December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fwd: Mother Jones on Microsoft and BSA
by mj＠creative.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's some more on Microsoft. >Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 15:07:14 -0500 (EST) >Reply-To: love(a)cptech.org >Originator: am-info(a)essential.org >Sender: am-info(a)essential.org >Precedence: bulk >From: James Love <love(a)cptech.org> >To: Multiple recipients of list <am-info(a)essential.org> >Subject: Mother Jones on Microsoft and BSA >MIME-Version: 1.0 > >Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 09:07:37 -0800 (PST) > From: Richard Reynolds <reynolds(a)mojones.com> > Subject: Mother Jones Microsoft story > >For Release: >December 22, 1997 >Contacts: >Richard Reynolds 415/665-6637 x240 >Kerry Lauerman 415/665-6637 x215 > >Microsoft Blackmails Foreign Companies >Switch To Microsoft, and Your Legal Problems Will Disappear > >Microsoft appears to be using the Business Software Alliance (BSA) to >blackmail foreign companies into making exclusive deals with Microsoft, >reports Mother Jones magazine in a story released last night on the MoJo >Wire, Mother Jones' Web site: > >http://www.motherjones.com/mother_jones/JF98/burstein.html > >When the BSA tracks down companies using software pirated from its >various members, reports Mother Jones investigative reporter Rachel >Burstein, the offender is offered a simple out: Switch to Microsoft >products and your legal problems will disappear. > >* In 1995 the BSA caught Antel, Uruguay's national telephone company, >using unlicensed Microsoft, Novell, and Symantec software. Ricardo >Tascenho, Antel's information technology manager, told Mother Jones the >company settled the matter by signing a "special agreement" with >Microsoft to replace all its software with Microsoft products. According >to Eduardo DeFreitas, the BSA's lawyer in Uruguay, Microsoft's Uruguay >manager, Tomas Blatt, instructed him to drop the suit so that Microsoft >and Antel could "work out a deal for the future." > >* Felipe Yungman, Novell's manager of security for Argentina, says >Novell's investigations also indicate that the BSA has set up sweetheart >deals for Microsoft there. "Companies or government offices had to, as a >condition [that the BSA] forgive them of piracy, replace Novell products >with Microsoft products," he told Mother Jones. > >* In 1996, when the BSA sued the Australian shipping company Toll >Holdings for piracy, the suit alleged that Toll illegally used copies of >programs made by Lotus, Novell, Symantec, and Microsoft. According to >Martin Dunne, Toll's chief information technology officer, other than >keeping Symantec's anti-virus software, they only buy Microsoft now. A >Novell official told Mother Jones that Toll "offered to legalize on all >Microsoft products if [the BSA] dropped the suit." Both the BSA and Toll >deny any impropriety. > >* In Slovenia, where 96 percent of all software is pirated, Microsoft's >country manager, Aaron Marko, is also head of the BSA office. Marko says >that because enforcement is difficult in the country's court system, he >offers discounted > >Microsoft software to companies caught pirating by the BSA. Microsoft >denies that the BSA acts solely on its behalf. But officials at >Novell and Lotus told Mother Jones that they will stop actively >participating in the BSA's programs in Asia and Latin America by the >beginning of 1998. > >Greg Wrenn, senior corporate counsel for Adobe, says his company has >stayed with the BSA, but he acknowledges Microsoft's upper hand: "If an >attorney does Microsoft work and BSA work and never hears from another >company besides Microsoft, he's going to do the work for the guy who's >in his office every week." > >The BSA story is part of a five-part cover package on Microsoft featured >in Mother Jones' January/February issue. ># # # > > >Full Article: > >Overseas Invasion >by Rachel Burstein > >Like Coke, Nike, and the tobacco industry before it, Microsoft now has >to >hook new consumers abroad. But the company has discovered a way to bully >foreign companies into buying Microsoft-and only Microsoft. > >In 1995 Antel, the national telephone company of Uruguay, was caught >pirating $100,000 worth of unlicensed software programs from Microsoft, >Novell, and Symantec. Antel was nabbed by the Business Software >Alliance, a >trade association that partly acts as a global bounty hunter for the >software industry. The BSA's lawyers in Uruguay quickly filed suit. > >But instead of waiting for a ruling on the case, the BSA abruptly >dropped >the suit in the fall of 1997. The BSA receives funding from most of the >top >software companies but appears to be most heavily funded by Microsoft. >And, >according to Antel's information technology manager, Ricardo Tascenho, >the >company settled the matter by signing a "special agreement" with >Microsoft >to replace all of its software with Microsoft products. > >The BSA's lawyer in Uruguay, Eduardo DeFreitas, supports Tascenho's >story: >"Microsoft told me to stop working on the case because they would write >an >agreement with Antel." DeFreitas says Microsoft's Uruguay manager, Tomas >Blatt, instructed him to drop the suit so that Microsoft could "work out >a >deal for