December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: crypto ++ where?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:32 AM 3/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >How can I obtain crypto++, I seem to have deleted the email I had reguarding it. The Cypherpunks mailing list is archived on *.hks.net. You can read it with a news reader on nntp.hks.net, or check www.hks.net (which tends to run a few weeks behind since it's indexed monthly so the current partial-month isn't indexed yet.) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 #

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Re: FCC and Internet telephones
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:16 PM 3/6/96 -0800, you wrote: > >Dost my ears deceive me? Is this true? >-------- INCLUDED MESSAGE > FCC Asked to Stop Net Phones True that some organization is asking the _government_ to stop their competition? I'm shocked! Why, next thing you know people will be asking the government to restrict imports of small cars, restrict who can run radio stations, ban the hemp industry, tax imported sugar, or limit campaign contributions to non-incumbents. ("Not possible", you say - "that would be Un-American!") Of course it's true. Will the FCC do what they want? Who knows; it's stupid enough that they just might, but it may end up like the Craig Shergold O'Hair Memorial Modem Tax with people writing them crank letters for years after they've decided not to. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, +1-415-442-2215 pager 408-787-1281 #

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Re: Another Motivation for the CDA (Federal Sentencing Guidelines)
by tj_lists＠prado.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

** Reply to note from Deranged Mutant <WlkngOwl(a)UNiX.asb.com> 03/07/96 7:06pm +0000 > Yes and no. Depends on the judge. Some are hard-assed about granting > waivers, others aren't. Part of the problerm is that judges have too ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > much discretion. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Couldn't help noticing this, presume you mean Federal Judges since the waiver would be from aspects of GCA 1968, a Federal law. The fact is, at least in sentencing, Federal Judges now have very little discretion. The Federal Sentencing Guideline structure established in the 1980's provides "guidelines" for a given defendant convicted of a given set of charges. Things like prior offenses add "points", ratting on your friends takes away "points". In this case less is better than more. Anyway, a low level bureaucrat fills out a presentence investigation report on the basis of complicated, arcane rules it is easy to get wrong. This report goes to the judge who can pass sentence only within a narrow range, say 6 months 1 way or the other on a 5 year sentence (very few new Federal "crimes" carry less than this). Any departure from this range, either upward or downward, must be justified in a formal opinion, & can be appealed by either party. Very few judges bother. This system is cookie cutter in-justice at it's finest, & only a lack of bureaucratic imagination has prevented it from being computerized beyond the use of word processors to write the report. Since well over 90% of Federal Criminal cases end in guilty pleas, this method has the effect of transferring discretion that formerly belonged to the judge to the prosecutor, who gets to pick from a variety of charges covering the same offense, and the low level flunkey who gets to fill out the forms. This is exactly the big problem with the new "crime" of using encryption in a felony in the Leahy bill. Assuming for a moment this new law is tailored very narrowly & is only used on people who 1. Commit without governmental entrapment an underlying felony. 2. Exclusively use encrypted traffic in direct furtherance of the underlying felony, (example: murder for hire is negotiated via encrypted messages) there still remains the fact that this is simply another tool of prosecutorial discretion, of which there is way to much already. The problem with prosecutorial discretion is that it is always used to encourage snitching, turning this country into a nation of Pavel Mozorov's (12 year old Hero of the Soviet Union who ratted out his parents to the Cheka for concealing a pig from collectivization. His uncles did as should be done in such cases & cut him up with an axe). However, I do agree that in setting conditions other than fines & prison time, Federal Judges do have too much discretion. Chris Lambert (mthreat, Minor Threat) a 21 year old Austin cracker now doing time in Bastrop FCI, as part of his sentence is forbidden to own or work with any computer w/ modem or network card/connection. This of course is to apply after he gets out. Traditionally, counterfeiters, who come from the ranks of printers, merely have to report to their parole officer & get his ok in order to own or go to work for a print shop. cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com mthreat(a)paranoia.com

