September 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Liberty Dollar
by Gary Jeffers 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My fellow Cypherpunks, The Liberty Dollar My fellow Cypherpunks, I think I may have some really great news here, but you all can check it out to be sure. I found an alternative money on the Internet. It is called the Liberty Dollar. The Internet site is: http://www.norfed.org NORFED is The National Organization for the Repeal of the Federal Reserve Act and the Internal Revenue Code. The money is backed by silver and gold and can be redeemed widely in America. As many of you know, the $US is a corrupt, proprietary, debt issued, fait, fractional reserved,illegal, unconstituional, U. S. State enforced monopoly currency. As corrupt as it is I don't know why it hasn't already collasped and dragged us down with it! If the Liberty Dollar is honest and robust, then it may be the vehical to beat the elite bankers tyranny and give us an honest wealth produced money. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers BEAT STATE !!!!

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RE: Cypherpunks IQ Test
by Aimee Farr 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Mike: Are you often the victim of mercenary females? > -----Original Message----- > From: mmotyka(a)lsil.com [mailto:mmotyka@lsil.com] > Sent: Monday, March 05, 2001 3:28 PM > To: aimee.farr(a)pobox.com > Subject: Cypherpunks IQ Test > > > It's an obvious setup. The woods are part of a defense installation, > apple is filled with coke, the girl is underage, the woods are full of > trigger happy fibbies. > > You hit the ground and roll into the brush, drawing on the way. You > attempt to locate opponents and identify the safest route away from the > situation. > > Mike > > > >CYPHERPUNKS IQ TEST > > > >QUESTION #1. > > > >You are walking through the woods alone. A beautiful unclothed woman > >magically appears in front of you. She holds out an apple. > > > >1. Please darken in the correct choice using a Number Two pencil: > > > >(a) you bite the apple. > >(b) you take the woman. > >(c) you run away. > >(d) a and b, but not c. > >(e) b and c only. > >(f) all of the above. > >(g) none of the above. > > > >2. Please justify your answer: > > > > > >___________________________________________________________________. > > > > > >Just curious.... > > > > -Aimee

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More on "new physics"
by Tim May 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Someone sent me a private note. I have deleted his name for this public reply. > Tim May wrote: > > >> The "new physics" stuff is quite different. It is scorned in a way >> that plate tectonics was not, and for good reason. Folks should visit >> Bearden's site. http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/index.html > > I did. Oh, dear. > > Not sure what is supposed to be denoted by "Tesla physics", but Tesla's > work with power transmission via HF is fascinating, even if there was > apparently no practical or safe use for it. No one disputes the outstanding work Tesla did on a.c. transmission. And anyone who has seen or used a Tesla coil knows how real it is. "Tesla physics" is all the cruft that has developed around some of his more obscure (and late) writings, usually mixed together with stuff Tesla could not have known about at the time of his death. To wit, the stuff about zero point energy and perpetual motion machines. And, sometimes, mixed together with the usual nutcase stuff about the Hollow Earth theory (zeta reticulans colonizing the hollow earth, Greys, underground UFO bases, secret Nazi weapons, etc.). Tesla is a hero to these "new physics" nuts, even though nothing Tesla ever worked on or built contradicts in the slightest way the predictions of Maxwell's theories. They take Tesla's very real contributions and some of his weirder theories (though none of them so weird as the Hollow Earth/antigravity/time reversal theories of modern nutters) and say that this means "They laughed at Tesla, they laugh at me!" BTW, I was/am an early ("angel") investor in a company doing work on ultrawideband transmissions. Some of the works Bearden cites, like those of Barrett, are familiar to me and others with this company. Saying that there is a role for ultrawideband pulse technology, a la spread spectrum and beyond SS, is NOT the same as saying there are confirmed "problems" with electromagnetic theory. There may be, and there are a handful of folks doing "foundational" work in E&M, but, so far, there are no indications that their foundational work is changing any engineering calculations. Quite the contrary, in my view. Electromagnetic theory basically "works"--to many decimal places of accuracy. Circuits work as expected, antennas work as expected, and there are no "unexplained observations" (as usually exist before a new theory arrives). There may be some _semantic_ issues, e.g., does a square wave or impulse "really" have components that were sent out _before_ the square wave or impulse? (A Fourier decomposition of a square wave starting at time t = 0 has "sine wave components" spread out over time and adding up in such a way as to give the square wave, or the impulse, or any other signal. Some think this means deep and mysterious things are happening, something having to do with time travel and reversing the aging process, blah blah blah. Henning Harmuth may write fairly eloquently about the "dogma of the circle" and how the Fourier decomposition of a signal into (allegedly) a near-infinite series of sine waves is "not real," but for all intents and purposes it all works. And the "new physics" people like Bearden go way beyond what Harmuth and Barrett are talking about: they bring in "curved space-time" and gravitation and antigravity and the ultra-weird notion that aging can be reversed by "pumping the conjugate time-axis of the Minkowski manifold" (OK, I made this up...don't have time to lift one of Bearden's direct quotes...and this will help train me in the jargon if I ever become a "new physicist."). Nut cases like Bearden have the patter of physics down. Very few actual physicists waste their time dissecting and refuting Bearden for obvious reasons. I urge readers of this list not to waste time on this stuff. --Tim May, Citizen-unit of of the once free United States " The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants. "--Thomas Jefferson, 1787

