May 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fwd: 6:30 pm Tuesday 20 May 2003 Refund Day II: The case of Adam Kosmin vs. Toshiba, in the matter of Adam's refund, will likely not be tried but put off for another day. (fwd)
by Jim Choate 21 May '03

21 May '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 20 May 2003 01:59:46 -0400 Subject: Fwd: 6:30 pm Tuesday 20 May 2003 Refund Day II: The case of Adam Kosmin vs. Toshiba, in the matter of Adam's refund, will likely not be tried but put off for another day. res ipsa loquitor... Begin forwarded message: > Subject: 6:30 pm Tuesday 20 May 2003 Refund Day II: The case of Adam > Kosmin vs. Toshiba, in the matter of Adam's refund, will likely not be > tried but put off for another day. > > Efforts at an out of court settlement having failed, the issue between > Adam Kosmin and Toshiba will at some unknown date be tried in a court > of > law. The case may be tried on Tuesday 20 May 2003, but more likely the > court will set yet another date some time in the future, perhaps a > month > from now. So far Adam Kosmin and Toshiba have been out to the Queens > County courthouse twice. This Tuesday's appearance will be the third > in > this matter. > > At 5:00 pm on Tuesday 20 May 2003 Adam Kosmin and some tribesfolk will > gather at the coffee house across the street from the Queens County > courthouse. All supporters of free software and all students of > contract > law are invited! > > If the case is heard this Tuesday, it might be useful to have on hand > more > than one laptop computer running a free OS. As always, Knoppix, or > Knoppix > variant, disks are welcome. These tools may help us explain to the > judge > some facts that are not often presented in large circulation > newspapers. > > If convenient, wear standard CLOTHES OF RESPECT. Do not interrupt or > shout > out in court. You may not read in court. You must sit and pay > attention > and be ready to help the judge and Adam. > > > Here is information about Refund Day I: > > http://www.svlug.org/events/refund > http://www.netmonger.net/~onr/ny/welcome.html > http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/02/biztech/articles/ > 16windows.html > > > Adam Kosmin is the leader of Refund Day II and all questions should be > addressed to him at > > info(a)windowsrefund.net > > For more about Refund Day II: > > http://www.windowsrefund.net > > > This action is not the whole of Refund Day II. It is just the > beginning. > Already other actions, not yet public, are in process. No matter what > happens in court we will continue the fight. What is at stake is our > right > to private ownership of computers and our right to free private, > tribal, > business, and public use of the Net. > > > <blockquote > what="information that is not twice confirmed yet" > contact-for-more-information="info(a)windowsrefund.net"> > > 1. court > > Queens County Court > > > 2. place of court > > 89-17 Sutphin Blvd. > Jamaica, NY 11435 > 718-262-7123 > > > 3. day and time of case > > Tuesday 20 May 2003 > 6:30 P.M. in the Small Claims/Commercial Claims Part Courtroom > First Floor Room 101 > > Note that the room number may actually be different. It is best to > arrive > early and meet with Adam at the coffee house across the street. > > > 4. name and/or number of action > > Index number: 531QSC2003 > Kosmin, Adam vs. Toshiba American Information Systems Inc > > > 5. ways to get out there > > By subway, take the F train to Sutphin Blvd. The court house is on > the same > street. It is several blocks from the subway stop. > > </blockquote> > > > Note: This action is not a formal official action of LXNY, though many > LXNY > members support the rule of law, and further, the particular > application of > the rule of law to Microsoft and Toshiba. > > > Jay Sulzberger <secretary(a)lxny.org> > Corresponding Secretary LXNY > LXNY is New York's Free Computing Organization. > http://www.lxny.org

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ColorLines: Timeline of Homeland Security (fwd)
by Jim Choate 21 May '03

21 May '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 19 May 2003 09:10:37 -0500 (CDT) Subject: ColorLines: Timeline of Homeland Security from cdavis: A succinct timeline of post-9/11 events and policies effecting immigrants and civil liberties. http://www.arc.org/C_Lines/CLArchive/story6_1_06.html

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LAT: (fwd)
by Jim Choate 21 May '03

21 May '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 19 May 2003 15:07:04 -0500 (CDT) Subject: LAT: from MoveOn.org mailing list post. "A Nuclear Road of No Return" by Robert Scheer http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-scheer13may13,0,5142385.column (free registration required) "On Sunday, the Washington Post wrote the obituary for the United States' effort to find Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction. "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq," read the headline, confirming what has become an embarrassing truth - that the central rationale for the invasion and occupation of oil-rich Iraq was in fact one of history's great frauds."

