December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RE: engineering infowar disasters (was Re: How the FBI/NSA forces can further twist SAFE)
by Phillip Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It really depends how the engineered "infowar disaster" is presented >in the press, ranging from say: > Dr Adam Back, a computer security researcher at Exeter > University highlighted a fundamental weakness in DNS security > which he demonstrates can be easily exploited. "This is > entirely avoidable", said Back, "the only reason that global > infrastructure is left vulnerable, is that the wire-tapping > extremists and intelligence special groups are being allowed > to jeopardise national security to protect their jobs in their > now redundant function in a post-cold war era." Unfortunately I don't think the above is true. The secure DNS specs have been circulating in a serious way for about three years. The main impediment to implementing them has been the time taken to completely rewrite the existing BIND code to make it work. Unfortunately the design of DNS does not encourage good coding parctice. The easy way to implement is to send out your request independently of processing the reply. One might possibly argue that the D-H patent has held matters up or that the FBI has generally intimidated people. I don't think this is actually the case however. Certainly Jeff Schiller, the IETF security director has not been intimidated, he has been handing out PGP to all commers for some time. An anonymous cypherpunk took down half of the internet yesterday, with an estimated loss to business of $50 million. The cypherpunk hacker terrorist issued a manifesto claiming that his motives were to highlight insecurities in the DNS. Whether his motives were pure or not, the incident does highlight the vulnerabilities in our infrastructure, something infowar researchers have been arguing. And which do you think is going to get published? Declan might possibly put the second story in rather than the first (but I would not count on it). But after his editor was finished with it it would be more like the second. >either one I can't see getting me or anyone else in trouble. Not unless you or they get caught. >They guy who wrote the SYN flood attack is none the worse for wear, it >was released in a phrack article, and I don't think there was any >secret as to who authored the software. Some of the people who doiwnloaded and used it are in big trouble though. >> I suspect I'm not the only person on the list who is responsible >> for a service that is a regular hacker target. If I catch someone I >> really don't care what the motive for the attack was. I'm going to >> look to make that person serve jail time. >Your argument seems to be that if you legislate against OS bugs, that >they will go away. That is not what I said. And in any case you probably would not be continuing the meme that reaction is useless if you knew the origin. All O/S inevitably have bugs. There is nothing that can be done about this in most cases. Many vendors simply don't give a hoot about fixing bugs. Two years ago Sun delivered a machine to me with a version of the O/S that didn't recognize the sound or video card. That was a standard package, completely current O/S and broken out of the box. Didn't strike them as the wrong approach. Nothing I could do but never buy from them again. If there is a bug in the O/S and the manufacturer is not interested in fixing it my *only* recourse may be to persecute the perpetrator of an attack. That is not my FIRST choice, but it is a choice. Also most of my systems are designed to give warning long before an attack succeeds. I don't trust the clowns who put UNIX together all that much. If there is an attack I want to know as soon as possible and respond by removing the threat as soon as possible. I'm not complacent enough to put my trust in the O/S. >I would point out that the hackers who change your web page, or >exploit OS bugs you haven't applied patches, and send you taunting >messages telling what's wrong with your setup, are probably doing you >a service. If I want such a service I will ask. I built a burgalar alarm into the system. If it goes off I assume that someone is robbing the bank. I don't care what their motives are or were, even if they are able to prove them they can tell them to the judge, I am simply not interested. If someone sets off the alarm it costs real money to react. Probably in the tens of thousands of dollars. > If you have something of real value to secure, you'd >rather know about it from a few harmless hackers, than an industrial >spy who takes the farm, and covers up his tracks so well that you >don't even notice. At present there arn't any secrets on the machine (with the exception of some heavily encrypted signature keys). In fact the purpose is to distribute information. All the logs could be obtained under FOIA in any case. The sole concern in the risk model is reputation capital. If the machine is compromised it is front page news. I want to ensure that does not happen. I am simply giving fair notice that I do not consider any attack 'friendly' and that I will react with the maximum force available to me. I have good reasons for this policy and they have nothing to do with complacency. Phill

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American Journalism Review on perils of Internet ratings