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Re: A Trial Balloon to Ban Email?
by Declan McCullagh 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

At 09:57 AM 5/14/2003 -0400, Sunder wrote: >Yes, but how will you stop the spammer from double spending the same $0.25 >micropayment on all of his 170,000 email addresses? Depending on whether >you check that there is a payment attached or not, and also check it with >the bank before delivering it, you'd have already wasted your bandwith and >possibly have accepted a spam into your mail spool. It is true that the notions of micropayments as applied to spam (that I'm familiar with, at least) would require that the email recipient check with the bank to detect doublespending. This would introduce an additional delay before delivery from unknown senders, yes, but I fail to see how it would impose an unacceptable cost in bandwidth or CPU usage. Spammers could still try the same-micropayment-a-million-times route, just as they could try to spam without micropayments, but if their email is rejected in sufficient quantities, the cost to the spammer would outweigh the benefits. The key is achieving sufficient quantities. -Declan

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Re: AP Al Qaeda
by mattd 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

>>No, no. AP is funny because it's impracticeable. One does not find an assassin exclusively by tracing who paid him to kill. One can (and often does) find him because he makes a mistake in the act of commiting the crime. Which, if I'm >>reading my history right, is what's hampered the noisy proponents of AP up to this point already. Crime? Wot crime,guvnor? Jim and CJ were not 'noisy'.imo. Im a bit noisy cos Im pushing the 'let it all hang out' version. >The point is that Bell's theory does a really good job of sorting out the business end of assassination,...< Oh THATS funny.I get it. HAHAHA! >>Killing one person, especially a public official, pisses a whole bunch of people off. Those people have a tendency to come find their buddy's killer. Mmm,where do we start,lets get some firebrands and go up to the proffrs? Look at sites with no logs for quad anon 'predictors' who may be overseas briefly visiting cybercafes,Good luck china.(you just contradicted yrself btw.) Oh,unless you mean the torture/french village reprisal thang.Win friends and influence people. The one person killed will have had to have done a lot of evil shit to get enough pooled (presumably) to tempt a seasoned pro.Unless some professional killer turns all altruistic,stranger things have happened.The killer could be suicidal.another possibility.Lots of scenarios possible here,movie scripts,even.Pop songs,video games.DoCoMo assasinphones. Someone like a torturer,murderer,terrorist,pedophile is a logical candidate.(stephen roach?)Sometimes these happen to be public officials.Theres one here where I live named dennis Tanner.(vic.au) Those killers by remote control like arbusto might be be made more accountable. What better way than...Bell's theory, "a really good job of sorting out the business end of assassination"according to you. KILL THE PRESIDENT! "Id buy that for a dollar!" >>No kind of real or threatened assassination can weaken a government in which a majority of the governed people >believe. It can only make it seem more righteous and be more strong. Thats true,roll over and go back to sleep,if you live under that govt you have nothing to worry about. More righteous and more smug.