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new California crypto legislation?
by Eric Murray 21 May '03

21 May '03

I've heard a rumor that there is some new legislation being proposed in California that would require consumer communication using SSL to go "directly to the server". A scan of the current in-process legislation doesn't turn up anything. Eric

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idea for OTP system, comments desired
by John Bethencourt 20 May '03

20 May '03

I've come up with an idea for a one-time-password based authentication protocol, and I would like any comments on it. It doesn't use sequences of passwords that need to be periodically reinitialized, so it is more convenient than systems like S/Key. In the following explanation, `h' is a cryptographic hash function and `x.y' denotes the concatenation of strings x and y. The `server' is taken to be a system which users need to authenticate to, e.g., to use some service. The `client' is software run by the user to assist them in authentication. To begin, the administrator of the server adds a user to the system. The server stores the username and an initial password set by the administrator. A flag is set for that user to indicate that that user has never been authenticated. The administrator tells the initial password to the user. To authenticate for the first time, the client connects to the server and sends the username. The server requests the initial password. The client prompts the user for it, and sends it to the server. The server then generates a random string, r_0, and sends it to the client. The client now prompts the user for the password, s, which they would like to use from now on. The client computes h(h(s.r_0)) and sends it to the server. The server stores the username, r_0, and h(h(s.r_0)). To authenticate for the second time, the client connects to the server and sends the username. The server sends r_0 to the client. The client prompts the user for s, then computes h(s.r_0) and sends it to the server. The server computes h(h(s.r_0)) and checks that it matches what it has stored for that user. The server then makes a new random string r_1 and sends it to the client. The client computes h(h(s.r_1)) and sends it to the server. The server stores the username, r_1, and h(h(s.r_1)). All subsequent authentications proceed like the second. Here's the protocol in a more concise form: [first authentication] Client --> username --> Server Client <-- 'initial password?' <-- Server Client --> initialpass --> Server Client <-- r_0 <-- Server Client --> h(h(s.r_0)) --> Server [subsequent authentications] Client --> username --> Server Client <-- r_x <-- Server Client --> h(s.r_x) --> Server Client <-- r_y <-- Server Client --> h(h(s.r_y)) --> Server This protocol seems pretty simplistic. I wonder if people have considered it and found a flaw in it. If not, I would expect people to be using it in place of S/Key, since it has the advantage of not requiring the password sequences to be reinitialized. I searched around on the web and couldn't find anything that seemed relevant. The only possible flaw that I could think of was the following: The attacker will have a large number of pairs like h(s.r_0), r_0 h(s.r_1), r_1 h(s.r_2), r_2 h(s.r_3), r_3 . . . Is there some way to use this knowledge to make inverting h to find s easier? Of course, that would depend on the particular hash function, and I don't know enough of the math behind secure hash functions to answer the question. Also, the random string r_i will need to be long enough to make collisions sufficiently unlikely (or the server could keep a list of past random strings to ensure it does not reuse them). If anyone can think of any flaws in this system or knows of any relevant literature, I would very much like to hear about it. Thanks, John Bethencourt

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Taking aim at denial-of-service attacks
by Steve Schear 20 May '03

20 May '03

May 13, 2003, 6:01 AM PT BERKELEY, Calif.--Graduate students from Carnegie Mellon University on Monday proposed two methods aimed at greatly reducing the effects of Internet attacks. In two papers presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy here, the graduate students suggested simple modifications to network software that could defeat denial-of-service attacks and that could be implemented in the current protocol used by the Internet. The symposium, sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, began Sunday and lasts through Wednesday. ...... The puzzle method The second presentation, also by a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon, proposes that servers use "puzzles"--problems that take a certain amount of processing time to solve--as a means of taxing any computer that tries to communicate with the server. Such a technique, which has also been suggested as a way to defeat spammers who send unsolicited mass e-mail, would help defend against denial-of-service attacks that attempt to tie up a victim server's memory with hundreds or thousands of connections. The plan from XiaoFeng Wang asserts that such small tasks would hardly be noticed by legitimate users, while attackers would have to expend far more effort to do any damage. While others have suggested similar methods, Wang added to his proposal an auction-like transaction to further allow legitimate traffic to win out over attacks. "Our mechanism enables each client to 'bid' for resources by tuning the difficulty of the puzzles it solves and to adapt its bidding strategy in response to apparent attacks," Wang stated in the paper that outlined his findings. Bellovin also liked this idea but again said that certain issues need to be resolved. "It will work up to a point," he said. "The problem is that spammers and denial-of-service attacks are not using their own machines. If they need 16 times as many computers, they can--most likely--easily get that many more." http://news.com.com/2100-1009_3-1001200.html --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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Re: Good things gro-o-o-o-w, in Ontario-o-o-o...
by Major Variola (ret) 20 May '03

20 May '03

At 08:07 PM 5/18/03 -0700, Mike Rosing wrote: >Yup, getting to the party will be a lot easier! Is it a coincidence that this comes as Matrix II is being released?