the future." Blatt refused to answer questions about the >settlement, claiming, "I don't have any information about the Antel >case. >You should call >BSA in Uruguay-Eduardo DeFreitas." > >Antel's situation suggests that when the BSA cracks down on piracy >overseas, it's Bill Gates who turns out to be the pirate. >Representatives >from rival firms complain that Microsoft is abusing its power within the >BSA to speed its global dominance. > >Microsoft denies that the BSA acts solely on its behalf. "I am not aware >of >any instance where that has happened," says Microsoft attorney Brad >Smith. >And the BSA dismisses the charges; spokeswoman Diane Smiroldo calls them >"hard to believe." But officials at Novell and Lotus confirm that by >January, both companies will have stopped actively participating in the >BSA's programs in Asia and Latin America. Novell says these allegations >played a part in its decision; Lotus refuses to comment. Such concerns >are also among the reasons Netscape is reluctant to join the BSA, says >Netscape attorney Peter Harter. > >The accusations aren't just limited to Uruguay: > >* Felipe Yungman, Novell's manager of security for Argentina, says he >and >another staffer at Novell discovered, while pursuing their own >investigation for the company, that the BSA was setting up sweetheart >deals >for Microsoft. "Companies or government offices had to, as a condition >[that the BSA] forgive them of piracy, replace Novell products with >Microsoft products," he says. > >were bullied by Microsoft, saying that he is trying to convince them to >come forward. "Most of the companies don't want to get involved," he >explains. "They think they need Microsoft. You cannot oblige them to >testify." > >Mario Tucci, Novell's country manager for Latin America, supports >Yungman's allegations. "If you call BSA, you will reach Microsoft," he >says. "They shield Microsoft's actions with the BSA name. It's bad for >us >and [for] the software industry." > >* In 1996, when the BSA sued the Australian shipping company Toll >Holdings >for piracy, BSA lawyer Charles Gonsalves, of the Sydney-based firm of >Mallesons Stephen Jaques, oversaw the case. > >"I generally handle cases for both Microsoft and the BSA," Gonsalves >told >Mother Jones. > >But while the suit alleged that Toll illegally used copies of programs >made >by Lotus, Novell, Symantec, and Microsoft, Martin Dunne, Toll's chief >information technology officer, says the company settled by paying fines >to >only Symantec and Microsoft. And, Dunne says, other than keeping >Symantec's >anti-virus software, the company has made a significant change: Toll >only >buys Microsoft now. > >According to a Novell official, Toll "offered to legalize on all >Microsoft >products if [the BSA] dropped the suit." Both the BSA and Toll deny any >impropriety. While a written agreement between Toll and Gonsalves does >exist, neither party would reveal the terms of the settlement. When >Gonsalves was asked if Microsoft ever paid for his handling of BSA >cases, >he chuckled and said, "That's a confidential matter." > >* In Slovenia, where 96 percent of all software is pirated, the head of >the >BSA office, Aaron Marko, is also Microsoft's country manager. Marko says >that because enforcement is difficult in the country's court system, he >offers discounted Microsoft software to companies caught pirating by the >BSA. Does Marko see this as a conflict of interest, since he also >supposedly represents other software firms? "BSA is trying to find the >pirate. Then it is a question of marketing and product awareness to see >who >will get the legal market share," he says. When asked which BSA members >have local subsidiaries that do local marketing, Marko says only >Microsoft >and Oracle, which is not a direct Microsoft competitor. > >These allegations "raise questions as to whether the BSA serves the >interest of its members or whether it serves its dominant member," says >James Love, director of Ralph Nader's Consumer Project on Technology. >And >for the foreign companies, he says, "these seem to be stories of >blackmail." > >The BSA employs a team of more than 100 lawyers and investigators to >find >cases of software piracy-a crime it says costs the industry $11 billion >a >year. The BSA says it catches "thousands of cases a year," many through >its >55 piracy hotlines, the most famous of which urges employees to "Nail >Your >Boss" by calling. > >While the BSA won't release its funding details, it does say that money >comes from membership dues, which are based on each company's software >revenues. This is one way in which Microsoft dominates the BSA: >Microsoft's >annual revenues, for example, are eight times that of Novell, its >largest >rival. > >In the future, Novell and Lotus say they will use their own in-house >resources for anti-piracy efforts in Asia and Latin America. > >But other BSA members, while concerned about Microsoft's role in the >organization, aren't quite willing to go their own way. Greg Wrenn, >senior >corporate counsel for Adobe, says his company has stayed with the BSA >despite having had some uneasy experiences with Microsoft. For example, >Wrenn says, the Microsoft attorneys who worked for the BSA refrained >from >going after big Microsoft clients caught pirating Adobe products-until >Adobe prodded them. > >Wrenn says Adobe will stay in the BSA, pressuring the organization to >play >fair. But he acknowledges Microsoft's upper hand. "If an attorney does >Microsoft work and BSA work and never hears from another company besides >Microsoft, he's going to do the work for the guy who's in his office >every >week," Wrenn says. > > > >________________________________________ >Richard Reynolds/Communications Director >Mother Jones magazine >415/665-6637 x240 >731 Market Street, 6th Floor >San Francisco, CA 94103 >

