April 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

[IP] U.S. may need to step in, says cybersecurity report
by R. A. Hettinga 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

Two hints: 1. It's not the camel's nose, and, 2. It's not your tent, either. Cheers, RAH --- begin forwarded text

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Blackwater
by Major Variola (ret.) 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

http://web.archive.org/web/*/www.blackwatersecurity.com Blackwater had no web pages before Aug 2002. Funny how the 0wn3d media doesn't question the "consultant" label.

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Re: [Politech] John Gilmore on the homeless, RFID tags, and kittens
by Major Variola (ret) 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

At 03:22 PM 4/1/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > >Last year I found it almost impossible to adopt a kitten or cat that >didn't have an RFID tag implanted under its skin. What is his problem? You just put them in the microwave and the chip is useless.

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Re: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
by Major Variola (ret) 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

At 01:41 PM 4/1/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: >More to the point, once you cleaned out a bunch of injuns, *somebody* >had to ranch the land, right? Well of course. It was our destiny, our mission. Just like bringing democracy (tm) to the a-rabs, etc. If, of course, they vote for our puppets, and their presses print what we like.

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Announcement: New mailing list for UK crypto
by Ben Laurie 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

By popular demand, I've created a moderated alternative to the UKCrypto mailing list. See https://mailman.aldigital.co.uk/mailman/listinfo/ukcisnac for the charter and subscription information. This is intended to be complementary to the cryptography (because its about the UK) and ukcrypto (because its moderated) mailing lists, rather than competitive with them. And no, I'm not interested in discussing why we haven't burnt our money buying a cert from your favourite money sink. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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RE: The 'Privacy' Jihad
by Tyler Durden 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

