August 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

DAA and Credentials
by hal＠finney.org 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

A few weeks ago Adam Back sent me a pointer to a paper with what was basically a new anonymous credential system, by Brickell, Camenisch and Chen, http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2004/HPL-2004-93.pdf. I've followed Jan Camenisch's work pretty closely over the years and although he is only the 2nd author here, the paper is very much based on his ideas. Actually the paper is about a very controversial topic, trusted computing: TCPA, TCG, TPM, the Fritz chip, etc. Despite the questions about that technology, the paper has some interesting ideas which could be applied more widely. One of the concepts in trusted computing is that the computer would have a chip in it with an embedded key. This chip is called the TPM officially but is widely known as the Fritz chip after the senator who was pushing some legislation that might mandate technology controls. Fritz Hollings is gone and so is his CBDTPA but now the FCC seems to be taking up the gauntlet. But that's another story. Anyway, the TPM generates a key internally and it gets certified by some kind of CA established by the TCG (the TCG is the new name for the TCPA). When someone wants to, say, download some DRM-protected data, they could prove they have a real TPM by providing this certificate from the TCG CA on their TPM key. This would let the data supplier know he was talking to a system with a genuine TPM that would protect the data and keep the user from defeating the DRM. That would be the simple way to work, but the TCG didn't do it that way, because having the user show his TPM certificate everywhere would violate his privacy. It may seem strange that a proposal which is built on the idea that the user is the enemy will care about his privacy, especially since most TCG uses will require the user to pay for things, meaning showing a credit card number, so he has no privacy anyway. But that's the political decision the TCG made. Instead, they came up with a "Privacy CA", where the user would in effect show his TPM certificate to the PCA, and the PCA would then certify a temporary "pseudonym key" that the user would then use in place of his TPM key and certificate. The problem here is that this doesn't protect privacy all that well, plus the PCA needs to have both high availability and high security, two requirements that don't work well together. So TCG has approved this new proposal, cryptographically based, called Direct Anonymous Attestation or DAA. There is no more Privacy CA. Instead, the user directly proves that he has a valid certificate on his TPM key, but he does it in zero knowledge. He doesn't reveal the TPM key or the certificate, nevertheless the verifier (which would typically be a seller of DRM'd content) gets convinced that he is talking to a real TPM. The way it works is a modification of a group signature. Camenisch has done a lot of work on these over the years, with various co-authors. But the general idea is the same, that group members each generate a key, which gets certified by a "group ownership manager" and that means they're officially part of the group. Then they can create signatures of which it can only be determined that they came from someone in the group, but you can't tell which one. This is done by the method described above, a zero knowledge proof that you know a key and you have a certificate (signature) on it by the group manager key. That establishes that you are a group member. One of the new ideas in the DAA paper relates to revocation. The TPM private keys are supposed to remain locked in the chip. But suppose someone uses some fancy lab equipment or perhaps a side channel attack and extracts one. They could spread it around to their friends, who could use it to pretend to have TPMs, download DRM-protected data and easily remove the protections. The TCG wanted to deal with this. The assumption is that a secret this good can't be kept quiet for long, so soon there will be lists of TPM-cracked keys floating out there. TCG-based vendors are assumed to have access to such a list, so when someone shows up with their ZK proof about having a good TPM, they want to know if the TPM key is on the list. The problem is that the TPM key is not revealed in the ZK proof. So the authors propose that, if the key is k, another value of the form u^k mod p gets revealed, where u is perhaps chosen by the vendor, or is perhaps random. This doesn't reveal k but there is a proof that the k used in u^k is the same k that got certified as a TPM key. Now the vendor can compare the reported u^k value with computed u^k based on all known "bad" keys. If it matches for any of them, he knows that he is being offered a bogus TPM key proof. That's the basic idea of the DAA, but there are two additional points of interest. The first is that DAA is really complicated, more so than most group signatures of this type I have seen. The main reason seems to be a desire to not make the TPM work too hard. The authors have cleverly and diligently split up the protocol so that as much work as possible is done by the host computer and not the TPM, even though the host is not trusted. The concept is similar to the old "wallet with observer" protocols of Chaum and Brands. But the effect is to add many extra phases and passes, which could probably be eliminated if we didn't care about that. The second point relates to the system as a credential system. This idea of proving in zero knowledge that you have a cert on your key is the basis of an earlier credential system from Camenisch and Lysyanskaya. The concept is that credentials are represented by particular signatures from particular signers. Say, AAA could give me a credential as a member for the year 2004 by a certain signature. Then I could show possession when I made a hotel reservation and get a discount, by proving that I had that signature by AAA on a key I owned. Doing it in ZK protects my privacy. I actually looked at implementing the C&L credential system a few years ago, but there was a big stumbling block right at the beginning. It would only work with an RSA key of a special form, one composed of the product of two strong primes (primes p and q where (p-1)/2 and (q-1)/2 were themselves prime). And worse, it was necessary to prove that the modulus was of that form, without of course revealing p and q. Well, Camenisch had a protocol for this, but it was very complicated. I implemented it and it was intolerably slow, it took many minutes or even hours. It just didn't appear feasible as the foundation for a practical credential system. One of the improvements in the new DAA system is that it escapes from the need to prove that the RSA key is built of strong primes. This means that it could conceivably be the foundation for a credential system that would actually be efficient enough to use. That's very exciting! Unfortunately, as I said the DAA system in its present form is not quite right; it is too complicated due to the need to split up the work between TPM and untrusted host. That complication is not necessary for a plain credentialling system. So some work would have to be done to clean it up and get it into a form that would work for credentials. Crypto is next week and I hope to see Jan there and ask him about this. If he thinks it would work then this is another project I might try in the near future. I would really like to see some kind of anonymous credential system available for people to experiment with. I had looked into doing one with ring signatures but it would not be very efficient. Camenisch's technology is far superior. Hal Finney

