December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

interesting pattern
by An Metet 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

I have noticed this lately: When someone sends mail to user(a)thisdomain.com , shortly thereafter a query comes from the ISP that runs the outgoing SMTP and loads http://www.thisdomain.com. The query does not load any images, just the base html page. It comes from IP usually in the same cloud as outgoing SMTP. Sometimes this happens only after the first mail from that ISP to thisdomain.com, sometimes every time. Is this anti-spam (why querying the recipient?), or some data harvesting and connecting the dots?

2 1

Re: Is Matel Stalinist?
by Tyler Durden 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

Ken wrote... "Tyler Durden's" GET them damn quote marks offa my name, or I'm comin' over there to stomp your pasty-white British ass!!!!! Ahem. As for Tim May's replies to my original post, he seems to have misenterpreted most of the basic gist of it. My basic point was that corporate culture (as you say) basically imitates a monarchy (or other very 'statist' structures) and as a result often prevents them from utilizing their resources properly. It would be nice to think of Borders as a counter-example, and I'd LIKE to believe that utilizing their talent-on-the-floor has helped them do so well here in the US. (Though these mega-Barnes-and-Nobles may have dented their numbers in the last few years...) -TD >From: ken <bbrow07(a)students.bbk.ac.uk> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: Re: Is Matel Stalinist? >Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 09:56:31 +0000 > >Tim May quoted Tyler Durden who wrote: > >>>Well, I wouldn't apply the word "oppressive" across the board to the >>>cultures of big companies, but the fact is that modern American coporate >>>culture more often than not imitates a top-down, 'statist' culture that >>>is so universal we rarely recognize it. > >Well, yes. Most big corporations are in effect constitutional monarchies. >Decisions are made by bureaucrats with some oversight or direction >provided by the "king" (CEO in some places, significant shareholders in >others). When it all goes totally pear-shaped owners (or more likely, the >banks) step in. > >[...] > >>The difference with government is that we do not have "polycentric" >>governments. We have a single entity, a single "corporation," which brooks >>no competition, which brooks little or no "shareholder dissent." > >Yes, but in practice a lot of big companies are just like that. Whatever >the paper ownership decisions tend to be made by a few large corporate >owners, often banks, insurance companies, pension funds and the like; >themselves run by officers and managers who share interests with the >managers who run the company they own. The situation is in some ways >analogous to "it doesn't matter who you vote for: the government always >gets in". In most large corporations the chain of responsibility back to >individual owners is so long and so flexible that there is little real >control. > >Small business is different of course. You make money or you go broke. >Very direct feedback. > >>Many here miss this point and focus on the superficial aspect that >>corporations typically have a hierarchy and that this hierarchy supposedly >>makes them like governments. Yes, in this respect. But the tens of >>thousands of corporations, the ability to form new partnerships, new >>companies, new corporations, and for some of these entities to become as >>large as past corporate giants, is what makes all the difference. > >Emotional reactions & gut feelings about this point are one of the things >that make people happier with one political camp or another. > >The state-socialism that you Americans call "liberal" tends to be >supported by people who feel that their governments are more responsive to >their needs or wants than corporations are. Conservatives US-style >libertarians are likely to feel happier with corporations than government. >The "anti-globalisation" crows and European-style left anarchists & >old-style non-Marxist socialists dislike both equally. > >If I was cynical, or a Marxist, I'd say that it has a lot to do with having >money. People whose wealth makes up a larger share of the whole than their >vote does are more likely to feel happy about corporations than they are >about representative government. > >OK, it's before noon and I've only had one cup of tea, so I'm cynical. > >[...] > >>Corporations have sales tracking software out the wazoo. If it sells, they >>buy more and sell them. Sounds like they're doing precisely what their >>owners want them to do. > >Yes, but, it might be that a corporation makes more money for its owners by >centralising and systematising and reducing the local autonomy of business >units. It's a lot easier to manage a thousand identical stores than a >hundred unique ones. So from "Tyler Durden's"'s POV there might be more >responsiveness from an independent store than a chain. > >Though like you said, that doesn't seem to apply to books. Might to food >though. _________________________________________________________________ Winterize your home with tips from MSN House & Home. http://special.msn.com/home/warmhome.armx

2 1

Re: Has this photo been de-stegoed? (and Clouds)
by Major Variola (ret) 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

At 02:35 PM 12/11/03 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: >Variola wrote... > >"How do you know the signature of the unaltered carrier-medium? >E.g., have you measured the LSBit noise from my camera recently? >Under which lighting conditions?" > >Well, having done some optical signal processing (and getting a patent in >that area, come to think of it), I imagined that most photos will naturally >have some image noise in certain frequency bands... You are *way* too FT based in your thinking. There are *many* other measurements and statistics and co-relations. And the noise I was referring to is in part electronic noise, not image noise in either the spatial freq. or poisson sense. The point being that there is info that is perceptually insignificant, that you can replace with compressed encrypted bits.

1 0

Dangerous Proxies to Avoid
by Nostradumbass＠SAFe-mail.net 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