Silly bitch. But then again, she may just be looking for a gig. Can someone out there slip her name into the do-not-fly registries so we can have a new privacy advocate? Here's the part I love... >As with >any public or private power, TIA's capabilities could have been abused -- >which is why the Pentagon research team planned to build in powerful >safeguards to protect individual privacy. Not just safeguards, but powerful ones at that! Well, now I feel bad about losing TIA! -TD >From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: The 'Privacy' Jihad >Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2004 07:25:58 -0500 > ><http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB108079540145771406,00.html> > >The Wall Street Journal > > April 1, 2004 > > COMMENTARY > > >The 'Privacy' Jihad > >By HEATHER MAC DONALD >April 1, 2004; Page A14 > > >The 9/11 Commission hearings have focused public attention again on the >intelligence failures leading up to the September attacks. Yet since 9/11, >virtually every proposal to use intelligence more effectively -- to connect >the dots -- has been shot down by left- and right-wing libertarians as an >assault on "privacy." The consequence has been devastating: Just when the >country should be unleashing its technological ingenuity to defend against >future attacks, scientists stand irresolute, cowed into inaction. > >The privacy advocates -- who range from liberal groups focused on >electronic privacy, such as the Electronic Privacy Information Center, to >traditional conservative libertarians, such as Americans for Tax Reform -- >are fixated on a technique called "data mining." By now, however, they have >killed enough different programs that their operating principle can only be >formulated as this: No use of computer data or technology anywhere at any >time for national defense, if there's the slightest possibility that a >rogue use of that technology will offend someone's sense of privacy. They >are pushing intelligence agencies back to a pre-9/11 mentality, when the >mere potential for a privacy or civil liberties controversy trumped >security concerns. > >* * * > >The privacy advocates' greatest triumph was shutting down the Defense >Department's Total Information Awareness (TIA) program. Goaded on by New >York Times columnist William Safire, the advocates presented the program as >the diabolical plan of John Poindexter, the former Reagan national security >adviser and director of Pentagon research, to spy on "every public and >private act of every American" -- in Mr. Safire's words. > >The advocates' distortion of TIA was unrelenting. Most egregiously, they >concealed TIA's purpose: to prevent another attack on American soil by >uncovering the electronic footprints terrorists leave as they plan and >rehearse their assaults. Before terrorists strike, they must enter the >country, receive funds, case their targets, buy supplies, and send phone >and e-mail messages. Many of those activities will leave a trail in >electronic databases. TIA researchers hoped that cutting-edge computer >analysis could find that trail in government intelligence files and, >possibly, in commercial databases as well. > >TIA would have been the most advanced application yet of "data mining," a >young technology which attempts to make sense of the explosion of data in >government, scientific and commercial databases. Through complex >algorithms, the technique can extract patterns or anomalies in data >collections that a human analyst could not possibly discern. Public health >authorities have mined medical data to spot the outbreak of infectious >disease, and credit-card companies have found fraudulent credit-card >purchases with the method, among other applications. > >But according to the "privacy community," data mining was a dangerous, >unconstitutional technology, and the Bush administration had to be stopped >from using it for any national-security or law-enforcement purpose. By >September 2003, the hysteria against TIA had reached a fevered pitch and >Congress ended the research project entirely, before learning the >technology's potential and without a single "privacy violation" ever having >been committed. > >The overreaction is stunning. Without question, TIA represented a radical >leap ahead in both data-mining technology and intelligence analysis. Had it >used commercial data, it would have given intelligence agencies >instantaneous access to a volume of information about the public that had >previously only been available through slower physical searches. As with >any public or private power, TIA's capabilities could have been abused -- >which is why the Pentagon research team planned to build in powerful >safeguards to protect individual privacy. But the most important thing to >remember about TIA is this: It would have only used data to which the >government was already legally entitled. It differed from existing >law-enforcement and intelligence techniques only in degree, not kind. >Pattern analysis -- the heart of data mining -- is conventional >crime-solving, whether the suspicious patterns are spotted on a crime pin >map, on a city street, or in an electronic database. > >The computing world watched TIA's demolition and rationally concluded: >Let's not go there. "People and companies will no longer enter into >technology research [involving national-security computing] because of the >privacy debates," says a privacy officer for a major information retrieval >firm. > >But the national-security carnage was just beginning. Next on the block: a >biometric camera to protect embassies and other critical government >buildings from terrorist attack; and an artificial intelligence program to >help battlefield commanders analyze engagements with the enemy. In the >summer of 2003, New York Times columnists Maureen Dowd and Mr. Safire >sneered at the programs, portraying them as -- once again -- the personal >toys of the evil Mr. Poindexter to invade the privacy of innocent >Americans. The Dowd-Safire depictions of the projects were fantastically >inaccurate; but Pentagon researchers, already reeling from the >public-relations disaster of TIA, cancelled both projects without a fight. >Special forces leaders in Afghanistan and embassies in terror-sponsoring >states will just have to make do. > >The privacy vigilantes now have in their sights an airline-passenger >screening system and an interstate network to share law-enforcement and >intelligence information. Both projects could soon go down in flames. As to >whether that would be in the national interest, readers should ask >themselves if they would be happy to fly seated next to Mohamed Atta. If >yes, they needn't worry about the cancellation of the Computer Assisted >Passenger Prescreening System (known as Capps II). And if they don't care >whether police can track down a child abductor within minutes of his crime, >then they shouldn't care about the crippling of the Multistate >Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, either. > >Capps II seeks to verify that an airline passenger is who he says he is and >has no terrorist ties. To that end, the program would ask passengers to >supply their name, address, phone number and date of birth upon purchasing >a plane ticket. A commercial databank would cross-check those four >identifiers against its own files to see if they match up. Next, Capps II >would run the passenger's name through anti-terror intelligence files. >Depending on the results of both checks, the system would assign a risk >score to air travelers -- acceptable, unknown, or unacceptable. > >Privacy zealots have mischaracterized Capps II as a sinister rerun of TIA >-- which it is not, since it has nothing to do with data mining -- and as a >plot to trample the privacy rights of Americans. They argue that, by asking >your name and other minimal identifying information already available on >the Internet and in countless commercial and government databases, aviation >officials are conducting a Fourth Amendment "search" of your private >effects for which they should obtain a warrant based on probable cause that >you have committed a crime. Such a broad reading of the Constitution is >groundless, but even were the collecting of publicly available information >a "search," it is clearly reasonable as a measure to protect airline >safety. > >Development of Capps II has come to a halt, due to specious privacy >crusading. Air passengers can only hope that when the next al Qaeda >operative boards a plane, baggage screeners are having a particularly good >day, free of the human errors that regularly let weapons on board. > >Also under a death sentence: a state-run law-enforcement program called >"Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange." Known as Matrix, it >allows police officers to search multiple law-enforcement databases and >public records in the blink of an eye after a crime has been committed. It >uses only information that law enforcement can already routinely access: >its own records on suspects, convicts and sexual offenders, as well as >publicly available data from county courthouses, telephone directories and >business filings. Strong protections against abuse are built into the >system. > >Matrix developers had hoped to allow law-enforcement agencies nationwide to >instantaneously connect the dots about itinerant felons like the D.C. >snipers. That won't happen, however, thanks to the lies of the privacy >community. Using the familiar tactic of tying the hated program to TIA and >data mining, and of invoking Big Brother totalitarianism, the advocates >have browbeaten nearly two-thirds of the states that had originally joined >the data-sharing pact into withdrawing from it. > >The bottom line is clear: The privacy battalions oppose not just particular >technologies, but technological innovation itself. Any effort to use >computerized information more efficiently will be tarred with the >predictable buzzwords: "surveillance," "Orwellian," "Poindexter." This >Luddite approach to counterterrorism could not be more ominous. The volume >of information in government intelligence files long ago overwhelmed the >capacity of humans to understand it. Agents miss connections between people >and events every day. Machine analysis is essential in an intelligence >tidal wave. > >Before the privacy onslaught, scientists and intelligence officials were >trying to find ways of identifying those fanatics who seek to destroy >America before they strike again. Now many avenues are closed to them. This >despite the fact that proposals for assessing risk in such areas as >aviation do not grow out of an omnivorous desire to "spy on citizens" but >out of a concrete need to protect people from a clear threat. And since >9/11, no one's "privacy rights" have been violated by terror pre-emption >research. > >The "privocrats" will rightly tell you that eternal vigilance is the price >of liberty. Trouble is, they're aiming their vigilance at the wrong target. > >Ms. Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute. This is adapted from >the forthcoming issue of City Journal. > > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > _________________________________________________________________ Tax headache? MSN Money provides relief with tax tips, tools, IRS forms and more! http://moneycentral.msn.com/tax/workshop/welcome.asp

