September 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

moderated cryptography list
by pmetzger＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, all. I'm looking for a site willing to host a high-quality moderated cryptography mailing list which I am thinking of starting up. The list would be designed as a low volume, high readership, high quality source for 1) In-depth technical discussions of cryptography 2) Announcements of cryptographic products 3) Announcements of news items of interest to the cryptography community. 4) VERY limited numbers of postings on the social implications of cryptography, and I mean VERY limited. All postings would be explicitly approved by the moderator before going out to assure quality. Yes, that means fascistic restriction of your capacity for free speech, in exchange for not being overwhelmed with garbage every day. It is ultimately envisioned that should the list be a success I would try to move it to a moderated Usenet newsgroup. If you think that such a list is a Good Thing, and you can host it (which requires that you have a good internet connection and root access or similar on the machine in question), please let me know. I'll do all the work, and the crypto community will thank you tremendously. Perry Metzger

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Re: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd)
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This post is a perfect example why the two lists should be kept seperate and not merged. This sounds to me like it belongs on alt.politics.data- highway. -uni- (dark)

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Re: CHAUM CHIMES IN
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: 08 Sep 93 16:30:55 EDT >From: Sandy <72114.1712(a)CompuServe.COM> >Subject: CHAUM CHIMES IN >Message-Id: <930908203054_72114.1712_FHF95-2(a)CompuServe.COM> ..From: > SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com [ . . . ] >Of course, the next letter to the editor calls for the adoption >of systems to track every vehicle at all times. The genius who >wrote the letter, thinks it would be a good way to prevent >nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism. Geeeeez. It was signed by Dorothy Denning, right? Actually, they should take that to its full conclusion. We need implants in every individual, broadcasting to the local surveillance agency, giving not only location but also every word spoken in the vicinity. It could also do a chemical analysis of the air in the neighborhood. It should also have a radiation counter. It should also monitor the host body, looking for signs of anger or sexual arousal? How else will we be guaranteed safe from mad bombers, rapists and child molesters? How else will our big budget LE agencies be able to protect us? I know. When it's finally adopted, worldwide, they'll call it the Ellison Plan. :-( - Carl

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Stegno and DAT and digital music...
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In this week's Sunday NYT, Hans Fantel, their music guy, writes at length about the new "dithered" CD's and how the guys have improved the sound. He says that the original CD format was limited to 16 bits of sound because of costs. But many audiophiles reacted very negatively to the tinny, metalic quality to the music. For this reason, the companies have developed 20 bit DAT recording tape and then come up with ways to "dither" this into 16 bits. I am curious if anyone knows the details of these algorithms. Also, his point suggests that flipping the least significant bit of 16 bit music may not be imperceptable to some ears. If the classical music starts to sound tinny then there might be something subversive in the least significant bits. -Peter Wayner

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Remail: errors
by HFinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have been out of town for the last week, so I missed some CP mail. It looks like some good things are happening with remailers, though. Kudos to Karl, Sameer, and the others for their work! I have received many messages to my remailer in the last week which came from remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu, which were PGP-encrypted apparently in an effort to get my remailer to send them. They did not work, though, because there was no "Encrypted: PGP" header to trigger the remailer's decryption. This can be arranged by creating the message something like this: ======================================================== :: Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com :: Encrypted: PGP - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- <rest of message> - -----END PGP MESSAGE------ ======================================================== This would then be sent to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu. I don't know whether the multiplicity of such erroneous messages is just due to one person stubbornly re-trying, or whether there is an error in one of the new programs for creating chained remailer messages. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLJaNuKgTA69YIUw3AQHrNwQAowMEQwuH6YyHoj6T7AqZFLNdTf+eqJ9L LhAatHS94nmC1smkfVNq0dZmigmkvBdMNEPlBZemmxALz+KJw6OSY/ULSBmuVNEq 5rJANh3XimoJWqLISy2lZiuC5Fw2R7UvRadcdM94pncSVvev92Fyf7CqEOOtrGAK PUzRds7BVNo= =FpLa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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more than spread spectrum
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are alternatives to spread spectrum, if we're threatened with loss of freedom to communicate. We could lay our own wires/fibers. We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air. Last time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as long as they didn't bother anyone. An infrared laser could hardly bother anyone. We could produce a line of cheap cards to plug into a PC which would do packet routing, using a variety of physical links -- our own wires, lasers, very low range radio, .... Each card would connect to three or more neighbors and become part of the global mesh. Adaptive routing with no global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central tapping. Of course all of these solutions require a high density of users. A college campus might be the right place to start. We could then branch out to cities. I suspect that a place like Chicago or NYC with high rise apartments might be the place to start -- many options for line-of-sight communications. The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks. It's a free network for the masses -- like the original USENET (with each user donating routing and store/forward) but with unrestricted, low-range, continuously operating physical links. I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card. Does anyone have hardware design/fab to donate to the effort? - Carl

