying are paying for patent licenses, or paying for sofware and expertise. Over time, in any given software technology, the cost of software and expertise tends to fall, eventually to near zero. At that point, it then becomes apparent how seriously people take any patent claims. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG 9oJtLl3PEvVntjE5/K1vIF9Nnar6OLl18dHQ2cU4 4C4BOaRXcQbMfkkZ71fBvjkaLgW5k/pOu1ch7sPQc

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[cyphrpunk@gmail.com: Re: Hacker strikes through student's router]
by Eugen Leitl 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

----- Forwarded message from cyphrpunk <cyphrpunk(a)gmail.com> -----

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MIT Study on Tin-Foil Hats :-)
by Bill Stewart 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

The page was actually published in February, but showed up at www.fark.com today. (Hmm. Looks like Slashdot just got it also, so it'll probably be a bit slow downloading. I've included the text here, but the pictures make it worthwhile.) http://people.csail.mit.edu/rahimi/helmet/ On the Effectiveness of Aluminium Foil Helmets: An Empirical Study Ali Rahimi1, Ben Recht 2, Jason Taylor 2, Noah Vawter 2 17 Feb 2005 1: Electrical Engineering and Computer Science department, MIT. 2: Media Laboratory, MIT. Abstract Among a fringe community of paranoids, aluminum helmets serve as the protective measure of choice against invasive radio signals. We investigate the efficacy of three aluminum helmet designs on a sample group of four individuals. Using a $250,000 network analyser, we find that although on average all helmets attenuate invasive radio frequencies in either directions (either emanating from an outside source, or emanating from the cranium of the subject), certain frequencies are in fact greatly amplified. These amplified frequencies coincide with radio bands reserved for government use according to the Federal Communication Commission (FCC). Statistical evidence suggests the use of helmets may in fact enhance the government's invasive abilities. We theorize that the government may in fact have started the helmet craze for this reason. Introduction It has long been suspected that the government has been using satellites to read and control the minds of certain citizens. The use of aluminum helmets has been a common guerrilla tactic against the government's invasive tactics [1]. Surprisingly, these helmets can in fact help the government spy on citizens by amplifying certain key frequency ranges reserved for government use. In addition, none of the three helmets we analyzed provided significant attenuation to most frequency bands. We describe our experimental setup, report our results, and conclude with a few design guidelines for constructing more effective helmets. Experimental Setup The three helmet types tested The ClassicalThe Fez The Centurion We evaluated the performance of three different helmet designs, commonly referred to as the Classical, the Fez, and the Centurion. These designs are portrayed in Figure 1. The helmets were made of Reynolds aluminium foil. As per best practices, all three designs were constructed with the double layering technique described elsewhere [2]. A radio-frequency test signal sweeping the ranges from 10 Khz to 3 Ghz was generated using an omnidirectional antenna attached to the Agilent 8714ET's signal generator. The experimental apparatus, including a data recording laptop, a $250,000 network analyser, and antennae. A network analyser (Agilent 8714ET) and a directional antenna measured and plotted the signals. See Figure 2. Because of the cost of the equipment (about $250,000), and the limited time for which we had access to these devices, the subjects and experimenters performed a few dry runs before the actual experiment (see Figure 3). Test subjects during a dry run. The receiver antenna was placed at various places on the cranium of 4 different subjects: the frontal, occipital and parietal lobes. Once with the helmet off and once with the helmet on. The network analyzer plotted the attenuation betwen the signals in these two settings at different frequencies, from 10Khz to 3 Ghz. Figure 4 shows a typical plot of the attenuation at different frequencies. A typical attenuation trace form the network analyser Results For all helmets, we noticed a 30 db amplification at 2.6 Ghz and a 20 db amplification at 1.2 Ghz, regardless of the position of the antenna on the cranium. In addition, all helmets exhibited a marked 20 db attenuation at around 1.5 Ghz, with no significant attenuation beyond 10 db anywhere else. Conclusion The helmets amplify frequency bands that coincide with those allocated to the US government between 1.2 Ghz and 1.4 Ghz. According to the FCC, These bands are supposedly reserved for ''radio location'' (ie, GPS), and other communications with satellites (see, for example, [3]). The 2.6 Ghz band coincides with mobile phone technology. Though not affiliated by government, these bands are at the hands of multinational corporations. It requires no stretch of the imagination to conclude that the current helmet craze is likely to have been propagated by the Government, possibly with the involvement of the FCC. We hope this report will encourage the paranoid community to develop improved helmet designs to avoid falling prey to these shortcomings. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Andy (Xu) Sun of the MIT Media Lab for helping with the equipment, Professor George Sergiadis for lending us the antennae, and Professor Neil Gershenfeld for allowing us the use of his lab equipment.

