December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Pasting in From:
by Robert A. Costner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems to me that the purpose of a remailer is to strip the headers, including the FROM header, not to put in fake headers. Until someone can explain it to me, I'd consider the idea of adding a FROM header to anonymous mail to be asinine. Best I can tell, the only reasonable good purpose for this is to create a persistent nym identity without a reply to capability. Well, remailer software cannot support everything I suppose. (Even if Cracker may apparently support this) I would think the best way to put in a persistent nym capability would be to database the PGP key id's along with the persistent identity. Then the remailer could produce lines like From: "Monty Cantsin" <anon(a)anon.efga.org> Persistent identities would be created by sending a signed PGP message that includes both the PGP public key and the persistent identity. Since the identity server would not database email addresses, only PGP key id's, and only work for signed messages, there should be no problem with people worrying about the remailer being compromised. This also keeps someone from stealing another's reputation capital. -- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746 Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh@efga.org http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key

3 3

Big Brother Is Watching ATMs
by Jonathan Wienke 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I just heard that a bank card company has just released a program for using photos of the iris in people's eyes as a biometric ID to replace people's PIN codes for ATM / credit cards. What I found really interesting is how they plan to implement it. As people use the ATM, they are photographed. (Every ATM has a security camera.) Over time, as people use the ATM, the security camera images are composited to produce a high-quality image of their irises, which is coded and placed in their account information. Once this is accomplished, when a card is inserted into the ATM and the security camera gets an iris image that matches the account sufficiently closely, the user can conduct transactions without entering the PIN code. People affected by this will merely receive a letter that under certain circumstances, entering the PIN is no longer necessary, but this is not a security problem. This scenario may not be a security problem, but it certainly poses a privacy problem. Given the frequency that the average Joe Sixpack uses the ATM, it is only a matter of time before the government mandates a nationwide eyeprint ID database to catch ATM and credit card theives, money launderers, tax cheats, and other undesirables. Perhaps the eyeprint could even replace or supplement the SSN as the unique taxpayer ID key for tax and other purposes. Of course, given the fact that ATMs have had cameras from the start, this theoretical eyeprint database could already be under construction. How's that for paranoia? >:-( Of course, there are a few ways to beat this, such as mirror sunglasses, (which would only be useful while alternative credentials to eyeprint ID are still available) and contact lenses, (which would have to be carefully oriented so that the same side of the lens was always up, or the fact that you are wearing contacts and are therefore a Suspicious Person would become obvious to the system) and of course intraocular implants of various types. Of course if the implant's power-on LED gives your eyes a constant Satanic red glow, you may be flagged as a Suspicious Person anyway. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Business Security 5.5 iQA/AwUBNIJMc8JF0kXqpw3MEQJEiACdH+0zupstOe2EK3nO+xkF6nY4SOsAnAuO d/cf2DBRj3tiSUHgBaQHOgq9 =LxX3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Jonathan Wienke PGP Key Fingerprints: 7484 2FB7 7588 ACD1 3A8F 778A 7407 2928 3312 6597 8258 9A9E D9FA 4878 C245 D245 EAA7 0DCC "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams "Stupidity is the one arena of of human achievement where most people fulfill their potential." -- Jonathan Wienke Never sign a contract that contains the phrase "first-born child." RSA export-o-matic: print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