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Digital cash and campaign finance reform
by Steve Schear 02 Oct '03

02 Oct '03

Everyone knows that money is the life blood of politics. The topic of campaign finance reform in the U.S. has been on and off the front burner of the major media, for decades. Although the ability of citizens and corporations to support the candidates and parties of their choice can be a positive political force, the ability of political contributors to buy access and influence legislation is probably the major source of governmental corruption. Despite some, apparently, honest efforts at limiting these legal payoffs there has been little real progress. The challenge is to encourage "neutral" campaign contributions. Perhaps technology could lend a hand. One of the features of Chaimian digital cash is unlinkability. Normally, this has been viewed from the perspective of the payer and payee not wishing to be linked to a transaction. But it also follows that that the payee can be prevented from learning the identity of the payee even if they wished. Since the final payee in politics is either the candidate or the party, this lack of knowledge could make it much more difficult for the money to be involved in influence peddling and quid pro quo back room deals. By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the "posting" of each transaction to the account of the counter party, it could create mix conditions which would thwart the ability of contributors to easily convince candidates and parties that they were the source of particular funds and therefore entitled to special treatment. Comments? steve A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored by judges and demagogue statesmen. - Steve Schear

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free hosting for cpunkly projects...
by Adam Back 02 Oct '03

02 Oct '03

remops and cpunks: http://www.1and1.com are offering: 512 MB disk space ssh and ftp access pop, mail etc. 5GB/month free bandwidth cgi/php/mysql free for 3 years as an advertising ploy to get into small business / personal web posting. They use a computerized phone call back to prevent people being silly and registering thousands of accounts, so you have to give them your phone#. (And that works for US and Canadian numbers only). But they don't require a credit card (unless you start buying extras). btw They also have the cheapest domain registration I've seen so far at $6/year. You also don't have to transfer your domain to them in order to host there, you can just point your existing domain's DNS to them, and they also will optionally keep your existing MX in their DNS so your mail is handled however it was before. Well just thought remops and cpunks might find some interesting uses or it would be a bonus to people working on crypto / remailer coding, or internet service type stuff to have some serious hosting to work with or do dev work in. (They have gcc, pgp, ssh etc installed). They seem quite serious hosting-wise and I got a 12 hr turn around on a fix for a system /etc/csh.cshrc bug that was preventing me changing my shell to tcsh which is pretty impressive. (Most hosting shops wouldn't bother answering or would fob you off, or your query would not get anywhere near someone clue-full enough to understand never mind tweak and fix the minor problem). Their bandwidth is supposed to be pretty good too as they have 12Gbits connectivity. Claim to have been in business for 11 years. 3 years free seems pretty generous (most free offers are a few months or 1 year tops). The offer is available only until 31st Dec this year. >From what I could see from the two I did (one for someone else) based on serial number on account it looks like they might be signing up around 1000 accounts per day. So I could imagine they might pull the offer also if they got too much take up! Have phun. Adam

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Re: Wipe your Lamo notes now
by Tyler Durden 01 Oct '03

01 Oct '03

Tim May wrote... "If it's a felony for _me_ to say "Sources tell me that Valerie Plame, the wife of Ambassador Joseph Wilson, has been a CIA covert operative since 1980," it is a felony for Robert Novak to do so." Hum. Particularly in the era of the Internet and blogs. Even if "The Press" should have some special treatment, the clear and obvious thing to do is to set up an Internet Press of some minimal sort, and start "reporting". -TD >From: Tim May <timcmay(a)got.net> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: Re: Wipe your Lamo notes now >Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 16:15:49 -0700 > >On Monday, September 29, 2003, at 11:42 AM, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > >>http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/187 >> >>The Subpoenas are Coming! >>By Mark Rasch Sep 29 2003 05:00AM PT >> >>... > >>The Bureau recently sent letters to a handful of reporters who have >>written >>stories about the Lamo case -- whether or not they have actually >>interviewed Lamo. The letters warn them to expect subpoenas for all >>documents relating to the hacker, including, apparently, their own >>notes, >>e-mails, impressions, interviews with third parties, independent >>investigations, privileged conversations and communications, off the >>record >>statements, and expense and travel reports related to stories about >>Lamo. >> >>In short, everything. > >Hypocrisy is the name of the game in Washington, as in all imperial cities. > >Robert Novak, a reporter, revealed the name of a clandestine CIA operative, >which is said to be a felony (the revealing of a name, that is). Will he >face jail time, or does he get one of those special "exemptions for >reporters"? > >Long time readers here know that I argue we are all reporters, we are all >writers, we are all ministers, we are all preachers. There are no special >rights for "badged" or "licensed" reporters, writers, ministers, witch >doctors. > >If it's a felony for _me_ to say "Sources tell me that Valerie Plame, the >wife of Ambassador Joseph Wilson, has been a CIA covert operative since >1980," it is a felony for Robert Novak to do so. > >And yet he will not be prosecuted, while Jim Bell was prosecuted >essentially for "outing" the names of some lower-ranking investigators. > >(As for the Plame case, Novak will not be prosecuted, because he's a loyal >Republican and Ashcroft won't touch loyal Republicans. But were I to talk >about Plame's role in assisting with CIA-sponsored diamond smuggling in >Niger and Gabon, and her involvement with the death squads in South Africa >in the early 80s, I could expect a visit from the Thought Police. So I >won't talk about these things. Novak can talk about her, we cannot.) > >And in the Lamo case, reporters who clam up will face Patriot Act >consequences. > >Will Robert Novak and Karl Rove get the same Patriot Act treatment? Don't >be silly. > >Washington is corruption on earth. The Great Satan needs to be destroyed >with a 40 megaton bomb. > >Corruption on earth. > >--Tim May _________________________________________________________________ Help protect your PC. Get a FREE computer virus scan online from McAfee. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

