October 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: Chance plays a key role in start-up company's success
by Tyler Durden 11 Oct '04

11 Oct '04

Well, as a research toy QC seems gee-wiz super cool. I'm still not super-impressed by the current set of applications. In particular, consider that random number generator. Although QM does indeed predict that experimental outcomes will be 'random', they are random within the weightings imposed by the measuring apparatus. In a sense, this is the perfect analog to the notion that, "Your crypto algorithm may be unbreakable, but your hard/software ain't." Consider...I set up my random number generator to spit out a 1 every time a photon passes through a half-silvered mirror, and a 0 every time it reflects. Over time the silvering on the mirror is going to degrade, or perhaps it's already not perfect but you need a large number of 'measurements' and/or analysis to begin to see it. In any event, your probabilities are going to shift over time, yielding an imperfect distribution of 0s/1s. Sure, it's still "random", but the probability density function is no longer useful for many applications. Right now I can't see why this would be any more desirable than, for instance, grabbing the outcome of some distinctly nonlinear process, or perhaps many other approaches to RNG. The only thing this does is allow users/buyers to think their system is now free of any deep technical issues that may make classical systems insecure. -TD >From: "R.A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Chance plays a key role in start-up company's success >Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2004 11:09:03 -0400 > ><http://istresults.cordis.lu/popup.cfm?section=news&tpl=article&ID=70263&Aut…> > > IST Results > >Chance plays a key role in start-up company's success > >Using randomly generated numbers to ensure the security of encryption >applications seems counter-intuitive but is a fundamental part of quantum >cryptography. Pioneering the approach is an award-winning Swiss start-up >company, id Quantique, that launched the world's first commercial quantum >random number generator and quantum cryptography system. > > In fact, numerous applications require random numbers. Besides potential >quantum cryptographic applications, such as bank transfers and e-voting, >further examples include scientific calculations and games involving chance >such as national lotteries. Initially though, id Quantique's products >mainly target demand from customers of high security encryption systems >such as financial, government and military institutions. > > id Quantique was founded in October 2001 as a spin-off from the >University >of Geneva by four researchers from the University's Applied Physics >Department - Grigoire Ribordy, Olivier Guinnard, Nicolas Gisin and Hugo >Zbinden. December 2003 marked a milestone in the company's evolution: the >entrepreneurs successfully raised 1 million euros from the Luxemburg-based >i2i venture capital fund in a first round of funding and they concluded a >worldwide exclusivity agreement with the University of Geneva regarding two >important quantum cryptography patents. > > Over a short period of time, the fledgling company and its founders have >won several prestigious prizes. The company was a recipient of the European >Innovation Awards from the Wall Street Journal Europe in 2001; Olivier >Guinnard and Grigoire Ribordy were winners of the de Vigier's prize for >Swiss entrepreneurs in 2002; and this year the company was a winner of the >annual Swiss Technology Award. > > id Quantique supplies three products. Firstly, a physical random number >generator, Quantis, which relies on an elementary quantum optical process - >namely the perfectly random reflection or transmission of a photon, or >light particle, on a semi-transparent mirror - in order to produce binary >random