1 0

RE: The Turncoats on Niihau Island
by Tyler Durden 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

Wow. What a dumb fuck this columnist is. No wait...this guy's got a gig and fuck the truth. I wonder how many of the Japanese in internment camps owned a Zero? And, if a Saudi citizen on our shores gets rowdy, should we round up Morrocans? (ie, Japan is a country and a nationality...Islam is neither.) -TD >From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: The Turncoats on Niihau Island >Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 08:09:02 -0400 > ><http://www.townhall.com/columnists/michellemalkin/printmm20040810.shtml> > >Townhall.com > >The Turncoats on Niihau Island >Michelle Malkin (back to web version) | Send > >August 10, 2004 > >The following is an exclusive excerpt from Michelle Malkin's new book, In >Defense of Internment: The Case for "Racial Profiling" in World War II and >the War on Terror (Regnery). > >The Turncoats on Niihau Island > >"Are you a Japanese?" > >Those were the first English words spoken by downed Japanese fighter pilot >Shigenori Nishikaichi on tiny Niihau Island, located about one hundred >miles northwest of Honolulu. It was December 7, 1941. Nishikaichi had had a >busy, bloody morning at Pearl Harbor. Now, with the aid and comfort of a >Japanese-American couple, Nishikaichi was about to make the lives of the >Niihau residents a living hell. > >Around 7:00 a.m., Nishikaichi boarded his Zero single-seat fighter plane >and took off from the carrier Hiryu in the Pacific. An hour and a half >later, the young Japanese pilot strafed planes, trucks, and personnel on >Oahu. Headed back to his carrier, Nishikaichi and some fellow pilots >encountered a group of American P36 fighter planes. During the air battle, >Nishikaichi's plane took several hits. One punctured the Zero's gas tank. >Nishikaichi steered the crippled plane toward the westernmost Hawaiian >island: Niihau. Fewer than 200 Hawaiians plus three laborers of Japanese >descent called Niihau home. Japan planned to use the island as a submarine >pickup point for stranded pilots. > >Nishikaichi crash-landed the plane in a field near one of the ranch homes. >The first to reach him was Hawila "Howard" Kaleohano, a burly Hawaiian. The >island had no telephones. On that tranquil, late Sunday morning, none of >the inhabitants was yet aware of the death and destruction that had just >rained down on Pearl Harbor. > >Nonetheless, Kaleohano wisely confiscated the dazed Nishikaichi's gun and >papers. Kaleohano, perhaps the most educated Hawaiian on Niihau, had been >keeping tabs on world affairs through newspapers supplied by ranch owner >Aylmer Robinson (who paid weekly visits to the island and lived twenty >miles away on Kauai). Wary but warm, Kaleohano brought the enemy pilot to >his home. Along the way, Nishikaichi asked Kaleohano if he was "a >Japanese." The answer was an emphatic "No." > >After sharing a meal and cigarettes, Nishikaichi demanded that Kaleohano >return his papers, which included maps, radio codes, and Pearl Harbor >attack plans. Kaleohano refused. To make their communication easier, >Kaleohano asked his neighbors to summon one of the island's three residents >of Japanese descent to translate for Nishikaichi. They first brought a >Japanese-born immigrant, Ishimatsu Shintani, to the house. He reluctantly >exchanged a few words with the pilot in Japanese, but left in a >hurry-apparently sensing trouble. > >The islanders then turned to Yoshio Harada and his wife Irene, both U.S. >citizens, born in Hawaii to Japanese immigrants. Harada had moved from >Kauai to California as a young man and lived there for seven years before >relocating to Niihau with his wife in 1939. Instantly at ease with the >Japanese-American couple, Nishikaichi dropped the bombshell news about the >attack on Pearl Harbor. The Haradas did not inform their neighbors. > >That night, the hospitable Niihau residents learned about the Pearl Harbor >attack on the radio. They decided to confine the pilot in the Haradas' home >until help arrived. > >Exploiting their common ethnic ties and