December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

is cypherpunks@toad.com still moderated?
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just curious, is the moderation experiment still continuing or it is over? Thank you. - Igor.

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REA_lly
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-12-97: US claims CIA was not spying on Germany but on rogue states doing business there. Spy has not been expelled. ----- REA_lly

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U.S. State Department crackdown (fwd)
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Conrad wrote > >From jjc(a)infi.net Wed Mar 12 00:21:16 1997 Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 00:20:36 -0500 (EST) Message-Id: <2.2.16.19970312001929.4db72c86(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net> X-Sender: jjc(a)mailhost.norfolk.infi.net X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (16) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" To: die(a)die.com, ttyler(a)mich.com, troach(a)netcom.com, lrkn(a)zeus.anet-dfw.com, crisp(a)netcom.com, victor(a)best.com, "Michael F. Peyton" <Michael.Peyton(a)MCI.com>, dwilson(a)paprika.mwc.edu, stever(a)infi.net, rbritt(a)visi.net, larry51(a)aol.com, jmccolman(a)infi.net, brueger(a)infi.net, lburke(a)infi.net, donjr(a)infi.net, acolejr(a)erols.com From: Jim Conrad <jjc(a)infi.net> Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown Thought you'all might find this interesting ... >Return-Path: jmatk(a)tscm.com >X-Sender: jmatk(a)tiac.net >Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 17:26:56 -0500 >To: jmatk(a)tscm.com >From: jmatk(a)tscm.com (James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng) >Subject: U.S. State Department crackdown > >The U.S. State Department is starting to crackdown on the illegal >export of TSCM and SIGINT equipment under ITAR. > >Noice how section (b) is worded: > >"...equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring." > >-jma > > >================================================================= > >DEPARTMENT OF STATE - Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs >22 CFR Parts 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, and 130 > >================================================================= > > Category XI-Military [and Space] Electronics > > (a) Electronic equipment not included in Category XII of the U.S. Munitions >List which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military >application. This equipment includes but is not limited to: > > *(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or >configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in search, >reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding, display, analysis and >production of information from the electromagnetic spectrum and electronic >systems or equipment designed or modified to counteract electronic surveillance >or monitoring. A system meeting this definition is controlled under this >subchapter even in instances where any individual pieces of equipment >constituting the system may be subject to the controls of another U.S. >Government agency. Such systems or equipment described above include, but are >not limited to, those: > > (1) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the >spreading code for spread spectrum or hopping code for frequency agility. This >does not include fixed code techniques for spread spectrum. > > (2) Designed or modified using burst techniques (e.g., time compression >techniques) for intelligence, security or military purposes. > > (3) Designed or modified for the purpose of information security to suppress >the compromising emanations of information-bearing signals. This covers TEMPEST >suppression technology and equipment meeting or designed to meet government >TEMPEST standards. This definition is not intended to include equipment designed >to meet Federal Communications Commission (FCC) commercial electro-magnetic >interference standards or equipment designed for health and safety. > > > > =============================================================== > "If it doesn't involve a torque wrench, then it's not TEMPEST" > =============================================================== > James M. Atkinson Phone: (508) 546-3803 > Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk(a)tscm.com > =============================================================== > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most > Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet > =============================================================== > > > <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:> <:> Jim Conrad - Ocean View Communications - jjc(a)infi.net <:> <:> 757-490-8127 Office - 757-587-8251 Fax - 757-473-6740 Pager <:> <:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:><:>

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone calling themselves TruthMonger wrote: >> Firstly, remailers were developed by the cypherpunks as >> a method of monitoring supposedly private communications >> of others, in order to increase their own power and wealth. That message was relatively funny, and trust is a serious issue in this business - even though the suggestion that _we_ in the Cypherpunks Elite Cabal did that, it doesn't mean that there aren't People With Ulterior Motives running remailers, or remailers hosted on machines run by bad guys who are actually monitoring their users. However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. >> Thirdly, the remailer owners only support compromised >> cryptography systems such as the newer versions of PGP >> produced by All-my-charges-mysteriously-disappeared- >> when-I-agreed-to-switch-to-a-new-system Zimmerman. ..... > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into >the country. > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the >NSA and the Military. The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. If you want to do a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms patented by PKP... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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CIA_ami
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to UM we offer an English version of the Spiegel report on the US spy expelled by Germany (cited by NYT). ----- CIA_ami

