April 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

Steve Brinich: The Criminal
by Thomas Shaddack 09 Apr '04

09 Apr '04

Dug this from my old archives, after finding out it vanished from the Net. Decade-old, but more truthful than before. May it provide some inspiration. -------------------------------------------------- Title: The Criminal Lyrics by: Steve Brinich Tune: The Idiot (Stan Rogers) Date: 1994 Found online at: http://www.access.digex.net/~steve-b/myfilks.htm Recorded on: Subject: Government [This is one of my reactions to the US government's attacks on freedom of electronic speech (I was thinking specifically about the government's Big Brother wiretap/encryption policies, but it applies equally well to the CDA and other such offenses. As for the politicians who vote for these abuses -- alas, cutting out the tongues of oathbreakers has gone out of fashion, so we will have to settle for turning them out to find honest work. They're sneaky characters, but groups such as the Voters' Telecom Watch, Electronic Frontier Foundation, etc. do a fairly good job of monitoring the hired help in Washington and sounding the alarm when they start getting out of line again.] I log onto this homebrew Net where the Feds are not around I've turned my back on Big Brother's track and made this open ground I slip past the surveillance taps; the alarms will make no sound I set up the link and I always think back to my old account I remember back six years ago, this outlaw life I chose When every day the news would say there's another rule to impose Well, I could have stayed and just obeyed, but I'm not one of those I'm remaining free, and that makes me a criminal, I suppose. So I bid farewell to the tamed old Net I never more will see But write I must, and I put my trust in human liberty Oh, I miss support, and the GUI ports, and the realtime videos But I like being free, and that makes me a criminal, I suppose. So, come you fine young hackers all, to the cyber underground This outlaw life's no paradise, but it's better than lying down Oh, the interface isn't cut-and-paste, and the system's often down But the government spies will set their eyes on a licensed Net account So bid farewell to the tamed old Net you never more will see Here your words will ship without censorship; there's real liberty You'll miss the bells and the fancy shells; here we just have plain old prose But you'll be free, and just like me, a criminal, I suppose.

1 0

RE: Gmail as Blacknet
by An Metet 09 Apr '04

09 Apr '04

Tyler Durden writes: > "Ironically, some of the features of Gmail bear resemblance to BlackNet. > In particular, its claimed policy of retaining email indefinitely, > even after the recipient has stopped using the account, is reminiscent > of BlackNet's function as a data haven, as well as other Cypherpunk > projects like the Eternity Network. This retention is objectionable to > conventional privacy groups, but Cypherpunks will recognize it as being > deeply in accord with their values." > > Poo poo. The difference between a potential blacknet and Gmail is that > there's little doubt that google will cough up the true names of > objectionable posters, if and when anyone looking even remotely > authoritative/governmental comes pounding on their doors. In a worst-case > Blacknet, my True Name will only be gettable by agents of the state via the > expenditure of very large amounts of resources, if at all. You have missed the point of the analogy entirely. BlackNet makes information available even when the subjects of the information (or any other parties) want it suppressed. It is a censorship-proof store of data. If information about you is stored in BlackNet, anyone can get access to it (for a price, perhaps), and you can't do anything about it. To make Gmail more like BlackNet, you should first do as others have suggested and access it via cryptographic anonymity techniques (see the recent announcements for the onion routing network now being developed, http://www.freehaven.net/tor. Now you can use it as a store of data for your pseudonym without linking to your true identity. A second step is to then PGP-encrypt all email going to your Gmail address. This could be done easily by someone writing a mail forwarder which accepted email for any username, looked up a PGP key for that name and encrypted the email, then forwarded it along to the corresponding username at Gmail. This would be less than one page of Perl. You would give out the name of a system running such a script as your email address, but your encrypted mail would then be stored and accessed at Gmail. You'd gain the advantage of their multi gigabyte storage facility while protecting the privacy of your own email. And I'd like to see their adwords facility struggling to come up with something appropriate when the only legible text is "BEGIN PGP ENCRYPTED MESSAGE". A third step is to get a browser plugin which would transparently decrypt PGP encrypted email stored at web mail services like Gmail, Yahoo mail, etc. At one time this would have been an overwhelmingly difficult task due to the multiplicity of browsers; at a later time, it would have been impractical due to the dominance of IE; but today, with Mozilla becoming a widely used, standardized, open source alternative to IE, it is finally possible for such browser customizations to become generally available and useful. So there you have it, a simple three step program to turn your Gmail account into a privacy-protected, virtually unlimited-size data store.