urging loyalty to the emperor, >Nishikaichi won over the Haradas. They enlisted the other resident of >Japanese descent-the skittish Shintani-in a conspiracy to retrieve >Nishikaichi's papers from Kaleohano. On the afternoon of December 12, a >reluctant Shintani visited Kaleohano and asked for the enemy pilot's >papers. He offered his neighbor a wad of cash. Kaleohano refused. Shintani >desperately told him to burn the papers. It was a matter of life and death, >Shintani pleaded with Kaleohano. Kaleohano again refused. > >An hour later, Nishikaichi and the Haradas launched a campaign of terror >against the islanders. They overtook the guard on duty and locked him in a >warehouse. Mrs. Harada cranked up a phonograph to drown out the commotion. >Yoshio Harada and Nishikaichi retrieved a shotgun from the warehouse and >headed to Kaleohano's home. Kaleohano, who was in the outhouse, saw them >coming and hid while Nishikaichi and his collaborators unsuccessfully >searched for the pilot's papers. They recovered Nishikaichi's pistol and >headed toward his grounded plane. Harada watched as the enemy pilot tried >in vain to call for help on his radio. > >Meanwhile, Kaleohano fled from the outhouse and ran to the main village to >warn his neighbors of Nishikaichi's escape. He returned to his house to >retrieve the papers, hid them in a relative's home, and set out with a >strong team of islanders in a lifeboat toward Kauai to get help. That >night, Harada and Nishikaichi set both the plane and Kaleohano's home on >fire. They fired off their guns in a lunatic rage and threatened to kill >every man, woman, and child in the village. After gathering for a prayer >meeting, many residents escaped to a mountaintop with kerosene lamps and >reflectors in an attempt to signal Kauai. > >On the morning of December 13, Harada and Nishikaichi captured islander Ben >Kanahele and his wife. Kanahele was ordered to find Kaleohano. In their own >"Let's Roll" moment of heroism, the gutsy Kanaheles refused to cooperate. >When Nishikaichi threatened to shoot Kanahele's wife, fifty-one-year-old >Ben lunged for the enemy's shotgun. The young Japanese fighter pilot pulled >his pistol from his boot and shot Kanahele three times in the chest, hip, >and groin. Mrs. Kanahele pounced at Nishikaichi; her once-peaceful neighbor >Harada tore her away. > >Angered, the wounded Kanahele summoned the strength to pick up Nishikaichi >and hurl him against a stone wall, knocking him unconscious. Quick-thinking >Mrs. Kanahele grabbed a rock and pummeled the pilot's head. For good >measure, Ben Kanahele took out a hunting knife and slit Nishikaichi's >throat. A desperate Harada turned the shotgun on himself and committed >suicide. > >The Kanaheles' harrowing battle against a Japanese invader and his >surprising collaborator was over. > >The significance of the Haradas' stunning act of disloyalty and Shintani's >meek complicity in collaboration with Nishikaichi was not lost on the >Roosevelt administration. The facts of the case "indicate a strong >possibility that other Japanese residents of the Territory of Hawaii, and >Americans of Japanese descent . . . may give valuable aid to Japanese >invaders in cases where the tide of battle is in favor of Japan and where >it appears to residents that control of the district may shift from the >United States to Japan," wrote Lieutenant C. B. Baldwin after a naval >intelligence investigation. > >The Haradas were neither radical nationalists nor professional spies. They >were ordinary Japanese-Americans who betrayed America by putting their >ethnic roots first. How many other Japanese-Americans-especially on the >vulnerable West Coast-might be swayed by enemy appeals such as >Nishikaichi's? How many more might be torn between allegiance for their >country of birth and kinship with Imperial invaders? These were the >daunting questions that faced the nation's top military and political >leaders as enemy forces loomed on our shores. > >Michelle Malkin is a syndicated columnist and maintains her weblog at >michellemalkin.com > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