If you use anonymous proxies it would be wise to save the list below and compare the IP's to make sure you are not surfing in shark-infested waters. I often use tools to scan for and test 'public' proxies, and other tools to chain or rotate through the best. I'm sure others of us do the same. This just underscores the need for trustworthy mixes. Single proxies (eg anonymizer.com) only hide IPs from web servers, not from 3rd party observers. They are vulnerable to black bag and legal attacks. Aparently we can safely(?) use JAP again if careful about cascade selection. But this is very slow, and slow discourages one from consistent use.... As for JAP, I used it before Privatesea came up, and i'm back down to it now that privatesea dissapeared. By using cascades that don't end at the Dresden mix, and inserting a single pseudo-public SSL proxy between JAP and the first mix, you're pretty safe. But the performance sucks. There are no other mix cascades or meshes that I know of. Lots of single proxies, but that's not safe at all. And you are often having to find and setup another when they get hammered down or start blocking the public. An updated list, current as of 5 October: 6.*.*.* : Army Information Systems Center 21.*.*.* : US Defense Information Systems Agency 6.*.*.* : Army Information Systems Center 21.*.*.* : US Defense Information Systems Agency 22.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 26.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 29.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 30.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 49.*.*.* : Joint Tactical Command 50.*.*.* : Joint Tactical Command 55.*.*.* : Army National Guard Bureau 22.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 26.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 29.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 30.*.*.* : Defense Information Systems Agency 49.*.*.* : Joint Tactical Command 50.*.*.* : Joint Tactical Command 55.*.*.* : Army National Guard Bureau 62.0-30.*.* : 64.224.*.* : 64.225.*.* : 64.226.*.* : 195.10.* : 199.121.4.* - 199.121.253.* Naval Air Systems Command, VA (NETBLK-NALC-P3) 204.34.*.* - 204.34.254.0 Navy Environmental Preventive Medicine (NET-NEPMU6-BUMED) 205.96-103.* : 207.30-120.* : 207.60-61.* : FBI Linux server used to trap scanners 209.35.*.* : 210.124*.* - Korean 212.143 * Israeli government ISP -- dont try those ranges!! 212.149.* Israeli government ISP -- dont try those ranges!! 212.179.* Israeli government ISP -- dont try those ranges!! 212.199 012.* Israeli government ISP -- dont try those ranges!! 213.8.*.* Israeli government ISP -- dont try those ranges!! 216.248.*.* VERY DANGEROUS 216.25.* VERY DANGEROUS 216.94.*.* 216.25.* : VERY DANGEROUS 216.247.* : VERY DANGEROUS 217.6.*.* : VERY DANGEROUS 155.7.*.* : American Forces Information (NET-AFISHQ-NET1) 155.8.*.* : U.S. ArmyFort Gordon (NET-GORDON-NET5) 155.9.*.* : United States Army Information Systems Command (NET-LWOOD-NET2) 155.74.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP2) 155.75.*.* : US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP3) 155.76.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP4) 155.77.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP5) 155.78.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP6) 155.79.*.* : US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP7) 155.80.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP 155.81.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP9) 155.82.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP10) 155.83.*.* : US Army Corps of Enginers (NET-CEAP11) 155.84.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP12) 155.85.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP13) 155.86.*.* : US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP14) 155.87.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP15) 155.88.*.* : PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP16) 155.178.*.* : Federal Aviation Administration (NET-FAA) 155.213.*.* : USAISC Fort Benning (NET-FTBENNNET3 155.214.*.* : Director of Information Management (NET-CARSON-TCACC ) 155.215.*.* : USAISC-FT DRUM (NET-DRUM-TCACCIS) 155.216.*.* : TCACCIS Project Management Office (NET-FTDIX-TCACCI) 155.217.*.* : Directorate of Information Management (NET- EUSTIS-EMH1) 155.218.*.* : USAISC (NET-WVA-EMH2) 155.219.*.* : DOIM/USAISC Fort Sill (NET-SILL-TCACCIS) 155.220.*.* : USAISC-DOIM (NET-FTKNOX-NET4) 155.221.*.* : USAISC-Ft Ord (NET-FTORD-NET2) 128.47.*.* : Army Communications Electronics Command (NET-TACTNET) 128.50.*.* : Department of Defense (NET-COINS) 128.51.*.* : Department of Defense (NET-COINSTNET) 128.56.*.* : U.S. Naval Academy (NET-USNA-NET) 128.63.*.* : Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (NET-BRL-SUBNET) 128.80.*.* : Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) (NET-CECOMNET) 128.98.*.* to 128.98.255.255: Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (NET-DERA-UK) 128.154.*.* : NASA Wallops Flight Facility (NET-WFF-NET) 128.155.*.* : NASA Langley Research Center (NET-LARC-NET) 128.156.*.* : NASA Lewis Network Control Center (NET- LERC) 128.157.*.* : NASA Johnson Space Center (NET-JSC-NET) 128.158.*.* : NASA Ames Research Center (NET-MSFC-NET) 128.159.*.* : NASA Ames Research Center (NET-KSC-NET) 128.160.*.* : Naval Research Laboratory (NET- SSCNET) 128.161.*.* : NASA Ames Research Center (NET-NSN-NET) 128.183.*.* : NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (NET-GSFC) 128.216.*.* : MacDill Air Force Base (NET-CC-PRNET) 128.217.*.* : NASA Kennedy Space Center (NET-NASA-KSC-OIS) 128.236.*.* : U.S. Air Force Academy (NET-USAFA-NET 132.3.*.* to 132.225.*.* Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (NET-AECL-RCNET) 134.11.*.* The Pentagon (NET-PENTNET) 134.12.*.* NASA Ames Research Center (NET-RIACS-B-NET) 134.164.*.* Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station (NET-USAEWESNET) 134.165.*.* Headquarters Air Force Space Command (NET-SPACENET1) 134.229.*.* Navy Regional Data Automation Center (NET- REGION-PEN1) 134.230.*.* Navy Regional Data Automation Center (NET- CONCGY-PENS2) 134.232.*.* - 134.232.255.255 U.S. Army, Eu 134.5.*.* Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company (NET-LASC) 134.51.*.* Boeing Military Aircraft Facility (NET-BOE-MIL) 134.52.*.* Boeing Corporation (NET-BOE-GIS) 134.78.*.