numbers. Next, a quantum key distribution (QKD) system that enables >cryptographic keys, which are required for encrypting and decrypting >information, to be securely transmitted over standard optical fibres >between two parties. Finally, a Single Photon Detection Module (SPDM), id >200, which is a photon counter used in quantum cryptography and other >quantum optical applications. > > In March 2004, id Quantique and the University of Geneva launched the >first ever website offering perfectly random numbers created by the Quantis >generator. Grigoire Ribordy, id Quantique's CEO, remarks, "We launched the >www.randomnumbers.info website to promote our new quantum random number >generator and to provide a service to the scientific community. In the long >term, we would like it to become the reference point for random numbers." > > Despite the demand for perfectly random numbers, their generation remains >a difficult task. Conventional computers use a rule to produce >pseudo-random numbers, which can sometimes introduce unwanted bias. >"Quantum physics is the only physical theory predicting that the outcome of >certain phenomena is random," emphasises Nicolas Gisin, Professor at the >University of Geneva. "It is thus a natural choice to use it to generate >true random numbers." > > id Quantique is a partner in the IST project SECOQC which began in April >2004 under the Sixth Framework Programme. The project is focused on >evaluating quantum cryptography technology as well as developing standard >specifications for secure global digital communication systems. > > Recently, the project consortium performed the world's first ever bank >transfer using quantum cryptography by sending $3000 over a 1.45 km link >between Vienna City Hall and the headquarters of Bank-Austria >Creditanstalt. "The SECOQC project makes it possible for id Quantique's >engineers to interact with some of the best groups worldwide in the field >of quantum cryptography," observes Ribordy. "And because of the >multidisciplinary nature of this project, it is an extremely enriching >platform to exchange ideas and find new ways to solve problems." > > More recently, id Quantique has teamed up with the Deckpoint, a Swiss >Internet Service Provider, to develop and implement the world's first data >archiving network secured using quantum cryptography. The official opening >of the new archiving network took place on 29 September 2004 in the >presence of Carlo Lamprecht, the Minister of Economy, Labour and Foreign >Affairs of the Republic and Canton of Geneva. Data stored on a farm of 30 >servers at Deckpoint Housing Centre, in the middle of Geneva, was backed up >to servers located at the Cern Internet Exchange Point, in the city suburbs >some 10 kms away. "This world premiere is an excellent illustration of the >of the potential of this technology " says Ribordy. "We are convinced that >security has become critical, in particular with the implementation of the >Basel II standards in the banking industry as of 2006," adds Dominique >Perisset, Director of Deckpoint. "The economic world cannot afford anymore >not to have a complete information security strategy." > > Contact: >Grigoire Ribordy >Chief Executive Officer >id Quantique SA >Chemin de la Marbrerie, 3 >CH-1227 Carouge / Geneva >Switzerland >Tel: + 41-22-3018371/2 >Fax: + 41-22-3018379 >Email: gregoire.ribordy(a)idquantique.com > >Sources: Based on information from id Quantique > > > > > > >Information : > >DATE : >11 Oct 2004 > >TECHNOLOGY AREA: > > Trust/security > > >MARKET APPLICATION: > >Electronics/IT manuf > > >USEFUL LINKS: >id Quantique website >SECOQC project >SECOQC factsheet on CORDIS >www.randomnumbers.info website > > > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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Chance plays a key role in start-up company's success
by R.A. Hettinga 11 Oct '04