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[brian@posthuman.com: [>Htech] The bioweapon is in the post]
by Eugen Leitl 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

----- Forwarded message from Brian Atkins <brian(a)posthuman.com> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] Apple tries to patent 'tamper-resistant software']
by Eugen Leitl 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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[dave@farber.net: [IP] Quarantine station to open at Logan / US acts amid growing threat of bioterrorism and infectious diseases]
by Eugen Leitl 10 Nov '05

10 Nov '05

----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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Arnie spoofing, stateworker idiocy, privacy
by Major Variola (ret) 09 Nov '05

09 Nov '05

Schwarzenegger Hits Snag at Polling Place By Robert Salladay, Times Staff Writer SACRAMENTO -- Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger showed up to his Brentwood neighborhood polling station today to cast his ballot in the special election and was told he had already voted. Elections officials said a Los Angeles County poll worker had entered Schwarzenegger's name into an electronic voting touch screen station in Pasadena on Oct. 25. The worker, who was not identified, was testing the voting machine in preparation for early voting that began the next day. Somehow, Schwarzenegger's name was then placed on a list of people who had already voted, said Conny B. McCormack, the Los Angeles County registrar. Schwarzenegger's aides were informed of the problem when they arrived this morning to survey the governor's polling station. The poll worker told the governor's staff he would have to use a "provisional" ballot that allows elections workers to verify if two votes were made by the same person. McCormack said the poll worker did the correct thing. http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-110805arnold_lat,0,7268769.story?coll=…

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[Clips] MIT Real ID Meeting Postponed to December 5th, AND Homeland Security to Propose Regulations - Join the Discussion
by R. A. Hettinga 09 Nov '05

09 Nov '05

--- begin forwarded text Delivered-To: clips(a)philodox.com Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2005 18:43:07 -0500 To: "Philodox Clips List" <clips(a)philodox.com> From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: [Clips] MIT Real ID Meeting Postponed to December 5th, AND Homeland Security to Propose Regulations - Join the Discussion Reply-To: rah(a)philodox.com Sender: clips-bounces(a)philodox.com --- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2005 15:16:43 -0800 (PST) From: "Daniel J. Greenwood" <dang(a)media.mit.edu> Reply-To: dang(a)media.mit.edu Subject: MIT Real ID Meeting Postponed to December 5th, AND Homeland Security to Propose Regulations - Join the Discussion To: dang(a)media.mit.edu ** In-Person Event Postponed to December 5th, 2005 ** This note is to inform you that the MIT Real ID Forum in-person meeting will take place on Monday, December 5th, 2005 at the Media Lab at MIT. The event will take place from 9am to 3pm. I encourage you to register, if you had not already, at http://ecitizen.mit.edu/realid.html and to participate in our pre-conference online discussion, at http://ecitizen.mit.edu/realid.html. The program had to be postponed from November 17th due to a last minute important meeting called by the Department of Homeland Security on regulations implementing the Real ID Act related to privacy. Understandably, key privacy advocates and relevant Homeland Security individuals must now attend this meeting in Washington, DC. For this reason, we have decided to postpone the event to December 5th. We apoligize for any inconvenience this may cause. ** Regulations Under Real ID -- Join the Discussion ** I invite anybody on this list who may have opinions you wish to share on the topic of Real ID regulatory issues to post those ideas to our online forum under the new topic "Homeland Security Regulations". This topic thread is for participants in this Online Forum on the Real ID Act to share ideas you may have on problems and prospects associated with potential regulations under this federal law. All comments posted to this thread will be presented, as part of our conference proceedings, and published as part of our in-person conference to happen on December 5, 2005. The conference proceedings will also be presented to the Department of Homeland Security, as a record of the remarks made by participants, for their considerations as they determine how to implement the Real ID Act. I encourage you to attend the in-person meeting on December 5th at MIT and to participate in the dialog at the Online Forum. Best regards, - Daniel Greenwood ==================================================== Daniel J. Greenwood, Esq. Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Media Lab, Program of Media Arts and Science Principal, CIVICS.com The InfoSociety Consultancy http://ecitizen.mit.edu & www.civics.com 1770 Mass. Ave, #205, Cambridge, MA 02140 USA dang(a)media.mit.edu ==================================================== --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _______________________________________________ Clips mailing list Clips(a)philodox.com http://www.philodox.com/mailman/listinfo/clips --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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gonzo cryptography; how would you improve existing cryptosystems?
by Travis H. 09 Nov '05