7 7

V Chips in PCs -- comments filed with the FCC
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A bunch of other groups filed comments last week, generally opposing a requirement for Vchips in computers, but the ACLU's is the only one I have in electronic form. An excerpt: Any FCC efforts to restrict content online, directly or indirectly, through a forced rating scheme would violate the First Amendment. It would also have the effect of turning what the Supreme Court call the most participatory medium into a bland and homogenized medium that provides access to only self-rated or censored speech. More info: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1528,00.html -Declan ================ Subject: Fwd: fcc comments v-chip Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 12:49:29 -0500 (EST) From: PRIVACLU(a)aol.com To: declan(a)well.com Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, DC 20554 ________________________________ In the Matter of ET Docket No. 97-206 Technical Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video Programming Based on Program Ratings _______________________________ COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Introduction The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a nonpartisan organization of more than 250,000 members nationwide dedicated to defending the principles of liberty and equality embodied in the Bill of Rights. For nearly a century, the ACLU has sought to preserve and strengthen the First Amendment as a bulwark against all forms of governmental censorship. The ACLU has previously submitted extensive comments to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in opposition to government-prescribed ratings systems for television programming that single out sex, violence, or other controversial subjects on television because we believe they infringe the fundamental principles of free expression. We adhere to our prior views. We respectfully submit these comments on the different issues raised by the FCC's proposal for emerging technology and urge the Commission to refrain from entering into the censorship business. In particular, the ACLU urges the Commission not to expand the application of the proposed rules to include any and all equipment capable of displaying or receiving video programming, including personal computers and Digital Television (DTV), Multi-point Distribution Systems, Direct Broadcasting Systems (DBS) and other emerging technologies. The ACLU believes that Congress has not directed the FCC to mandate the inclusion of the V-Chip in these emerging technologies. Furthermore, such an expansive reading of the Telecommunications Act would run afoul of the First Amendment protections accorded to speech on interactive media, such as the Internet, as a result of the landmark Supreme Court decision Reno v. ACLU. 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997). Finally, we urge the FCC to abstain from prohibiting distribution services from deleting or modifying ratings information from television programming as a violation of the First Amendment. I. THE FCC IS NOT REQUIRED TO MANDATE INCLUSION OF BLOCKING TECHNOLOGY IN PERSONAL COMPUTERS CAPABLE OF RECEIVING VIDEO PROGRAMMING UNDER THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT. Section 551(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act"), the Parental Choice in Television Programming, directs the FCC to "require in the case of an apparatus designed to receive television signals ... that have a picture screen 13 inches or greater in size (measured diagonally), that such apparatus be equipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to block display of all programs with a common rating...". Section 551 (e)(2) requires the Commission to consult with the television manufacturing industry to find an effective date for inclusion of the V-chip in televisions. In contrast, with regard to technologies like the Internet, Congress directed the FCC in section 552(d)(4)(A) of the Act to determine the availability of alternative blocking technology that enables parents to block programming based on identifying programs without ratings. Although the language of the Act addresses the need for traditional television manufacturers to comply with the provision at issue, the Commission's current Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) calls for expansion of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to mandate inclusion of blocking devices in all technology capable of displaying broadcast video programming, even in apparatus that is not primarily designed for television viewing. Specifically, the NPRM includes a requirement for personal computer manufacturers to include V-chip technology. Paragraph 22 of the NPRM, states in pertinent part: "In addition, personal computer systems, which are not traditionally thought of as television receivers, are already being sold with the capability to view television and other video programming. Section 551(c) of the Telecommunications Act makes it clear that the program blocking requirements were intended to apply to any "apparatus designed to receive signals" that has a picture screen of 13 inches or larger. Accordingly, we believe that the program blocking requirements we are proposing should apply to any television receiver meeting the screen size requirements, regardless of whether it is designed to receive video programming that is distributed only through cable television systems, MDS, DBS, or by some other distribution system. These requirements would also apply to any computer that is sold with TV receiver capability and a monitor that has a viewable picture size of 13 inches or larger, as we currently do of closed captioning." (emphasis added) The NPRM broadly states that the rules should apply to any computer "regardless of whether it is designed to receive video programming that is distributed only through cable television systems, [satellite], or by some other distribution system." Under the broadest interpretation the rules could be extended to cover any video programming viewed using a computer. Despite this confusion, the FCC has not publicly offered clarification as to what types of personal computer technology would fall under the purview of the proposed rules. In addition, the NPRM statement that Section 551 (c) of the Act "makes it clear that program blocking requirements were intended to apply to any apparatus" capable of receiving television signals, is plainly contrary to the expressed view of Congress and a conclusion with which the ACLU strongly disagrees. Congress instead suggested in Section 551 (d) (4) et seq., that as new video technology is developed, the Commission determine the availability of less restrictive and more informative alternatives. Thus, Congress did not propose the mandatory inclusion of V-chip technology, but directed the Commission to determine whether other features could be used to provide greater user choice over content. We believe that the rush to embrace the V-chip for traditional televisions has been more damaging to the development of other user friendly tools that do not require the state imposition of a rating and blocking system. Previously submitted comments by the television manufacturing industry also make clear that the FCCs haste in establishing schedules for the inclusion of the V-chip in televisions may result in poorly adapted equipment that may quickly become obsolete. The expansion of V-chip technology into the computer realm makes even less sense. Interactive media is subject to even more rapid change than television and that change increasingly allows for more user choice and control. II. THE FCC MAY NOT REQUIRE COMPUTERS TO INCLUDE CENSORING TECHNOLOGY IF THEY ARE CAPABLE OF RECEIVING VIDEO PROGRAMMING VIA THE INTERNET OR BY OTHER MEANS: Currently, there are at least three ways to view video programming on