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Re: Lock and Load (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 1997 13:42:34 -0800 (PST) > From: Mix <mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> > Subject: Re: Lock and Load > Jim Choate wrote: > > Forwarded message: > > > Not being a native English speaker, I do not understand the > > > meaning and origin of the phrase "LOck and Load". > > > > It means to lock the rifles safety and load it's chamber in preperation for > > firing at an enemy. It is usualy used in a military context but head-bangers > > and such use it when talking about loading their bongs and I am shure other > > groups use it as well in various contexts. > > > > Wait a second, aren't we supposed to load first and lock later? How > can you load a rifle if it is on safety? Well on my .22 I slide bullets down the loading tube and manualy cycle the bolt. On the M1 carbine I simply insert the clip and cycle the bolt. On a HK-33 or G3 you do the same sort of thing. Those are the ones I know how to work because I have used them. In general the safety locks the trigger and firing-pin mechanism not the loading or chambering mechanism. I don't know of a safety on a rifle that blocks the bolt. But I ain't a gun nut (IAAGN). Revolvers are self-explanatory. Automatics generaly block the trigger and firing-pin mechanism, again not the bolt. Just grab that damn thing above the barrel and pull toward yourself with a loaded clip. When it releases should be loaded and on safety. Certainly works that way on the 1911 that I use on occassion where the hammer action is blocked (hint - don't drop it when cocked and safetied). I don't think I have ever shot an automatic that didn't work that way (all 3 or 4 of them). Again, IAAGN. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Lock and Load
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/22/97 5:30 PM, mparson(a)smartnap.com (mparson(a)smartnap.com) passed this wisdom: >> Wait a second, aren't we supposed to load first and lock later? >> How can you load a rifle if it is on safety? > >You can load most rifles with the safety on. We loaded our M-16s on >the line while the weapon was on 'safe' all the time. The next >command was always, "Rotate your selector switch from 'safe' to >'semi.' Firers, watch your lanes... fire at will." Most safeties >are just trigger locks that prevent you pulling the trigger, they >do nothing preventing you from sticking in a loaded magazine and >chambering a round. At the risk of thumping upon a well deceased equine carcass, the original expression was "Load and Lock" (admittedly "Load and Lock" rolls off the tongue more easily than the inverse) as there were many weapons whose actions could not be loaded when in the 'safe' position. There are probably as many weapons where this is true as there where it is not. In general it makes most sense to check for safe condition before and after loading. But, to answer the orginal question, it is generally used as a euphemism for "get ready for action" either offensive or defensive. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ7w2z7r4fUXwraZAQGHtAf/Qi3zmRF6nfW/OxkyiV5gyh+7Yl+HuVnP ri6kmiyI0273h10dz7naAftBTUXUDNLTKyGputK97ApLd1LI8pw0IXJuR4zCs8dn eis5k1jf/RdEX7l3et1PogkeKseC0u0CsPr8kv7xkJcth0Wo5aFCSvGGiIKAAQLO cGOyvdlA1cdA0L5PLizCpAkt5TATDbSpus0uadPOrh/MEv7GcOdaT4eHlKUDL0rJ ypwZt3VQqlkZKf7d7WISt/CicR2HiI1tDlqfqcJasvUvYJNshi0KpASVWCybZ49a wiXytgjo2BlQCDUtCnAn0NH7hP+bqC3W9TaXcGMTyxaLMsUBsKFxTQ== =DHrc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Journeys are about discovery, about lives touching briefly and then parting, except on the Internet, where distant lives can intertwine, and where a journey of discovery never has to end." -- Jim Heid

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Re: Lock and Load (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Lock and Load > Date: Mon, 22 Dec 97 17:59:49 -0500 > From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr(a)together.net> > There are probably as many weapons where this is true as there where > it is not. In general it makes most sense to check for safe condition > before and after loading. Would you be so kind as to give a specific example of a bolt action, semi-automatic, or automatic rifle that can't be loaded on safe? I have never seen a rifle that wouldn't allow this. A parallel pistol example would be nice too, if you're so inclined. Merry Christmas! ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Rich Graves and fight-censorship
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone tell me why Rich Graves was kicked of fight-censorship some time ago? Maybe Rich Graves himself will answer.