* Army Information Systems Command-ATCOM (NET-AVTROS-NET) 136.149.*.* Air Force Military Personnel Center (NET-AFMPC-LAN) 139.142.*.* : 139.142.153.23 : Front end portal of a security network filtering hundreds of client subscription IPs. If you find a vulnerable pub,IIS, SQL, or *nix -- LEAVE IT ALONE FBI's honeypot HoneyNet Project http://project.honeynet.org/ Know your Ennemy : HoneyNets http://project.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/ SANS IDS FAQ : What is Honeypot ? http://www.sans.org/newlook/resourc...Q/honeypot3.htm Honey Pots and Intrusion Detection http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/intrusion/honeypots.htm The Deception Toolkit http://www.all.net/dtk/index.html An Explanation of Computer Forensic http://www.computerforensics.net/forensics.htm Computer Forensics An Overview http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/incident/forensics.htm The Forensic Challenge http://project.honeynet.org/challenge/ Forensic Computer Analysis - An Introduction http://www.ddj.com/articles/2000/0009/0009f/0009f.htm The Coroner Toolkit http://www.fish.com/tct/ 207.60.*.* : (FBI's honeypot) The Internet Access Company (NETBLK-TIAC-BLK) 207.60.2.128 - 207.60.2.255 Abacus Technology (NETBLK-TIAC-ABACUSTC) 64.224.* : (FBI's honeypot) 64.225.* : (FBI's honeypot) 64.226.* : (FBI's honeypot) 195.10.* : (FBI's honeypot) 205.96-103.* : (FBI's honeypot) 207.30-120.* : (FBI's honeypot) 207.60-61.* : (FBI's honeypot) 209.35.* : (FBI's honeypot) 216.25.* : (FBI's honeypot) INTERLAND --- hosts DoD 216.247.* : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.40.211 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.41.173 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.0.2 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.1.1 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.1.4 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.1.5 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.56.107.22 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.0.2 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.159.33.56 : (FBI's honeypot) 212.56.107.22 : (FBI's honeypot) 139.142.*.* : 139.142.153.23 : Front end portal of a security network filtering hundreds of client subscription IPs. If you find a vulnerable pub, IIS, SQL, or *nix -- LEAVE IT ALONE 207.60.0.0 - 207.60.255.0 The Internet Access Company (NETBLK-TIAC-BLK) 207.60.2.128 - 207.60.2.255 Abacus Technology (NETBLK-TIAC-ABACUSTC) 207.60.3.0 - 207.60.3.127 Mass Electric Construction Co. (NETBLK-TIAC-MECC56-2) 207.60.3.128 - 207.60.3.255 Peabody Proberties Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-PEABISDN1) 207.60.4.0 - 207.60.4.127 Northern Electronics (NETBLK-TIAC-NORTHERELEC) 207.60.4.128 - 207.60.4.255 Posternak, Blankstein & Lund (NETBLK-TIAC-PBL56) 207.60.5.64 - 207.60.5.127 Woodard & Curran (NETBLK-TIAC-WCPORT) 207.60.5.192 - 207.60.5.255 On Line Services (NETBLK-TIAC-ONLINES-1) 207.60.6.0 - 207.60.6.63 The 400 Group (NETBLK-TIAC-400T1) 207.60.6.64 - 207.60.6.127 RD Hunter and Company (NETBLK-TIAC-RDHUNTER2) 207.60.6.128 - 207.60.6.191 Louis Berger and Associates (NETBLK-TIAC-BERISDN) 207.60.6.192 - 207.60.6.255 Ross-Simons (NETBLK-TIAC-ROSIMONS) 207.60.7.0 - 207.60.7.63 Eastern Cambridge Savings Bank (NETBLK-TIAC-ECSB) 207.60.7.64 - 207.60.7.127 Greater Lawrence Community Action Committee (NETBLK-TIAC-GLCAC12 207.60.7.128 - 207.60.7.191 Data Electronic Devices, Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-DEDI) 207.60.8.0 - 207.60.8.255 Sippican (NETBLK-TIAC-SIPPICAN) 207.60.9.0 - 207.60.9.31 Alps Sportswear Mfg Co (NETBLK-TIAC-ALPISDN) 207.60.9.32 - 207.60.9.63 Escher Group Ltd (NETBLK-TIAC-ESCHERT1-2) 207.60.9.64 - 207.60.9.95 West Suburban Elder (NETBLK-TIAC-WESTISDN) 207.60.9.96 - 207.60.9.127 Central Bank (NETBLK-TIAC-CENTRALT) 207.60.9.128 - 207.60.9.159 Danick Systems (NETBLK-TIAC-DCS12 207.60.9.160 - 207.60.9.191 Alps Sportswear Mfg CO (NETBLK-TIAC-ALPSISDN) 207.60.9.192 - 207.60.9.223 BSCC (NETBLK-TIAC-BSCC) 207.60.13.16 - 207.60.13.23 Patrons Insurance Group (NETBLK-TIAC-PATRON99) 207.60.13.40 - 207.60.13.47 Athera Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-ATHERA1) 207.60.13.48 - 207.60.13.55 Service Edge Partners Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-SERVISDN-2) 207.60.13.56 - 207.60.13.63 Massachusetts Credit Union League (NETBLK-TIAC-MCUL384) 207.60.13.64 - 207.60.13.71 SierraCom (NETBLK-TIAC-SIER384K) 207.60.13.72 - 207.60.13.79 AI/ FOCS (NETBLK-TIAC-AIFOC384) 207.60.13.80 - 207.60.13.87 Extreme soft (NETBLK-TIAC-DOWNIE) 207.60.13.96 - 207.60.13.103 Eaton Seo Corp (NETBLK-TIAC-EATON) 207.60.13.112 - 207.60.13.119 C. White (NETBLK-TIAC-PETROL) 207.60.13.120 - 207.60.13.127 Athera (NETBLK-TIAC-ATHERA-2) 207.60.13.128 - 207.60.13.135 Entropic Systems, INC (NETBLK-TIAC-ENTRO12 207.60.13.136 - 207.60.13.143 Wood Product Manufactureds Associates (NETBLK-TIAC-WOOD56) 207.60.13.160 - 207.60.13.167 Jamestown Distribution (NETBLK-TIAC-JAMES56) 207.60.13.168 - 207.60.13.175 C&M Computers (NETBLK-TIAC-CRAMB-2 ) 207.60.13.176 - 207.60.13.183 ABC Used Auto Parts (NETBLK-TIAC-ABC56K) 207.60.13.184 - 207.60.13.191 Tomas Weldon (NETBLK-TIAC-TWELDON) 207.60.13.192 - 207.60.13.199 Tage Inns (NETBLK-TIAC-TAGE) 207.60.13.200 - 207.60.13.207 Control Module Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-CMOD56K) 207.60.13.208 - 207.60.13.215 Hyper Crawler Information Systems (NETBLK-TIAC-HCRAWLER) 207.60.13.216 - 207.60.13.223 Eastern Bearings (NETBLK-TIAC-EB56K) 207.60.13.224 - 207.60.13.231 North Shore Data Services (NETBLK-TIAC-NSDS) 207.60.13.232 - 207.60.13.239 Mas New Hampshire (NETBLK-TIAC-MASISDN) 207.60.14.0 - 207.60.14.255 J. A. Webster (NETBLK-TIAC-JAWFRT1-2) 207.60.15.0 - 207.60.15.127 Trilogic (NETBLK-TIAC-LOGIC384) 207.60.16.0 - 207.60.16.255 Area 54 (NETBLK-TIAC-AREA54) 207.60.18.0 - 207.60.18.63 Vested Development Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-VESTEDT-2) 207.60.18.64 - 207.60.18.127 Conventures (NETBLK-TIAC-CON56-2) 207.60.21.0 - 207.60.21.255 Don Law Company (NETBLK-TIAC-DONLAWT1-2) 207.60.22.0 - 207.60.22.255 Advanced Microsensors (NETBLK-TIAC-AMS384) 207.60.28.0 - 207.60.28.63 Applied Business Center (NETBLK-TIAC-APP56K-2) 207.60.28.64 - 207.60.28.127 Color and Design Exchange (NETBLK-TIAC-COLOR-2) 207.60.36.8 - 207.60.36.15 Shaun McCusker (NETBLK-TIAC-FINLAY) 207.60.36.16 - 207.60.36.23 Town of Framingham (NETBLK-TIAC-INFOSERV) 207.60.36.24 - 207.60.36.31 AB Software (NETBLK-TIAC-ABSADSL) 207.60.36.32 - 207.60.36.39 Seabass Dreams Too Much, Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-SEABASS) 207.60.36.40 - 207.60.36.47 Next Ticketing (NETBLK-TIAC-NT256T1-2) 207.60.36.48 - 207.60.36.55 Dulsi (NETBLK-TIAC-DULSI) 207.60.36.56 - 207.60.36.63 The Internet Access Company (NETBLK-TIAC-PTIMJ) 207.60.36.64 - 207.60.36.71 Maguire Group (NETBLK-TIAC-MAGISDN) 207.60.36.72 - 207.60.36.79 Cogenex (NETBLK-TIAC-COGENEX-2) 207.60.36.88 - 207.60.36.95 AKNDC (NETBLK-TIAC-AKNDC) 207.60.36.96 - 207.60.36.103 McGovern election commitee (NETBLK-TIAC-MCGOVDED) 207.60.36.104 - 207.60.36.111 Digital Equipment Corp (NETBLK-TIAC-DECISDN) 207.60.36.112 - 207.60.36.119 PTR - Precision Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-PTREB) 207.60.36.120 - 207.60.36.127 Extech (NETBLK-TIAC-EXTECH-2) 207.60.36.128 - 207.60.36.135 Manfreddi Architects (NETBLK-TIAC-MANELKUS-2) 207.60.36.144 - 207.60.36.151 Parent Naffah (NETBLK-TIAC-PARENT) 207.60.36.152 - 207.60.36.159 Darling Dolls Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-EMARTEL) 207.60.36.160 - 207.60.36.167 Wright Communications (NETBLK-TIAC-WRIGHT56) 207.60.36.168 - 207.60.36.175 Principle Software (NETBLK-TIAC-PRINCIPL) 207.60.36.176 - 207.60.36.183 Chris Pet Store (NETBLK-TIAC-CPETDIAL) 207.60.36.184 - 207.60.36.191 Fifteen Lilies (NETBLK-TIAC-GREYROSE) 207.60.36.192 - 207.60.36.199 All-Com Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-ALLCOM1-2) 207.60.37.0 - 207.60.37.31 Cardio Thoracic Surgical Associates, P. A. (NETBLK-TIAC-HEARTDOC) 207.60.37.32 - 207.60.37.63 Preferred Fixtures Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-PREFMFG-2) 207.60.37.64 - 207.60.37.95 Apple and Eve Distributors (NETBLK-TIAC-AEDED99) 207.60.37.96 - 207.60.37.127 Nelson Copy Supply (NETBLK-TIAC-NCOP56K) 207.60.37.128 - 207.60.37.159 Boston Optical Fiber (NETBLK-TIAC-BOSISDN) 207.60.37.192 - 207.60.37.223 Fantasia&Company (NETBLK-TIAC-FANTCOMP) 207.60.41.0 - 207.60.41.255 Infoactive (NETBLK-TIAC-INFOACT-2) 207.60.48.0 - 207.60.48.255 Curry College (NETBLK-TIAC-CURRY) 207.60.62.32 - 207.60.62.63 Alternate Power Source (NETBLK-TIAC-APSIS) 207.60.62.64 - 207.60.62.95 Keystone Howley-White (NETBLK-TIAC-KEYSTONE-2) 207.60.62.128 - 207.60.62.159 Bridgehead Associates LTD (NETBLK-TIAC-BRIDG384) 207.60.62.160 - 207.60.62.191 County Supply (NETBLK-TIAC-CS384) 207.60.62.192 - 207.60.62.223 NH Board of Nursing (NETBLK-TIAC-NHBNDED99) 207.60.64.0 - 207.60.64.63 Diversified Wireless Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-LAUCHAM) 207.60.64.64 - 207.60.64.127 Phytera (NETBLK-TIAC-PHYTERA1) 207.60.66.0 - 207.60.66.15 The Network Connection (NETBLK-TIAC-TNC56) 207.60.66.16 - 207.60.66.31 Young Refrigeration (NETBLK-TIAC-YRDED135) 207.60.66.32 - 207.60.66.47 Vision Appraisal Technology (NETBLK-TIAC-VISIONT1) 207.60.66.48 - 207.60.66.63 EffNet Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-EFFNETT1) 207.60.66.64 - 207.60.66.79 Entropic Systems Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-ENTRO128-3) 207.60.66.80 - 207.60.66.95 Finley Properties (NETBLK-TIAC-FPDED135) 207.60.66.96 - 207.60.66.111 Nancy Plowman Associates (NETBLK-TIAC-NPAISDN) 207.60.66.112 - 207.60.66.127 Northeast Financial Strategies (NETBLK-TIAC-NFSISDN) 207.60.66.128 - 207.60.66.143 Textnology Corp (NETBLK-TIAC-TEXTC0RP) 207.60.66.144 - 207.60.66.159 Groton Neochem LLC (NETBLK-TIAC-NEOCHEM) 207.60.66.160 - 207.60.66.175 Tab Computers (NETBLK-TIAC-TCSI3) 207.60.66.176 - 207.60.66.191 Patrons Insurance (NETBLK-TIAC-PATRON99-2) 207.60.66.192 - 207.60.66.207 Chair City Web (NETBLK-TIAC-CHAIR56K) 207.60.66.208 - 207.60.66.223 Radex, Inc. (NETBLK-TIAC-RADEXINC ) 207.60.66.224 - 207.60.66.239 Robert Austein (NETBLK-TIAC-HACTRN) 207.60.66.240 - 207.60.66.255 Hologic Inc. (NETBLK-TIAC-HOLOGIC3) 207.60.71.64 - 207.60.71.127 K-Tech International Inc. (NETBLK-TIAC-KTECH) 207.60.71.128 - 207.60.71.191 Pan Communications (NETBLK-TIAC-PANCOM-2) 207.60.71.192 - 207.60.71.255 New England College of Finance (NETBLK-TIAC-NECF56K) 207.60.75.128 - 207.60.75.255 Absolve Technology (NETBLK-TIAC-ABSOLVE-2) 207.60.78.0 - 207.60.78.127 Extech (NETBLK-TIAC-EXTECH) 207.60.78.128 - 207.60.78.255 The Insight Group (NETBLK-TIAC-MFIA) 207.60.83.0 - 207.60.83.255 JLM Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-JLMISDN) 207.60.84.0 - 207.60.84.255 Strategic Solutions (NETBLK-TIAC-STRATSOL-2) 207.60.94.0 - 207.60.94.15 McWorks (NETBLK-TIAC-MCWORKSS) 207.60.94.32 - 207.60.94.47 Rooney RealEstate (NETBLK-TIAC-ROONEY56) 207.60.94.48 - 207.60.94.63 Joseph Limo Service (NETBLK-TIAC-JOLIMO56) 207.60.94.64 - 207.60.94.79 The Portico Group (NETBLK-TIAC-PORT56K) 207.60.94.80 - 207.60.94.95 Event Travel Management Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-EVENT384) 207.60.94.96 - 207.60.94.111 Intellitech International (NETBLK-TIAC-IIDED99) 207.60.94.128 - 207.60.94.143 Orion Partners (NETBLK-TIAC-ORION56) 207.60.94.144 - 207.60.94.159 Rainbow Software Solution (NETBLK-TIAC-RAIN99) 207.60.94.160 - 207.60.94.175 Grason Stadler Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-GRASON56) 207.60.94.192 - 207.60.94.207 Donnegan System (NETBLK-TIAC-DYST384-2) 207.60.95.1 - 207.60.95.255 The Iprax Corp. (NETBLK-TIAC-IPRAX56K) 207.60.102.0 - 207.60.102.63 Coporate IT (NETBLK-TIAC-CIT) 207.60.102.64 - 207.60.102.127 Putnam Technologies (NETBLK-TIAC-PUTTECH) 207.60.102.128 - 207.60.102.191 Sycamore Networks, Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-SYCAISDN) 207.60.102.192 - 207.60.102.255 Bostek (NETBLK-TIAC-BOSTEK) 207.60.103.128 - 207.60.103.255 Louis Berger and Associates (NETBLK-TIAC-BERGISDN) 207.60.104.128 - 207.60.104.191 Hanson Data Systems (NETBLK-TIAC-HHANSON) 207.60.106.128 - 207.60.106.255 Giganet Inc. (NETBLK-TIAC-GIGANET-3) 207.60.107.0 - 207.60.107.255 Roll Systems (NETBLK-TIAC-ROLLISDN) 207.60.108.8 - 207.60.108.15 InternetQA (NETBLK-TIAC-EBENNETT) 207.60.111.0 - 207.60.111.31 Reading Cooperative Bank (NETBLK-TIAC-READ56K) 207.60.111.32 - 207.60.111.63 Edco collaborative (NETBLK-TIAC-EDCOT1) 207.60.111.64 - 207.60.111.95 DTC Communications Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-DTCCOM2) 207.60.111.96 - 207.60.111.127 Mike Line (NETBLK-TIAC-MLINE ) 207.60.111.128 - 207.60.111.159 The Steppingstone Foundation (NETBLK-TIAC-STEP56) 207.60.111.160 - 207.60.111.191 Caton Connector (NETBLK-TIAC-CATON118K) 207.60.111.192 - 207.60.111.223 Refron, Inc (NETBLK-TIAC-REFRON1 ) 207.60.111.224 - 207.60.111.255 Dolabany Comm Group (NETBLK-TIAC-DCGDED99) 207.60.112.0 - 207.60.112.255 207.60.116.0 - 207.60.116.255 207.60.122.16 - 207.60.122.23 207.60.122.24 - 207.60.122.31 207.60.122.32 - 207.60.122.39 207.60.122.40 - 207.60.122.47 207.60.122.48 - 207.60.122.55 207.60.122.56 - 207.60.122.63 207.60.122.64 - 207.60.122.71 207.60.122.72 - 207.60.122.79 207.60.122.80 - 207.60.122.87 207.60.122.88 - 207.60.122.95 207.60.122.96 - 207.60.122.103 207.60.122.104 - 207.60.122.111 207.60.127.0 207.60.128.0 - 207.60.128.255 207.60.129.0 - 207.60.129.255 207.60.129.64 - 207.60.129.127 207.60.129.128 - 207.60.129.191 207.60.129.192 - 207.60.129.255 207.30.