11 Oct '04

<http://istresults.cordis.lu/popup.cfm?section=news&tpl=article&ID=70263&Aut…> IST Results Chance plays a key role in start-up company's success Using randomly generated numbers to ensure the security of encryption applications seems counter-intuitive but is a fundamental part of quantum cryptography. Pioneering the approach is an award-winning Swiss start-up company, id Quantique, that launched the world's first commercial quantum random number generator and quantum cryptography system. In fact, numerous applications require random numbers. Besides potential quantum cryptographic applications, such as bank transfers and e-voting, further examples include scientific calculations and games involving chance such as national lotteries. Initially though, id Quantique's products mainly target demand from customers of high security encryption systems such as financial, government and military institutions. id Quantique was founded in October 2001 as a spin-off from the University of Geneva by four researchers from the University's Applied Physics Department - Grigoire Ribordy, Olivier Guinnard, Nicolas Gisin and Hugo Zbinden. December 2003 marked a milestone in the company's evolution: the entrepreneurs successfully raised 1 million euros from the Luxemburg-based i2i venture capital fund in a first round of funding and they concluded a worldwide exclusivity agreement with the University of Geneva regarding two important quantum cryptography patents. Over a short period of time, the fledgling company and its founders have won several prestigious prizes. The company was a recipient of the European Innovation Awards from the Wall Street Journal Europe in 2001; Olivier Guinnard and Grigoire Ribordy were winners of the de Vigier's prize for Swiss entrepreneurs in 2002; and this year the company was a winner of the annual Swiss Technology Award. id Quantique supplies three products. Firstly, a physical random number generator, Quantis, which relies on an elementary quantum optical process - namely the perfectly random reflection or transmission of a photon, or light particle, on a semi-transparent mirror - in order to produce binary random numbers. Next, a quantum key distribution (QKD) system that enables cryptographic keys, which are required for encrypting and decrypting information, to be securely transmitted over standard optical fibres between two parties. Finally, a Single Photon Detection Module (SPDM), id 200, which is a photon counter used in quantum cryptography and other quantum optical applications. In March 2004, id Quantique and the University of Geneva launched the first ever website offering perfectly random numbers created by the Quantis generator. Grigoire Ribordy, id Quantique's CEO, remarks, "We launched the www.randomnumbers.info website to promote our new quantum random number generator and to provide a service to the scientific community. In the long term, we would like it to become the reference point for random numbers." Despite the demand for perfectly random numbers, their generation remains a difficult task. Conventional computers use a rule to produce pseudo-random numbers, which can sometimes introduce unwanted bias. "Quantum physics is the only physical theory predicting that the outcome of certain phenomena is random," emphasises Nicolas Gisin, Professor at the University of Geneva. "It is thus a natural choice to use it to generate true random numbers." id Quantique is a partner in the IST project SECOQC which began in April 2004 under the Sixth Framework Programme. The project is focused on evaluating quantum cryptography technology as well as developing standard specifications for secure global digital communication systems. Recently, the project consortium performed the world's first ever bank transfer using quantum cryptography by sending $3000 over a 1.45 km link between Vienna City Hall and the headquarters of Bank-Austria Creditanstalt. "The SECOQC project makes it possible for id Quantique's engineers to interact with some of the best groups worldwide in the field of quantum cryptography," observes Ribordy. "And because of the multidisciplinary nature of this project, it is an extremely enriching platform to exchange ideas and find new ways to solve problems." More recently, id Quantique has teamed up with the Deckpoint, a Swiss Internet Service Provider, to develop and implement the world's first data archiving network secured using quantum cryptography. The official opening of the new archiving network took place on 29 September 2004 in the presence of Carlo Lamprecht, the Minister of Economy, Labour and Foreign Affairs of the Republic and Canton of Geneva. Data stored on a farm of 30 servers at Deckpoint Housing Centre, in the middle of Geneva, was backed up to servers located at the Cern Internet Exchange Point, in the city suburbs some 10 kms away. "This world premiere is an excellent illustration of the of the potential of this technology " says Ribordy. "We are convinced that security has become critical, in particular with the implementation of the Basel II standards in the banking industry as of 2006," adds Dominique Perisset, Director of Deckpoint. "The economic world cannot afford anymore not to have a complete information security strategy." Contact: Grigoire Ribordy Chief Executive Officer id Quantique SA Chemin de la Marbrerie, 3 CH-1227 Carouge / Geneva Switzerland Tel: + 41-22-3018371/2 Fax: + 41-22-3018379 Email: gregoire.ribordy(a)idquantique.com Sources: Based on information from id Quantique Information : DATE : 11 Oct 2004 TECHNOLOGY AREA: Trust/security MARKET APPLICATION: Electronics/IT manuf USEFUL LINKS: id Quantique website SECOQC project SECOQC factsheet on CORDIS www.randomnumbers.info website -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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RE: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real money)
by Tyler Durden 11 Oct '04