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Re: Anonymous remailers and Leahy bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 08:03 PM 3/7/96 -0500, Jonathan Rochkind wrote: >At 5:22 PM 03/07/96, jim bell wrote: >>Wouldn't help "Bob" in the least. And you didn't read what I wrote very >>carefully, either: Notice that I said, "under a different name." In other >>words, the source of the note does not identify the user name under which >>the illegal activity is promised to occur. Cancelling this particular >>fellow's account does NOTHING to prevent the illegal activity from >>occurring by other, unidentified users, and "Bob" knows it. > >How is this differnet then me calling up AOL and saying "Using a friend's >account whose password I have, I'm going to send child pornography out to >many people sometime tommorow"? It may be similarly illegal, but it's still a bit different. See below. > >I don't know if it is or not, but hopefully it's the same. As long as >anonymous remailers are legally identical to ISPs, I think we don't have to >worry too much becuase ISPs are now serious money-making businesses with >lots to spend on lobbying and legal fees, and will fight any laws that >effect them such. It is occasionally argued that business doesn't like regulation. That observation is misleading: It turns out that _big_ business actually benefits, at least differentially, from regulation: If it costs a fixed amount to keep a corporation on the right side of the regulation, that's the same for a tiny company and a large company, in fixed dollars. However, as a fraction of sales, it can be vastly different. "Big business" is well aware that regulations keep down the competition. "Big business" wants JUST ENOUGH regulation to achieve its ends of reducing competition, but without being too expensive for itself. > Whether this Leahy bill is passed or not, clearly AOL >is not going to quietly shut down their entire company after receiving such >a phone call. And they can't really do anything to stop the theoretical >next-day child porn mailing either. One big advantage that AOL, or for that matter ANY online service has, is that its customers (or the customers of a competing big service) will be on any jury. They are familiar with how such an organization operates, and they can sympathize a bit with the difficulty of monitoring all this material. They may, in fact, want to KEEP AOL from doing this monitoring, and thus they'll cut AOL some slack when it comes to any decision. Prosecutors know this, judges know this, etc. In this case, familiarity breeds tolerance. Encrypted anonymous remailers, however, are more of a shady, fly-by-night sort of operation. The average AOL user may not even have HEARD about them, let alone actually used them or depended on their continued existence. It is far less likely that a juror will understand why they exist, and will be more likely to think the remailer is responsible for any illegalities committed with that service. Besides, any prosecutor is fully aware that AOL has enough money to defend itself fully, and has the ability to generate angry publicity from its customers against its harassers. Essentially by definition, an anonymous remailer can't count on anyone stepping forward and saying, "I use this encrypted anonymous remailer a lot..." >So it would be beneficial to present anonymous remailers as just another >sort of internet service provider. And we only really have to worry when >there are laws that seem to apply to anon remailers but not AOL. On the contrary: It is the application of any such law which is critical, and that can't be accurately gauged until the law is actually passed and it is in the hands of prosecutors. I'm not willing to give them that chance. I'm certain they will abuse the law. But if you doubt their motivations, I recommend that you try to have that section removed. If that section was put there just as a "throwaway," they won't squawk. But I predict they will be extremely reluctant to remove it, because that's exactly the portion of the bill they really want. They don't want you to know this, of course. Please test them. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT/FyvqHVDBboB2dAQGWbgQAlEpgHvprqslBSJLaGO4A6uk6ixAzVp9L 0FNEFlBqqnTVzLN4phPcjUb1DTPkjQqqoMDFJYD9nBGucyLWfGdvU5xxxLYD9ZAy Qfh57JQoFeR6og9M4khYwAhic+qCXphWKegH7fIGolMi4vW8SXv+OcSbPMQqTAAk rdGarImmTmc= =/9/5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FCC v. Internet Phone?
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TWP March 8: "Long-Distance Dueling. Free Dialing Via Internet Faces a Challenge From Small Phone Firms." VIA_net