1 0

[osint] Gulf conference tackles terror financing
by R. A. Hettinga 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

--- begin forwarded text

1 0

RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
by Trei, Peter 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

Major Variola (ret) wrote: >Peter, what would be wrong with having a machine in the booth that >prints >any valid receipt BUT is not connected to the voting system. "To vote >use the red machine; if you're being coerced you can use the blue >machine >to print as many receipts as intimidators." >A trade off between (mild) user complexity and the desire for receipts >(without coercion). The system described allows the user to take a reciept (which has only numbers on it) and use a website to determine that the vote was recorded correctly. A decoy receipt would also have to pass this test. Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an unneccesary complication. * Both real and decoy receipts would have to be in the database for verification - which bothers me a lot. * There seems to be no provision for recounts - what are they supposed to do - have everybody send in their receipts? How can you tell the decoys from the real? I give VoteHere kudos for releasing their source, but it doesnt solve the e-voting problem. Peter Trei

6 6

RE: Hierarchy, Force Monopoly, and Geodesic Societies (Re: [irtheory] Re: Anarchy and State Behaviors)
by Tyler Durden 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

"The pre-microprocessor automation of telephony (pulse and then touchtone dialing) put expensive automation at the top of the hierarchy, and, as costs fell, moved down from there." Well, from the little I can understand of what you're saying, there seems to be some stuff worthy of at least cursory consideration there. However, the analogy to switching systems is a little off. For one, a telephony switch isn't really something that can be measured on one axis (ie, throughput). There are two (or perhaps 3) axes that really describe the family of telephony switches: throughput and granularity. Back in my telecom days I used to joke that "In my pocket I have a switch matrix capable of 100 Terabits of throughput"...whereupon I'd whip out a (fiber) jumper, and point out that this jumper could "switch" 100Tb "from this port to this port". (This is an exageration of claims made about the throughput of OXCs, or optical cross connects.) This is important because it is indicative of the fact that there is no hierarchy of switches as you describe in a telephony switch. A Broadband DCS doesn't somehow control the network. In fact, you could argue that the 'little' 5ESS switches out on the edge ultimately control the network, though even that would be inaccurate. No, the entire phone network is "governed" externally by an OSS. I don't really see how this is describable by a hierarchy per se, and certainly not a hierarchy that can somehow be traced to a linear measure of switching capability. As for the tem "geodesic", I have to admit it's cool sounding in this context. -TD >From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: irtheory(a)yahoogroups.com >CC: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Hierarchy, Force Monopoly, and Geodesic Societies (Re: [irtheory] >Re: Anarchy and State Behaviors) >Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2004 13:56:47 -0400 > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >At 4:41 AM +0000 4/8/04, Daniel Pineu wrote: > >I am very curious about what are your views about the twin concept > >of hierarchy > >Hierarchy emerges as a result of the economics of information >switching. > >When you have expensive nodes (brains) and inexpensive lines >(behavior, talking, writing, whatever), you end up with hierarchical >networks. > >When you have a small number of nodes in a network, hierarchical >switching (i.e. chains of command, etc.) can't emerge because direct >communication is possible. For instance, in neurobiology, emotion is >a way of weighting memory. In human networks, we have the ability to >have significant emotional relationships with about 12-16 people at a >maximum, not coincidentally the size of a hunter-gatherer band, a >social unit that stayed with humanity, from our virtual evolution as >a separate species until sedentarianism, which preceded agriculture >by several thousand years, roughly 12-24,000 years ago. See Jared >Diamond's "Guns, Germs, and Steel" for a nice popular summary of this >process. > > >Food surplus creates an attractive nuisance, and causes large >populations of even solitary, non-social animals to create dominance >and social hierarchies, as a way of avoiding the wasteful expenditure >of energy that constant battle would involve. Salmon streams attract >Grizzly bears and Eagles, the town dumps at Churchill Manitoba >attracts Polar bears, house-cats in a farm-yard, and the intersection >of significant agricultural trading routes causes