* - 207.120.* 207.60.* - 207.61.* 205.96.* - 205.103.* 209.35.* 216.25.* 216.247.* VERY DANGEROUS 64.224.* 64.225.* 64.226.* 195.10.* 62.0.0.1 - 62.30.255.255 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.159.33.56 212.159.40.211 212.159.41.173 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.56.107.22 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.159.33.56 212.159.40.211 212.159.41.173 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.56.107.22 The IP listed below is a fake front end portal of a security network filtering hundreds of client subscription IPs. If you find a vulnerable pub, IIS, SQL, or *nix -- LEAVE IT ALONE. AVOID THIS RANGE: 139.142.* WARNING: Replicon's security team is working close with federal/state and corporate law enforcement. They will let you scan, tag, fill, or overtake the entire system. But you really have no control. They are monitoring you, accepting your every move while they profile you. Your dumbass is on Candid Camera. (The *nix box that you 'overtake' is actually a guided security emulator that runs on NT...) Let 'em record you ploppin' the newest, unrealeased version of Photoshop, Windows, Lightwave. Max, Maya, Cosmo, or others and you (as well as everyone else involved in the operation - from Scanner to Downloader) will be 'profiled' for a very unhappy future.... 6.*.*.* - Army Information Systems Center 21.*.*.* - US Defense Information Systems Agency 22.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 26.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 29.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 30.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 49.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 50.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 55.*.*.* - Army National Guard Bureau 64.224.*.* 64.225.*.* 64.226.*.* 209.35.*.* 216.247.*.* 216.25.*.* VERY DANGEROUS 217.6.*.* 155.7.0.0 American Forces Information (NET-AFISHQ-NET1) 155.8.0.0 U.S. ArmyFort Gordon (NET-GORDON-NET5) 155.9.0.0 United States Army Information Systems Command (NET-LWOOD-NET2) 155.74.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP2) 155.75.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP3) 155.76.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP4) 155.77.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP5) 155.78.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP6) 155.79.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP7) 155.80.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP 155.81.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP9) 155.82.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP10) 155.83.0.0 US Army Corps of Enginers (NET-CEAP11) 155.84.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP12) 155.85.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP13) 155.86.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP14) 155.87.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP15) 155.88.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP16) 155.178.0.0 Federal Aviation Administration (NET-FAA) 155.213.0.0 USAISC Fort Benning (NET-FTBENNNET3 155.214.0.0 Director of Information Management (NET-CARSON-TCACC ) 155.215.0.0 USAISC-FT DRUM (NET-DRUM-TCACCIS) 155.216.0.0 TCACCIS Project Management Office (NET-FTDIX-TCACCI) 155.217.0.0 Directorate of Information Management (NET- EUSTIS-EMH1) 155.218.0.0 USAISC (NET-WVA-EMH2) 155.219.0.0 DOIM/USAISC Fort Sill (NET-SILL-TCACCIS) 155.220.0.0 USAISC-DOIM (NET-FTKNOX-NET4) 155.221.0.0 USAISC-Ft Ord (NET-FTORD-NET2) 128.47.*.* Army Communications Electronics Command (NET-TACTNET) 128.50.*.* Department of Defense (NET-COINS) 128.51.*.* Department of Defense (NET-COINSTNET) 128.56.*.* U.S. Naval Academy (NET-USNA-NET) 128.63.*.* Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (NET-BRL-SUBNET) 128.80.*.* Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) (NET-CECOMNET) 128.98.*.* - 128.98.255.255 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (NET-DERA-UK) 128.154.0.0 NASA Wallops Flight Facility (NET-WFF-NET) 128.155.0.0 NASA Langley Research Center (NET-LARC-NET) 128.156.0.0 NASA Lewis Network Control Center (NET- LERC) 128.157.0.0 NASA Johnson Space Center (NET-JSC-NET) 128.158.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-MSFC-NET) 128.159.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-KSC-NET) 128.160.0.0 Naval Research Laboratory (NET- SSCNET) 128.161.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-NSN-NET) 128.183.0.0 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (NET-GSFC) 128.216.0.0 MacDill Air Force Base (NET-CC-PRNET) 128.217.0.0 NASA Kennedy Space Center (NET-NASA-KSC-OIS) 128.236.0.0 U.S. Air Force Academy (NET-USAFA-NET) 30.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 49.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 50.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 55.*.*.* - Army National Guard Bureau 64.224.*.* 64.225.*.* 64.226.*.* 209.35.*.* 216.247.*.* 216.25.*.* 217.6.*.* 155.7.0.0 American Forces Information (NET-AFISHQ-NET1) 155.8.0.0 U.S. ArmyFort Gordon (NET-GORDON-NET5) 155.9.0.0 United States Army Information Systems Command (NET-LWOOD-NET2) 155.74.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP2) 155.75.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP3) 155.76.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP4) 155.77.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP5) 155.78.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP6) 155.79.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP7) 155.80.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP 155.81.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP9) 155.82.