February 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

[IP] AAMVA National ID Forum scheduled for Feb 26-29 in Houston [priv] (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 05 Feb '04

05 Feb '04

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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MetaCarta
by Eugen Leitl 04 Feb '04

04 Feb '04

ip2location (which is surprisingly accurate) on steroids. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3430987.stm Spooks turn to hi-tech geography By Alfred Hermida BBC News Online technology editor Imagine being able to pinpoint someone's location anywhere in the world simply by typing a few keywords on your PC. That is what software partly funded by the US military is trying to do. The MetaCarta program works by analysing thousands of documents and cross-checking the results with a massive geographical database. So far it has largely been used by US intelligence agencies to analyse the huge amount of information collected as part of the war on terror. "The government and international security agencies have a desire to find, track and sometimes arrest people," said Randy Ridley, MetaCarta's Vice President of Sales. "Our system can be used to find them across the globe." "Perhaps it could be used to find Osama Bin Laden by checking out various aspects of Afghanistan and other parts of the world where we think he might be and see if there is a lot of data that supports a potential presence," he told BBC News Online. Patterns of activity The company behind the software was founded in 1999 by researchers from the renowned Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It received funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the investment arm of the CIA to develop its MetaCarta Geographic Text Search program. In three to four years we expect this software to be ubiquitous, something that everybody has to use to do their work Randy Ridley, MetaCarta The software automatically extracts geographic references from text documents such as e-mails or webpages. Millions of documents can be searched using keywords, place names or a time reference. Search results appear as points on a map instead of as a list of documents. The company says this information can be used, for example, to track patterns of criminal activity and identify spots of intensity. The software relies on the reliability of the documents searched. But the program tries to take account of some of these factors by making sure it has found the right location. This can be particularly tricky in the Middle East, where many place names are the same as a person's name. To counter this, the MetaCarta software uses an AI process to make sense of the geographical information, rating the results on a probability factor. 'Ubiquitous' software The company sees its product as giving the intelligence community an edge in providing timely and reliable analysis of mountains of data. "Government agencies have information archived, streaming in," said Mr Ridley. "We estimate that there is roughly 1,000 to one or 10,000 to one productivity advantage over a human doing it manually, depending on the process." "In three to four years we expect this software to be ubiquitous," he added, "something that everybody has to use to do their work." Since September 11, US security agencies have increasingly turned to technology to help them process website postings, internet chat and e-mail traffic. MetaCarta was exhibiting its technology at the recent Government Convention on Emerging Technologies in Las Vegas, which showcases hi-tech products developed for use in the fight against terror. Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/technology/3430987.stm Published: 2004/01/30 09:04:35 GMT -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Indian Govt bans pre-paid cell because of "separatists"
by Bill Stewart 04 Feb '04

04 Feb '04

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3448581.stm The Indian government has banned the sale of pre-paid cash cards for cell phones in the northeastern states of Assam and Meghalaya, allegedly because separatists have bought lots of them for hard-to-trace communications. Reliance Telephone, who runs cell service in those areas, didn't feel they had a choice about complying. (If it were VSNL, the former telecom monopoly, that'd be no surprise, but Reliance is a big competitor.) Consumer groups are extremely upset and vocal (at least until their current phone cards run out, at which point they'll become much quieter...) We'll see how long Bogus Homeland Security can override consumers and smugglers.-- Bill Stewart bill.stewart(a)pobox.com

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[IP] Are terrorists using encryption to cloak their secrets? (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 04 Feb '04

04 Feb '04

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli
by Tyler Durden 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

