December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (fwd) Import restrictions for crypto code
by alexlh＠xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 17 Oct 1997, Alex Le Heux wrote: [snip] > ps. Lucky - what became of the "Brain"? Brian didn't come back to the US with Lucky as he wanted to develop strong crypto applications and did not want to have to contend with export restrictions. He currently has a desk in the offices of a major Dutch ISP, XS4ALL, so he is nice and close to the backbone and thus has great connectivity. Cheerio, Alex --- I dabble in techno-house and sometimes, I do that badass hip-hop thang... But the F U N K gets me every time!

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by web-promotions＠nevwest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Marutukku - cryptographic filing system
by Julian Assange 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Marutukku (my cryptographic file system/block device) is due for first beta sometime next week. Before release, I'd like some (strong!) criticism of the sub key generation / chaining techniques I'm using. But first, for those who haven't a frigging clue what Marutukku is, here is a hastily drawn non-cryptographic (more about that later) features list: o OS independent (excepting two files pertaining only to the kernel drivers) o Currently implemented as a 4.4bsd (Free/Net/OpenBSD) loadable kernel module, and client (I have someone working on the Linux port, but no promises). o The BSD implementation turns a file (even an NFS mounted file) into a device, on which any number of file systems types can be created in the regular manner (or even a swap partition ;) o Endian independent - Marutukku extents (the ciphertext regions) can be mailed around like .tar files o various backup/recovery/whole extent encryption/decrypt functions built into the client Marutukku supports a variety of ciphers, and the cipher used for the lattice (which is used to generate sub-keys for each file-system block) generation is independent from the cipher used for block functions. At the moment it only makes sense to talk of the lattice generator in terms of a stream cipher or a block cipher/hash algorithm in OFB. My design principles along the way have attempted as far as possible to cover as yet unknown vulnerabilities in the under-laying ciphers used with good management of IV's, salts, sub-keys, chaining etc. Some of these steps may pose no additional security in relation to certain attacks (i.e secret vs public IV's) on particular ciphers but most come at little cost compared to the encryption itself. Primary key/salt generation walk though: A pass-phrase of size (l) is requested from the user. max_keysize (256) public random key saltation bytes are generated and [saved]. (l) of these bytes then salt the key (XOR) (we don't use more than (l) to avoid any potential issues with key-correlation attacks as the salt is public). max_keysize cryptographically random bytes are produced to form the "master key". The salted pass-phrase is used to encrypt the master key, which is [saved]. The (unencrypted) master key is used to key a stream cipher (in this case that's rc4 or rc16) which is used for further key generation. Bytes [0] and [1] of the key stream output are saved for later use in creating a pass-phrase checksum (more about that later). Bytes [2] and [3] of the key stream are saved for later use in encrypting the number of stream-cipher key-generator iterations. The stream cipher is then set to stir its internal state for (t) seconds (a user supplied value). The number of iterations (i) is counted, the two LSBytes's from which are encrypted with [2] and [3] and [saved]. The reason we don't encrypt the MSB's is that they are are likely to be known-plain-text (all 0 bits to the left) which can be used for key-scanning checks. This has the annoying effect of reducing the uncertainty in the iteration count to 2^16, but I can't fathom a way around it without exposing bits of the stream output. Stream bytes [3+i] and [3+i+1] are XOR-ed with bytes [0] and [1] to provide a 16 bit key checksum and [saved]. The distance here serves to obfuscate any predictability in the key-stream generator and force the attacker though all (i) iterations to test each key (or if they are attacking directly on the internal state of the stream cipher at (i) to generate guesses at [0] as well). A public random key-salt for the two primary lattice keys are generated and [saved]. n * 2 (n=32 for a 4G file-system-block maru extent) public random sub-key lattice IV's are generated and [saved]. The public master block IV array salt is randomly generated and [saved]. Instance/Lattice generation: The saved maru saltation/IV header (above) is loaded, and the the pass-phrase is salted as before. The master key is decrypted and the key stream cipher is initialised, half the checksum is generated, the number of iterations decrypted, the generator stired, the other half of the checksum is generated and the checksum verified. The two primary lattice salts are encrypted with the key stream stream and form the primary lattice keys for the lattice fs-block sub-key generating block cipher. The n*2 lattice sub-key IV's are encrypted with the stream and form the lattice sub key array. The master block IV salt array is encrypted with the stream and forms the master block IV array. This ends the primary initialisation stage. Block key generation: The problem here is to turn a block number into a unique "sub-key" for each fs-block in such a way that frustrates possible key (or other) correlation attacks. i.e discovering the key for one block should not help the cryptanalyst in discovering the key for any other block. It is simple to generate a sub-key key-stream with a stream cipher or a block cipher operating in OFB, but storing such a construct is untenable and it is not efficient to generate on the fly (for instance, the first fs-block accessed might be the last in the maru extent, which would correlate to the last sub-key generated by the key-stream). The solution designed and employed is a binary tree based key generation approach, that can generate a cryptographically-unique block key in log2(max_blocks) steps. The author has thought of various variations on this scheme (e.g with two different cryptographic hashes, one moving left, one moving right), but see below for the variant used in Marutukku. It is simpler to visualise the sub-key generator tree "turned inside out" as a 2d lattice, two columns across and n rows down (this is also how it is implemented in Marutukku). i.e ______________________ |LEFT | RIGHT| |----------+----------| |L-SUBKEY 0|L-SUBKEY 1| |----------+----------| |L-SUBKEY 1|L-SUBKEY 2| |----------+----------| | .... | .... | |----------+----------| |L-SUBKEY n|L-SUBKEY n| |__________|__________| The journey from fs-block number to fs-block-key starts with the msb of the block number and the top of the lattice (we use the msb rather than the lsb for caching reasons. Using the lsb naively seems more secure but uncacheable, yet on closer examination, neither of theses claims are true (however the Marutukku lattice sub-key cache *performance* using lsb is poor due to the inverted clustering)). As each bit slides off the left of the block number, key material is picked up from the left or right of the lattice according to whether the bit is on or off. Each lattice sub-key chosen is encrypted with the next (CBC wise, but lattice sub-key size, rather than cipher block size) at the top of the lattice and twines it's way down to the end, collecting key-material as it goes. The result is a unique compressed (i.e its the CBC chaining performing the compression) "necklace" of key material which forms the appropriate fs-block key. FS block encryption: Each plain text block in the fs-block is XOR-ed with the corresponding entry in the master block IV array and then CBC encrypted. In effect, each cipher block has two IV's. The first block, which lacks any cipher text from previous blocks to chain with, uses the block number XOR-ed with its master block IV entry. The rational behind this is that we have the benefits of CBC's error-recovering abilities without it's major drawback (and it is certainly not alone here among major block cipher modes) - that is, find the key for (cipher) block 0 and the attacker can successfully decrypt every other block that (CBC wise) follows it. Comments? -- Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people |together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks proff(a)iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless proff(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery

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17 Dec '03

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Non-conventional
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May implied that Cpunx should develop non-conventional email. Crypto has been declared to be munitions. Nukes are non-conventional weapons. Should we be developing nuclear email? Should we 'email-nuke DC?" Prespiring minds want to know...

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Import restrictions for crypto code
by Jerry R. Brady 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, I was at hip, met some of you, camped behind the cypherpunks tent and had a blast. I'm not on the list anymore (couldn't keep up) but have a quick question which I know someone can post a quick answer back to me directly. I'd appreciate it. We have an RC540/RSA512/MD5 crypto package our customers use for the secure exchange of CAD data files with some of the automotive industry OEMs - It is a very lucrative store-and-forward system. We have a customer in Italy and I need to know if there are any import restrictions for sending the software there. We already have a GSN exemption because the international code is whimpy. Perhaps there is also an on-line resource that covers what countries have import restrictions? Any help would be appreciated, please mail directly to me. Regards, Jerry ps. Lucky - what became of the "Brain"? -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Jerry R. Brady jrb(a)autoweb.net Technical Director (v) 248.967.3738 AutoWeb Communications, Inc. (f) 248.967.3739 -=- PGP5 key at pgpkeys.mit.edu or via e-mail -=-

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Left Brain / Right Brain QUESTIONAIRE
by stargazer＠force2.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Freeh letter to NYT
by Roger Schlafly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[From www.nytimes.com, Oct. 16, 1997] To the Editor: "An Attack on Privacy Rights" (editorial, Oct. 3) argues that the approach to encryption that the law enforcement community is advocating has somehow "put the need to eavesdrop on criminals above the privacy rights of ordinary Americans." Nothing could be further from the truth. You fail to mention that the same court-ordered, judicially approved procedures that now apply to wiretaps and electronic data searches would also apply to our ability to obtain decryption keys or information. In fact, what we proposed requires two orders from a judge before we proceed, not just one as now required. There is another issue that, if unaddressed, will have public safety ramifications. Encryption that cannot be deciphered regardless of the number of court orders or new technologies obtained by the police will devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. It will nullify the ability to carry out court-authorized searches and seizures of criminal communication and electronic evidence. Policy decisions about encryption should not be left solely to market forces. Congress, the computer industry and law enforcement can work together to craft legislation that balances the public safety with the commercial and private needs of law-abiding Americans. We are not wedded to any particular solution, but feel that some workable solution can be found to insure that law enforcement can gain immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted criminal communication or electronic data that we have lawfully seized. LOUIS J. FREEH Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, Oct. 10, 1997 ---------------------------------------------------------------- How can he say this with a straight face? >In fact, what we proposed requires two orders from a judge >before we proceed, not just one as now required. The DOJ proposal, sect 302, says: (A) A Key Recovery Agent, whether or not registered by the Secretary under this Act, shall disclose recovery information stored by a person: (1) ...; or (2) to a law enforcement or national security government agency upon receipt of written authorization in a form to be specified by the Attorney General. It also contradicts his final sentence: >... some workable solution can be found to insure that law enforcement can >gain immediate access to the plaintext of encrypted criminal communication >or electronic data that we have lawfully seized. The term "immediate access" means without having to goto a judge. Roger

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what is purpose of CMR?
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a question which I am unclear on about PGP Inc's design goals in using the CMR method. Is the CMR field to allow the company to recover from the user forgetting his password? (recover his mail folder full of encrypted email). or Is the CMR field to allow the company to read the email in transit This seems like a fairly important distinction. Adam

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SSZ Down hard today... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: >From ravage(a)ssz.com Fri Oct 17 20:10:35 1997 From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> Message-Id: <199710180110.UAA00156(a)einstein.ssz.com> Subject: SSZ Down hard today... To: users(a)ssz.com (SSZ User Mail List) Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1997 20:10:34 -0500 (CDT) X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1389 Hi Folks, Not shure exactly why, doesn't seem to be related to the OS or hardware, but you obviously are aware that SSZ had some serious problems this afternoon. I suspect (wild guess at best) that it was power related in some way. Anyway, I'll be watching it all weekend. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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