personal computers. The first model is where video programming can be viewed on "PC-TVs," computers that include built-in television receivers or have an added plug-in circuit board to provided video reception capability. Second, a personal computer user has her Web browser connected to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) with the appropriate enabling technology to permit a multimedia connection to the Internet. With this connection, a user who is on the Web can go to any number of sites to download or view video/audio objects. Until now, the slow speed of Internet dial-up connections has meant that it could take several minutes to view online video clips. However, with new high speed connections, large video files may be downloaded or viewable in a matter or seconds -- making it possible to view video programming online in real time, like television and radio. Webcasting offers access to a much greater number of speakers or content providers than traditional broadcasting. PC-TVs and webcasting have only recently become available, with new models and features being marketed forth daily. Both offer a much greater spectrum of data, including programming information, than is possible by traditional broadcasting and under the current ratings scheme. The potential to offer greater information means does not mean the FCC should expand the reach of its content restriction through the V-chip. Instead, these technologies could offer transmission of program reviews or other detailed information about individual programs. The Commission may not mandate blocking technology for computers with Internet software that provides the ability to view real-time video programs online. Unlike television, the Internet provides inexpensive, user controlled access and not government regulated or licensed access. Video programming displayed online may include traditional broadcast programming, but also includes a variety of authors and producers that have never before had the ability to gain wide distribution. Such an application of the proposed rules not only runs counter to the Telecommunications Act, but represents an assumption of authority by the government over content on the Internet that has already been rejected by the Supreme Court. In the landmark case Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court overturned provisions of the Federal Communication Decency Act (CDA) and declared that the Internet is entitled to the highest level of free speech protection. The Court explicitly analogized the Internet to the traditional print media, saying that unlike broadcast media, which has been traditionally considered a more intrusive means of speech that is available to a fewer number of speakers, the virtually unlimited access and potential for speech means that the government requires a compelling reason to restrict lawfully protected speech. As the lead attorneys and plaintiffs in the case, the ACLU successfully argued that the provisions of the CDA that would have made it a crime to communicate anything "indecent" online violated the First Amendment. The Court rejected the CDA because it was an overbroad means of addressing the government's asserted interest in protecting minors from inappropriate material -- the very same reason offered today by the Commission and Congress in enacting V-Chip regulations. Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that the government has the authority to regulate constitutionally protected speech online. The Court stated, "the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, -- , (1997). Although the ACLU believes that the same First Amendment values apply to each media, the Court has repeatedly stated that any government regulation of broadcast television is justifiable only because of the intrusiveness of television coupled with the scarcity of the broadcasting transmission spectrum. As the high court stated in Reno v. ACLU, neither of those rationale applies to the Internet. Any FCC efforts to restrict content online, directly or indirectly, through a forced rating scheme would violate the First Amendment. It would also have the effect of turning what the Supreme Court call the most participatory medium into a bland and homogenized medium that provides access to only self-rated or censored speech. IV. THE FCC MAY NOT PROHIBIT OPERATORS THAT DISTRIBUTE VIDEO PROGRAMMING FROM DELETING OR MODIFYING PROGRAM RATINGS CARRIED ON LINE 21 OF VBI. The NPRM states that the FCC proposes to amend its rules to ensure that ratings information is not deleted or modified before transmission by distributors. Put plain, this means that the FCC is selecting which of the "speakers" -- from the programs writers, to its producers, network and local stations has the power to set a rating and requiring all the other speakers to agree with the given rating. But by removing the power for any of these parties to modify ratings, the government also removes any flexibility from its proposed scheme -- it is deciding that national broadcasters make that decision, for all of their writers, producers, directors, affiliates and stations. There is no room for disagreement and there is no choice but for distributors to agree with the designation. Ratings must, by definition be national. Leaving one that might appropriate in Mississippi but that is not in New York. Furthermore, there are serious First Amendment problems with compelling all program distributors from carrying ratings that they find objectionable or that they disagree with are critical. Government required ratings are a form of "forced speech" and diminish any discretion of programming distributors in determining the relevance or appropriateness of the proposed program rating. That is, mandating labels compels private individuals and companies to say things about their creative offerings that they have no wish to say and with which they may disagree. The Supreme Court has made clear that such compelled speech is as much a violation of First Amendment rights as enforced silence. See, e.g., Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). Ratings prescribed by the FCC pursuant to the Act can hardly be defended as an innocuous effort to empower parents by supplying them with neutral information. A truly non-coercive effort to inform parents, rather than censor what the government believes to be "negative" or dangerous ideas, would not rely on the minimal, inevitably misleading information conveyed by a letter or code that can be read by a computer chip. Parents are better served by fuller information (descriptions or reviews) that explains the context in which violent or sexual material is presented, and that enables them to make viewing decisions based on their own values and childrearing philosophies, and the personal maturity levels of their children. Conclusion The ACLU believes that the extension of the V-chip rules is unnecessary and unwise under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The ACLU believes that the FCC should not hastily embrace or extend plans to incorporate V-chip technology in emerging technologies. The FCC can and must exercise its discretion and consider alternatives such as media literacy, promotion of educational programming and episode reviews. We believe that there are alternatives that would not offend core First Amendment values and accomplish the same purpose. In the final analysis, violence and sex are dramatic, consistent themes in human life and history, and like other controversial subjects, need to be confronted and discussed rather than suppressed, whether through direct censorship laws or through more indirect, convoluted governmental ratings and information blocking systems. Respectfully submitted, _______________________________________ Barry Steinhardt ACLU Associate Director ____________________________________ A. Cassidy Sehgal William J. Brennan Fellow of the ACLU