"Or would you instead, simply just stick a Carnivore machine at one hop above each CDR node that you're interested in, and gather the information you wanted with nearly zero risk of tipping your hand? Or even simpler than that, get a hotmail or yahoomail account and just subscribe. Which of the above scenarios makes the most sense in terms of Occam's?" While you make some good points, you've way overstated both sides of your argument. But this statement..."simply stick a Carnivore machine at one hop above each CDR node"... Isn't that almost like saying "simply splice into the undersea cable"? Of course, if we're talking about hunting down Osama bin Laden a TLA (or whoever) would probably do that. But in terms of merely rounding up the names of potential trouble makers (particularly when they don't want anyone to know that they're doing this) it seems to be an awfully easy thing to do. As for the fake virus part, all they need to do is go to some year-old virus list, select a virus, and send one directly through a non-de-mimed list server, and then watch what comes out. Seems a lot cheaper and easier. But this misses the point: Even IF this would be "stupid", it would be stupider still to be aware that this is possible, and then not implement a fix (if a cheap fix is available). De-miming is now obvious. In other words, the idea is not to compare dick sizes but to actually force them to spend huge amounts of money on trivial tasks, by raising aware of and plugging any holes that become evident. That assymetry is exactly what crypto is, in a nutshell. -TD >From: sunder <sunder(a)sunder.net> >To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com> >CC: petard(a)freeshell.org, cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli >Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 13:28:47 -0500 > >Tyler Durden wrote: > >>And in case it's not clear, I'm suggesting that it may be useful for them >>to deliberately create a "fake" virus that is easily detectable, and so >>cull the bounce messages. > >Right, why should they do something passive that doesn't tip their hand and >allows them to collect the information they need, when instead they can do >something active and stupid that could possibly give away their position. > >Think about it. In fact, apply Occam's Razor to this, in fine, thin >slices: > >If you were a TLA and you'd want to send a "fake" virus, it would need to >be something that would trip every anti-virus software that anyone could >possibly run, but yet, not be a virus, and you'd need to do so without >giving away your IP address - while making it look like it came from lots >of sources. If you'd only use a single IP address, the guy that runs the >node would likely block you as a virus source. > >Then, on top of it, you'd have to *HOPE* that none of your targets saw the >real version of the virus, and then bothered to compare the two, or worse >yet, dissect the decoy you've sent, and figure out that it isn't real. > > >How's would you do this and have it be successful? Unless, of course, you >wish to claim that the TLA's wrote the anti-SCO viruses? In which case, >there's a lovely bridge between Brooklyn and Manhattan that I would gladly >sell you... Real cheap... it's a bit old, but it's in decent shape... No? > How about some nice foil hats? Real cheap... For you, only $100 each >(plus tax of course)... guaranteed to be made of 100% aluminum foil. > > >Or would you instead, simply just stick a Carnivore machine at one hop >above each CDR node that you're interested in, and gather the information >you wanted with nearly zero risk of tipping your hand? Or even simpler >than that, get a hotmail or yahoomail account and just subscribe. Which of >the above scenarios makes the most sense in terms of Occam's? > > >P.S.: I stand by my original statement: the collective IQ of the posters on >list is dropping. _________________________________________________________________ Check out the new MSN 9 Dial-up fast & reliable Internet access with prime features! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=dialup/home&ST=1

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[IP] Bruce Schneier on ID cards and the "illusion of security" (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli
by Tyler Durden 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

Sunder wrote... "That's got to be the dumbest thing I've ever heard of. No TLA would do that. They'd simply watch upstream of each node. They can wait for outgoing messages and collect email addresses to their heart's content...." I'm not sure I understand this. On Cypherpunks we always seem to assume that the TLAs have infinite amounts of cash, and that's just not the case. If they can spend a couple of bucks to flush out a list rather than mount some major operation that's what they'll do, if for no other reason than to keep their exposure down. And if they're going to Gitmo me one day, I sure as hell want them to spend a few hundred thou rather than a few hundred, and hopefully leave a paper trail so I can sue the crap out of 'em if somehow I survive. And in case it's not clear, I'm suggesting that it may be useful for them to deliberately create a "fake" virus that is easily detectable, and so cull the bounce messages. -TD >From: sunder <sunder(a)sunder.net> >To: petard <petard(a)freeshell.org> >CC: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com>, cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli >Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2004 18:22:01 -0500 > >petard wrote: > > >>Along these same lines, mightn't a TLA or similar induce someone >>downstream of them to spam the cypherpunks remailers and collect the >>identities of those who complain? > >That's got to be the dumbest thing I've ever heard of. No TLA would do >that. They'd simply watch upstream of each node. They can wait for >outgoing messages and collect email addresses to their heart's content.... > >By definition, if you've subscribed to cypherpunks, you can expect all of >the TLA's to at least know your email address. > >If anything, you can blame the slew of anti-SCO and non-SCO related virii >for the lack of messages... If you were going to pull some half assed >conspiracy theory, you might have come up with something more original - >like "Maybe the TLA's are sending the virii so as to choke off the >lists..." But that's dumb as well for far more obvious reasons: > >See, the cypherpunks is a gold mine for the TLA's. All they have to do is >subscribe, listen, and wait. At some point, some poor dumb nutcase like >Jim Bell will do something silly. The polyester suited knights will hit >the champale and have a nice party on his ass... > >Man, the collective IQ's of the posters on this list has certainly been >dropping lower and lower... sheesh! _________________________________________________________________ High-speed usersbe more efficient online with the new MSN Premium Internet Software. http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-us&page=byoa/prem&ST=1