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 14:05:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: American Journalism Review on perils of Internet ratings ======================================================================== http://www.newslink.org/ajrjdl21.html X-Rated Ratings? The Clinton administration and the Internet industry have championed voluntary ratings for Web sites to create a ``family-friendly'' environment in cyberspace. Their campaign nearly led online news organizations to create a licensing system for Web journalism. By J.D. Lasica From AJR, October 1997 WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON challenged the high-tech industry this summer to create a ``family-friendly Internet'' by cleaning up cyber-smut and other offensive content, newspaper editorials applauded the president's decision to forgo government regulation and let private industry police the Net. Few realized that the White House's ``parental empowerment initiative'' would plunge online news publications headlong into the thorniest thicket of free speech issues in the history of cyberspace--and lead to the news media's rejection of the president's proposal when it comes to their own Web sites. The fate of an Internet self-rating system, however, remains far from settled. And the online news media's actions in recent weeks have been riddled with more intrigue than a John Le Carr* thriller--with the final chapters still unwritten. Consider the questions the online news world took up after the president's call for an Internet ratings system: How would Web news sites rate themselves for violence, language and sexual frankness when publishing stories involving war, murder, rape, gang shootings, domestic abuse, hate crimes and teenage pregnancy? If an exception is carved out for news sites, which sites would qualify? Where do you draw the line between news and information, entertainment, propaganda and opinion? And who decides? If news sites refuse to rate themselves, will they be shut off from a growing number of parents and others who are demanding filters on their Web browsers? Finally, will the entire ratings scheme transform the Net from a global democratic village into a balkanized, regulated medium where foreign despots can easily censor any material that strays from the party line? Questions like these are now being vigorously debated by online journalists who've barely had time to catch their breath after the U.S. Supreme Court slapped down the Communications Decency Act in June. The Clinton administration has adopted the approach championed by the Internet industry, which fears another effort by Congress to clamp down on ``indecent material'' in cyberspace. At the July 16 Internet summit at the White House, the president called on such companies as Netscape, America Online and IBM to give parents the tools needed to shield children from obscenity, violence and antisocial messages on the Net. ``We need to encourage every Internet site, whether or not it has material harmful to minors, to rate its contentsÉto help ensure that our children do not end up in the red-light districts of cyberspace,'' Clinton said. The assembled captains of industry obliged. Netscape indicated it would support Internet ratings in its next browser, meaning that about 97 percent of all browsers will support Internet ratings. (Microsoft's Internet Explorer 3.0 already includes ratings as an option for parents to turn on.) The search engines Lycos, Excite and Yahoo! also fell into line, pledging to ask for ratings labels for all Web sites in their directories. [...]

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Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 22:52:09 +0200 (MET DST) > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd) > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> wrote: > > > What besides raising hell anonymously, laundering money, and defeating > > merchant purchase traffic analysis are commercial anonymous remailers > > good for? > > Avoiding spam. Anyone who doesn't use remailers is sure to get their > mailbox full of crap. Using an anonymous remailer does nothing to reduce spam. It doesn't even make it harder for them to send it to you, they just don't know who you are; hardly a requirement for most spam that I have seen. > Employment related concerns. I know of many people on this list who > have had problems along these lines. How in the world would an anonymous remailer help me get or keep a job? Are you perhaps refering to whistleblowing? If so, being anonymous will do nothing in most cases because you have to be willing to stand up and say you saw what you saw non-anonamously in court. Otherwise the company will just claim it ain't so and that you are some chicken-shit ex-employee with a grudge, the DA will buy it too unless you reveal your identity which sort of defeats the whole point of anonymity. Now it might be useful for other forms of whistleblowing, ala Pentagon Papers, where the source is irrelevant except for idle curiosity. But considering the frequency at which this sort of stuff happens it hardly qualifies as a reason to stay in business day after day. > The rest of your comment is utterly stupid. How many people do you > know who use remailers to launder money? Zero, I'd bet. If it is a commercial remailer using ecash payments then every user is laundering money - strictly speaking. The point being that with such a system in place it becomes trivial to anonymously launder your money into ecash and then using another account turn it back into real money. The nice thing about this is that you don't loose anything in the process, unlike regular underground money laundering where you might get 60% return (if you are lucky and got a big gun). I'll leave it as an excercise to the reader as to how this can be used to avoid taxes at nearly every level. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Fisher Mark <FisherM(a)exch1.indy.tce.com> > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd) > Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 11:49:29 -0500 > Jim Choate writes: > >What would motivate an average consumer to use an anonymous remailer? > >What besides raising hell anonymously, laundering money, and defeating > >merchant purchase traffic analysis are commercial anonymous remailers > good > >for? > Well, maybe the avenue to pursue isn't the average consumer, but the > average employee. I don't doubt that at least some companies are under > email traffic analysis by their competitors (and/or their competitor's > governments) to get a clue about future directions for their products. Well, speaking from more than a couple of years in the business, most companies don't take that sort of traffic outside their corporate firewalls. I can state unequivicaly, working for Tivoli - IBM, that were an employee to send such confidential email out they would get sacked ASAP (as they should be) and possibly face criminal and/or civil charges. Besides, it's much safer to just bribe somebody, that way some eager beaver doesn't stumble over your tap in a routine maintenance tour. > I could see where many (eventually most) companies would send email to > each other using remailers, so that only the companies involved know > that they communicated with each other. So you are proposing something like: employee emial --> anonymous remailer --> firewall --> Internet Intenet --> firewall --> anonymous remailer --> employee2 email Or, employee email --> firewall --> anonymous remailer --> firewall firewall --> employee2 email To be honest, I can't see either one providing any sort of security that would be advantagous to a business. Not only that but in the second case the remailer is owned/operated by a third party. How do I know my competitors aren't running remailers to capture my traffic? The first case would be much simpler if we simply do away with the remailers and simply send encrypted email using company distributed software and keys. > Internet email doesn't provide > the same level of privacy that snail mail, phones, and faxes do now. You consider snail mail, phones, and faxes secure? You certainly live in a different world than I do. I personaly consider none of them secure. Hell, I have all the equipment I need to intercept any and all of these forms of traffic in my workshop. For less than a thousand bucks you too can have the necessary equipment. > With the use of remailers, Internet email could provide more privacy > than snail mail, phones, or faxes. Only if we use encryption and/or remailer technology. This crypto technology is applicable to the other technologies besides email. Otherwise they are all about equivalent without it, they keep the honest man honest and thats about it. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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INFO-RUSS: New Russin Law List (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Tue Sep 30 20:42:09 1997 Message-Id: <9709301725.AA13658(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu> Errors-To: INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu Sender: INFO-RUSS-request(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu From: "Alexander V Pavlenko" <lawyer(a)openmail.irex.ru> To: <info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu> Subject: INFO-RUSS: New Russin Law List Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 15:55:44 +0400 --------------------------------------------------------------------- This is INFO-RUSS broadcast (1200+ subscribers). Home page, information, and archives: http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/~kaplan/IRUSS/inforuss.html To post, or to subscribe/unsubscribe, mail to info-russ(a)smarty.ece.jhu.edu INFO-RUSS assumes no responsibility for the information/views of its users. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Announcement Russin Law List The Russian Law list is brought to you by The 21st Century Lawyers Association, (Moscow), in cooperation with The Rule of Law Foundation (Washington, DC). Our mission is to help young Russian lawyers take an active part in democratic reform in Russia, by strengthening their linkages with each other and international legal community. Although the list is primarily serving the needs of the members of the Association, it is open for anyone who is interested in law reform in Russia. To subscribe to the list, send "subscribe ruslaw" to listserv(a)rol.org. To send a message to the list, send it to ruslaw(a)rol.org. To unsubscribe, send "unsubscribe ruslaw" to listserv(a)rol.org. -- Postal address: PO Box 51, K-6 Moscow 103006, Russia Web site: http://lawyers.home.ml.org Alexander V Pavlenko lawyer(a)openmail.irex.ru ----------------------------------------------------

