December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:46 AM 9/6/96 -0400, Donald E. Eastlake 3rd wrote: >Suggest you look at draft-eastlake-internet-payment-*.txt in the >IETF shadow directories. I don't think any one step will solve all >our spam problems but I wouldn't mind spending, say, 5 cents for each >real piece of mail I sent outside my company and if end machines charged >5 cents per piece of ouside mail received, I think spamming would be >crippled. (Note that with bad guy lists, you could collect the money and >then just throw away the mail.) Assuming we all agree that we're moving from a paper-based mail system to email, it is logical that "junk mail" will move as well. As I recall, statistics show that the average cost of a piece of junk mail is about $1 or so, including postage, printing, etc. It occurred to me a while back (and this proposal appears to be at least approximated by other proposals around here) that since companies are already saving a dollar, they should use some of those savings to "bribe" Internet-users into reading those (commercial) messages. Don't bother with all the details on how to verify this, just include digital cash along with the message, to be credited automatically to the recipient. Assuming the average Internet user already pays about $15 per month for access, he would only have to receive 2 emails a day which pay him 25 cents per, to pay for this service. At that point, his Internet access would be free, at least somewhat analogous to free TV which is paid for by commercials. Everybody's ahead, except for the postman, the printer, etc. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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electronic offshore banking
by Jüri Kaljundi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are there any good offshore banks that would allow you to use your account over the Internet? I know European Union Bank www.eub.com is on of those available, but their US$ 25.000 minimum deposit is too stupid. Jüri Kaljundi AS Stallion jk(a)stallion.ee

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Re: Reputations
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:11 AM 9/6/96, Greg Burk wrote: >> I strongly disagree. It's quite possible for Person A to quickly convert >> his reputation to Person B to a _negative_ value. Real quick, in fact. > >I don't see how there can be such a thing as negative reputation >capital. Wouldn't that mean B believes the opposite of what A says? If >you anti-believed someone in a consistent manner, couldn't they exploit >that? Well, I suppose that if you don't believe in negative repuation capital, I'm not going to be able to spend enough time to convince you. It's like someone saying they're not sure such a thing as "entropy" exists. >For instance, when a certain infamously-low-reputation (deservedly so) >individual recently joined the cypherpunk lists, others who had endured >him in the past tried to relay their impressions of him. It proved very >difficult to convey, and they were somewhat attacked for their efforts >and not entirely believed. > >In other words, he *could not* spend down to 0, despite years of >unflagging effort. No, with many of the list members, his reputation was in fact negative. They disbelieved nearly anything he had to say, and his approval of some idea was largely cause for others to take the opposite tack. About as clear an example of a negative reputation as one can find. (Note that I am not saying his reputation is negative with _me_.) >I've already made the points I wanted to make, so I may not have further >comments. Nor me. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: What the NSA is patenting
by John Deters 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:26 AM 9/3/96 -0500, Bruce Schneier wrote: >I just spent a pleasant hour or so searching a patent database for all >patents assigned to the NSA. There's some interesting stuff: > > "Self-locking, tamper-evident package" > Method of retrieving documents that concern the same topic" > >Fifty-Four patents total. (Used to be they just kept stuff secret; now >they patent some of it.) Attached is the most interesting thing I found: a >patent on techniques for reading data off overwritten magnetic media. > >Bruce [ Interesting patent deleted ] This method implies that they have the ability to scan the entire platter surface at resolution level that is basically atomic. >From lots of experience gained from working with metalworking machinery, it sounds like some of the old magnetic data might be leaving traces behind by a process called "backlash". It happens because machines don't realign themselves precisely, unless the lead-in steps are repeated every time. A fairly simple demonstration of this can be found on most dot-matrix printers. They usually have a mode called "uni-directional" printing, where the printhead puts dots on the paper only when travelling from left-to-right. This is used to improve the quality of a graphic image. Print a simple pattern of repeating vertical bars (||||||) across the page and down several