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP10) 155.83.0.0 US Army Corps of Enginers (NET-CEAP11) 155.84.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP12) 155.85.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP13) 155.86.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP14) 155.87.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP15) 155.88.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP16) 155.178.0.0 Federal Aviation Administration (NET-FAA) 155.213.0.0 USAISC Fort Benning (NET-FTBENNNET3 155.214.0.0 Director of Information Management (NET-CARSON-TCACC ) 155.215.0.0 USAISC-FT DRUM (NET-DRUM-TCACCIS) 155.216.0.0 TCACCIS Project Management Office (NET-FTDIX-TCACCI) 155.217.0.0 Directorate of Information Management (NET- EUSTIS-EMH1) 155.218.0.0 USAISC (NET-WVA-EMH2) 155.219.0.0 DOIM/USAISC Fort Sill (NET-SILL-TCACCIS) 155.220.0.0 USAISC-DOIM (NET-FTKNOX-NET4) 155.221.0.0 USAISC-Ft Ord (NET-FTORD-NET2) 128.47.0.0 Army Communications Electronics Command (NET-TACTNET) 128.50.0.0 Department of Defense (NET-COINS) 128.51.0.0 Department of Defense (NET-COINSTNET) 128.56.0.0 U.S. Naval Academy (NET-USNA-NET) 128.63.0.0 Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (NET-BRL-SUBNET) 128.80.0.0 Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) (NET-CECOMNET) 128.98.0.0 - 128.98.255.255 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (NET-DERA-UK) 128.154.0.0 NASA Wallops Flight Facility (NET-WFF-NET) 128.155.0.0 NASA Langley Research Center (NET-LARC-NET) 128.156.0.0 NASA Lewis Network Control Center (NET- LERC) 128.157.0.0 NASA Johnson Space Center (NET-JSC-NET) 128.158.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-MSFC-NET) 128.159.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-KSC-NET) 128.160.0.0 Naval Research Laboratory (NET- SSCNET) 128.161.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-NSN-NET) 128.183.0.0 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (NET-GSFC) 128.216.0.0 MacDill Air Force Base (NET-CC-PRNET) 128.217.0.0 NASA Kennedy Space Center (NET-NASA-KSC-OIS) 128.236.0.0 U.S. Air Force Academy (NET-USAFA-NET) Don't scan these ranges..... 207.60.x.x and 207.61.x.x - FBI Linux servers used to trap scanners 64.224.* 64.225.* 64.226.* 195.10.* 205.96.* - 205.103.* 207.30.* - 207.120.* 207.60.* - 207.61.* 209.35.* 216.25.* <-- VERY DANGEROUS 216.247.* <-- VERY DANGEROUS 62.0.0.1 - 62.30.255.255 Avoid These Ranges: 64.224.* 64.225.* 64.226.* 195.10.* 205.96.* - 205.103.* 207.30.* - 207.120.* 207.60.* - 207.61.* 209.35.* 216.25.* 216.247.* 62.0.0.1 - 62.30.255.255 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.159.33.56 212.159.40.211 212.159.41.173 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.56.107.22 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.159.33.56 212.159.40.211 212.159.41.173 212.159.0.2 212.159.1.1 212.159.1.4 212.159.1.5 212.56.107.22 DANGEROUS IP RANGES 6.*.*.* - Army Information Systems Center 21.*.*.* - US Defense Information Systems Agency 22.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 26.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 29.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 30.*.*.* - Defense Information Systems Agency 49.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 50.*.*.* - Joint Tactical Command 53.*.*.* DaimlerChrysler AG 55.*.*.* - Army National Guard Bureau 62.0.0.1 - 62.30.255.255 64.224.*.* 64.225.*.* 64.226.*.* 128.47.0.0 Army Communications Electronics Command (NET-TACTNET) 128.50.0.0 Department of Defense (NET-COINS) 128.51.0.0 Department of Defense (NET-COINSTNET) 128.56.0.0 U.S. Naval Academy (NET-USNA-NET) 128.63.0.0 Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (NET-BRL-SUBNET) 128.80.0.0 Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) (NET-CECOMNET) 128.98.0.0 - 128.98.255.255 Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (NET-DERA-UK) 128.154.0.0 NASA Wallops Flight Facility (NET-WFF-NET) 128.155.0.0 NASA Langley Research Center (NET-LARC-NET) 128.156.0.0 NASA Lewis Network Control Center (NET- LERC) 128.157.0.0 NASA Johnson Space Center (NET-JSC-NET) 128.158.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-MSFC-NET) 128.159.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-KSC-NET) 128.160.0.0 Naval Research Laboratory (NET- SSCNET) 128.161.0.0 NASA Ames Research Center (NET-NSN-NET) 128.183.0.0 NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (NET-GSFC) 128.216.0.0 MacDill Air Force Base (NET-CC-PRNET) 128.217.0.0 NASA Kennedy Space Center (NET-NASA-KSC-OIS) 128.236.0.0 U.S. Air Force Academy (NET-USAFA-NET) 155.7.0.0 American Forces Information (NET-AFISHQ-NET1) 155.8.0.0 U.S. ArmyFort Gordon (NET-GORDON-NET5) 155.9.0.0 United States Army Information Systems Command (NET-LWOOD-NET2) 155.74.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP2) 155.75.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP3) 155.76.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP4) 155.77.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP5) 155.78.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP6) 155.79.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP7) 155.80.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP 155.81.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP9) 155.82.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP10) 155.83.0.0 US Army Corps of Enginers (NET-CEAP11) 155.84.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP12) 155.85.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP13) 155.86.0.0 US Army Corps of Engineers (NET-CEAP14) 155.87.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP15) 155.88.0.0 PEO STAMIS (NET-CEAP16) 155.178.0.0 Federal Aviation Administration (NET-FAA) 155.213.0.0 USAISC Fort Benning (NET-FTBENNNET3 155.214.0.0 Director of Information Management (NET-CARSON-TCACC ) 155.215.0.0 USAISC-FT DRUM (NET-DRUM-TCACCIS) 155.216.0.0 TCACCIS Project Management Office (NET-FTDIX-TCACCI) 155.217.0.0 Directorate of Information Management (NET- EUSTIS-EMH1) 155.218.0.0 USAISC (NET-WVA-EMH2) 155.219.0.0 DOIM/USAISC Fort Sill (NET-SILL-TCACCIS) 155.220.0.0 USAISC-DOIM (NET-FTKNOX-NET4) 155.221.0.0 USAISC-Ft Ord (NET-FTORD-NET2) 195.10.* 205.96.* - 205.103.* 207.30.* - 207.120.* 207.60.* - 207.61.* - FBI Linux server used to trap scanners 209.35.* 216.25.* <-- VERY DANGEROUS 216.247.* <-- VERY DANGEROUS 217.6.*.*