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colocation costs: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 16:03:22 -0700 > From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> > Subject: colocation costs: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd) > >>I'm wondering about your co-location machine, from your comments above it > >>must be sitting in a field since you don't pay rent (or was that your way of > >>saying somebody else pays the rent for you?). Is this so? Since so many of > >>your utilities and physical plant are donated I have to question the > >>accuracy and utility of your figures as well as the applicability of those > >>figures to a true commercial enterprise. > > Depending on the security, performance, and price you're looking for, > you can run your own machine on your own premises, > run your own machine in somebody else's colocation facility (either > as a favor, like anon.efga.org may be, or using a commercial ISP), > have somebody else run a dedicated machine for you (mostly ISPs), > buy a shell account on an ISP or other service provider's machine, > use a free shell account from somewhere, or use an IP-only connection. I am quite aware of what it takes, it's what I have done using SSZ since going online to the Internet full time in '92 via modem. > Sure, free colocation space is nice, It isn't nice, it's a threat to the utility and security of the remailer. > for far less than the rent you'd pay for doing the whole job yourself, > since they have economies of scale by handling multiple colocation > customers and > also handling their own servers. True, but you take a hit on security if you don't have a personal arrangement with the provider. It also means you won't be on hand when the cops come a knocking...better use CFS or something similar. This will require having some sort of contact point for times when the system gets rebooted, it's obvious you won't give the pass phrase to the operator. There are other issues involved like the utility of having a business at home and the number of legitimate deductions that can be taken. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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AT&T Paper on Digital PCS
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Bill Stewart we offer AT&T's white paper on digital PCS which describes the system in detail and its security features: http://jya.com/digipcs.htm (70K)

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USRobotics Palm Pilot and PGP
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. Is there anybody that know if there is a PGP compiled for the Palm Pilot? I looked around but didn't find anything. As I am not, despite Tim's rants ;-) , subscribed to CP, would you please reply directly to me or to the espam(a)intertrader.com mailing list. Thanks jfa -- Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds(Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest of Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing. PGP encryption keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon http://bs.mit.edu:8001/pks-toplev.html ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Why?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jim Choate wrote: >> However, it appears that part of the problem with the remailers is >> that nobody uses them. We should be making a concerted effort to do >> so, and not just for cpunk traffic. We should use them for >> everything. It won't take that many people to reduce the message >> delays substantially. It will also advertise the remailer network to >> our friends who may not yet be cypherpunks. >> >> The tools exist to do this. > >Yes, but why would I? - From "The Unbearable Lightness of Being" by Milan Kundera Part 4, Section 2: It was a program about Czech emigration, a montage of private conversations recorded with the latest bugging devices by a Czech spy who had infiltrated the emigre community and then returned in great glory to Prague. It was insignificant prattle dotted with some harsh words about the occupation regime, but here and there one emigre would call another an imbecile or a fraud. These trivial remarks were the point of the broadcast. They were meant to prove not merely that emigres had bad things to say about the Soviet Union (which neither surprised nor upset anyone in the country), but that they call one another names and make free use of dirty words. People use filthy language all day long, but when they turn on the radio and hear a well-known personality, someone they respect, saying "fuck" in every sentence, they feel somehow let down. "It all started with Prochazka," said Tomas. Jan Prochazka, a forty-year-old Czech novelist with the strength and vitality of an ox, began criticizing public affairs vociferously even before 1968. He then became one of the best-loved figures of the Prague Spring, that dizzying liberalization of Communism which ended with the Russian invasion. Shortly after the invasion the press initiated a smear campaign against him, but the more they smeared, the more people liked him. Then (in 1970, to be exact) the Czech radio broadcast a series of private talks between Prochazka and a professor friend of his which had taken place two years before (that is, in the spring of 1968). For a long time, neither of them had any idea that the professor's flat was bugged and their every step dogged. Prochazka loved to regale his friends with hyperbole and excess. Now his excesses had become a weekly radio series. The secret police, who produced and directed the show, took pains to emphasize the sequences in which Prochazka made fun of his friends - Dubcek, for instance. People slander their friends at the drop of a hat, but they were more shocked by the much-loved Prochazka than by the much-hated secret police. Tomas turned off the radio and said, "Every country has its secret police. But a secret police that broadcasts its tapes over the radio - there's