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[Lucrative-L] double spends, identity agnosticism, and Lucrative
by R. A. Hettinga 20 May '05

20 May '05

--- begin forwarded text

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"ID Rules Exist, But Can't Be Seen"
by Tyler Durden 06 Oct '04

06 Oct '04

http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,65154,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_4 I post this not as a refernce per se, but to ask the question: Exactly Why Does the Government Not Want to Reveal Their ID Rules? This would seem obvious at first, but upon thinking about it I have to admit to being a little confused. For instance, is it indeed possible that revealing this rule would pose an additional security risk? If such a rule exists (and it does) then hijackers obviously already know about it. Could this rule also reveal some deeper secrets about how hijackers can be detected? I seriously doubt it. Then of course, the argument may be that the government wanted to hide the rule for the very reason of making it more unassailable. In other words, if the rule were known, then it might be more easily contested in court. Hiding the rule protects the law which in turn protects national security. This last idea is the only one I can think of that might be behind why the government would make such a rule secret. If this is the case, then this reveals what I would argue to be a dangerous mindset: The government needs to protect the people from themselves...ie, from the normal operation of democracy. On Cyperhpunks I would suppose this does not seem suprising. But it perhaps reveals that there is explicit, conscious thought occurring along these lines in the government. THAT, perhaps, is new. -TD _________________________________________________________________ Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee. Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

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QC Hype Watch: Quantum cryptography gets practical
by R. A. Hettinga 05 Oct '04