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Johns Hopkins Physics Lab System Detects Digital Video Tampering
by R. A. Hettinga 30 Sep '03

30 Sep '03

Of course, if it's is just signed-frame video, "prior art" doesn't begin to describe this. Cheers, RAH ------ <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/09/030929054614.htm> Science Daily Source : Johns Hopkins University Date : 2003-09-29 Johns Hopkins APL Creates System To Detect Digital Video Tampering The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) in Laurel, Md., has opened the door to using reliable digital video as evidence in court by developing a system that identifies an attempt to alter digital video evidence. "It's not too hard to make changes to digital video," says Tom Duerr, APL's project manager. "But our system quickly and conclusively detects any alterations made to the original tape." For the past two years, Duerr has led development of the project for the United States Postal Inspection Service. "We're satisfied that our system can accurately detect tampering and now we're building a working prototype that can be attached to a camcorder," says Nick Beser, lead engineer for the project. "Our authenticator provides proof of tampering when the human eye can't detect it. You might theorize that a change has been made, but this system takes the theory out of that determination." The U.S. Postal Inspection Service, the federal law enforcement agency that safeguards the U.S. Postal Service, its employees and assets, and ensures the integrity of the mail, uses video surveillance and cutting edge technology as investigative tools in many of its cases. "We are looking forward to field testing the prototype developed by APL," says Dennis Jones, assistant postal inspector in charge of the agency's Forensic & Technical Services Division. "Being able to present a certifiable digital recording in court in support of our investigative efforts will minimize court challenges over the admissibility of such evidence. This system could reinforce the public's confidence in the work of law enforcement professionals." Securing the System The authentication system computes secure computer-generated digital signatures for information recorded by a standard off-the-shelf digital video camcorder. While recording, compressed digital video is simultaneously written to digital tape in the camcorder and broadcast from the camera into the Digital Video Authenticator (currently a laptop PC). There the video is separated into individual frames and three digital signatures are generated per frame -- one each for video, audio, and camcorder/DVA control data -- at the camcorder frame rate. Public-key cryptography is used to create unique signatures for each frame. The "keys" are actually parameters from mathematical algorithms embedded in the system. Duerr says, "The keys, signature, and original data are mathematically related in such a way that if any one of the three is modified, the fact that a change took place will be revealed in the verification process." One key, called a "private" key, is used to generate the signatures and is destroyed when the recording is complete. The second, a "public" key, is used for verification. To provide additional accountability, a second set of keys is generated that identifies the postal inspector who made the recording. This set of keys is embedded in a secure physical token that the inspector inserts into the system to activate the taping session. The token also signs the Digital Video Authenticator's public key, ensuring that the public key released with the video signatures was created by the inspector and can be trusted. The signatures that are generated for the recording make it easy to recognize tampering. If a frame has been added it won't have a signature and will be instantly detected. If an original frame is altered, the signature won't match the new data and the frame will fail verification. The method is so perceptive that tampering with even a single bit (an eighth of a byte) of a 120,000-byte video frame is enough to trigger an alert. After an event is recorded, the signatures and the signed public key are transferred to a removable storage device and secured along with the original tape in case the authenticity of a tape is challenged. When finished, the Digital Video Authenticator is expected to be within the size and cost range of consumer-grade digital camcorders. It will be attached to, rather than embedded in, a video camera, which allows it to be transferred to different cameras when current ones become obsolete. Comparison of signatures with recorded video and analysis of the results will be accomplished in separate software that will run on a desktop PC. Prototype development will include peer review by other researchers and potential users and is expected to be completed by 2005. In addition to Postal Inspection Service use, the system could serve state and local law enforcement needs and possibly corporate and other business venues. ### The Applied Physics Laboratory, a division of The Johns Hopkins University, meets critical national challenges through the innovative application of science and technology. For more information, visit http://www.jhuapl.edu . This story has been adapted from a news release issued by Johns Hopkins University. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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