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Censorware complaint online
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The complaint in the Loudoun County censorware case is at: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/spoofcentral/censored/ -Declan

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Re: Coercive Monopolism vs Wimpyness
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought it was time someone totally unbiased commented on this OS war thing! Blanc writes: >And, since Windows OS is so pitifully lousy, why do people continue to buy >it, even without the computer attached; why do they continue to upgrade, >even if it's so slow and bloated? Don't they realize Unix is better? >Don't they realize they're just making Billg richer? We buy computers ordered with blank disks in preference. In fact this one came with DOS and I wiped it on day 1. > Want to parse MS Turd documents? Windows 95 and MS Office. Red Hat's Applixware has had good reviews. Besides I'm happy to return unreadable messages asking for a different format. If the other guy refuses try him with DVI or something. It's different if you're being paid to use Windoze. I'll admit it - I did some Lose95 work today: what was it ? Trying to get a modem link to stay up. I've done more creative things, but not usually under Windoze. > Want to run that program your mother sends you and wants you to run? Quote her the exec format error you got. Ha ha ha. > Happened to buy a printer? It won't say "Yes! It works with Ghostscript!" But you should soon find out from other people. From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr(a)together.net> > Windows (who stole its interface from mac who stole it from xerox) > type GUIs are easier to use than CLIs, it is only since the > entrenchment of GUIs that they have come forth in the Unix/Linux > world. GUI interfaces are only easy for the few things they present you with, after which they are imnpossible. Unless you can connect your "find" and "sed" icons in a pipeline ... In fact I rarely even start X unless it's for the xboard chess game. speaking of which ... Is Unix dying--or even dead? From: "S. M. Halloran" <mitch(a)duzen.com.tr> From Edupage, 18 December 1997: <----------> TACTICAL SHIFT BY WORKSTATION COMPANIES Silicon Graphics Inc.'s plan to allow SGI graphics software to run on Microsoft's Windows NT operating system provides new evidence that a growing number of companies are giving up on Unix and instead standardizing on Windows NT. SGI hopes to be able to use its experience in developing high-end graphics software without having to spend a great deal of time building the underlying technology represented by an operating system. (Washington Post 17 Dec 97) <----------> But SGI never did put any effort into it, which was why their network programs were built on 'rcp' and needed fixing if you (horrors) set a password. > turnkey "office suite" and try to give MS a run for its money. There > is no time like now to get the X-Windows (or GUI-free-from-copyright) > Complete Office bundled together and have a media gathering to make > sure that all the important news organizations are informed. You > should get decent press exposure, since MS-bashing seems to be in > vogue. The Linux or FreeBSD people should select a mediagenic > spokesperson from the group--one with fire in the belly--and then do > the hard work of putting something together that a 25-year old > free-Unix developer's 72-year old grandmother can install to a x86 > box. In fact, your press conference would have real pinache if, in > fact, you put someone's 72-year old grandmother before a PC with an > empty disk drive, run the install, then type a short letter on the > fancy word processer, addressed to Bill G., with the message "Up > yours!" I can think of someone possibly suitable for this last bit. (R. what do you think ?) From: SL Baur <steve(a)xemacs.org> > Unix *is* far better and had the technology decades ago. > Where can I get a laptop without a pre-installed O/S (or with Linux > pre-installed) on it? Try these people. I'm not sure about laptops. : VA Research Linux Workstations | The World's Best Linux Workstations : | Featuring RedHat : http://www.varesearch.com | Now offering VarStation II Systems -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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The Jewish Defense League doesn't want you to know!