11 Oct '04

OK, I'll bite. Or rather... Well, your initial postulate was stated in such a way as to be fairly unrefutable, the key word being "float". Only companies, etc...provide that by requiring that the transacted funds flow through their coffers for a moment, where they extract their discount revenue. At this stage of the game, nobody when their head screwed on tight would argue that Internet-based businesses don't represent an increase in Risk (whether that increase will eventually make float-based business models impossible is an entirely different matter). Interestingly, the Visa organization recently launched a Purchasing Card platform which merely facilitates EFTs (a step towards your oft-mentioned "Geodesic Society"?)...there's a fixed and small discount revenue touch that's independent of the size of the transaction (and they can afford to do this because there's no float, ergo no risk). In this case, Visa is providing "value added" information systems for the transactions, but in a sense they're allowing their member banks to more or less completely step out of the transaction if they wish. Now of course, Paragraph 2 is only related to Paragraph 1 by the fact that I wrote both of them in one post. To my knowledge, Visa's new PCard platform has nothing to do with Internet-based risk PER SE, but in the long run I'll doubt we'll lable this a coincidence. -TD >From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> >To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real >money) >Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2004 19:14:08 -0400 > >Okay. So I'm coming to the conclusion that book-entry settlement, with its >absolute requirement for both "identity" and float between transactions, is >becoming more and more *un*-safe to use as internet ubiquity increases. > >Anyone want to pick up the other side of this and tell me why not? > >No bugbears or horsemen need apply... > >Cheers, >RAH >------- > > ><http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6175738/print/1/displaymode/1098/> > MSNBC.com > >Fake companies, real money >Elaborate con wrings cash out of stolen credit cards >By Bob Sullivan >Technology correspondent >MSNBC >Updated: 7:15 p.m. ET Oct. 7, 2004 > > >T-Data, a small New-York based software company, doesn't take credit cards >-- never has in its 20-year history. But a few weeks ago, owner Jeff Duhl >found himself looking over $15,000 worth of credit card charges seemingly >accepted by his store. > >A quick investigation revealed most of the charges had been made using >stolen credit cards. Slowly, he caught on: Someone had stolen a batch of >credit card accounts, then stolen his company's name, set up an imposter >version of T-Data, and rung up thousands of dollars worth of fake >purchases. The "profits" were then desposited into checking accounts >controlled by the imposters. > >"It is ingenious," said Dan Clements, who operates merchant advocacy site >CardCops.com. > >Duhl wasn't the only victim of this new brand of corporate identity theft: >At least 50 other firms apparently also had their identities stolen in the >scheme. For credit card thieves doing their best to wring money out of a >stash of stolen accounts, it seems like the perfect scam. > >How to profit from stolen credit cards >While millions of credit card account numbers are stolen every year -- 60 >million last year, and perhaps 120 million this year, according to one >estimate -- turning them into cash can be tricky. Merchandise ordered with >the card must be delivered somewhere, which is risky. Massive cash >withdrawals are quickly spotted by credit card associations. > > The scheme Duhl's firm was caught up in is a heady, complex alternative: > >First, credit card thieves find a legitimate company unlikely to already be >accepting credit card transactions. They then impersonate that company and >set up accounts with merchant processing providers, whose role it is to >transfer funds between credit card companies and merchants. > > Using stolen credit cards, the thieves then start sending small payments, >usually $498 or $598 at a time, to the fraudulent merchant accounts. The >credit card companies send funds to the processors and they in turn send >the funds off to bank accounts controlled by the criminals. > >"They are flying under the radar on each transaction unless someone does a >whole lot of work," Duhl said. > > A key part of the scheme: The thieves went to the trouble of registering >the domain www.T-datasoftware.com, then set up a fake Web site. The site >looked like a believable business to the merchant processing providers, who >gave the thieves their accounts. > >Duhl's imposters were able to set up accounts at seven different payment >processing firms. When Duhl investigated, he discovered some 50 other Web >sites -- most mere imitations of one another -- all sitting on the same >computer server. > >"They got away with $15,000 (in charges) at my company," Duhl said. >"Multiply that by the number of sites, the number of companies, these folks >could be getting away with millions of dollars," he said. > >It's not clear how much money the criminals really did get away with in the >end. Many of the processing firms interviewed for this article claimed they >caught on to the fraud after the transactions had cleared, but before the >suspects had withdrawn the money from various checking accounts around the >country. One did concede, however, that the scheme has real potential. > >'Hundreds of thousands' over a weekend >"If you don't catch it you could lose hundreds of thousands of dollars over >a weekend," said David Steinberg, chief credit officer at Merchant E >Solutions, one of the processing firms used by the thieves. > > Steinberg said his company had never suffered such a loss, but that the >industry is bustling with fraud attempts. Some 5 to 10 percent of all >applications his firm receives are turned away as potentially