09 Nov '05

Hi folks, If one had the ability to create standards over, with reckless disregard for performance, how would you improve their security? Feel free to pick a protocol or system (e.g. gpg or isakmp) and let me know how it is done, and how it should have been done. For example, pgp doesn't hide the key IDs of the addressees. Many systems use hashes that are too small. DSA keys are too small compared to large ElG keys. How would you make a signature with a larger keyspace? Does the protocol wrap encryption in authentication instead of vice-versa? Does ISAKMP do encryption where the input is meant to be secret, instead of the key? Does it use a rinky-dink algorithm, now that much better ones are available? I've got a hankering to re-write something, and I want to know what can be improved the most. PS: There's a paper on cryptanalyzing CFS on my homepage below. I got to successfully use classical cryptanalysis on a relatively modern system! That is a rare joy. CFS really needs a re-write, there's no real good alternatives for cross-platform filesystem encryption to my knowledge. -- http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><- "We already have enough fast, insecure systems." -- Schneier & Ferguson GPG fingerprint: 50A1 15C5 A9DE 23B9 ED98 C93E 38E9 204A 94C2 641B

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AW: [smb@cs.columbia.edu: Skype security evaluation]
by Kuehn, Ulrich 09 Nov '05

09 Nov '05

> -----Urspr|ngliche Nachricht----- > Von: owner-cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > [mailto:owner-cryptography@metzdowd.com] Im Auftrag von cyphrpunk > Gesendet: Freitag, 28. Oktober 2005 06:07 > An: cypherpunks(a)jfet.org; cryptography(a)metzdowd.com > Betreff: Re: [smb(a)cs.columbia.edu: Skype security evaluation] > > Wasn't there a rumor last year that Skype didn't do any > encryption padding, it just did a straight exponentiation of > the plaintext? > > Would that be safe, if as the report suggests, the data being > encrypted is 128 random bits (and assuming the encryption > exponent is considerably bigger than 3)? Seems like it's > probably OK. A bit risky perhaps to ride bareback like that > but I don't see anything inherently fatal. > There are results available on this issue: First, a paper by Boneh, Joux, and Nguyen "Why Textbook ElGamal and RSA Encryption are Insecure", showing that you can essentially half the number of bits in the message, i.e. in this case the symmetric key transmitted. Second, it turns out that the tricky part is the implementation of the decryption side, where the straight-forward way -- ignoring the padding with 0s "They are zeroes, aren't they?" -- gives you a system that might be attacked in a chosen plaintext scenario very efficiently, obtaining the symmetric key. See my paper "Side-Channel Attacks on Textbook RSA and ElGamal Encryption" at PKC2003 for details. Hope this answers your question. Ulrich

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