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently The Jewish Defense League succeded in shutting the domain ABBC.COM hosting a database of publicly available information of Jews who endorse censorship. The ISP CLEVER.NET forced Ahmed Ramito take off the list without any justifiable reason such as invasion of privacy. Under U. S. law public figures must demonstrate actual malice to recover damages for invasion of privacy and for defamation. But the information is publicly available and not covered by privacy laws in the United States. If you want to review what the extremist Jewish organization JDL doesn't want you to know go to http://www.dejanews.com Use the following search profile: ~a nobody(a)replay.com & Ahmed Rami Download it now and distribute it widely. Remember to download all the article segments! Be aware that The Jewish Defense League was founded by terrorist Meir Kahane whose Kach Movement was labeled a terrorist organization by the U. S. State Department. Related References: http://abbc.com http://www.hatewatch.org http://www.jdl.org

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Filed Friday afternoon
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) CIV NO 97 0266 ) SC/DJS ) Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) ) Defendant ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS 1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales] [Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the court may know, Rule 26 (b)(1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mater, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and LOCATION of any books documents, or other tangible thing and the identity and location of persons have knowledge of any discoverable matter. Rule 36 states, Request for admission (a) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for the purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request may WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. ... Plaintiffs capitalize WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT. 2 Rule 36 states, {T]he matter IS ADMITTED unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or with such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection address to the matter signed by the party or by the party's attorney, ... Plaintiffs capitalize IS ADMITTED. 3 PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN were served I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday November 3, 1997. More than 30 days elapsed and Plaintiff's have received no response from Minihan or Mitchell. Therefore, Minihan ADMITS 1 NSA is involved in 'spiking' [modifying the advertised intended functions] electronic equipment. 2 NSA 'spiked' Iranian and Libyan cryptographic units so that the cryptographic key was transmitted with the cipher text. 3 Iranian messages were given to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war. 4 NSA was involved in the conviction, by giving contents of secret messages, of Ali Vakili-Rad and Masour Hendi to the Court in Paris in the trial for the stabbing death of Shapour Baktiar. 5 Minihan knows where copies of intercepted messages are kept at NSA. 4 Requests for First set of Admission were mailed October 13, 1997. More than 30 days has elapsed. No response from lawyer Mitchell or respondents were received by Plaintiffs. Therefore, NSA employee Brian Snow ADMITS 1 He designed the cryptographic algorithm for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit (MSCU). 2 NSA funded the MSCU at Sandia labs. 3 In about 1983 he gave a presentation at NSA FANX building to some Sandians involved with the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit. 4 In the presentation he showed electronic schematics of the units to the Sandians. 5 He told the Sandians about the electronic and operational problems NSA had with the cryptographic units he bought with him. 6 He told the Sandians that one of the cryptographic units failed in the Moscow embassy and transmitted clear text. 7 He concluded his talk telling the Sandians that NSA had no operational failures once NSA went to dual redundant cryptographic units. 8 He told the Sandians not to ask for a theoretical reason why dual redundant cryptographics never failed, in the sense of releasing classified data, but that this was based on practical experience. 9 William H. Payne was one of the Sandians in the audience of his talk. 10 He sat across the table from William H. Payne at lunch in the cafeteria in the basement of the FANX building directly after his talk. 11 He was involved in algorithms associated with the Clipper project. 12 He where the documents specifying the MSCU algorithm are located at NSA. 13 He knows where the documents specifying algorithms associated with the Clipper project are located at NSA. NSA employee Thomas White ADMITS 15 He served as the liaison between NSA and Sandia for the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 16 He forwarded documents such as NSA's Orange book and the public key Firefly chip to Sandia. 17 He told Bill Payne that NSA regarded former president Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors. 18 He told Bill Payne that the reasons NSA regarded Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors is that Reagan, on TV announced to the world that the US was reading Libyan communications. 19 He Bill Payne that the following day [after Reagan's TV announcement] NSA could no longer read Libyan communications. 20 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz ADMITS 21 He visited Sandia in about 1986-87 with R division employee Ed Georgio to discuss which data authentication algorithm should be used for the US/USSR deployable seismic verification system (DSVS). 