fraudulent, >he said. > >Phyllis McNeill, a spokeswoman for Global Payments, another processing firm >hit in the scam, confirmed a fake account had been set up in T-Data's name >with her company. She said the account was actually set up through a >reseller, and was shut down after eight transactions had been performed. > >Randy Lobban, director of risk management at North American Bancard, said >the con artists were able to open up an account at his firm and pass eight >charges through the system, but the funds were never released. > >"They never got any money," Lobban said. He alerted the U.S. Postal >Inspection Service to the incident. > >Representatives at First Data and Wells Fargo also confirmed that fake >accounts had been opened at their firms. > > An official at Beacon Bank in Minnesota, where one of the checking >accounts used to receive the stolen funds had been set up, confirmed that >he had discussed the situation with Duhl, but would not provide further >comment. > > Corporate ID theft >Whoever impersonated T-Data were clever enough to throw a few monkey >wrenches in the path of anyone trying to detect them. > >When applying for the compulsory credit check needed to obtain the fake >merchant account, for example, the thieves didn't use T-Data's tax ID >number. Instead, they used the name and credit profile of a man unconnected >with the company. Steven Wiencek, who lives on Long Island near the >company, didn't even know his credit had been checked until contacted by >MSNBC.com for this story. > >But the application, which listed Wiencek as company president, gives his >Social Security number and driver's license number, suggesting the people >behind this scheme have access to a wide swath of stolen credit cards and >stolen identities. > >Another attempt at misdirection was foiled by an alert mail carrier. > > The application for the merchant account used a slight variation of >Duhl's >address -- apparently an attempt to ensure that mail to Duhl would be lost. >But a knowledgeable local postal worker recognized the company name anyway, >leading Duhl to discover the dupe. > >"Without that, I may not have found out about this for a long time," he >said. > > The thieves were also persistent. Using one stolen credit card, they >attempted to steal $2,500 through five separate faked merchant accounts, >according to an affidavit of credit card fraud supplied by Duhl. > > Another corporate ID victim, John Bartholomew of Abcom Services, said he >was lucky, because Duhl contacted him just as the scam began. > > "We are a management company in long-term health care. We would have no >reason to use credit cards," he said. The firm had been in business for 21 >years, and never accepted a single charge -- until the criminals stole his >company's name, Bartholomew said. > >True to form, the criminals hijacked his brand name and set up merchants >accounts using his company's name and a similar -- but slightly altered -- >street address. > > The good news is, Bartholomew was able to warn the merchant account >providers soon enough that only about $4,000 in charges were run through >his company's name. The bad news is, some of the providers are still trying >to make him pay the bill for the charges. He figures he's spent about >$5,000 in legal fees trying to clean up the mess. > >Who are they working with? >Rob Douglas, a consultant who operates PrivacyToday.com, blames the >merchant account providers for never checking to see if the name on the >account application actually represented a real person who worked at the >firm. > >"You have to ask what the companies that set up the merchant accounts are >doing?" he said. "Who has the responsibility to do due diligence that they >are in fact working with who they think they are working with when they >open an account?" > >But several of the merchant service providers pointed out the difficulty of >stopping all fraudulent applications in a world where identities are so >easily stolen. > > "For all of us, it's a tough business," Steinberg, of Merchant E >Services, >said. "It's a large, large problem." > >Duhl himself blames the banks where the money was to eventually wind up -- >wondering how the thieves were able to set up accounts in the post-Patriot >Act era. Apparently worried as much about security implications as his >personal loss, Duhl contacted the FBI, the Secret Service and the U.S. >Postal Inspector's Office. None of the agents he spoke to returned phone >calls placed by MSNBC.com. > > He says he is frustrated that none of the agencies seem to have taken any >interest in the incident -- particularly because at least one phone call >was placed to Pakistan using the cell phone purchased in his company's >name, and one of the bank accounts used to funnel money was established by >suspects who presented Russian passports as identification, he says his own >research revealed. > > "No one in the government seems like they are going to get interested in >establishing a case," Duhl said. > > Douglas, who consults with firms trying to deal with the new trend of >corporate identity theft, says there's little small companies like Duhl's >can do to prevent this kind of incident. But one piece of practical advice >he offers larger firms: search the Web once a week for evidence of >impersonation. > >"As strange as it sounds, companies need to have one or more people >assigned to surf the Web and see if there are mirror sites out there, just >like we tell parents to surf for their child's name," he said. > >Bob Sullivan is the author of Your Evil Twin: Behind the Identity Theft >Epidemic > >-- >----------------- >R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> >The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> >44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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Money Laundering for the Nazis by President Bush's family
by Nomen Nescio 11 Oct '04