cities. >Proto-humans have traded since they invented tools, including sites >where hand-axes were literally manufactured at some negotiated rate >of exchange for raw materials collected a tens or hundreds of miles >away. > >Persistence of a food source over great lengths of time creates the >evolution of social animals. Wasps evolve into ants, cockroaches >evolve into termites, solitary proto-cats and -dogs become social >lions and wolves, and so on. As a counterexample, Orang-otans are >solitary because the distribution of food in jungles is uniform, >sparsely distributed, and random in appearance over time. > >Notice that the speed of information processing is also a component. >An Orang-Otan is a very sophisticated information processor, full of >data about what plants bear fruit, when they do so, and where they >are. And, contrary to popular belief, a beehive, or a termite or ant >nest, is not all *that* hierarchical in its organization. Do not >mistake functional specialization, like you find in ants and >termites, as hierarchy. See Kevin Kelly's "Out of Control" for a nice >survey of this idea. An ant "queen" is, in the final stage of her >life, a breeding machine, she doesn't signal, even in a gross sense, >what each worker does, in the same way that an army general does for >privates, for instance. > > >In mechanical information switching hierarchies, the fastest, most >expensive switches are at the top, and there is a single route >through the network. In the old phone network, you had a single >operator for a small enough town, and central offices in large cities >had rooms with hundreds of operators in them. The pre-microprocessor >automation of telephony (pulse and then touchtone dialing) put >expensive automation at the top of the hierarchy, and, as costs fell, >moved down from there. This fall in switching prices, exponential >after the invention of the microprocessor, is important, and I'll >talk about it more in a bit. > >Human switching hierarchies aren't so efficient, :-), but certainly >the most important information summaries are presented *near* the top >of a human-switched information hierarchy, and the most "expensive" >switches were certainly at the top, and economic rent being what it >is, people literally killed each other to be at the top of those >hierarchies. > >Which brings us to two principal features of international relations >through the industrial era: force monopoly, by which you literally >define a state whether it involves a single national cultural entity >or not, and information/social hierarchies, by which that state is >controlled . > >First of all there's the emergence of geographic force monopoly, >which is, more or less, a function of sedentarianism, and later >agriculture. Nomads may fight over the immediate use of local >resources, a watering-hole, say, but they don't set up principalities >(Mancur Olsen says in "Power and Prosperity" that a prince is a >bandit who doesn't move :-)). > >So, when you mix geographic force monopoly with social hierarchy you >get first cities, then city-states, then empires, and then >nation-states. The progression of which is driven directly by speed >of information processing, the span of communication, and the speed >of that communication over a specific distance. > >Oddly enough, it is the ability of communication to transmit >emotional information (first word of mouth, then words, then >pictures, then moving images and sound, all with ever increasing >instantaneity) that allows the mobilization of the most resources. >Because of their emotional attachment, people will die for their >modern nation-states much more readily than the normal merchant -- or >obviously slave -- would die for the current tyrant of their ancient >city-state, or feudal aristocrat. While it's safe to say that the >British Empire started this, Napoleon was the first memorable modern >exploiter of this phenomenon, if one remember that most of the >salient features of warfare changed at this time. Prisoners weren't >given parole anymore, for instance, but were kept throughout >hostilities. Warfare was not a game of honor anymore, but an issue of >one's individual and familial survival, the resources of all, not >just a trained cadre, could be mobilized for war. Because of the >emergence of mass media -- even Napoleon commissioned paintings and >drawings throughout each campaign, for instance, which were >re-printed in newspapers -- politics in France after the Revolution >created a much stronger emotional bond with the state than existed >under monarchy. The same thing happened in the United States, and it >has extended throughout the west and west-influenced world, until >nation-states are the dominant force structure in the world today. > >What's changing is that the price of information switching has, in >fact, *fallen*, since, paradoxically, the first real attempt to >create a "natural" monopoly out of the telephony market in the US. (I >say "create", with natural in quotes, because modern economics shows >us that only a force monopoly can create monopoly in another market.) >The paradox comes from the negotiation of universal service in >exchange for that monopoly, necessitating the automation of >switching. Mechanical switching (pulse-dial) became electronic >switching (touchtone), which, through the invention of the transistor >- - -- by AT&T to solve this very problem -- became microprocessor >switching. > >We now have an interesting problem, however, and a good explication >of the physical effects of this process can be found in Peter Huber's >"The Geodesic Network". > >Remember when I said above that network hierarchy evolves when nodes >are dear and lines are cheap. However, we have moved into a world in >which nodes can literally be printed, photolithographically. The >result is Moore's "Law", the observation (thus not a physical law) >that the number of transistors you can cram on a semiconductor >continues to double every 18 months or so, affecting processor, and >thus switching, prices, accordingly. > >[Nanotechology at least holds out the possibility of making Von >Neumann machines, that is, switches which make copies of themselves, >almost as if they were alive, dropping the cost even faster someday, >but, for the time being, we'll leave that one out there in the weeds, >where it belongs, but remember that progress can sneak up on you, if >you're not careful.] > >When you exponentially drop the price of something, you get >significant effects, some of which you can't predict. :-). > >In the case of physical network architectures, when nodes become >cheaper in relation to lines, even large hierarchical networks >collapse, or evolve, I suppose, into geodesic structures, like the >kind of domes that Bucky Fuller used to build, or the structures you >get in carbon when you burn it right and get so-called "buckyballs", >which are spheres that look like the same thing. When a bunch of >these networks are hooked together, you get a ubiquitous geodesic >internetwork, the internet, which is what we have today. If you go >look at graphs of the internet, you can tell that huge parts of it >are physically geodesic, and certainly, in logical performance, the >network is completely geodesic. > >The result is logical "communities", like this one, instead of >geographic ones. Communities where people in different parts of the >world can talk to each other on a single topic, or, even, act in >consort to make something happen, like, say, develop some open-source >code. > >Or conspire to fly an airliner into a building -- something that >wasn't possible without the simulator technology enabled by Moore's >Law, and which, as software which can be transmitted and eventually >used *anywhere* someday, is an interesting feature of geodesic >society that can be discussed some other time. > > >The history of humanity, from the discovery of wild fields of edible >grass seed in Mesopotamia until the early 20th century, has been the >history of ever-increasing social hierarchy. Social hierarchy which >has grown as our ability to store larger amounts of information and >to transmit it faster and faster over greater distances, but, as >hierarchy itself, has not changed in structure until recently, when >the price of information switching has fallen dramatically in >relation to the cost of transmitting it, which itself is also falling >very fast. > >I would claim that this points to increasingly geodesic, instead of >hierarchical, forms of social organization, and that politics, as an >effect of physics, and not a cause of same, :-), will be changed as a >result. > >I think that what we call "terrorism", is in fact, a form of geodesic >warfare, for instance. I think that geodesic methods are the only way >to protect ourselves from it. The use of GPS and JDAMs in Afghanistan >by special forces to destroy whole armies is just the beginning of >such kinds of defense, and, frankly, I think we're looking at a world >of network-organized entities competing for resources using >network-organized force. > >Personally, I think that results in auction-priced markets force and >the end of the efficacy of geographic force monopoly as an effective >way to control physical resources. > >Princes will go back to being bandits, in other words, which, like >all progress, if it's cheap enough, is a *good* thing. :-). > >That, I believe, is the very definition of anarchy, at least in terms >of political economics. And, since, like physics, politics is an >*effect* of economics, not the other way around... Well, you get the >idea. > >Cheers, >RAH > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: PGP 8.0.3 > >iQA/AwUBQHWSRsPxH8jf3ohaEQLl4ACgivxynGisIYyigyJbRQySe1pcMmgAmwWe >WtCP+c84v89nnhTfYIkp7sE0 >=sPPT >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > _________________________________________________________________ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