22 He and Bill Payne discussed using public key for the DSVS system. 23 He concluded that there were too many problems with public key so it was best to continue using the old Benincasa USO (unmanned seismic observatory) algorithm. 24 In 1989 he and others asked Bill Payne to write a memorandum to NSA deputy director James J. Hearn requesting help from NSA to develop new data authentication algorithms. 25 He did this is because R division needed a letter of support for more funding. 26 The DRAFT letter he asked Payne to write is seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 27 He asked Payne to fax the DRAFT letter to his fiancee, Amy Johnston, since NSA did not have fax for unclassified work readily available to use. 28 The "To Mark and Ed, R" on page 183 of SAND91-2201 UC 706 addressed him and his boss boss at the time, Ed Donohue. 29 He told Payne that NSA takes about a year to evaluate an encryption/authentication algorithm before it can be distributed for use. 30 He told Payne, in a response to a question from Payne, that NSA runs crypto algorithms through statistical tests. 31 After Payne wrote the Appendix T memorandum, NSA sent a delegation to Sandia. 32 He and NSA employee Scott Judy designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 33 The replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 34 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 35 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 36 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 37 He knows where the documents specifying his and Judy's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Scott Judy ADMITS 38 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 39 He later met Payne again at NSA in a meeting. 40 He told Payne that NSA bases its cryptographer algorithm on principles other than mathematics. 41 He and NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 42 His replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 43 GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 44 The number stepping on the internal registers of GRANITE was decreased in response to deficiency 2 enumerated in the June 21, 1989 letter to Hern. 45 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 46 He knows where the documents specifying his and Unkenholtz's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Edward Donohue ADMITS 47 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 48 He was head of NSA's R division cryptographic algorithms division in 1989. 49 He knows where 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Brian Snow's MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithms, 6 the STU III algorithms. written specifications are located at NSA. NSA employee Paul Bridge ADMITS 50 He assumed liaison control from NSA employee Tom White for the US/USSR seismic data authenticator. 51 He placed a copy of WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have established a working relationship which has gown substantially over the last decade. Currently, there exist several joint project areas of mutual interest. Different policies and administrative procedure exist at SNL and NSA which govern the handling of sensitive and classified material, and the documentation and dissemination of such work. It is the purpose of the Agreement to specify the general guidelines under which work will be administered in the area of cryptography research at SNL. First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires and indigenous cryptographic capability to support its Department of Energy mission in the design and development of safe and secure nuclear weapons and in treaty verification. SNL and NSA agree to a cooperative effort to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with the role of such work to national security. Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval authority for cryptographic systems developed for and used in national security applications, recognizes its responsibility to provide support and guidance to SNL's activities in applying cryptography. Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as classified when it is initiated or created, i.e., will protect such work as "created classified", and will consult with NSA prior to handling such work as unclassified. Periodic technical and managerial discussions between SNL and NSA will be held to increase the awareness of the security concerns of both organizations and to develop and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide which will protect the national security interests of both organizations. This working agreement shall be effective on the date of the last signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL and NSA. It will be valid until terminated by mutual agreement. AGREED: ALBERT NARATH RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND (USN) President Plans and Policy TITLE TITLE SANDIA NATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY LABORATORIES June 10, 1991 22 July 1991 DATE DATE which is now seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997. 52 His purpose of giving Payne a copy of the Narath/MacFarland agreement an attempt to threaten Payne. 53 He told Payne that Sandia must regard the US/USSR Deployable Seismic Verification System (DSVS) authenticator as classified and get permission from NSA to place the unit in the field. 54 He told Payne that Sandia must have the DSVS authenticator TEMPEST tested . 55 He agrees Payne responded to him that the previous unit had already passed TEMPEST testing and that Payne's Sandia project leader, H. B. [Jim] Durham, did not want to spend the money to repeat the testing. 