1 0

SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement
by Bill Stewart 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

Rick Moen suggested we have a Cypherpunks meeting in August, so: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement General Info: DATE: Saturday 14 August 2004 TIME: 12:00 - 5:00 PM (Pacific Time) PLACE: Stanford University Campus - Tressider Union courtyard Agenda: "Our agenda is a widely-held secret." (This will be our first meeting since April 2003, so the agenda is somewhat up for grabs. Among upcoming events to note is the 7th annual Information Security Conference, aka ISC04, Sept. 27-29 at Xerox PARC, http://isc04.uncc.edu/ . Also of note: Our friendly Federalistas seem to be imposing unprecedented visa restrictions on visiting foreign cryptographers. Is it time for all international cryptography conferences to move off-shore? See: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 ) As usual, this is an "Open Meeting on US Soil", and the public is invited. Location Info: The meeting location will be familiar to those who've been to our outdoor meetings before, but for those who haven't been, it's on the Stanford University campus, at the tables outside Tressider Union, at the end of Santa Theresa, just west of Dinkelspiel Auditorium. We meet at the tables on the west side of the building, inside the horseshoe "U" formed by Tresidder. Ask anyone on campus where Tressider is and they'll help you find it. Food and beverages are available at the cafe inside Tresidder. Location Maps: Stanford Campus (overview; Tressider is dead-center). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/bldg.jsp?cx=344&cy=471&zoomto=50&… Tressider Union (zoomed detail view). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/results.jsp?bldg=Tresidder Printable Stanford Map (407k). http://www.stanford.edu/home/visitors/campus_map.pdf [ This announcement sent to the following mailing lists: cypherpunks-announce(a)toad.com, meetingpunks(a)cryptorights.org, cypherpunks-request(a)minder.net, cryptography-request(a)metzdowd.com Mailing list complaints or address corrections to bill.stewart(a)pobox.com. Agenda and Location questions to Rick Moen, rick(a)linuxmafia.com ] ---- Bill Stewart bill.stewart(a)pobox.com

1 0

Iowa Deploys Cell-Phone GPS location-tracking for 911
by Bill Stewart 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

Iowa's deploying cell-phone location-trackers for 911, and for whatever other purposes the cellphones support. > ><http://www.wqad.com/global/story.asp?s>http://www.WQAD.com/Global/story.asp?s=2150225 Des Moines, IA New technology will allow better response to 911 cell callers 08/09/04 10:35 AM DES MOINES, IOWA (AP) -- Cell phone users in Iowa are getting a 911 upgrade. The state is among the first in the nation to use the new technology that will help dispatchers pinpoint the emergency caller. Iowa 911 Program Manager John Benson says it's already being tested in Des Moines, and the end of the year, about half of the state's 125 dispatch centers will have the upgrade. About half of Iowa's 911 calls are placed by cell phones. That's about 50,000 a month. Current technology allows dispatchers to locate a cell phone 911 caller by the nearest cell tower, often miles away. The new global-positioning technology provides the latitude and longitude of the caller, which can be electronically displayed on a map. Copyright 2004, Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material cannot be published, broadcast, rewritten, or distributed. (looks like Fair Use to me...)