lines with this mode turned off, and you'll probably notice the lines tend to not line up perfectly. Turn uni-directional printing on, and watch the behavior of the printhead. It will "home" itself to the far left side before printing the next line of bars. The bars will then be lined up "better" than in the bi-directional print. We should be able to use this feature to our advantage to write a "backlash- enhanced" wipedisk driver. The wipedisk utilities I've seen today primarily consist of repeatedly writing a pattern such as 0x55555555, then 0xAAAAAAAA, then 0xFFFFFFFF, then 0x00000000. While this will probably eradicate most of the traces of the original data, it's all happening "unidirectionally" -- starting at the first sector of the file, write this data till all the sectors have been overwritten. Given that the original data may have been written in reverse sector order, or reverse cylinder motion order, or after a large cylinder change, the wipedisk might still leave traces remaining on the disk. Using the above example of printing vertical bars, imagine having each line print three times using the unidirectional mode, and randomly picking one line out of the entire array to print bi-directionally. It'll stand out like a sore thumb. That's what I think they're looking for with their data recovery method. What would probably make for a more secure wipe utility would be to alter the "head approach path" prior to making each of the passes described above. So, before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF full of 0x55555555s, have the head move to the 0th cylinder first. Before overwriting the sectors in order from 0 to EOF with 0xAAAAAAAAs, have the head move to the last cylinder beforehand. Repeat for the 0xFFFFFFFF and 0x00000000 sectors, except overwrite the sectors in order from EOF to 0. All this pre-writing motion could theoretically reduce the repeatability of the drive head positioning arm as well as possibly hitting different rotational sync points, using the backlash effect to its fullest extent. Of course, the biggest problem will be that of overcoming intelligent disk controllers. No self-respecting SCSI drive is going to voluntarily swing the disk head around inefficiently, and I don't know enough about how IDE works to say anything different about it. I hope some hardware hacker who knows their low-level stuff will be able to write a secure disk wiper. John -- J. Deters "Captain's log, stardate 25970-point-5. I am nailed to the hull." +-------------------------------------------------------+ | NET: jad(a)dsddhc.com (work) jad(a)pclink.com (home) | | PSTN: 1 612 375 3116 (work) 1 612 894 8507 (home) | | ICBM: 44^58'36"N by 93^16'27"W Elev. ~=290m (work) | | PGP Key ID: 768 / 15FFA875 | +-------------------------------------------------------+

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Muckraker column
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not sure it came through in my cut-and-paste, but the Muckraker column is of course by Brock Meeks and went up on the site today. -Declan

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Re: Race Bit: C
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:05 AM 9/6/96 +0000, jonathon wrote: >On Thu, 5 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> The way I see it, the status quo doesn't come "pre-justified": It needs >> just as much a defense as any other proposal. Its main advantage is that it >> tends to be more understood that most hypotheticals, because it's been > >More understood, and just more accepted, because alternatives >are hard to conceive, and even harder to popularize, without >lots of red liquid running in the streets? Since red liquid running in the streets is generally so reviled, one of the things which mystifies me is why there aren't more simulation-type programs used to test out hypotheticals, for example a "SimEconomy." For example, you'll occasionally hear about a media news organization gathering a dozen or so volunteers in a room, and asking them to solve a problem like "The Budget Deficit" or some such. The result of their interplay is generally used to explain why these problems are hard to solve. I, for one, would love to be able to program in an immediate 25%+ reduction in military spending (added to that a 5%/year cumulative cut after that for 10+ years), a 5% cut then a cap on Socialist Insecurity, 5% per year (cumulative,for 10 years) of reduction in welfare, along with similarly substantial cuts/caps in Medicare and a few other features. Obviously, a computer-based simulation wouldn't just blindly do the cuts, but would also estimate the secondary and tertiary effects of such cuts, for example spending in areas whose economies are traditionally dependant on defense programs, etc. I'm not saying that I think these changes would be _easy_, politically, but if the average citizen were made aware of how simple the changes were, he'd be less tolerant of special-interest politics. > On second thoughts, let's just terminate > with extreme prejudice, each and every individual > who has worked in any capacity