1 0

Re: Hierarchy, Force Monopoly, and Geodesic Societies
by Major Variola (ret) 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

At 03:29 PM 4/8/04 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: >At 11:28 AM -0700 4/8/04, Major Variola (ret) wrote: >>Geodesic means shortest path, and you'll note if you play with >>tracert that the shortest path (as seen on Earth's surface) is rarely >>taken. > >Measure the path in time? Yeah, some dead french dude IIRC pointed out that light takes the quickest route through a lens. Light and time being rather intimate if you believe your interferometer. OTOH a packet takes a route that depends on business practices, etc, and isn't generally optimal. In any case you're a lot more readable if one global replaces 'geodesic' with 'well-connected' or glibly 'wired'. Feel free to ignore any constructive hints of course :-) your prose is more identifying than your pk sig.

2 1

Re: Von Neumann machine - Wikipedia
by Major Variola (ret) 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

At 03:36 PM 4/8/04 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: >As someone who was a Gerard O'Neill <http://www.ssi.org/obit.html> fan long The L-5 dude? I never knew he dabbled in mental-nano-masturbation. I'm familiar with his macroscopic living-in-$pace speculations. >The term von Neumann machine also refers to the idea of a self-reproducing >machine, which was first examined in a rigorous manner and popularized by >John von Neumann who called it a "Universal Constructor." In principle, if >a machine (for example an industrial robot) could be given enough Just remember that Johnny was playing symbol-games, having a little cellular automata fun to prove it could be done. Not really surprising once you "get" the concept of a description-of-a-machine being processed by a machine. BTW, surely you can find a better ref than Wpedia?

2 1

We want everything, all the time...
by Dave Emery 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