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Economics of "Wanted" and "Unwanted" Messages
by Tim May 20 May '03

20 May '03

I'm reading with only 10% of my brain engaged the many (and oft-repeated) articles about how Hash$ash or MailBucks or whatever will "fix" the spam problem. First, what is the spam problem? It's the receipt of unwanted messages, like a celebrity receiving unwanted attention when he walks in public. (Issues of his choice to appear in public are not central to the argument. He receives attention because his name and face is known to many. A "many to few" problem, just as more letters are sent to the New York Times than to me. Ordinary people don't get bothered on the street because they are not one of the relative handful of celebrities. With e-mail, we're all celebrities. Rather, the costs of sending (contacting) are so low that we can all become celebrities to a subset of stalkers. The analogy with celebrities is intentional. Their are three main approaches for dealing with the problem of unwanted attention towards celebrities: 1. Pass laws making it a crime to approach a person unless one has good reason to. Courts decide who is authorized or justified. This is the "unsolicited e-mail is a crime" approach. 2. Celebrities have agents who screen all potential contacts for the right amount of attention, deals, cocaine, or other forms of "consideration." This is the HashCash approach. "Pay me to be interested." 3. Reclusiveness. Celebrities live behind guarded walls, or on their own Bermuda or Bahamas island estates. When in Hollywood or London, they stay in 5-star hotels with rigorous screening of who gets to their floor. This is the "spam filter and personal responsibility" approach. Now it may be sad that Michael Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones choose to live on Bermuda, in a walled compound no less, but this is the price of notoriety. As for complicated schemes involving using CPU resources to compute cryptographic numbers and thus decide whether a sender was sufficiently motivated or not, this is nonsense. If I recognize a sender's name, I am likely to read his mail, regardless of whether my 1 GHz G4 decides that he did not spend enough of his own CPU resources in contacting me. Etc. And if I see a bunch of Chinese characters in the message, or I see it is from a name I don't recognize, I will likely click on "Think of this kind of message as Trash" and will never again see this kind of message. (I use OS X Mail, a descendant of NeXTMail, and it has this kind of Bayesian filtering built in and easy to use.) If and when spam from harvested messages gets to be too great, I expect I'll change my e-mail address again. (My spam dropped from about 100 per day to about 1 per day when I changed my 7-year-old address of "tcmay(a)got.net" to "timcmay(a)got.net." It hasn't gone up in the past few months. This suggest to me, BTW, that maybe a lot of the spam is using a relatively static list harvested a while back. Which makes sense. Those selling "500 million e-mail addresses for $29.95" have no real incentive to try to keep current: they are selling to dummies trying to sell fake Viagara sugar pills to suckers. Maybe they're selling each other the same lists of harvested addresses during the dot com peak? Just a thought.) The fundamental flaw which is leading to the spam problem is that sending a million messages costs very little, not that recipients are not "charging" for e-mail. If bandwidth actually cost money, if various links in sending either JPEGs or copies of the Koran or e-mail actually were charged, a lot of the "ontological" problems with free mail would be lessened. Notice that I am NOT saying that all carriers should charge. Indeed, whether they carry traffic for free or charge for it, and how they charge, is their business. Whether on the uplink (sending) or downlink (receiving) or in the middle side, that some traffic is charged for, and must be paid for somehow, should be enough to fix things. The reason we don't get inundated with hundreds of pounds of physical junk mail each day is that there are ontological limits on sending of physical goods, on consuming of physical resources. (And learning takes place. A few years ago I was getting 10 times as much weight in glossy catalogs. I surmise that some of the glossy catalog makers gave up on sending expensive catalogs, for which they also had to pay postage, to tens of millions of potential customers.) On the downlink side, I expect my ISP is not much interested in trying to charge me or the sender for the e-mail I receive. But on the uplink side, on the side which fires off a million e-mails, I wonder why they don't try to charge the sender? And why traffic in between, bouncing amongst nodes, is not charge for? (Such charges would eventually force backwards a charging mechanism, of whatever form, a la the arguments by Hardy, Tribble, etc. for "digital silk road." Nobody expected the camel caravan from Tashkent to Baghdad to carry stuff for free. So why is it expected that 50 GB of JPEGs and e-mail should travel for free on the Net? Long term, unwanted communication comes with the "celebrity" effect. Greg Egan describes it well in "Permutation City": a constant barrage of agents attempting to make contact, with movies, fake voices, and every other possible trick. And so the spam filters will spend more time filtering. (And getting rid of the socialized "all bits are carried for free" pricing policy at least solves the worst of the ontological problems.) Should crypto people be worrying about how nodes on the Net charge for traffic? Maybe. But it won't involve "HashCash" tokens. For the 99.99% who never bother with the complications of crypto and signatures, convincing them to learn about how to use HashCash will be 100 times harder a sell. And if some mail system tries to ram it down the throats of the users, they'll find alternatives. --Tim May