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[Politech] John Gilmore on the homeless, RFID tags, and kittens [priv]
by R. A. Hettinga 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

--- begin forwarded text

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Re: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
by Major Variola (ret) 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

At 05:19 PM 3/31/04 -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: >So, what, declare all current property claims in Fallujah to be null and >void, sell claims off to the highest bidder, and whoever gets there with >the most men owns it. I mean, it worked in Texas with the Comanches and >Apaches... How long do we have to wait before we can name our new attack helicopters "Fallujahs"? Do Iraqis know how to run casinos?

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Israeli coders, Arab testers
by Major Variola (ret) 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

from owner-cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Eugene Volokh, 3/25/2004 04:02:38 PM Israeli coders, Arab testers: A reader writes, apropos checking sensitive source code for sabotage: I spoke to [someone] from the NSA, about this subject a couple of years back. As you probably know, although the NSA has teams of cryptographers at its disposal, a large amount of the successful interception it carries out is simply due to exploiting software faults in communications soft- ware. Consequently, in their other role, as advisor to the DoD about communications security issues, they focus on software assurance to an extent that often takes new- comers by surprise. The NSA used to have a requirement that only American citizens should be allowed to work on sensitive source code, because they considered there to be too great a risk of backdoors being placed in the code by foreign nationals . . . . More recently, because of the number of H1(B)s and green cards in the computer industry, it's been impractical for the NSA to insist on that. Instead, what they've encouraged -- and this is the interesting and quite clever part -- is that programmers and testers should be of different nationalities. If you have Israeli coders, get Arabic testers. If you have British coders, get French testers. And so on. A cute solution to the problem. But I don't know if it ever worked. I suspect the NSA still insists, though, that source code for sensitive systems be written by American companies on American soil, even if it isn't written by American fingers.Of course, even if the NSA's program worked for the NSA, it would be pretty expensive to adopt for the important source code and off-the-shelf object code used by lots of other organizations -- many of which are private companies -- that manage critical American infrastructure. Nor am I sure that it would work that well even if it were adopted. Still, it struck me as interesting enough to be worth mentioning. http://volokh.com/2004_03_21_volokh_archive.html#108025935883663167

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Re: Mercs need to wear clean underwear
by nobody＠See.Comments.Header 01 Apr '04

01 Apr '04

Hettinga advocates: > So, what, declare all current property claims in Fallujah to be null and > void, sell claims off to the highest bidder, and whoever gets there with > the most men owns it. I mean, it worked in Texas with the Comanches and > Apaches... > Yeah, it's a fantasy, but we all have our dreams, right? :-). Yes, we do. And some of our dreams are of invading the homes of rich Amerikan assholes to fund the jihad. Want to know something fun? Using simple tools like this link http://www.fundrace.org/neighbors.php we can locate all the fascist supporters in Amerika, with address and phone number, and enjoy their womenfolk and riches.

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