something that could happen only in Prague, something absolutely without precedent!" "I know a precedent," said Tereza. "When I was fourteen, I kept a secret diary. I was terrified that someone might read it, so I kept it hidden in the attic. Mother sniffed it out. One day at dinner, while we were all hunched over our soup, she took it out of her pocket and said, 'Listen carefully now, everybody!' And after every sentence, she burst out laughing. They all laughed so hard they couldn't eat." Part 4, Section 4: She came out into Old Town Square - the stern spires of Tyn Church, the irregular rectangle of Gothic and baroque houses. Old Town Hall, which dated from the fourteenth century and had once stretched over a whole side of the square, was in ruins and had been so for twenty-seven years. Warsaw, Dresden, Berlin, Cologne, Budapest - all were horribly scarred in the last war. But their inhabitants had built them up again and painstakingly restored the old historical sections. The people of Prague had an inferiority complex with respect to these other cities. Old Town Hall was the only monuyment of note destroyed in the war, and they decided to leave it in ruins so that no Pole or Germans could accuse them of having suffered less than their share. In front of the glorious ruins, a reminder for now and eternity of the evils perpetrated by war, stood a steel-bar reviewing stand for some demonstration or other that the Communist Party had herded the people of Prague to the day before or would be herding them to the day after. Gazing at the remains of Old Town Hall, Tereza was suddenly reminded of her mother: that perverse need one has to expose one's ruins, one's ugliness, to parade one's misery, to uncover the stump of one's amputated arm and force the whole world to look at it. Everything had begun reminding her of her mother lately. Her mother's world, which she had fled ten years before, seemed to be coming back to her, surrounding her on all sides. That was why she told Tomas that morning about how her mother had read her secret diary at the dinner table to an accompaniment of guffaws. When a private talk over a bottle of wine is broadcast on the radio, what can it mean but that the world is turning into a concentration camp? Almost from childhood, Tereza had used the term to express how she felt about life with her family. A concentration camp is a world in which people live crammed together constantly, night and day. Brutality and violence are merely secondary (and not in the least indispensable) characteristics. A concentration camp is the complete obliteration of privacy. Prochazka, who was not allowed to chat with a friend over a bottle of wine in the shelter of privacy, lived (unknown to him - a fatal error on his part!) in a concentration camp. Tereza lived in the concentration camp when she lived with her mother. Almost from childhood, she knew that a concentration camp was nothing exceptional or startling but something very basic, a given into which we are born and from which we can escape only with the greatest of efforts. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDGcUD7jyGKQlFZpAQGv1ggAg9Vmgpmai4eVBzeA0XwJSaKrnkvCJdKI KzqNNi/HUaxCMMReCR0xRLZlLz0IXfK71zCOEZib9UbuTWE84X2x2KlpcQgBRrex IoRXkT5mQ+4GSTvG6CX4ZvLYohiVO+sKXX7m8RQcOqfo1IPYwqikNMixc1Yw4U3l hO0AMxPz/gE/2beYXBNFuDRU7PIRINhHCmoOtX+xxbQDEK8d/BRUwTBhS0XnY6Ek 6e1yNsEOaGZxR9NLNo3sYaaTpAcOZCDF4WQkfywpFXcyVyHWd5HSi9Oo5r2opnvK evH9JaLE2OO7iaqEuVYay4Tv9OB6YegUNmBhp3sSmQgzrVdvtfFZiQ== =Fawj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Why? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 30 Sep 1997 22:19:09 -0400 > From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> > Subject: Why? > Jim Choate wrote: > >> so, and not just for cpunk traffic. We should use them for > >> everything. It won't take that many people to reduce the message > >> > >> The tools exist to do this. > > > >Yes, but why would I? > - From "The Unbearable Lightness of Being" by Milan Kundera > Part 4, Section 2: > > It was a program about Czech emigration, a montage of private > conversations recorded with the latest bugging devices by a Czech spy > who had infiltrated the emigre community and then returned in great > glory to Prague. It was insignificant prattle dotted with some harsh And your premise is what? - Anonymous remailers would have resolved the Czech issue? - America is currently in the same sort of situation and the use of remailers would resolve it? - Anonymous remailers guarantee that such things won't happen in the future? - Santyana was right? Obviously the first two are gibberish. There is absolutely nothing to have prevented the Czech government (or any other) from setting up anonymous remailers acting in the role of man-in-the-middle attacks subverting any conspiracies. Now the 3rd is clearly unrealistic because the issue is the respect one human being gives another in regards to their beliefs and the expression thereof. The problem is a people problem, not technology. I personaly vote for the 4th option myself. I would like to believe that through the use of commercial anonymous remailers the concept of anonymity could become ingrained in a society. That is what would help resolve issues like the above, not the remailers themselves. My original question still stands, why would I or any other party choose to use an anonymous remailer for anything other than the original 3 items I mentioned previously. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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