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Re: Underestimating long-term consequences of cryptoanarchy
by Tyler Durden 20 May '03

20 May '03

>In the case of printing, the result over the following century or two was a >rise in literacy rates (in the common languages, and this is when German, >French, and English, for example, largely solidified into their current >forms, viz. the Luther Bible, the King James Version, etc.). And the >Protestant Reformation was built on printed words and on the people's >ability to directly read the religious texts. > >A technology undermined the state and the church. This is why I still bother reading Tim May's posts. Every now and then he comes up with a good one. Hell, I'd recommend he stick with technology and stop worrying about blacks and other "social problems". In response to the main post I'd point out that it would have been easy (and wrong) to say that, "The Printing Press, The telescope, town clocks and Protestantism will reduce the power of the church to the point where it will collapse." (Actually, many educated catholics probably thought this at the time.) And although the Catholic church did lose power on many fronts, it by no means dissappeared. (You could almost say it prospered, but probably by virtue of the fact that it might be the single largest real estate dealer in the world.) The church morphed, changed, fought itself and the rest of the world and found a nice cozy niche for itself. ANd part of this is due to mere social inertia... but also, the church probably still serves a function that people need (or at least want), and so they continue to feed it $$$ and whatnot. But the Catholic church has become one possible option, and arguably they've learned to "compete" for donations and members. Likewise with governments. I still need my trash taken out, and for potholes to be fixed. And although these services can be provided privately (maybe) if strong crypto gives people opportunities, government might be forced to learn how to do some things more efficiently so that people can "opt-in" if they choose to. Hell, this has already happened to some extent with the US mail service. So while I don't believe heavy crypto will kill off governments, I DO believe it will eventually force them to change into something we probably can't imagine too well right now. -TD _________________________________________________________________ Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail

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A Trial Balloon to Ban Email?
by Nomen Nescio 19 May '03

19 May '03

Lauren Weinstein, founder of People for Internet Responsibility, has come out with a new spam solution at http://www.pfir.org/tripoli-overview. According to this proposal, the Internet email architecture would be revamped. Each piece of mail would include a PIT, a Payload Identity Token, emphasis on Identity. This would be a token certifying that you were an Authorized Email User as judged by the authorities. Based on your PIT, the receiving email software could decide to reject your email. It is anticipated that all Pits considered acceptable by the vast majority of all Tripoli-compliant software user would be digitally signed by one or more designated, trustworthy, third-pary authorities who would be delegated the power to certify the validity of identity and other relevant information within Pits. In other words, here comes Verisign again. It is anticipated that in most cases, in order for the sender of an e-mail message to become initially certified by a Pit Certification Authority (PCA), the sender would need to first formally accept Terms of Service (ToS) that may well prohibit the sending of spam, and equally importantly, would authorize the certification authority to "downgrade" the sender's authentication certification in the case of spam or other ToS violations. Thus you have to be politically acceptable to the Powers That Be in order to receive your license to email, aka your PIT. And be careful what you say or your PIT will be downgraded. Unfortunately he doesn't discuss various crypto protocol issues: If the PIT is just a datum, what keeps someone from stealing your PIT and spams with it? If the PIT is a cert on a key, what do you sign? The message? What if it gets munged in transit, as messages do? You've just lost most of your email reliability. Or maybe you sign the current date/time? Then delayed mail is dead mail. Or maybe you respond to a challenge and sign that? That won't work if relays are involved, because they can't sign for you. Spam is a problem, but it's no excuse to add more centralized administrative control to the Internet. Far better to go with a decentralized solution like camram.sourceforge.net, basically a matter of looking for hashcash in the mail headers. This raises the cost to spammers without significantly impacting normal users.

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