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The Farewell Dossier
by R. A. Hettinga 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/opinion/02SAFI.html?pagewanted=print&posi…> The New York Times February 2, 2004 OP-ED COLUMNIST The Farewell Dossier By WILLIAM SAFIRE ASHINGTON Intelligence shortcomings, as we see, have a thousand fathers; secret intelligence triumphs are orphans. Here is the unremarked story of "the Farewell dossier": how a C.I.A. campaign of computer sabotage resulting in a huge explosion in Siberia - all engineered by a mild-mannered economist named Gus Weiss - helped us win the cold war. Weiss worked down the hall from me in the Nixon administration. In early 1974, he wrote a report on Soviet advances in technology through purchasing and copying that led the beleaguered president - ditente notwithstanding - to place restrictions on the export of computers and software to the U.S.S.R. Seven years later, we learned how the K.G.B. responded. I was writing a series of hard-line columns denouncing the financial backing being given Moscow by Germany and Britain for a major natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe. That project would give control of European energy supplies to the Communists, as well as generate $8 billion a year to support Soviet computer and satellite research. President Frangois Mitterrand of France also opposed the gas pipeline. He took President Reagan aside at a conference in Ottawa on July 19, 1981, to reveal that France had recruited a key K.G.B. officer in Moscow Center. Col. Vladimir Vetrov provided what French intelligence called the Farewell dossier. It contained documents from the K.G.B. Technology Directorate showing how the Soviets were systematically stealing - or secretly buying through third parties - the radar, machine tools and semiconductors to keep the Russians nearly competitive with U.S. military-industrial strength through the 70's. In effect, the U.S. was in an arms race with itself. Reagan passed this on to William J. Casey, his director of central intelligence, now remembered only for the Iran-contra fiasco. Casey called in Weiss, then working with Thomas C. Reed on the staff of the National Security Council. After studying the list of hundreds of Soviet agents and purchasers (including one cosmonaut) assigned to this penetration in the U.S. and Japan, Weiss counseled against deportation. Instead, according to Reed - a former Air Force secretary whose fascinating cold war book, "At the Abyss," will be published by Random House next month - Weiss said: "Why not help the Soviets with their shopping? Now that we know what they want, we can help them get it." The catch: computer chips would be designed to pass Soviet quality tests and then to fail in operation. In our complex disinformation scheme, deliberately flawed designs for stealth technology and space defense sent Russian scientists down paths that wasted time and money. The technology topping the Soviets' wish list was for computer control systems to automate the operation of the new trans-Siberian gas pipeline. When we turned down their overt purchase order, the K.G.B. sent a covert agent into a Canadian company to steal the software; tipped off by Farewell, we added what geeks call a "Trojan Horse" to the pirated product. "The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go haywire," writes Reed, "to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space." Our Norad monitors feared a nuclear detonation, but satellites that would have picked up its electromagnetic pulse were silent. That mystified many in the White House, but "Gus Weiss came down the hall to tell his fellow NSC staffers not to worry. It took him another twenty years to tell me why." Farewell stayed secret because the blast in June 1982, estimated at three kilotons, took place in the Siberian wilderness, with no casualties known. Nor was the red-faced K.G.B. about to complain publicly about being tricked by bogus technology. But all the software it had stolen for years was suddenly suspect, which stopped or delayed the work of thousands of worried Russian technicians and scientists. Vetrov was caught and executed in 1983. A year later, Bill Casey ordered the K.G.B. collection network rolled up, closing the Farewell dossier. Gus Weiss died from a fall a few months ago. Now is a time to remember that sometimes our spooks get it right in a big way. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Cypherpunks response to viral stimuli
by sunder 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