56 He told Payne that NSA should be getting the capability to build cryptographic devices. NSA employee Rick Proto ADMITS 57 He and group of other NSA employees met Sandians H. B. Durham, Ron Moya, and William Payne at NSA at Fort George G. Meade in about 1986 to discuss, in part, implementation of the Deployable Seismic Verification System data authenticator. 58 He and other NSA employees directed that the NSA Unmanned Seismic Observatory data authenticator algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa be implemented entirely in hardware. 59 He and the other NSA employees at the meeting, directed that the data authenticator be enclosed in a TEMPEST enclosure. Sandians expressed objection to the TEMPEST enclosure in that the authenticator was housed in a steel tube buried about 100 meters beneath ground surface. 60 He agrees that he and NSA employee Robert Morris met with Sandia cryptographer G. J. Simmons when Simmons asked them both the two questions: 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility? 61 He and/or Morris refuse to respond to Simmons' above question. Retired Sandia Employee Gustavus J Simmons ADMITS 62 He with Sandia Paul Stokes designed a data authentication algorithm for seismic treaty verifications in the early 1970s. 63 He and Stokes either patented, tried to patent, or contemplated patenting their authentication algorithm. 64 NSA, when we presented their seismic data authentication algorithm to the Agency, rejected its use. 65 He know that NSA gave Sandia the data authentication algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa to use in seismic verification rather than use your and Stokes algorithm. 66 He feels that the algorithm that he and Stokes proposed is as good or better than Benincasa's algorithm. 67 He feels that NSA demanding Sandia use Benincasa's algorithm could be a case of Not-invented-here as opposed to technical advantages over his and Stokes algorithm. 68 In about 1986 he gave a presentation in Sandia spook-shop building 868 to promote the use of public key cryptography for use in the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 69 No one, until he received a copy of Payne's technical report in 1992, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System told him what algorithm and authentication technology was used. 70 He asked NSA employees Rick Proto and Robert Morris to the effect, 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility. 71 Proto or Morris did not answer his questions. 72 He retired before he planned from Sandia Labs. 73 He felt that NSA exerted some pressure on Sandia to have him retire. 74 He told William Payne on the phone that he was forced into early retirement as a result of NSA pressures. 75 He felt that some NSA algorithms do not are properly classifiable. 76 He felt that NSA abuses classification with regard to cryptography. 77 He feels that cryptography, by its 'slippery math' basis, is difficult, if not impossible, to regulate. Sandia employee D. Jerry Allen ADMITS 78 He was a supervisor Sandia's weapons components department. 79 NSA has responsibility for furnished Sandia the cryptographic algorithms and approving the implementation technology which went into the electronic locks in the US nuclear arsenal. 80 He told William Payne in about 1991-92 that it cost $300,000 per nuclear bomb to recall bombs to Pantex to remove and repair Sandia's failing semiconductor chips. Sandia employee Ronald Kulju ADMITS 81 He worked in Sandia weapons components department in about 1986/7. 82 He was working on a project which involved use of the Cylink corporation CY 1024 public key cryptography semiconductor chip. 82 He made an agreement in about 1986/7 with Payne. He would design the hardware oscillator for the CY 1024 if Payne would try to get CY 1024 to communicate with an 80c51 microcontroller using synchronous Mode 0 communications. 83 He told Payne that Sandia's public key cryptography chips did not get the same answers as the CY 1024. 84 He told Payne that NSA and Sandia was in the process of removing the public key cryptography from weapons systems. 4 Admissions reveal that NSA employees KNOW where the lawfully requested documents reside. And that NSA has EMBARRASSING problems with its cryptographic algorithms. 5 Rule 56 states. Summary Judgment states, The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs capitalize NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. Admissions attest to the contention that there are NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. WHEREFORE, 6 Replace judges Svet and Campos because these judges have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Award Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as a matter of law based on admissions. 8 Have replacement judges ORDER Defendant to produce immediately produce documents in machine-readable format for publication on Internet. In preparation for settlement of this unfortunate bungled spy sting. And analysis of 'deficient' NSA cryptographic algorithm work designed to get the US government out of the cryptography business. 9 grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 Pro se litigants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 and hand delivered to Jan E Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday December 22, 1997. 13

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Re: Completely anonymous communications ARE only for "Criminals"