1 0

SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement
by Bill Stewart 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

Rick Moen suggested we have a Cypherpunks meeting in August, so: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement General Info: DATE: Saturday 14 August 2004 TIME: 12:00 - 5:00 PM (Pacific Time) PLACE: Stanford University Campus - Tressider Union courtyard Agenda: "Our agenda is a widely-held secret." (This will be our first meeting since April 2003, so the agenda is somewhat up for grabs. Among upcoming events to note is the 7th annual Information Security Conference, aka ISC04, Sept. 27-29 at Xerox PARC, http://isc04.uncc.edu/ . Also of note: Our friendly Federalistas seem to be imposing unprecedented visa restrictions on visiting foreign cryptographers. Is it time for all international cryptography conferences to move off-shore? See: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 ) As usual, this is an "Open Meeting on US Soil", and the public is invited. Location Info: The meeting location will be familiar to those who've been to our outdoor meetings before, but for those who haven't been, it's on the Stanford University campus, at the tables outside Tressider Union, at the end of Santa Theresa, just west of Dinkelspiel Auditorium. We meet at the tables on the west side of the building, inside the horseshoe "U" formed by Tresidder. Ask anyone on campus where Tressider is and they'll help you find it. Food and beverages are available at the cafe inside Tresidder. Location Maps: Stanford Campus (overview; Tressider is dead-center). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/bldg.jsp?cx=344&cy=471&zoomto=50&… Tressider Union (zoomed detail view). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/results.jsp?bldg=Tresidder Printable Stanford Map (407k). http://www.stanford.edu/home/visitors/campus_map.pdf [ This announcement sent to the following mailing lists: cypherpunks-announce(a)toad.com, meetingpunks(a)cryptorights.org, cypherpunks-request(a)minder.net, cryptography-request(a)metzdowd.com Mailing list complaints or address corrections to bill.stewart(a)pobox.com. Agenda and Location questions to Rick Moen, rick(a)linuxmafia.com ] ---- Bill Stewart bill.stewart(a)pobox.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement
by Bill Stewart 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