11 Oct '04

The subject says it all. Read more here: http://www.debatecomics.org/BushFamilyFortune/ We must retire this criminal from office now! Link to the full 89 MB pdf below http://www.debatecomics.org/assets/Sources/US_Fascism/ A-2%20FascistFriendly%20Power%20Brokers/ Roaming%20Ghost%20Case/Whole/full.pdf (Concat above rows to one URL)

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China Rewards Porn Snitches (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
by Eugen Leitl 11 Oct '04

11 Oct '04

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews(a)hyperreal.org -----

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E-Commerce Sites Make Great Laboratory For Today's Economists
by R.A. Hettinga 10 Oct '04

10 Oct '04

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109744444984841427,00.html> The Wall Street Journal October 11, 2004 PORTALS By LEE GOMES E-Commerce Sites Make Great Laboratory For Today's Economists October 11, 2004 Calling them eBayologists doesn't sound quite right; Amazonists is even worse. There may not be a good name for them, but for a growing number of academics trying to test ivory-tower theories in the real world, the big online commerce sites are the new place to be. Especially for economists, Web sites and their untold millions of interactions are perfect real-world laboratories. For instance, a fast-growing specialty in economics is "auction theory," which, as the name suggests, tries to tease out the basic patterns by which auctions operate. Before eBay, an aspiring auction theorist didn't have much data to work with. As a result, many of them spent time sifting and resifting through a limited set of data on government wireless spectrum auctions of the 1990s for their auction insights. But now, with eBay and the rest, there are more data than even the most dedicated graduate student would know what to do with. EBay itself even helps with this, supplying anonymized data to university researchers under special arrangement. What exactly are economists learning? Frankly, the conclusions aren't the sort that would cause a layperson's jaw to drop; many are the sort that only a microeconomist would love. For instance, one of the cardinal rules of eBay involves the importance of a seller's reputation, or the rating given the person by those who have done business with him or her. Luis M.B. Cabral, an economist at NYU's business school, says that for an economist, it wouldn't have been immediately obvious that the eBay ranking would be important -- partly because reputations on eBay, unlike those in the real world, are essentially anonymous. But not only is reputation important, Prof. Cabral found, but it affects the prices sellers can charge and the amount of merchandise they can move. In one study, he looked at what happens to sellers with perfect ratings who receive their first piece of negative feedback. Not only did they begin selling less, but they entered a kind of downward spiral, with fewer sales and a declining reputation. "It really makes a huge difference," Prof. Cabral says. Another academic foray into the online world ended up confirming the power of brand names. Conventional wisdom among most American economists would be that prices on Web sites should be essentially the same. After all, Internet users all have "perfect information" about what everyone is charging, and they face few, if any, "switching costs" in moving from one supplier to the next. But Judith A. Chevalier, an economist at the University of Chicago business school, looked at price differences between Amazon and Barnes & Noble and found that Amazon was consistently able to charge more. And in a separate study, she found that Amazon's customer-written reviews of books do indeed affect sales, with negative reviews having more of an impact than positive ones. Prof. Chevalier theorized that prospective shoppers may suspect positive reviews are some sort of shill for the author but don't bring comparable skepticism to negative notices. Even with all the interest by researchers, some of the questions posed by the e-commerce sites remain unresolved. One of them involves the usefulness of "sniping," which occurs when a prospective buyer in an auction doesn't get involved in the bidding until the last minute, and then makes an offer the others don't have time to top. The practice works only on eBay-style auctions, which have fixed time limits. There are many eBay users who swear by the practice. In fact, there are even a number of services that will snipe for you automatically. David Reiley, a University of Arizona economist, says that for certain kinds of auction items -- including standardized electronic gear with many different bidders -- studies suggest that snipers don't do better than anyone else, either in their success rate in winning their items or in the price they end up paying. But he says there may be other kinds of merchandise, such as those with fewer bidders or prices that aren't easy to determine, where buyers should, in fact, snipe. Even that could change, he notes, if everyone sniped. It is currently unclear how many people on eBay engage in the practice. Not all of the work being done online by economists is theoretical, and savvy eBay traders would be wise to acquaint themselves with some of the literature. Lucking Reiley, for instance, along with a colleague, Rama Katkar, wanted to find out if it was better to publicly set a minimum bid for an item or to use an eBay feature called a "secret reserve," which rejects bids below a certain dollar amount without telling bidders what the minimum is. By comparing 50 pairs of identical items, one with the secret minimum and one without, the economists concluded that the secret minimum dissuaded buyers from participating in the auction, thus driving down prices. The study was done using Pokimon cards, but the finding, presumably, could hold true for anything: Beanie Babies, lawn gnomes, you name it. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [Full-Disclosure] WWII cryptography: the dark side (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 10 Oct '04

