December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Dole web site cracked?
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:08 AM 10/7/96 -0500, "Bruce M." <bkmarsh(a)feist.com> wrote: >On Mon, 7 Oct 1996, Black Unicorn wrote: > >> Actually, on further examination, looks like a cute little spoof, not a >> hack. >> >> The address for the actual dole page is : www.dolekemp96.org > > But, which one of these DNS entries looks more official? [snip] Heh. www.dolekemp96.org is definitely the address Dole gave at the close of the debate. The fact that the billing contact and one of the domain servers are at "getcaught.com" is perhaps just a fine bit of irony... I tried to connect to www.getcaught.com with no success, so I'm not sure what's there... Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: Can somebody unsubscribe cyberpromo from CP?
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:23 AM 10/7/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >I think somebody subscribed that Cyberpromo organization to the Cypherpunks >list. It needs to be unsubscribed... I did a "who" and didn't see them. Maybe someone already took care of it... BTW, the messages I was receiving from "abusebot(a)savetrees.com" were sent to me, not the list. I wrote the address in their email and was told that apparently someone was forging notes to their "abuse" address from mine -- the information about reporting abuses, etc, comes back in response. I was told the messages would be blocked, but I'm not sure if it happened as I'm now filtering them. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon U.S. State Censorship Page at - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/state New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: You can be forced to turn over your encryption keys?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:17 AM 10/7/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 10:33 AM -0400 10/7/96, Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote: >>I thought we had a 5th amendment. Isn't turning over your key that may (or >>may not) expose encriminating evidence an extension of self-encrimination? >>Haven't there been dozens of famous witnesses (Patty Hurst, Oliver North, >>etc) that "take the 5th" dozens of times on the stand. Why couldn't I >>"take the 5th" when asked for my encryption keys? When asked for your key, >>can't you say: "I'm sorry your honor, but I respectfully refuse to answer >>that question on the grounds that it may incriminate me.". >Though IANAL, I know of many, many discussions of this question. So far as >I know, it remains one of The Great Unresolved Questions. I think that there was an idea that appeared in the last few months around here, which took advantage of the fact that a one-time pad makes all decrypts equally likely. If the cops sieze an apparently-encrypted file and they insist on the key, just ask them to give you the file back (although presumably you already had it) and present them with the OTP, revealing the fact (surprise!!!) that the thing decrypts to (for just one example) the first "N" bytes of the King James Bible, or the Cybernomicon, or "War and Peace" or the stock exchange results for August 1, 1989, etc... This suggests that there is a reason to have a program which uses OTP techniques but generates files which "look like" valid PGP output. The judge can't force you to reveal what you don't know, but more importantly if you give him a "key" that might be the correct one, and assuming it is impossible to prove that it wasn't the correct key, then it would be somewhat pointless and certainly unjustified for him to continue to insist on providing yet another key. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: Dole web site cracked?
by Alex Filacchione 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: Skeeve Stevens[SMTP:skeeve@skeeve.net] Sent: Monday, October 07, 1996 1:10 PM To: campbell(a)c2.net Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Dole web site cracked? You, Rick Campbell, shaped the electrons to say: + +So, I just finished watching the debate and at the very end, Bob Dole +suggested that people check out www.dole-kemp.org. I was already on +playing decision96.digital.com so I went for it. + +The first page says ``Oops! You've tried to access the old +way. Please choose the new way instead.'' Clicking on `new' gives a +black background page with two yellow arrows, one left and one right. +The left one gives you ``Nope, you can't go back now''. The Right one +gives you www.cg96.org, the Clinton-Gore home page. Yeah.... definatly hacked... not much point in mirroring this one. hmm it goes to www.dole-kemp.com which then sends it to cg96.org...... hmmmm the INTERNIC entry for dole-kemp.com looks find... and its a redirect, so they prolly hacked both sites... not sure... anyone else have any ideas? My understanding is that everyone has been fooled. The addresses www.dole-kemp.com and www.dole-kemp.org seem to be spoofed sites. The REAL sites are www.dolekemp96.org and www.dole96.org. These sites have not been touched. Hmm, and I thought that internic was supposed to be watching this stuff (domain names). I wonder if mcdonalds.org is still available... Alex F alexf(a)iss.net

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Libel & Pseudonymous Reputation - permissions fixed!
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about that. The file is available now. http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/CyberLaw_Course/cyberlaw.038 -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Program Director </HTML>