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Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > > On the Wired "brain tennis" debate, http://www.braintennis.com/, Kawika > Daguio of the American Bankers Association wrote: > > > The real danger of cyberspace is that it could be the tragedy of > > the commons in waiting. Technology alone won't provide participants > > sufficient security for e-commerce to flourish. Law, tradition, and good > > reputations and technology give rise to trust. Trust cannot be established > > solely though technical protocols. And trust is not irrelevant. > > What do you think he means about a "tragedy of the commons"? > I wonder if he just meant that there would be too many "commoners" trying > to engage in commerce, so you couldn't know who to trust? Be assured that those already in control of commerce in this country and others have already written new laws 'in their head' concerning the future of eca$h. I predict that these laws will be for our 'protection,' but will have the curious effect of limiting the control of eca$h to the already rich and powerful. Some groups such as the Anguila Antagonists may be able to wrest a certain number of digital dollars from the grip of the system currently in place, but above a certain point, they will eaten up, either passively or aggressively (crushed or bought off). If 'outsiders' begin to make too large a dent in the main players' piece of the action, then we can expect to see events similar to the Junk Bonds fiasco, with the 'bad guys' set-up and knocked down like bowling pins. We can expect automatic taxation at the time of all eca$h transactions, as well as strict laws against anonymity in the transfer of eca$h. Freelance cryptographers are going to be outlaws, by decree of law. It is quite simply a matter of money (power and control being merely prerequisites for controlling money). TruthMonger

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Re: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 AM 3/11/97 +0900, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote: >Although I have not seen it, there should be the Japanese >translated version of the W.A. While it is true that MITI has halted all exports of crypto products since late September, citing their obligations under the Wassenaar "arrangement", numerous high level meetings conducted by Japanese industry heavyweights with MITI produced neither a copy of the arrangement nor any written MITI guidelines. MITI reserves the right to decided on a case by case basis. So far, every single export application has been denied. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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by MLM-Powerhouse＠cash-in-now.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > > However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, > at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. The straight facts are that you can't trust your best friend not to bop your old-lady, given ample opportunity, and to put even more trust in a stranger is foolish. > > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into > >the country. > > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. > >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the > >NSA and the Military. > > The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, > introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, > Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, > /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. > PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - > which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the > RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only > way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. Are you saying that the patent on the RSA algorithm wasn't enforceable? > If you want to do > a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship > between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) > or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms > patented by PKP... The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military isn't very far under the table. The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not noted for funding projects for the good of the common man. To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible. TruthMonger

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Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:15:15 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97) [I find that Cato's forums are always worth attending. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 10:15:21 -0500 (EST) From: Solveig Bernstein <sberns(a)cato.org> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: a cato forum Declan, could you post this to fightcensorship or otherwise forward it around? ******************************************************************** This forum will be held at noon on March 24 at the Cato Institute at 1000 Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington, DC. To register, please call Heather Antilla at 202.842.3490 or email to hantila(a)cato.org. ******************************************************************** Wiretapping in the Digital Age: Reassessing CALEA Barry Steinhardt Alan McDonald ACLU FBI Jim Dempsey Albert Gidari Center for Democracy and Technology Perkins Coie CALEA, the "Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act," requires phone companies to retrofit their networks to facilitate wiretapping by law enforcement. Are laws like CALEA appropriate for our constitutional republic, or are the economic costs and dangers to privacy too great? Should Congress have delegated to the FBI so much power to implement CALEA? Have the FBI's demands under the statute been reasonable? Solveig Bernstein, Esq. (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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