2 1

LAPD captain busted for selling bootleg DVDs
by Major Variola (ret.) 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

December 10, 2003 Just days after Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton pledged a crackdown on motion picture piracy, department investigators on Tuesday helped arrest an LAPD captain suspected of selling bootleg DVDs. Julie D. Nelson, a decorated patrol captain and a 28-year veteran of the Los Angeles Police Department, was arrested at the Hollywood station following a sting operation in which she allegedly sold counterfeit film titles such as "The Cat in the Hat" to undercover officers. http://www.latimes.com/news/local/orange/la-me-dvd10dec10,1,6566326.story?c…

1 0

Cryptophone delivers source
by Eugen Leitl 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

http://www.cryptophone.de/html/downloads_en.html -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

2 1

Re: Has this photo been de-stegoed? (and Clouds)
by Tyler Durden 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

Variola wrote... "How do you know the signature of the unaltered carrier-medium? E.g., have you measured the LSBit noise from my camera recently? Under which lighting conditions?" Well, having done some optical signal processing (and getting a patent in that area, come to think of it), I imagined that most photos will naturally have some image noise in certain frequency bands...this noise would not have to have anything to do with your camera or whatever, but is probably a function of what's in the image. For instance, a picture of a naked girl standing in front of drywall probably has very little useful image energy in spatial frequencies represented down at the length of a pixel. In a spatial fft there's probably a lot of low frequency white noise for a while, until you get to the level of the shorter body hairs and whatnot. And then there may be spatial freuency bands between that and her height that are nearly unoccupied with image energy. >From a spatial/fft perspective I imagined that this is where stego'd information goes. I also imagined that if it were done in a very simple way, the stegoed info will be fairly obvious to someone knowledgeable and looking at the spatial fft of the image. I imagine that it will look obvious because, to an expert, it won't look like the authentic kind of noise expected there. If the information is encrypted, I consider it possible that the noise may even look too "perfect" perhaps. If that's true, then I suspect it's often possible to determine that a photo's stego has been removed. Or at least, there will be cases where stego removal will be "obvious". Come to think of it, I bet TLA operatives are given precise instructions about what kinds of photos make for undiscernable stego (I'd bet where the spatial image information is not well-concentrated into "bands"). In other words, a photo with all different-sized objects in it. Perhaps they even travel with some photos for just this purpose. Hum. I wonder if photos of "clouds" work well for this purpose. That would actually explain something I encountered recently.... -TD >From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv(a)cdc.gov> >To: "cypherpunks(a)lne.com" <cypherpunks(a)lne.com> >Subject: Re: Has this photo been de-stegoed? (and Anonymity) >Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 10:26:16 -0800 > >At 06:22 PM 12/10/03 +0200, Anatoly Vorobey wrote: > >On Tue, Dec 09, 2003 at 04:20:20PM -0600, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >> We have anonymity in Web browsing (more or less, thanks to Lance & > >> co). It's not NSA-proof, but it's probably subpoena-proof. > >> > >> We have anonymity in email thanks to remailers (to the extent they're > > >> still around). > >> >... > > > >alt.anonymous.messages has a healthy amount of traffic. > >One could count some fraction of all the *.binaries.* on usenet >as anonymous communications (via stego), but then you'd have to know >how many are stego'd, and that is the game after all. > > >At 02:24 PM 12/8/03 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > >Is it possible to determine that the photo 'originally' (ie, when it >was > >sent to me) contained stegoed information, but that it was intercepted >in > >transit and the real message overwritten with noise or whatever? > >Yes. Trivially, If your correspondent told you, but that's out of >band. Otherwise, >If there *remains* info which was not washed out "in transit", then that > >would be an inband way. Maybe all the pictures with a red flower >in them are carriers, and this content isn't washed out. Maybe its a >more subtle crypto-watermark, independent of the stego'd message. > > >Now I know pretty much nothing about this subject, but I would suppose >that > >de-stegoing a photo must like some kind of spatial spectral fingerprint >that > >should be visible after the photo is FFT'd (is there freeware software >out > >there?). > >1. How do you know the signature of the unaltered carrier-medium? >E.g., have you measured the LSBit noise from my camera recently? >Under which lighting conditions? > >2. Don't you think I can measure the properties of my carrier and shape >the stego'd info to match? (This does get into an arms race over what >properties to measure.) > > >Now I IMAGINE that a sophisticated interceptor could substitute >'believable' > >de-stego-ing noise so that it would look like the photo never had any >stego > >in the first place. OR...is this actually 'impossible' to do perfectly? > >You don't just put your message in the LSBits or whatever. You >compress, >encrypt, and possibly redundantly code them. Then you shape the noise >to match the bits you're replacing. > > > >And then, what if the interceptor tried to put an alternate message in >there > >instead? Is there a way to tell that there was originallya different >message > >there? > >Depends on the coding. > > >My assumption first of all is that nothing was done to prepare the >photo > >against these possibilities. > >Just make sure you did the original analog recording and destroy the >original after you stego it. Best also if you never post unstego'd >messages >so the Adversary can't measure your raw carrier. > >A simple stego message was placed without real > >thought about whether it might be intercepted and altered. > >You shouldn't stego life-critical messages without proper training in >the use of your tools. >(That training may vary with personality, see _Silk and Cyanide_. Some >like "why", >some like "do this".) > >----- >"You can have democracy when you vote for the people we approve of" >King George to the Colony of Iraq _________________________________________________________________ Cell phone switch rules are taking effect find out more here. http://special.msn.com/msnbc/consumeradvocate.armx