LEAs Propose Sweeping Changes In CALEA Compliance Mar 31, 2004 Policy Specialists Warn Of Significant Implications The U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration -- referred to in telecom circles as LEAs' (an acronym for Law Enforcement Agencies) -- are pressing the FCC for sweeping changes in the commission's rules governing compliance with the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Specifically, the agencies are asking the commission to immediately undertake a rulemaking that would: Extend the LEAs' access for authorized wiretaps to a broad array of new, packet-based networks, push-to-talk "dispatch" systems, and other advanced communications technologies; Establish firm, short deadlines for compliance by communications services providers and networks that are deemed covered under CALEA; Restrict the FCC's culture of granting extensions for CALEA compliance by specifying the criteria for extensions of any benchmarks and deadlines; and Establish procedures for enforcement actions against entities that do not comply with their CALEA obligations. Impact Potentially Broad The LEAs' proposals, if fully adopted by federal regulators, could have a major impact on many sectors of the telecommunications and information technology services, as well as the manufacturing sectors, according to policy experts in the Global Telecommunications and Technology Group at the international law firm of Coudert Brothers LLP. In a March 22 advisory to Coudert's clients, the firm's policy analysts warned that hardware and software manufacturers could see a significant demand for affordable solutions to bring a variety of communications technologies into CALEA compliance. Special attention would be focused on Internet-related, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and some wireless technologies, if the LEA's primary objectives are achieved. Indeed, providers of broadband access, broadband telephony, and advanced communications technology could face relatively short deadlines to implement either standardized or individual solutions so that law enforcement can have ready access to their networks, if needed. Even those operators and manufacturers that are already working towards CALEA compliance could face more stringent deadlines for implementation of solutions, if the LEAs' requests are even partially adopted by the FCC, according to Coudert's experts. Broader Compliance Required In their joint petition to the FCC, the LEAs contend there is an urgent need for the FCC to act in light of the rapid movement of traffic from legacy switched-circuit systems to newer, packet-based systems. This technological revolution is accompanied by the emergence of new telecommunications service providers that may not fit neatly into the definitions for telecommunications operators in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, they say. The LEAs also claim that previous decisions by the commission have led to continuing disputes between the law enforcement community and the telecommunications and information services industries over which services and providers are covered by CALEA. Thus, the LEAs advocate that the FCC formally: Identify the types of services and entities that are subject to CALEA; Identify the services that are considered packet-mode services; and Determine that broadband access services and broadband telephony services are subject to CALEA. Mobile Services The petition urges the FCC to reaffirm its earlier decision that push-to-talk "dispatch" services are subject to CALEA to the extent these services are interconnected. The LEAs claim that these new systems are being implemented without reference to CALEA obligations and therefore the new networks are not accessible to law enforcement wiretaps. Future Services The LEAs' petition advocates that the FCC establish rules that would facilitate the easy and rapid identification of future CALEA-covered services and entities. Such rules, they argue, would include any service that is in competition with a service already complying with CALEA, any entity offering electronic communications (including packet-switching and transmission) to the public for a fee, and any packet-based technology or service presently covered by CALEA, but offered over a new communications technology. Moreover, the LEAs propose that the FCC establish a procedure permitting any provider that is uncertain whether its new technology is subject to CALEA to seek clarification immediately from the FCC before implementing the service. Ending 'Automatic' Extensions The petition states that because industry standards-setting bodies have argued with the LEAs regarding the applicability of CALEA to packet-based technologies, few standards have been published and those that have are deficient. This lack of standards has provided an easy excuse for manufacturers to postpone the production of equipment and carriers to seek extensions of CALEA implementation deadlines, even though, the LEAs argue, carriers are obliged to meet the deadlines with either standardized or non-standardized solutions. The LEAs are asking the FCC to: Set implementation deadlines for CALEA compliance and require benchmark filings by operators to keep the FCC informed as to their progress; Require operators to state what type of interception technologies they intend to implement on their packet-based networks; Set short, closely monitored extensions of time; and Establish procedures for enforcement actions if operators fail to meet CALEA implementation deadlines. Customers To Bear The Costs The LEAs want the FCC to establish rules (1) confirming that carriers bear the sole financial responsibility for complying with CALEA and adapting post-1995 equipment, facilities and services; (2) permitting carriers to pass the costs of the capital improvements required to make networks CALEA-compliant onto their customers; and (3) requiring law enforcement organizations only to pay for the cost of implementing specific, duly authorized wiretaps, not the capital costs incurred to make such wiretaps possible. The FCC, which has been anticipating the LEAs' petition, has already put the matter on public notice. The commission is asking all interested parties to file comments by April 12and reply comments by April 27. Filing of the petition by the LEAs came close on the heels of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by the FCC regarding the proper regulatory treatment of VoIP and other packet-enabled communications systems. The NPRM referred to the importance of support for law enforcement agencies by the communications industry and the FCC's plan to open a separate rulemaking proceeding that would run in tandem with the NPRM. In placing the LEAs' petition on public notice, the FCC reiterated that it would work closely with the LEAs to make certain that their requirement for support of lawfully authorized wiretaps are met. Against the backdrop of the recent Madrid train bombings, coupled with the intense scrutiny that national security and terrorism-related issues are already receiving in the presidential election campaign, the FCC can be expected to respond to the LEAs' petition as quickly as possible, the Coudert experts say. However, the issues raised by the LEAs will be difficult to resolve both legally and in practical terms, given the architecture of modern telecommunications networks, they add. www.telecomweb.com -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)dieconsulting.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass 02493