10 Oct '04

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2004 21:57:15 +0200 From: Christian Leber <christian(a)leber.de> To: full-disclosure(a)lists.netsys.com Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] WWII cryptography: the dark side On Sun, Oct 10, 2004 at 07:52:20PM +0200, Feher Tamas wrote: >(in german only or bablefish, sorry): I bablefished it and corrected the worst errors: ------- Secret code TELWA cracked: Nazi decoder developed computer forerunner 23. September 2004 Hanover - the decoder Reinhold Weber decoded the US secret code TELWA in the Second World War and built a decoding machine to crack M-209-Nachrichten. This was now revealed by Klaus Schmeh, author at the InterNet magazine Telepolis That German decoding specialists decoded in the the Second World War secret code of the allied was even not well known by experts until a few years ago. According to report of the former president of the Federal Office for security in the information technology (BSI), Dr Otto Leiberichm the Germans in the Second World War cracked the US coding machine M-209. These remarks served the Telepolis author Klaus Schmeh as important source of information, when he worked on his book 'Die Welt der geheimen Zeichen - Die faszinierende Geschichte der Verschl|sselung' ('The world of the secret signs - the fascinating history of encryption). When he published excerpts of this book with Telepolis first, this led to a small sensation: A 84 year old man from Frankfurt contacted him and reported that he was in WWII involved in the crackong of the mentioned US coding machine M-209. The 1920 in Austria born Reinold Weber, which had spent six years of his childhood in the USA, was drawn in 1941 to the armed forces. Due to excellent knowledge of the english language he was first trained as a message interpreter and later as decoder. Inserted in the decoding unit FNAST5, he succeeded to decode the TELWA messages from US radiograms and decipher also machine keys. In this time Weber and his colleagues cracked the codes of the US coding machine M-209 and intercepted explosive information. Thus there were again and again hints referring to forthcoming bombardments of German cities, which were announced usually about six to eight weeks before execution in radiograms. What counter measures the German military did with the help of these information, weber however never experienced. In April 1944 Weber had the idea to build a machine which should automate a part of the laborious deciphering computations. The company Hollerith, late IBM, was positive in an evaluation, explained however the building of such a machine takes about two years. Thus Weber with a colleague made itself alone to the work. They created a machine, which consisted of two boxes: one in the size of a desk, which contained the relays and the four turning rollers, as well as a further box with 80 x 80 x 40 cm edge length. Latter box contained 26 times 16 bulb sockets, with which by bulbs the letters of the relative attitude could be copied. Thus Webers and his colleague wrote an interesting piece of technology history, because their construction had already many thing in common with a computer with their binary logic. The computer was still not at all invented at this time, if one refrains from the British machine Colossus likewise developed for decoding, which developed about at the same time. In the middle of September 1944 Weber could prove the strength of its computer forerunner for the first time: During a night duty he determined with his machine - without the support of his colleagues - an M209 key. Which would have meant one week work without machine assistance for a three-team at least, he created within approximately seven hours. At the beginning of of 1945, weber had landed over several detours in Salzburg, wanted to use his decoding machine again. However the necessary radio engineering was missing. The equipment proved as useless. Its superior instructed to destroy the machine. With pickel, hatchet, hammer and stahlsaege Weber scrapped thereupon the equipment, whose construction had employed him several months long. Thus a historically extremely interesting computer forerunner disappeared again from the scene. Until today this equipment in no source of literature is mentioned to computer history. ------- Here is the complete Telepolis article (german): http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalt/co/18371/1.html Christian Leber -- "Omnis enim res, quae dando non deficit, dum habetur et non datur, nondum habetur, quomodo habenda est." (Aurelius Augustinus) Translation: <http://gnuhh.org/work/fsf-europe/augustinus.html> _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html