1 0

RE: Zombie Patriots and other musings [was: Re: (No Subject)]
by Trei, Peter 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

From: Nostradumbass(a)SAFe-mail.net wrote: > Nothing less than a guerilla war seems necessary to restore > something akin to the original constitutional balance in the > U.S. But where to recruit these people? My suggestion: the > terminally ill. > Many TI come to the table with a 'gift', the certainty of > impending death and for some the possibility of fearlessness > for physical harm or imprisonment. Mr. Dumbass appears to be channeling the Earth Liberation Front: Quotes from: http://www.stopecoviolence.com/words.htm ------------ "If I knew I had a fatal disease, I would definitely do something like strap dynamite on myself and take out Grand Canyon Dam. Or maybe the Maxxam Building in Los Angeles after it's closed up for the night." - Darryl Chernery, Northern California Earth Firster, CBS News Sixty Minutes, March 4, 1990 "Are you terminally ill with a wasting disease? .Don't go out with a whimper; go out with a bang! Undertake an ecokamikaze mission." - Excerpt from an article that ran in the Sept. 1989 issue of the Earth First Journal, urging terminally ill activists to go on "eco-kamikaze" suicide missions ---------------- Google on "eco-kamikaze" for more. It's worth noting that despite over a decade of this rhetoric, not a single terminally ill American has done this, so far as I am aware. The *only* even vaguely simlar cases I'm aware of are in India and Sri Lanka, where young Hindu widows (who, in traditional Hindu society have very dim prospects for a happy life) are recruited as suicide bombers by the Tamil Tigers. I think Rajiv Ghandi's assassin was such a woman. Peter Trei

1 0

Re: Has this photo been de-stegoed? (and Anonymity)
by Major Variola (ret) 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

At 06:22 PM 12/10/03 +0200, Anatoly Vorobey wrote: >On Tue, Dec 09, 2003 at 04:20:20PM -0600, Declan McCullagh wrote: >> We have anonymity in Web browsing (more or less, thanks to Lance & >> co). It's not NSA-proof, but it's probably subpoena-proof. >> >> We have anonymity in email thanks to remailers (to the extent they're >> still around). >> ... > >alt.anonymous.messages has a healthy amount of traffic. One could count some fraction of all the *.binaries.* on usenet as anonymous communications (via stego), but then you'd have to know how many are stego'd, and that is the game after all. At 02:24 PM 12/8/03 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: >Is it possible to determine that the photo 'originally' (ie, when it was >sent to me) contained stegoed information, but that it was intercepted in >transit and the real message overwritten with noise or whatever? Yes. Trivially, If your correspondent told you, but that's out of band. Otherwise, If there *remains* info which was not washed out "in transit", then that would be an inband way. Maybe all the pictures with a red flower in them are carriers, and this content isn't washed out. Maybe its a more subtle crypto-watermark, independent of the stego'd message. >Now I know pretty much nothing about this subject, but I would suppose that >de-stegoing a photo must like some kind of spatial spectral fingerprint that >should be visible after the photo is FFT'd (is there freeware software out >there?). 1. How do you know the signature of the unaltered carrier-medium? E.g., have you measured the LSBit noise from my camera recently? Under which lighting conditions? 2. Don't you think I can measure the properties of my carrier and shape the stego'd info to match? (This does get into an arms race over what properties to measure.) >Now I IMAGINE that a sophisticated interceptor could substitute 'believable' >de-stego-ing noise so that it would look like the photo never had any stego >in the first place. OR...is this actually 'impossible' to do perfectly? You don't just put your message in the LSBits or whatever. You compress, encrypt, and possibly redundantly code them. Then you shape the noise to match the bits you're replacing. >And then, what if the interceptor tried to put an alternate message in there >instead? Is there a way to tell that there was originallya different message >there? Depends on the coding. >My assumption first of all is that nothing was done to prepare the photo >against these possibilities. Just make sure you did the original analog recording and destroy the original after you stego it. Best also if you never post unstego'd messages so the Adversary can't measure your raw carrier. A simple stego message was placed without real >thought about whether it might be intercepted and altered. You shouldn't stego life-critical messages without proper training in the use of your tools. (That training may vary with personality, see _Silk and Cyanide_. Some like "why", some like "do this".) ----- "You can have democracy when you vote for the people we approve of" King George to the Colony of Iraq

1 0

Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings [was: Re: (No Subject)]
by Major Variola (ret) 11 Dec '03

11 Dec '03

At 03:04 AM 12/11/03 -0500, Nostradumbass(a)SAFe-mail.net wrote: >Nothing less than a guerilla war seems necessary to restore something akin to the original constitutional balance in the U.S. But where to recruit these people? My suggestion: the terminally ill. > >Many TI come to the table with a 'gift', the certainty of impending death and for some the possibility of fearlessness for physical harm or imprisonment. Of course your idea has merit, both on a personal and govt payback level. But you can get more, and fitter soldiers: Simply convince some healthy folks that an "afterlife" exists. And that by doing worthy acts you do well there. Religion is a terrorist weapon after all. ---- What would a palestinian bastard on a stick do?

1 0