05 Oct '04

<http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,96111,00.html> - Computerworld Quantum cryptography gets practical Opinion by Bob Gelfond, MagiQ Technologies Inc. SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 (COMPUTERWORLD) - In theory and in labs, quantum cryptography -- cryptography based on the laws of physics rather than traditional, computational difficulty -- has been around for years. Advancements in science and in the world's telecommunications infrastructure, however, have led to the commercialization of this technology and its practical application in industries where high-value assets must be secure. Protecting information today usually involves the use of a cryptographic protocol where sensitive information is encrypted into a form that would be unreadable by anyone without a "key." For this system to work effectively, the key must be absolutely random and kept secret from everyone except the communicating parties. It must also be refreshed regularly to keep the communications channel safe. The challenge resides in the techniques used for the encryption and distribution of this key to its intended parties to avoid any interception of the key or any eavesdropping by a third party. Many organizations are advancing quantum technology and bringing it outside academia. Research labs, private companies, international alliances such as the European Union and agencies such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are investing tens of millions of dollars in quantum research, with projects specifically focused on the challenge of key distribution. The trouble with key distribution Huge investment in the late 1990s through 2001 created a vast telecommunications infrastructure resulting in millions of miles of optical fiber laid across the country and throughout buildings to enable high-speed communications. This revolution combined a heavy reliance on fiber-optic infrastructure with the use of open network protocols such as Ethernet and IP to help systems communicate. Although this investment delivers increased productivity, dependence on optical fiber compounds key distribution challenges because of the relative ease with which optical taps can be used. With thousands of photons representing each bit of data traveling over fiber, nonintrusive, low-cost optical taps placed anywhere along the fiber can siphon off enough data without degrading the signal to cause a security breach. The threat profile is particularly high where clusters of telecommunications gear are found in closets, the basements of parking garages or central offices. Data can be tapped through monitoring jacks on this equipment with inexpensive handheld devices. This enables data to be compromised without eavesdroppers disclosing themselves to the communicating parties. Another important aspect of this problem is the refresh rate of the keys. Taking large systems off-line to refresh keys can cause considerable headaches, such as halting business operations and creating other security threats. Therefore, many traditional key-distribution systems refresh keys less than once per year. Infrequent key refreshing is detrimental to the security of a system because it makes brute-force attacks much easier and can thereby provide an eavesdropper with full access to encrypted information until the compromised key is refreshed. Adding quantum physics to the key distribution equation Companies are now in a position to use advancements in quantum cryptography, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, to secure their most valued information. Two factors have made this possible: the vast stretches of optical fiber (lit and dark) laid in metropolitan areas, and the decreasing cost in recent years of components necessary for producing QKD systems as a result of the over-investment in telecommunications during the early 2000s. Based on the laws of quantum mechanics, the keys generated and disseminated using QKD systems have proved to be absolutely random and secure. Keys are encoded on a photon-by-photon basis, and quantum mechanics guarantees that the act of an eavesdropper intercepting a photon will irretrievably change the information encoded on that photon. Therefore, the eavesdropper can't copy or read the photon -- or the information encoded on it -- without modifying it, which makes it possible to detect the security breach. In addition to mitigating the threat of optical taps, QKD systems are able to refresh keys at a rate of up to 10 times per second, further increasing the level of security of the encrypted data. Not for everyone Quantum key distribution systems aren't intended for everyday use: You won't find a QKD system in the home office anytime soon. One reason is that a QKD system requires a dedicated fiber-optic line. Also, because the loss of photons over longer distances, these systems have current distance limitations of approximately 120 kilometers (nearly 75 miles) which is common with optical infrastructure equipment. Quantum repeaters are under development to extend that range much farther. Finally, the end points of these QKD systems must reside in secure locations. However, since they are tamper-proof, if attempts are made to compromise them, they will stop running or fire off an alarm, thus ensuring ultimate information protection. The practical development of QKD systems has made them applicable for a number of industries such as financial services, biotech and telecommunications along with government sectors such as intelligence and the military. They don't require a physicist or an engineer to administer them. These appliances fit in standard racks, plug into existing networks, and are reliable around the clock. QKD systems interoperate with security standards such as IPsec-based VPNs providing an added layer of security to networks. Ask the right questions As you look for better ways to protect your company's most important information, QKD may be an option. However, be sure you understand the strengths and drawbacks of quantum key distribution by asking the right questions: 1. What does your organization's security policy say about the threat profile for high-value assets? 2. How frequently are your encryption keys changed and by what method? 3. What is the total cost of ownership for QKD products? Are there additional costs in support and training? 4. Are your competitors implementing QKD systems? 5. What infrastructure requirements must be met? 6. What personnel/staffing levels are required? 7. How does this QKD system work with existing cryptography systems? 8. What are the distance limitations of this system? QKD isn't an everyday desktop tool, but the technology makes sense for those organizations that have the resources and the capacity to use it effectively. Bob Gelfond is founder and CEO of MagiQ Technologies Inc., a vendor of quantum information processing services and products in New York. Additional Content White Papers Read up on the latest ideas and technologies from companies that sell hardware, software and services. View all whitepapers Research Report This IDC white paper demonstrates growth in value of distributed applications accessed over the Web, especially for eCommerce applications, and analyses the requirements needed for performance management of distributed applications in today's complex heterogeneous environments. Distributed Applications Performance Management: The VERITAS i3 Approach Featured Webcast Network Computing Web Event See the latest innovations, including Sun servers and workstations based on AMD Opteron[tm], new Sun StorEdge[tm] solutions, and breakthrough technologies in Solaris[tm] 10. Sponsored Links A smart plan for assuring application quality: New webcast from Compuware Distributed Applications Performance Management: The VERITAS i3 Approach Download this free white paper from IDC Enterprise Solutions for Federal Government An IT infrastructure starts with robust technology. The IP migration A wake-up call Enterprise Grid Alliance Helping make grid computing work for you About Us Contacts Editorial Calendar Help Desk Advertise Privacy Policy Copyright ) 2004 Computerworld Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of Computerworld Inc. is prohibited. Computerworld and Computerworld.com and the respective logos are trademarks of International Data Group Inc. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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RE: QC Hype Watch: Quantum cryptography gets practical
by Tyler Durden 02 Oct '04