by Charlie Comsec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :The fact that the people making the claims could not afford to pay even the > :costs probably influences the decision. > > Nope. If a lawyer believes he can win and there big money involved, he'll take > it on the premise that he gets paid if he wins. If the defendant has nothing > to offer, the lawyer won't do it. Thus, the falsly accused may not be able to > afford to go to court. The decision to sue is mostly based on how deep the > pockets of the defendant would be. Then what's the point of going to all the trouble of tracking someone down if you're unwilling or unable to take appropriate legal action against him after he's found? > :So you're suggesting that the victim should suffer. You are really saying > :that it is perfectly acceptable for someone to be run out of a newsgroup by > :a single person who refuses to be killfilable. > > > Yup, that's what he's saying. I don't recall ever saying that. How do you run a person out of an unmoderated NG? And if it's moderated, and the moderator is allowing what you consider libel against you, then you probably have a case against him. That's what the courts decided in a landmark case against an ISP. When you manage the content then you become responsible for it as well. Nor do I understand the "who refuses to be killfilable" part, either. How can someone you don't even know control your killfile? I can killfile anyone I want to, including "nobody@some_remailer". I haven't killfiled anyone, but I could do so if I wanted to. > :>:The problem is that devising workable solutions to problems that don't yet > :>:exist is much more difficult that resolving problems that do already exist. > :> > :>Many say the problem does exist. > : > :There are already problems with anonymous posts. It's all about abuse "on" > :the net, in this case. Everyone in the NANA groups say "That's abuse on the > :net, not abuse of the net. If someone is libelling or harassing you, take > :it up with the police." A traceless remailer makes that impossible. > > True. Why would that prevent you from contacting the police? But consider that libel is a civil tort not a criminal offense, so the police aren't likely to get involved, even if you could identify the culprit. Using a remailer does not make a person unidentifiable, just untraceable. There is a difference. > :>Good point. I again forgot he said "Are only for criminals" > : > :Oh, for crying out loud. I'll try to be more precise. Completely > :untraceable communications are only *needed* by people performing acts that > :are illegal by the laws of all jurisdictions where an anonymous remailer > :with trace logging exists. > > You did it again. If you change the word "only" to "sometimes" it would be > more correct. And probably no more so than pay phones or Netcom accounts. > :>:> I still think he's mistaken by thinking that all who post anonymously are > :>:> lawbreakers. > : > :I don't think that. I never said that. > > Yes, you did. And you did it again above. "only needed by people performing > acts that are illegal" Sounds the same to me. I don't know how you could have one without the other. > :>:I do too. But his premise was used to support his suggested remedy. If an > :>:anonymous user is NOT presumed to be a criminal, then you can't justify > :>:treating him like one. > : > :How is this "treating him like a criminal". I'm asking for a very small > :amount of information to be kept. Far less than that required to open a > :bank account. Are you saying that banks are treating people like criminals > :when they ask for ID? > > True. Very True. It should be "treat him like a suspect" and yes, the banks > treat you like a suspect everytime they ask for ID. They suspect you may be a > criminal if they don't know you. It's SUPPOSED to be that way. Banks are a poor analogy, because anonymity is more analogous to paying cash. When you sign your name to a check, you're already identifying yourself. Banking is an inherently identity-based institution. You're asking someone to trust you, and it's up to you to prove yourself to be trustworthy. A check is made valuable or worthless by virtue of the validity of its signature. Ideas can be evaluated on their own merit, just like paper currency can. I don't need to see two forms of ID to determine whether that $100 bill you just handed me is genuine or counterfeit. > :>I still wonder about what to do about "suspects" on the net. How do you > :>investigate one suspected without harming those NOT suspected? > : > :This is my point. > > > Duh, I know. The solution being what? Surrendering freedom for the sake of supposed security? I don't see that there is necessarily a dilemma between protecting victims versus preserving the freedoms of average citizens. It seems that every solution I offer Politas' is countered with a "yeah, but what about .... " objection. In an imperfect world, government cannot completely protect people from themselves. I'm really trying to understand what Politas' wants, but it's difficult. I've suggested several solutions to his hypothetical problems that don't infringe on the freedoms of the innocent, but each is quickly rejected. - --- Finger <comsec(a)nym.alias.net> for PGP public key (Key ID=19BE8B0D) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJ7rOQbp0h8ZvosNAQHuNQf+JTOZwB/OMXag+Q/fp7vYjZ9pfHV0U5WI rlSgEmZzDIHPUqfns7cDrHSwhKYvfQn9L3VC64qgwRjNSiHcgCqo2f2pnv1Rogoe pu8nvhANfAFpSIiLQ3oMndVvp3xcNt3MGlFhrBGADgbJ1ky4RtdWeDWvz19tJWlM Zpy4igHDWyTFmgNTbccq5qeUrHR2mw9/QQb5GNWK9c6tmj54OMv0kOH8Xpqyl+Fq FocnOLXZI/MAacL5gaLFhNdsv9LkNaC+SeFlK1OxHkcNmTVc00VkPwEzAXtrLSA+ Te+FiRp61mz39CY3hg+Hg/fyLdrTIPK0QjAyL+Lg9ayJh1gVkS8rLw== =HyrT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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