1 0

Re: voting
by Major Variola (ret) 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

At 11:16 PM 4/8/04 +0200, privacy.at Anonymous Remailer wrote: >In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties >running. The casual reference above to representatives "on each >side" betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide >representatives as easily as the Republicans and Democrats. We already >know that the major parties fight to keep third party candidates off >the ballots. Can we expect them to be vigilant in making sure that >Libertarian and Green votes are counted? Your points about the weaknesses of adversarial observers are stimulating, valid points, but the Reps and Dems *can* count on those votes *not* being moved into their de facto adversary's (Dems, Reps, respectively) bin. And in practice the fringe votes usually don't matter. (I vote Lib..) Its not uncommon for elections to be upheld *even when votes are known lost* if the margins are sufficient. (It happened in California last election, human error plus tech.) Ultimately the adversarial parties are the ones who have to check the whole process, including any tech that gets used. And that process is open to the Libs, etc. As to your other point, the clever protocols, Perry and other KISS advocates have a very strong (albeit social) point. Joe Sixpack can understand *and test* levers or Hollerith cards or their optical counterparts. Good luck getting him to understand number theory. It would be better in many estimations to have even coercible voting than to have "Trust Me" apply to electing a government. (Not that the govt will avoid using that phrase once elected :-)

1 0

Re: voting
by privacy.at Anonymous Remailer 08 Apr '04

08 Apr '04

Perry Metzger writes, on his cryptography list: > By the way, I should mention that an important part of such a system > is the principle that representatives from the candidates on each side > get to oversee the entire process, assuring that the ballot boxes > start empty and stay untampered with all day, and that no one tampers > with the ballots as they're read. The inspectors also serve to assure > that the clerks are properly checking who can and can't vote, and can > do things like hand-recording the final counts from the readers, > providing a check against the totals reported centrally. > > The adversarial method does wonders for assuring that tampering is > difficult at all stages of a voting system. On the contrary, the adversarial method is an extremely *weak* source of security in a voting system. In the first place, it fails for primary elections where there are multiple candidates, all of one party, running for a position. It's not unusual to have a dozen candidates or even more in some rare cases (the California gubernatorial election, while not a primary, had hundreds of candidates running for one seat). It is impractical for each candidate to supply an army of representatives to supervise the voting process, nor can each polling place accommodate the number of people required. In the second place, it fails for elections with more than two parties running. The casual reference above to representatives "on each side" betrays this error. Poorly funded third parties cannot provide representatives as easily as the Republicans and Democrats. We already know that the major parties fight to keep third party candidates off the ballots. Can we expect them to be vigilant in making sure that Libertarian and Green votes are counted? In the third place, tampering has to be protected against in each and every voting precinct. Any voting station where the voting observers for one party are lax or incompetent could be identified in advance and targeted for fraud. Given that these observers are often elderly and have limited faculties, such frauds are all too easy to accomplish. It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud, error and incompetence is overwhelming. Cryptographic voting protocols have been in development for 20 years, and there are dozens of proposals in the literature with various characteristics in terms of scalability, security and privacy. The votehere.net scheme uses advanced cryptographic techniques including zero knowledge proofs and verifiable remixing, the same method that might be used in next generation anonymous remailers. Given that so many jurisdictions are moving towards electronic voting machines, this is a perfect opportunity to introduce mathematical protections instead of relying so heavily on human beings. I would encourage observers on these lists to familiarize themselves with the cryptographic literature and the heavily technical protocol details at http://www.votehere.com/documents.html before passing judgement on these technologies.

1 0