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Re: Leahy's guillotine
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > Let's look at the word "willfully". Among other things, it implies > knowledge; under US law, to be guilty you have to know you did something > that you at least reasonably believe is an activity that you're not supposed > to do. Agreed, but it's precisely the sort of thing that is misinterpreted by prosecutors and has to be resolved by a judge after a potentially long stay in prison whilst awaiting trial. (All depending on circumstances of course). Too close for comfort I'm afraid. Jim Bell wrote: > 2804. Unlawful use of encryption to obstruct justice > Whoever willfully endeavors (by means of encryption) to (obstruct, > impede, or prevent) the communication of (information in furtherance > to a felony) (which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States), > to an investigative or law enforcement officer shall... I think the following is a tad better: Whoever willfully endeavors (by means of encryption) to (obstruct, impede, or prevent) the communication of information (in furtherance to a felony (which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States)), to an investigative (or law enforcement) officer shall... Gary -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)kampai.euronet.nl> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06

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FWD: FCC's Implementing the CDA Schedule
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI - **************************************************** FCC Schedule for Rulemaking Implementing The Communications Decency Act The FCC has announced a schedule for promulgating regulations implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Communications Decency Act is number 28 on that schedule. The following is from the FCC announcement: Issues/FCC Bureas 28. Obscene or Harassing Use of Telecom. Facilities CCB [Common Carrier Bureau] [OGC] [Office of General Counsel] Statutory Requirements/Deadlines Pursuant to section 223, FCC may describe measures which are reasonable, effective, and appropriate to restrict access to prohibited communications. (83) FCC shall have no enforcement authority over the failure to utilize such measures. FCC shall not endorse specific products relating to such measures.(83) FCC Proceedings Section 223 Measures Timetable NOI [Notice of Inquiry] Third Quarter 1996 Policy Statement First Quarter 1997 For Further Information Contact: Robert Cannon, Esq. 2358 N. Vernon Street Arlington, VA 22207 202-862-4395 (o) 703-527-6631 (home office) ********************************************************** Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Go to bed." **********************************************************

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Re: rhetorical trickery
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Or it's the list of local dairies, and the guy can't spel.... Diary, dairies... It gives me diarrhoea! Jay Effay

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Re: FWD: FCC's Implementing the CDA Schedule
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops. The URL is: http://www.cais.net/cannon/noi.html/ ********************************************************** Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. | "The key to life: Poughkeepsie, New York | - Get up; E-mail: | - Survive; lharrison(a)mhv.net | - Go to bed." **********************************************************

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Re: Cryptanalysis
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >The usual: Kahn, Denning, and some of the old Dover Press books on crypto. >Also, Herbert Zim wrote a nice little book about 40-50 years ago on codes. >Some of the standard crypto textbooks will of course have more pointers to >cryptanalysis. (Not to sound harsh to Allen, but why would anyone ask here >on the list for recommendations to such a standard subject when Schneier, >Garfinkel, Denning, etc. all have books listed?) Thanks, I'll check. I don't happen to _have_ a copy of Applied Cryptography, etcetera, immediately available, and I had gotten the impression that those concentrated on cyphers as opposed to codes. >And there are so many interesting areas to pursue with using and furthering >modern crypto, that I just can't understand how people can think that >classical cryptanalysis is useful. It might be fun, as a hobby, but it has >no bearing on modern systems. (Well, I'm exaggerating a bit. I suspect that >classical cryptanalysts at the NSA or GCHQ might have some insights into >some problems with modern systems, such as traffic analysis. So I shouldn't >say there is "no use" for it. But I hope you all understand my point in >general. It is unlikely in the extreme that anyone who fools around a >little with classical cryptanalysis will have anything important to >contribute as a result of this.) I never said I was interested in putting stuff about codes into practical usage. Actually, I'm a roleplaying gamer, and I wanted the info for historical settings. True codes appear to be the historical equivalent of OTPs. -Allen

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