for any part of any > government agency in the us -- regardless of whether it > was federal, state or local, and regardless of whether > they were president, janitor, or clerk. > All people in the employ of government agencies are death-dealers. I hope you don't expect me to argue with this B^) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: PRESS RELEASE: GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:18 AM 9/6/96, tank wrote: >Please forward: > * * * P R E S S R E L E A S E * * * > > >GERMANY CENSORS DUTCH WEBSITE WWW.XS4ALL.NL, WITH 3100 WEBPAGES > > >German internetproviders, joined in the Internet Content Taskforce >(ICTF), started censoring the Dutch website www.xs4all.nl, containing >3100 personal and commercial homepages. This act of censorship is >caused by the webpage of a magazine that is banned in Germany, Radikal >(http://www.xs4all.nl/ ~tank/radikal/). ... Though my German friends will perhaps feel I am picking on them, this is not so (this week Germany is in the hot seat, last week it was Singapore....). A Modest Proposal: * as Germany is bent on blocking sites which carry this subversive pamphlet, "Radikal," let us mirror it on thousands of sites around the world. * when the Germans went into Danmark and insisted Jews wear badges, ordinary citizens (and the Danish Royal Family, as I recall) also took to wearing these Star of David badges. * wouldn't it be deliciously ironic if the "Free Speech Blue Ribbon" now attached to so many pages were to be joined by a "Star of David"? This Star of David symbol could mean "We support freedom to read, and our site contains the "Radikal" publication which Germans are forbidden to access." (I know nothing of how such symbolic campaigns are actually launched and managed, so I'm suggesting the hint of an idea. I do think mirroring the banned publication (_any_ banned publication, by _any_ government) on as many sites as possible is a Good Idea.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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"The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...."
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:30 PM 9/5/96, Omegaman wrote: >What strikes me as odd is that the arguments against anonymous >communication are nearly identical to those against strong crypto. >ie. the same four horsemen flare up in these discussions. Yet we >have parties who are ostensibly pro-crypto but anti-anonymity. > >To put it in a nutshell, in a free society I can have a private >conversation, but I must essentially announce that I am having one >and who I am having that conversation with? As with Adam Back's mini-rant yesterday, this is exactly correct. In a free society, speech need not be approved, registered, escrowed, labelled, or identified with the Registered True Name of the speaker. One can paraphrase Esther Dyson's concerns about anonymity in several fairly equivalent forms. Here's the original: "Anonymity can be dangerous -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." Here's a slightly paraphrased version for freedom to read anonymously, with some "reasons" included in brackets: "Books and magazines can be dangerous [bomb recipes, racial hatred, instilling bad values, etc.]-- as can restrictions on reading, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing unfettered reading -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (i.e., "book escrow," where one's reading materials are escrowed with Trusted Authorities, and only accessed by law enforcement under Proper Conditions. Failure to escrow reading materials would be a Class B felony. Cf. the FBI's Library Awareness Program of circa 1987-8.) A version for freedom of movement: "People moving around can be dangerous [avoiding parental responsibilities, avoiding taxes, spying, plotting to bomb buildings]-- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing freedom of movement -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (a la the "position escrow system" I predicted a couple of years ago would someday be seriously considered) A version for freedom of association: "Freedom of association can be dangerous [plotting of crimes, gathering of mobs, spread of dangerous ideas, disease]-- as can restrictions on such gatherings, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing freedom of association -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." ("Club escrow"? All mailing lists, clubs, associations, and such would have to escrow an up-to-date list of members, associates, and contacts. Then, with proper authorization by proper authorities, law enforcement could inspect these lists to see who had been meeting with whom. Hotels would have to monitor use of rooms by more than two persons (the two person case is already covered by the "Sex can be dangerous..." variant of the Dyson Principle).) A version for anonymous purchases and sales: "Anonymity in sales and purchases can be dangerous [bomb materials, stolen goods, unhealthful foods, etc.] -- as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing anonymous purchases and sales of goods -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (There go the flea markets and garage sales (for buyers), which are largely anonymous. There goes walking into a store and paying cash for a piece of pipe (could be made into a bomb). There goes cash, period. See next item.) A version for cash: "Cash can be dangerous [illegal purchases, drugs, prostitution, tax evasion, illegal workers, extortion, etc.] -- as can traceable money, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would favor allowing cash -- with some form of traceability only under terms considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap." (One has to presume that Dyson would probably not support Chaumian untraceable e-cash, though I doubt she would go for the other examples.) And so on. One can take Dyson's basic argument for why anonymity may be dangerous at times and why it may need to be restricted, limited, or banned, and use these arguments for a variety of other basic freedoms. Essentially, freedom can be dangerous. The world can be dangerous. In fact, it is. (No, Dyson has not called for such restrictons on freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom to read anonymously. But her argument that she would support anonymity if some form of traceability is built in essentially applies, by the same logic (that it can be dangerous) to a wide variety of other cases.) To summarize: "The Bill of Rights can be dangerous...." --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactl
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Audit trails may now be in place, in which case the cost of anonymity is increased to the cost of the lowest denomination card. Think OTP. However, in both Britian and France I have seen defective phones that allowed LD calls but did not deduct the call amount from the card. Obviously, the effect was free LD and these phones were perpetually busy. If audit trails were in place, this problem should have been noticed quickly. As I said, things may have changed for newer systems. James ---------- From: Flying insect killer <kadafi(a)netcom.com> Sent: Friday, September 06, 1996 1:20 PM To: jimbell(a)pacifier.com Cc: James Bugden; pstira(a)escape.com; cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Anonymous phone calls (was: What is the EFF doing exactl On Fri, 6 Sep 1996, jim bell wrote: > At 10:08 AM 9/6/96 EST, jbugden(a)smtplink.alis.ca wrote: > >There is another spin possible on the reasons for replacement of pay phones with > >credit card phones. In Canada all new credit card phones are also able to take > >phone cards (which are anonymous). > > Don't be too sure about the "anonymity" of these cards. You don't have to > give your name when you buy or use them, but assuming a large number of > phone calls (to, from different locations) can be associated together after > the fact, your name can probably be fairly easily obtained. > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com And phone companys that offers phone cards keep track of every call that goes thru each card number.

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Anonymous Payphones Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:31 AM 9/6/96 -0400, "<pstira(a)escape.com>" <pstira(a)escape.com> wrote: >Not just DC and Chicago, I'm afraid. If anyone around NYC noticed, there >are less and less payphones, and all new ones installed, just about, are >those yellow credit card phones. That's not a big problem - you can buy telephone credit cards, anonymously, in your local convenience store. Around here you've got a choice of cards where the announcements are in Spanish and the rates to call Mexico are cheap, cards that come in exact $20 from machines that don't give change, cards with pretty pictures on the front, cards with advertising, etc., as well as cards that are reusable and want some personal information about you to activate. I don't blame phone companies in New York for using non-coin-phones, especially non-monopoly phone companies. Collecting and handling coins is expensive, phones get vandalized to steal the coins, it's harder to change your rates when you need to go to each phone to do it, and people get annoyed at coin phones that charge higher than Bell prices. What I do get annoyed about is that most pay phones won't accept calls, they'll only initiate them. This means that if you call somebody from a pay phone who only has a beeper, or if you don't have a beeper, you can't leave them a useful message to call you back. Part of this is done because of the Great Drug Hysteria, but I suspect part of it is that pay phone companies don't make money receiving calls, so they don't want to tie up their phones doing that; perhaps if they charged money to receive calls as well as initiate them, they'd be willing to receive calls? Not all of them, but it's now one for >one, at least. > >=Millie= >PS: i wrote a fiction book about this a few years ago -- i should have >published. People could've said i was the next nostradamus. :( # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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