Rick Moen suggested we have a Cypherpunks meeting in August, so: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement General Info: DATE: Saturday 14 August 2004 TIME: 12:00 - 5:00 PM (Pacific Time) PLACE: Stanford University Campus - Tressider Union courtyard Agenda: "Our agenda is a widely-held secret." (This will be our first meeting since April 2003, so the agenda is somewhat up for grabs. Among upcoming events to note is the 7th annual Information Security Conference, aka ISC04, Sept. 27-29 at Xerox PARC, http://isc04.uncc.edu/ . Also of note: Our friendly Federalistas seem to be imposing unprecedented visa restrictions on visiting foreign cryptographers. Is it time for all international cryptography conferences to move off-shore? See: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 ) As usual, this is an "Open Meeting on US Soil", and the public is invited. Location Info: The meeting location will be familiar to those who've been to our outdoor meetings before, but for those who haven't been, it's on the Stanford University campus, at the tables outside Tressider Union, at the end of Santa Theresa, just west of Dinkelspiel Auditorium. We meet at the tables on the west side of the building, inside the horseshoe "U" formed by Tresidder. Ask anyone on campus where Tressider is and they'll help you find it. Food and beverages are available at the cafe inside Tresidder. Location Maps: Stanford Campus (overview; Tressider is dead-center). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/bldg.jsp?cx=344&cy=471&zoomto=50&… Tressider Union (zoomed detail view). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/results.jsp?bldg=Tresidder Printable Stanford Map (407k). http://www.stanford.edu/home/visitors/campus_map.pdf [ This announcement sent to the following mailing lists: cypherpunks-announce(a)toad.com, meetingpunks(a)cryptorights.org, cypherpunks-request(a)minder.net, cryptography-request(a)metzdowd.com Mailing list complaints or address corrections to bill.stewart(a)pobox.com. Agenda and Location questions to Rick Moen, rick(a)linuxmafia.com ] ---- Bill Stewart bill.stewart(a)pobox.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Internet Pirates
by R. A. Hettinga 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109209577232687104,00.html?mod=opi…> The Wall Street Journal August 10, 2004 REVIEW & OUTLOOK Internet Pirates August 10, 2004; Page A10 If you own a movie or record copyright, and someone else "induces" people to start infringing it, should you be able to sue the inducer? Senator Orrin Hatch thinks so, and it's possible his bad idea could become bad law. Granted, he's trying to address a real copyright problem. Music labels and movie studios are playing a frustrating game of whack-a-mole, with new Internet file-sharing networks popping up faster than the recording industry can protest. The newest networks, including KaZaa and Morpheus, are run as for-profit piracy havens but have found ways to skirt copyright laws. They display advertising on users' desktops but make sure that individual users, rather than anyone in corporate HQ, handle the actual dirty work of infringing copyright. The network operators then claim to be shocked by the illegal activity of individual file traders -- even though they're well aware that their users aren't swapping Shakespeare. Trouble is, the facts don't support the idea that legal action against these network operators would help in the larger fight against piracy. Napster's court-ordered shutdown in 2001 might have been a symbolic triumph over intellectual property theft, but it caused only a minor hiccup in the supply chain for pirated media. The new firms that took its place (the ones that Mr. Hatch's bill targets) are housed outside the U.S., which makes it tough to make them pay a court judgment. Long after they're gone, old copies of their software will allow new swappers to join the party. And even if none of these problems existed, there is already a second tier of file sharing programs like BitTorrent created by hobbyists who don't profit from piracy, and make lean targets for lawsuits. Which brings us to Mr. Hatch's legislation, known as the Induce Act, which gives copyright holders a cause of action to sue anyone who "induces" the violation of their copyrights. While it wouldn't make much of a dent in the Internet piracy problem it's designed to solve, it would unleash a wave of frivolous lawsuits. Makers of technologies ranging from computers and multimedia software to portable music players could find themselves in the crosshairs, on the theory that their wares encourage infringement. Even if the industry's major players showed restraint in using their new power to sue, technology producers would have to contend with the most litigious of copyright holders. Winning such suits, as legitimate technology producers hopefully would, is financially burdensome, especially to startups. The prospect of costly court battles would deter new investments in technology. Mr. Hatch claims his bill would leave in place a Supreme Court ruling that protects the makers of general-purpose technologies from copyright liability. Even if he were right, the conceptual problem with criminalizing tools is inescapable. As long as the necessary legal umbrella protecting technology tools stays in place, the shadier network operators will find a way to shelter themselves under it. The better legal tools to stop file traders are hidden in plain sight, in pre-Internet U.S. copyright law. "Willful" infringement -- when the copier knows, or should know, that he's over the line -- carries a statutory penalty of $150,000 per illegal copy. The content industry can also continue to sue individual pirates. With penalties this high, it doesn't take very many suits to substantially increase the expected cost of pirating an album or film. These suits aren't popular with customers, which is why music and movie companies are asking Congress for other ways of stopping piracy. But it's high time providers and consumers alike bit the bullet and recognized that individual users who pirate content really do deserve steep punishment. That's a better solution than creating more causes of action for the trial bar. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Re: NSA Overcomes Fiber-Optic and Encryption
by Anonymous 10 Aug '04

10 Aug '04

I can see fatherland securitat goons raiding a certain restaurant at Stanford next weekend ... assume all keys are compromised due to RH attack. >The NSA has also found a silver lining to the use of encrypted e-mail: >Even if a particular message cannot be read, the very use of encryption >can flag it for NSA's attention. By tracking the relatively few Internet >users in a certain country or region who take such security measures, NSA >analysts might be able to sketch a picture of a terrorist network. >... >And cell phones - as handy for terrorist plotters as for everyone else - >provide not just an eavesdropping target but also a way to physically >track the user.