petard wrote: > Along these same lines, mightn't a TLA or similar induce someone > downstream of them to spam the cypherpunks remailers and collect the > identities of those who complain? That's got to be the dumbest thing I've ever heard of. No TLA would do that. They'd simply watch upstream of each node. They can wait for outgoing messages and collect email addresses to their heart's content.... By definition, if you've subscribed to cypherpunks, you can expect all of the TLA's to at least know your email address. If anything, you can blame the slew of anti-SCO and non-SCO related virii for the lack of messages... If you were going to pull some half assed conspiracy theory, you might have come up with something more original - like "Maybe the TLA's are sending the virii so as to choke off the lists..." But that's dumb as well for far more obvious reasons: See, the cypherpunks is a gold mine for the TLA's. All they have to do is subscribe, listen, and wait. At some point, some poor dumb nutcase like Jim Bell will do something silly. The polyester suited knights will hit the champale and have a nice party on his ass... Man, the collective IQ's of the posters on this list has certainly been dropping lower and lower... sheesh!

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[IP] Charging For E-Mail (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 03 Feb '04

03 Feb '04

----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber ----- From: Dave Farber Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2004 17:34:41 -0500 To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] Charging For E-Mail X-Mailer: munch X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.2.0 Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net And there are several more good arguments against it as proposed. Dave Delivered-To: dfarber+(a)ux13.sp.cs.cmu.edu Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2004 12:52:49 -0800 (PST) From: Lauren Weinstein Subject: Charging For E-Mail To: dave(a)farber.net Dave, Just a few notes on the issues of "charging" for e-mail... - As you point out, any fee structure is likely to start off low and rise as attempts are made to maximize the profit center on the part of ISPs. - Once ISP e-mail charging schemes are in place, governments will likely express interest in potential revenue to be derived from such sources. The long-debunked rumor of the "e-mail tax" might well become a reality. It has already been suggested in some quarters that the U.S. Postal Service's new "Electronic Postmark" EPM/Authentidate system could ultimately be a model in this regard. - It appears likely that a primary initial use for e-mail charging schemes would be to allow certain classes of bulk mailers to bypass ISP anti-spam filters to directly reach the captive audience of those ISPs. If you've got the bucks, you're classified as a "good" spammer and your wonderful offers will reach all those "grateful" e-mail recipients without interference from those pesky filter rules. - E-mail charging schemes can be used as an excuse to further bind customers tightly to their current ISPs. The "SPF" e-mail domain control system already has this effect by discouraging the legitimate use of alternate domains by users in many cases. - Widely-deployed e-mail charging would likely require ISPs to attempt extremely tight, centralized control over e-mail routing to try prevent "unauthorized" (and uncharged) e-mail flows by users operating their own MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents), non-escrowed e-mail encryption systems, and/or other "unapproved" technologies. Such centralized and enforced ISP control over e-mail would obviously have drastic potential negative privacy and security impacts. - The concept of widespread, enforced e-mail charging neglects to acknowledge the reality that e-mail is fundamentally an end-to-end Internet application that can be indistinguishable at the data level from most other applications. The backlash to e-mail charging schemes would likely give rise to vast distributed "underground" e-mail transport systems, encrypted and even designed to masquerade as other types of data. Even draconian attempts by ISPs to limit their subscribers' access to alternate TCP/IP ports would be unlikely to stem the flood of such alternate e-mail transport environments, that could even emulate standard Web (HTTP) traffic. Illicit music file trading would likely look like a drop in the bucket by comparison. Bottom line: Trying to charge broadly for e-mail could well provide a textbook definition of "Pandora's Box" brought to life. --Lauren-- Lauren Weinstein lauren(a)pfir.org or lauren(a)vortex.com or lauren(a)privacyforum.org Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 http://www.pfir.org/lauren Co-Founder, PFIR - People For Internet Responsibility - http://www.pfir.org Co-Founder, Fact Squad - http://www.factsquad.org Co-Founder, URIICA - Union for Representative International Internet Cooperation and Analysis - http://www.uriica.org Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com Member, ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl leitl ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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