1 0

Re: PGP / Outlook Express Plugin Problem
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rip van Seaberg writes: > Anyone care to speculate irresponsibly about what PGP is up to, what > with dropping the 2.6 command line in favor of a handful of plugins? > Did they get paid to integrate PGP support in Eudora and Communicator > and make integration unavailable to competing tools? Are they hoping to > sell piles of US$12k+ SDKs? Is there any other plausible reason they > would want to break every tool and script that shells to PGP? Since the introduction of PGP in 1991 there have been changes in the way people use computers. Instead of typing clumsy command lines like "pgp -s -a -e -t -f" to perform operations, computer users today use a "mouse", a small device about the size of a pack of cards which is connected to the computer by a long "tail" (hence the name). By moving the mouse they are able to move an indicator on the screen called a "cursor". They point the cursor at "icons", small pictures which represent the operations they want to perform. Clicking buttons on the mouse allows them to manipulate data in a much more intuitive way. Old command line programs were accessible only to a small fraction of potential computer users. The new mouse based graphical computers open the world of computing to a much wider base of users. PGP plugins allows mail to be encrypted or decrypted with a single click of a mouse button. This is a far cry from the clumsy command lines of the past. Tune in next week to find out how your trusty floppy disks may soon be replaced by Compact Disk Read Only Memory devices.

1 0

Kashpureff stuff online
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CBC has put together a short (7 mins or so) news piece on the Kashpureff/Alternic situation - it's available via RealVideo (which seems to run reasonably over my 28.8 modem at home) at <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/undercurrents/tv/week09/fugitive.ram>. They've also made an image of his US arrest warrant and the criminal complaint filed in the US district court (ED NY, 97-1343M) available at <http://www.tv.cbc.ca/undercurrents/stories/internic/warrant.html>. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

3 2

If it saves the life of one non-Iraqian child...
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ya gotta love that Saddam, eh? Allowing the press to do a photoshoot of all those children who don't seem to be the child everyone is desparately trying to save by taking away our basic human rights and freedoms... I loved watching the western newswoman on TV yesterday, trying to explain to the local citizens how the US embargo that was resulting in the deaths of their children was all Saddam's fault. (Although I must have missed the part where she explained Saddam's authority to set US foreign policy.) I think we should immediately drop-ship a few thousand baby T-shirts to Iraq that have "I am not _the_ child!" stenciled on them, so that Americans watching at home don't mistake the starving Iraqian children for the one that we are saving by allowing our government to monitor and oppress us. Next time you pay your taxes, try to remember that you are just following orders...Saddam is evil...those are not _the_ child...you are only doing what is required by law...Saddam is responsible...you are just obeying the law...you are just following orders...you don't put them in the ovens, you just pay for the ovens...you don't turn on the gas, you just pay for the gas...you are just following orders... TruthMonger