02 Oct '04

What's a "quantum repeater" in this context? As for "Hype Watch", I tend to agree, but I also believe that Gelfond (who I spoke to last year) actually does have a 'viable' system. Commerically viable is another thing entirely, however. -TD >From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: QC Hype Watch: Quantum cryptography gets practical >Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2004 17:39:24 -0400 > ><http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,96111,00.html> > > - Computerworld > > > Quantum cryptography gets practical > > Opinion by Bob Gelfond, MagiQ Technologies Inc. > > > > > > SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 (COMPUTERWORLD) - In theory and in labs, quantum >cryptography -- cryptography based on the laws of physics rather than >traditional, computational difficulty -- has been around for years. >Advancements in science and in the world's telecommunications >infrastructure, however, have led to the commercialization of this >technology and its practical application in industries where high-value >assets must be secure. > > Protecting information today usually involves the use of a cryptographic >protocol where sensitive information is encrypted into a form that would be >unreadable by anyone without a "key." For this system to work effectively, >the key must be absolutely random and kept secret from everyone except the >communicating parties. It must also be refreshed regularly to keep the >communications channel safe. The challenge resides in the techniques used >for the encryption and distribution of this key to its intended parties to >avoid any interception of the key or any eavesdropping by a third party. > > Many organizations are advancing quantum technology and bringing it >outside academia. Research labs, private companies, international alliances >such as the European Union and agencies such as the Defense Advanced >Research Projects Agency are investing tens of millions of dollars in >quantum research, with projects specifically focused on the challenge of >key distribution. > > The trouble with key distribution > >Huge investment in the late 1990s through 2001 created a vast >telecommunications infrastructure resulting in millions of miles of optical >fiber laid across the country and throughout buildings to enable high-speed >communications. This revolution combined a heavy reliance on fiber-optic >infrastructure with the use of open network protocols such as Ethernet and >IP to help systems communicate. > > Although this investment delivers increased productivity, dependence on >optical fiber compounds key distribution challenges because of the relative >ease with which optical taps can be used. With thousands of photons >representing each bit of data traveling over fiber, nonintrusive, low-cost >optical taps placed anywhere along the fiber can siphon off enough data >without degrading the signal to cause a security breach. The threat profile >is particularly high where clusters of telecommunications gear are found in >closets, the basements of parking garages or central offices. Data can be >tapped through monitoring jacks on this equipment with inexpensive handheld >devices. This enables data to be compromised without eavesdroppers >disclosing themselves to the communicating parties. > > Another important aspect of this problem is the refresh rate of the keys. >Taking large systems off-line to refresh keys can cause considerable >headaches, such as halting business operations and creating other security >threats. Therefore, many traditional key-distribution systems refresh keys >less than once per year. Infrequent key refreshing is detrimental to the >security of a system because it makes brute-force attacks much easier and >can thereby provide an eavesdropper with full access to encrypted >information until the compromised key is refreshed. > > Adding quantum physics to the key distribution equation > >Companies are now in a position to use advancements in quantum >cryptography, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, to secure >their most valued information. Two factors have made this possible: the >vast stretches of optical fiber (lit and dark) laid in metropolitan areas, >and the decreasing cost in recent years of components necessary for >producing QKD systems as a result of the over-investment in >telecommunications during the early 2000s. > > Based on the laws of quantum mechanics, the keys generated and >disseminated using QKD systems have proved to be absolutely random and >secure. Keys are encoded on a photon-by-photon basis, and quantum mechanics >guarantees that the act of an eavesdropper intercepting a photon will >irretrievably change the information encoded on that photon. Therefore, the >eavesdropper can't copy or read the photon -- or the information encoded on >it -- without modifying it, which makes it possible to detect the security >breach. In addition to mitigating