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Indymedia Seizures Initiated In Europe (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
by Eugen Leitl 10 Oct '04

10 Oct '04

----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews(a)hyperreal.org -----

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[i2p] 0.4.1.2 is available (fwd from jrandom@i2p.net)
by Eugen Leitl 10 Oct '04

10 Oct '04

----- Forwarded message from jrandom <jrandom(a)i2p.net> -----

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[TSCM-L] Interception capabilities 2000 (EC report on Echolon) (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 10 Oct '04

10 Oct '04

No doubt many here will have an interest in this as well. -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org 0xBD4A95BF "An ill wind is stalking while evil stars whir and all the gold apples go bad to the core" S. Plath, Temper of Time ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2004 12:40:41 -0000 From: contranl <contranl(a)yahoo.co.uk> Reply-To: TSCM-L(a)yahoogroups.com To: TSCM-L(a)yahoogroups.com Subject: [TSCM-L] Interception capabilities 2000 (EC report on Echolon) . Good morning... I gues (not)everybody has read this: "Interception capabilities 2000" http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/98-14-01-2_en.pdf (http://tinyurl.com/4lxds) This is an official report carried out for the European Commision in 2000. It deals with the "Echolon" network and the "alleged" use of it by the US and friends for militairy and industrial espionage... Yes i know it's old stuff but not outdated and makes very good reading... So i tried to upload it to the files section...but it was refused since it is to big. I consider this standard reading and it should be in the files section since it is not that easy to find if you don't know where to look for it (yes i know now). Maybe someone can cut it into 2 pieces (Pdf) and upload it ? Tnx 73's Tetrascanner ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> $9.95 domain names from Yahoo!. Register anything. http://us.click.yahoo.com/J8kdrA/y20IAA/yQLSAA/UBhwlB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> ======================================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List "In a multitude of counselors there is strength" To subscribe to the TSCM-L mailing list visit: http://www.yahoogroups.com/community/TSCM-L It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. It is by the juice of Star Bucks that thoughts acquire speed, the hands acquire shaking, the shaking is a warning. It is by caffeine alone I set my mind in motion. =================================================== TSKS Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TSCM-L/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: TSCM-L-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

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