1 0

Olympics snooping
by Eric Murray 09 Aug '04

09 Aug '04

http://sports.yahoo.com/oly/news?slug=ap-securitytech&prov=ap&type=lgns Unprecedented electronic net over the Olympics By MIRON VAROUHAKIS, Associated Press Writer August 9, 2004 ATHENS, Greece (AP) -- If you're going to the Olympics, you'd better be careful what you say and do in public. Software will be watching and listening. Recent leaps in technology have paired highly sophisticated software with street surveillance cameras to create digital security guards with intelligence-gathering skills. `It is a very vast network and it is the first time it is being done on such a scale at an international level,'' Greek police spokesman Col. Lefteris Ikonomou told The Associated Press. The system -- developed by a consortium led by San Diego-based Science Applications International Corp., or SAIC -- cost about $312 million and took up a sizable chunk of Athens' record security budget of more than $1.5 billion. It gathers images and audio from an electronic web of over 1,000 high-resolution and infrared cameras, 12 patrol boats, 4,000 vehicles, nine helicopters, a sensor-laden blimp and four mobile command centers. Spoken words collected by the cameras with speech-recognition software are transcribed into text that is then searched for patterns along with other electronic communications entering and leaving the area -- including e-mail and image files. The system, which includes components already used by U.S. and British government intelligence agencies, covers all of greater Athens, nine ports, airports and all other Olympic cities. Ikonomou said it ``allows the users to manage a critical incident in the best way possible and in the shortest time possible because they have all the information in front of them.'' The software used for surveillance camera recordings is designed to spot and rank possible risks, said Dionysios Dendrinos, general manager of One Siemens in Greece, one of the companies in the consortium. ``They can distinguish the sound of a flat tire from an explosion or a gunshot and inform the user at the command center of the incident,'' he said. ``This is also the case with any anomaly in the picture, such as a traffic jam.'' Technology also allows the users of the system at the main command center to save and analyze data from the surveillance network and beyond. And the material from the closed circuit cameras is kept for seven days, Ikonomou said, so specific incidents can be analyzed in depth. Much of that analysis is enabled by software from London-based Autonomy Corp., whose clients include the U.S. National Security Agency, that parses words and phrases collected by surveillance cameras and in communications traffic. In June, the Greek government expanded surveillance powers to screen mobile and fixed-line telephone calls during the Olympics. ``It listens, reads and watches,'' Dominic Johnson, Autonomy's chief marketing officer, said of his company's software. Then it synthesizes. Beyond Greek and English the software understands Arabic, Farsi and all major European languages, Johnson said. Other companies in the SAIC consortium include Germany's Siemens AG; General Dynamics Corp. and Honeywell International Inc. of the United States; and the Israeli company Elbit Systems. Several Greek companies also are participating. According to the contract, the system was to be delivered by May 28, but due to construction delays at some Olympic venues -- such as the main Olympic stadium -- it was delivered just weeks before the opening ceremony. Nevertheless, Public Order Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis declared last week that all the security systems were in full deployment and working smoothly. There'll be other sniffing going on, of course. A network of sensors designed to detect chemical agents has also been deployed near Olympic venues and around the capital, including on the security blimp. Advanced technology is also used in the creation of the Olympic credentials, which use such security features as holograms. All cardholder information, such as a person's photo and passport number, are printed on a very thin film designed to make the cards impossible to forge. The digitally enhanced surveillance net may provide comfort to Olympics attendees, but not everyone is happy at authorities' computer-aided eyes and ears. Several groups have held protests in recent months against what they say is an invasion of their privacy, and some demonstrators have spray-painted street cameras, seeking to blind them. ``The Olympic Games are accompanied with extended security measures that are unprecedented for Greece,'' six human rights groups said in a protest letter to Greek Parliament in July. ``Although the state's right to take all necessary measures that it deems necessary is recognized, there is fear that these measures will have a negative impact on basic human rights.''

1 0

[IP] The Surveillance Industrial Complex (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 09 Aug '04

09 Aug '04

----- Forwarded message from dave(a)farber.net -----

1 0