the threat of optical taps, QKD systems >are able to refresh keys at a rate of up to 10 times per second, further >increasing the level of security of the encrypted data. > > Not for everyone > >Quantum key distribution systems aren't intended for everyday use: You >won't find a QKD system in the home office anytime soon. One reason is that >a QKD system requires a dedicated fiber-optic line. Also, because the loss >of photons over longer distances, these systems have current distance >limitations of approximately 120 kilometers (nearly 75 miles) which is >common with optical infrastructure equipment. Quantum repeaters are under >development to extend that range much farther. Finally, the end points of >these QKD systems must reside in secure locations. However, since they are >tamper-proof, if attempts are made to compromise them, they will stop >running or fire off an alarm, thus ensuring ultimate information >protection. > > The practical development of QKD systems has made them applicable for a >number of industries such as financial services, biotech and >telecommunications along with government sectors such as intelligence and >the military. They don't require a physicist or an engineer to administer >them. These appliances fit in standard racks, plug into existing networks, >and are reliable around the clock. QKD systems interoperate with security >standards such as IPsec-based VPNs providing an added layer of security to >networks. > > Ask the right questions > >As you look for better ways to protect your company's most important >information, QKD may be an option. However, be sure you understand the >strengths and drawbacks of quantum key distribution by asking the right >questions: > > 1. What does your organization's security policy say about the >threat profile for high-value assets? > > 2. How frequently are your encryption keys changed and by what method? > > 3. What is the total cost of ownership for QKD products? Are there >additional costs in support and training? > > 4. Are your competitors implementing QKD systems? > > 5. What infrastructure requirements must be met? > > 6. What personnel/staffing levels are required? > > 7. How does this QKD system work with existing cryptography systems? > > 8. What are the distance limitations of this system? > >QKD isn't an everyday desktop tool, but the technology makes sense for >those organizations that have the resources and the capacity to use it >effectively. > > Bob Gelfond is founder and CEO of MagiQ Technologies Inc., a vendor of >quantum information processing services and products in New York. > > > > > > > > > >Additional Content > > White Papers > > > Read up on the latest ideas and technologies from companies that sell >hardware, software and services. > > >View all whitepapers >Research Report > > This IDC white paper demonstrates growth in value of distributed >applications accessed over the Web, especially for eCommerce applications, >and analyses the requirements needed for performance management of >distributed applications in today's complex heterogeneous environments. > Distributed Applications Performance Management: The VERITAS i3 Approach > > >Featured Webcast > > >Network Computing Web Event > See the latest innovations, including Sun servers and workstations based >on AMD Opteron[tm], new Sun StorEdge[tm] solutions, and breakthrough >technologies in Solaris[tm] 10. > > > > > >Sponsored Links > >A smart plan for assuring application quality: New webcast from >Compuware >Distributed Applications Performance Management: The VERITAS i3 Approach > Download this free white paper from IDC > > > >Enterprise Solutions for Federal Government An IT infrastructure starts >with robust technology. > > > > >The IP migration A wake-up call > > > >Enterprise Grid Alliance Helping make grid computing work for you > >About Us Contacts Editorial Calendar Help Desk Advertise Privacy Policy > > > > > > > > Copyright ) 2004 Computerworld Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction in >whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission >of Computerworld Inc. is prohibited. Computerworld and Computerworld.com >and the respective logos are trademarks of International Data Group Inc. > > > > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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Re: "ID Rules Exist, But Can't Be Seen"
by Major Variola (ret) 30 Sep '04

30 Sep '04

At 05:06 PM 9/30/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >I post this not as a refernce per se, but to ask the question: > >Exactly Why Does the Government Not Want to Reveal Their ID Rules? > >For instance, is it indeed possible that revealing this rule would pose an >additional security risk? If such a rule exists (and it does) then hijackers >obviously already know about it. Not only that, but as Bruce S pointed out, they can reverse-engineer the rules by sending probes.

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