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Re: You can be forced to turn over your encryption keys?
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:33 AM 10/7/96 -0400, Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote: >I thought we had a 5th amendment. Isn't turning over your key that may (or >may not) expose encriminating evidence an extension of self-encrimination? As Tim notes, this has been discussed several times. You might take a look at: Greg S. Sergienko, Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996), <http://www.urich.edu/~jolt/v2i1/sergienko.html>. -- Greg Broiles | "We pretend to be their friends, gbroiles(a)netbox.com | but they fuck with our heads." http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | |

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Re: "Drift net fishing," GAK, FBI, and NSA
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:07 AM 10/6/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Some convincing evidence was presented >that the moving force behind GAK is *not* the NSA, but is rather the *FBI*. >Specifically, even 40-bit keys are probably too long for massive "drift net >fishing," in that the cost per break is probably still too high. The cost >for a "focussed attack" (I can't think of a fishing parallel...maybe "spear >fishing"?) How about "DuPont-lure fishing"? is of course low. The speaker at SAFE pointed out that the FBI >is pushing for the 40-bit keys (and now is accepting the 56-bit keys?) >because for focussed attacks, e.g., on the communications of a person under >observation, they can call on other agencies to break the ciphers for them >(even if they don't yet have their own such machines). > >In a nutshell, almost any level of encryption above, say, 30something bits, >is too much when millions of messages per day are to be "drift-netted" is >too much. (The exact number that is "too much" depends on a lot of factors, >including the cost of the cipher-breaking machines, the number of messages >to be read per day, etc. This number will change with time.) You should also factor in the government's ability to store what they can't immediately decrypt, which drastically changes the playing field with regard to encryption. It was at least five years ago when I first read about a system to record data on so-called "digital paper," which was actually a plastic with a photo-writable layer similar to write-once CD's. It could be formed in any configuration, but perhaps one of the more intriguing (due to the large writable area) is on large reels similar to 1/2" magtape. As I recall, they claimed that such a reel could hold 1 terabyte of data. Sure, such a capacity is small compared with the total Internet traffic, but I assume that most traffic could be excluded from recording if its source was known, etc. They'd exclude anything from "probably-okay" web pages, they'd trim space-hogging graphics, etc. "Just the facts, ma'am." Call the whole thing "retroactive-selective-drift-net-fishing," if you will. Once this data is stored away the government would determine (perhaps years after the fact?) which data they want to decrypt, possibly based on crimes committed long after the data was recorded. This information might reveal contacts, etc. Obviously they have no prayer of doing real-time analysis. Even so, it makes it far more practical to do the equivalent of drift-net fishing if they can exclude 99.9999%+ of the traffic from their decryption attempts. 56-bit encryption doesn't look so ominous to them in this case. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Can somebody unsubscribe cyberpromo from CP?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think somebody subscribed that Cyberpromo organization to the Cypherpunks list. It needs to be unsubscribed... Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NSA/GCSB spying shown on NZ television
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

20/20 today had a segment on the operation of the GCSB (Government Communications Security Bureau), the trading name of the NSA in New Zealand. This was motivated by the recent publication of Nicky Hagers book "Secret Power" which goes into great detail about the operation of the GCSB (it has floor plans of the monitoring stations, details of operations, staff, names and contact numbers, etc etc - it's a very well researched book covering the day-to-day running of an intelligence agency). In the 20/20 segment, Nicky and a reporter managed to get through the security perimeter at the Waihopai base with a camera and ladder, climbed up to the windows, and shot footage of the interior of the base through improperly-closed curtains. The main operations room had racks of equipment which is hard to identify (it's not a very good shot), along with tables containing PClone monitors and HP II's[1]. Unfortunately the resolution isn't good enough to show what's being displayed on the monitors. Another shot of an office showed a desk with Intelsat operations manuals, providing, for the first time, direct proof of whose traffic is being monitored - not the Russians, not the Chinese, but NZ's pacific neighbours and trading partners. The intercepted traffic is then passed straight back to the NSA for analysis. AFAIK there's never been any direct, documented proof of what these bases are intercepting - the dishes are pointed in the right direction for intercepting Intelsat transmissions, but the various agencies have been able to deny the nature of the interception. The footage of operations manuals on a desk would seem to prove beyond a doubt that the agencies are engaged in large-scale interception and monitoring of civilian communications. It was rather unfortunate that the program was shown at the same time as the political leaders debate on another channel (we have an election in four days time), because virtually noone will have watched 20/20. Peter. [1] Given that the windows looked like plain glass and that these things have a control zone that reaches halfway to Antarctica, I'd love to park outside the base with certain pieces of receiving equipment...

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No Subject
by jeffm＠icu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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