1 0

Re: [RePol] NEWBIE QUESTION
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jari.aalto(a)poboxes.com wrote: > Sat 97-11-29 Denizen <logger(a)california.com> list.repol > | Since anon.penet.fi is dead, who is left that > | does approx. the same thing, > | > | 1) allowing non-encrypted email out > | 2) requiring encrypted only > | 3) allowing it either way. > Would someone shed a light, > tell me about the backgrounds of Denizen and his motives? > > I'd like to help people, but only the honest ones. Jari, You should also make certain that you only help honest people who will not become dishonest in the future. My suggestion. File all questions away for a period of forty years, and then, if the person asking the question has proved honest for that period of time, send them the answer. No need to thank me...I'm always willing to help. TruthMonger

1 0

McAfee buys PGP Inc.
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.pgp.com/newsroom/prel47.cgi Network Associates (formerly known as McAfee) is buying PGP Inc. Network Associates Acquires Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Network Associates Extends Enterprise Offerings with Leading Security Software SANTA CLARA, Calif., Dec. 1, 1997 Network Associates, Inc. Nasdaq: NETA, commencing Dec. 2), formerly McAfee Associates (Nasdaq: MCAF) announced today that it has a signed a definitive agreement to acquire privately-held Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. (PGP). The PGP acquisition extends Network Associates' network security and management software products with the leading applied cryptographic security solutions for protecting corporate assets and enabling secure electronic communication.

1 0

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Subject: Re: Pasting in From: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sender: Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> Robert Costner says: > It seems to me that the purpose of a remailer is to strip the headers, > including the FROM header, not to put in fake headers. Until someone can > explain it to me, I'd consider the idea of adding a FROM header to > anonymous mail to be asinine. The purpose of a remailer is to allow the sender to be anonymous, so it strips real headers to prevent accidents (eg. subject fields organization etc). Then it has to allow you to put headers back in otherwise you can't interoperate with software. Eg pasting in References:, Subject: (I would like to see Cc: and Bcc: being allowed to be pasted in also). I would also like to see From: pasted in. In fact I can see no purpose to restrict what can be pasted in, other than to reduce complaints to the remailer operator possibly. > Best I can tell, the only reasonable good purpose for this is to create a > persistent nym identity without a reply to capability. Well, remailer > software cannot support everything I suppose. (Even if Cracker may > apparently support this) It's easy enough to allow From:. I do it myself sometimes, and notice Nerthus does also, pasting in From fields works at least with Replay as the exit node, but that results in two From fields. My software shows be all headers. I am not sure what other software would do, probably, only display the first From field (the remailers). I would have thought remailers are not actually trying to advertise their From fields. Perhaps allowing bogus From fields, or even putting in remailer(a)dev.null if there is not a From field would greatly reduce complaints from clueless users. If you want to you can always put in Sender: remailer(a)anon.efga.org. > I would think the best way to put in a persistent nym capability would be > to database the PGP key id's along with the persistent identity. Then the > remailer could produce lines like > > From: "Monty Cantsin" <anon(a)anon.efga.org> That'd do. However you'll notice that my address is: Amad3us <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net> which means that I would like it to be pasted in as it is replyable (for encrypted mail) even though not being a nymserver account. > Persistent identities would be created by sending a signed PGP message that > includes both the PGP public key and the persistent identity. Since the > identity server would not database email addresses, only PGP key id's, and > only work for signed messages, there should be no problem with people > worrying about the remailer being compromised. This also keeps someone > from stealing another's reputation capital. Not sure that the assurance is this strong. However the feature would be useful. Amad3us -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 6.6.6 iQCVAwUBNIKq4PKMuKFNFivhAQGvpwP9HnkWew9lSzQ5cj70UehLkopbLJr7YFSq S5ZJzPp2KuYqVpjs7Lyagg0WtFyX9UUFFCXuWemhjJNLAmqQP7fkAnxs1Epq4LTj cd+qn3Y58EQlyQAlFwF/l7bUedWVwcxIkVmR5PxkwG3LTMzYHGLSIuhF6gqanSv0 EyjvkXIw/as= =fbA1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0